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The participation of government and constitutional functionaries, such as the Prime Minister, Judges, Chief Ministers, Governors, and Ministers in bhumi pujan, havan, coconut-breaking ceremonies, Vedic chanting, and other Hindu religious rituals before the stone-laying foundation or inauguration ceremonies of public infrastructure has become so common in India that it rarely attracts serious constitutional scrutiny. Be it laying of foundation stones for highways, bridges, hospitals, educational institutions, legislative buildings, government offices, or even court complexes, the ceremonies are often graced by government and constitutional functionaries and frequently incorporate distinctly Hindu religious practices.

Because the majority of India's population subscribes to Hinduism, the organizers and participants of such ceremonies rarely or never object to performing Hindu religious rituals at public events, defending them as expressions of Indian culture, civilizational continuity, or social tradition rather than as acts of religious preference. But, when viewed from the lens of constitutional law, secularism, equality, freedom of conscience, and democratic legitimacy, a pertinent question arises whether the State, acting through public officials and public institutions, can formally associate itself with rituals rooted in one particular religious tradition while claiming to remain secular and neutral toward all faiths and non-faith positions.

When the State has no religion, then why does it identify itself with a particular religious faith during public ceremonies?

The preamble of the Constitution of India, says India is a 'Secular' country, having no association with any particular religion. Unlike the American model of strict separation between church and state or the French doctrine of laïcité, Indian secularism accepted the principle of neutrality and equal respect toward all religions rather than complete exclusion of religion from public life. Despite the differentiation, a fundamental principle that remains cogent is that the State itself has no religion. Therefore, the question arises when state and public institutions, through official ceremonies, appear to recognize and identify themselves with the symbols, rituals, and theological assumptions of a particular faith.

(PM Modi visible performing bhumi pujan during stone laying ceremony of New Parliament Building in 2020. Image Source: NDTV)

In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, the constitution bench of nine judges held 'secularism to be a part of the basic structure doctrine', restraining the state from drawing identity to any particular faith or religion. The Court stated that a government authority derives from constitutional legitimacy rather than religious identity. Further, the Court in the 2005 M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala judgment went on to hold against the establishment of a theocratic state, where the Court doesn't mean to establish an atheist society, but a society where each religion and its culture is equally respected, prohibiting the State from identifying itself with or favouring any particular religion.

If the State has no religion, a legitimate question arises whether a government building, a court complex, a public hospital, or a highway project should formally commence with rituals invoking Hindu deities or religious blessings. Do such practices not identify the State with a Hindu religious faith? Does it not discriminate against citizens following other religious faiths or no faith (atheists or agnostics)? Does it not amount to the creation of a theocratic state?

Often, an argument is raised by the supporters that performing puja, chanting Vedic mantras, havan, praying to the deities, performing Aartis, reciting religious slogans, etc is a flowing from the Indian culture and traditions, and has nothing to do with performing a non-secular act. According to them, doing such religious activities for the successful completion of the public project is a secular activity, having no association with being disrespectful to any particular faith or religion. Their position is strengthened by the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in Atheist Society of India v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and the Gujarat High Court's decision in Rajesh Himmatlal Solanki v. Union of India.

In Atheist Society of India, the petitioner challenged the practice of conducting poojas, breaking coconuts, chanting mantras and displaying religious symbols during State functions. The High Court refused to prohibit such practices. It held that there was insufficient evidence that the government was officially promoting a religion or that such ceremonies violated constitutional secularism.

Similarly, in Rajesh Himmatlal Solanki, a challenge arose against the foundation ceremony of a new High Court building involving a traditional Hindu Bhoomi Pujan attended by constitutional dignitaries. The High Court rejected the challenge and held that prayers offered for successful completion of a public building were not non-secular. The Court reasoned that such ceremonies embodied universal welfare and did not amount to propagation of Hinduism; rather, it called it a practice of an individual's faith regardless of its constitutional character.

The High Courts had given a different interpretation to the word 'secularism', saying that performing a Hindu religious activity at a public event cannot be branded as non-secular. It invoked concepts such as 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' and 'Sarve Jana Sukhino Bhavantu' to characterize the ritual as inclusive rather than sectarian. The problem is not whether the prayer seeks universal welfare or portrays a culture. A question should be what is actually being performed and who is performing it in what capacity. A practice can simultaneously be cultural and religious. The Constitution protects culture, including India's composite cultural heritage. But that does not necessarily authorise the State to select the religious practices of one community as the ceremonial language of the State.

If a court building is inaugurated through Vedic rituals, citizens belonging to other faiths or no faith may reasonably perceive the State as identifying with Hindu symbolism. Moreover, the cultural defence becomes less convincing when one examines the actual content of many official ceremonies. A havan, Vedic chants, invocation of Hindu gods, participation of priests, and rituals based on Hindu scriptures are not merely cultural artefacts devoid of religious meaning; they are overtly religious acts. The fact that such practices may be widely accepted or historically rooted does not alter their religious character.

