Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11 & Non-Signatory Parties — "Veritable Party" Doctrine — Non-signatory to the primary agreement can be bound by the arbitration agreement contained therein if their conduct, participation, and performance of obligations under interlinked agreements demonstrate a mutual intent to be bound — Principles laid down in Cox and...
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11 & Non-Signatory Parties — "Veritable Party" Doctrine — Non-signatory to the primary agreement can be bound by the arbitration agreement contained therein if their conduct, participation, and performance of obligations under interlinked agreements demonstrate a mutual intent to be bound — Principles laid down in Cox and Kings applied - Veritable Parties & Non-Signatories - The Supreme Court held that a non-signatory to a primary settlement agreement (Memorandum of Settlement) can qualify as a "veritable party" to the arbitration clause contained therein if the performance of their individual agreement (Share Purchase Agreement) is fundamental and interwoven with the completion of the main agreement - Equal Treatment of Identically Situated Parties - Where multiple non-signatories execute individual Share Purchase Agreements containing similar or identical exclusion/decoupling clauses, the Court cannot differentiate between them to exclude one from arbitration while referring others - The Court observed that drawing a distinction between identically situated persons without a factual basis is unsustainable - Composite Transactions - Participation of a non-signatory in the performance of the underlying contract is the most critical factor indicating an intention to be bound by the arbitration clause - The composite nature of the transaction and commonality of the subject matter suggest that claims against such non-signatory are inextricably interlinked with the issues under arbitration. [Relied on Cox and Kings Limited v. SAP India Private Limited and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 1; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Discovery Enterprises Private Limited and Another, (2022) 8 SCC 42; Paras 13-22] KKH Finvest Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashiesh Shukla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 769 : 2026 INSC 803
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9, Section 9(1)(ii)(e), Section 34 and Section 36 – Maintainability of Section 9 Petition at Post-Award Stage by an Unsuccessful Party / Award Debtor – Threshold and Guiding Principles for Grant of Interim Relief – Securing Amount in Dispute / Deposit of Monies – Rare and Compelling Cases - A petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at the post-award stage by an unsuccessful party (award debtor) is maintainable in law - the threshold for granting interim relief to an unsuccessful party is significantly higher - The Supreme Court may grant interim measures in rare and compelling cases to balance equities, prevent irreparable prejudice, and preserve the efficacy of the challenge proceedings under Section 34 - The exercise of power under the "just and convenient" residuary clause under Section 9(1)(ii)(e) must be guided by settled principles namely, existence of a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and reasonable expedition and must promote the efficacy of arbitration without being rigidly bound by the strict procedural technicalities of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 or Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - In the present case, bank guarantees furnished against mobilisation advance were encashed by the appellant prior to the pronouncement of the arbitral award - The Arbitrator dismissed the respondent's claims in toto without the appellant having filed any counter-claim or the Arbitrator recording any finding regarding non-utilisation of the mobilisation advance - Sustaining the High Court's direction directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 3.5 crores in the Registry to be placed in an interest-bearing Fixed Deposit pending adjudication of the Section 34 petition, the Supreme Court held that permitting the appellant to retain the encashed funds in the absence of an executable award or counter-claim in its favour would result in unjust enrichment and defeat earlier interim undertakings - The case presented rare and compelling circumstances warranting interim deposit to prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the subject matter of the dispute. [Relied on Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 670; Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, (2022) 20 SCC 178; Paras 18–27]. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. v. Ishvakoo (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 791 : 2026 INSC 828
Central Excise Act