(CJI Surya Kant visible with UP CM Yogi and other Supreme Court Judges performing bhumi pujan during stone laying down ceremony for court complexes in UP early this year. Image Source: The Hindu)

A profitable reference may be made to 1986's Bijoe Emmanuel case where the Supreme Court protected Jehovah's Witness students who declined to sing the national anthem due to religious beliefs. The judgment emphasized freedom of conscience under Article 25. The Court underscored that constitutional protection extends not only to believers but also to individuals whose conscience prevents participation in religious practices. It would not be wrong to state that a citizen should not be expected to identify with a particular religious ceremony merely because it reflects majority traditions.

An argument that can be raised here is that when the 2009 Supreme Court order in Union of India v. State of Gujarat directed the States to identify and remove the unauthorised religious structures at public places, why not the public events of stone laying ceremony, whose operational cost is borne from the public purses, be distanced from an unauthorised religious performance of a particular faith? This is especially because High Courts, in the decisions referred to above, have termed such instances of performing Hindu puja as unsupported by the State.

From minorities perspective and a need for scientific temper

This is perhaps the most important aspect that deserves greater attention, as constitutional neutrality cannot be assessed solely from the perspective of the majority. Consider a situation wherein a Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Jewish citizen attends the inauguration of a government hospital, school, court building or public infrastructure project. If the official ceremony begins with the invocation of Hindu deities, Vedic chants and a havan, the citizen may legitimately ask: Is this a ceremony of the State, or a religious ceremony being conducted by the State? The organisers cannot escape from this situation by simply saying it is a culture; rather, it transcribes a perception that a State regards the Hindu religion's practices as the natural or default cultural expression of the nation, while other religious traditions are treated as distinct private identities.

Since public infrastructure belongs equally to every citizen regardless of their faith and religious faith, therefore, when the government and constitutional functionaries participate in public events, a projection of their personal faith and convenience to practice a particular rite at public sites cannot override the constitutional mandate to uphold the principle of secularism.

A public official may personally believe that a puja will bring prosperity to a project. Nothing in the Constitution necessarily prevents the official from holding that belief. But when the same official performs the ritual in an official capacity, at a State-funded ceremony, representing a constitutional or governmental institution, the character of the act changes. That is where scientific temper, secularism and institutional neutrality become relevant.

From an atheist or agnostic perspective

From the atheist (persons who do not believe in the existence of a God) and agnostic (persons who doubt the existence of God) perspective, the performance of a particular religious faith ceremony at a public event raises some prominent questions, such as:

First, whether the public events witnessing a particular religious activity would not amount to an endorsement of supernatural or theological assumptions that many citizens do not share.

Second, they may create a sense that non-believers are outsiders within institutions financed by their own taxes.

Third, an argument may be raised regarding the violation of Article 27 regarding the use of public resources for religious purposes.

Fourth, and perhaps most significant, would be the question about the loss of scientific temperament as to why a constitutional or state institution would need to derive its legitimacy from a divine sanction when its genesis is based on democratic and constitutional principles.

It is needless to point out that, when the courts themselves conduct religious ceremonies before occupying new premises, a person of no faith or a person having a different faith may legitimately ask why institutions dedicated to reason, evidence, and constitutional law require a particular religious validation.

Position in other major developed democratic countries

A comparative analysis between India and other democratic nations regarding the prevalence of religious activities in public events or gatherings presents a useful insight.

In France, the strictest forms of secularism are adopted through the doctrine of laïcité. This doctrine is meant to avoid religious ceremonies altogether, and public projects are inaugurated through secular civic events. Similarly, Canada and Singapore forbid particular religious participation in public events, while maintaining the principle of neutrality in religious matters for the State.

In the United States of America, for instance, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the State from endorsing or identifying itself with a particular religion. Government construction projects use secular public ceremonies, featuring civic speeches, ribbon-cuttings, and ceremonial shovels to turn the dirt. The clause prevents the government from endorsing or performing religious rites at official functions.

In the United Kingdom, where the Church of England enjoys established status, major public infrastructure projects are often laid down or inaugurated through civic rather than religious ceremonies.

Ultimately, it is not about the hostility towards a particular faith or religion, or disregard for a cultural tradition. Religion is always said to be a private affair of an individual. It cannot be mixed up with public life just because the majority of individuals subscribe to a particular religion. The idea of secularism as evolved in SR Bommai is not to erase the concept of religion in public life, but rather to require the State to maintain a position of principled neutrality among citizens who hold vastly different beliefs about faith, spirituality, and the nature of existence itself.

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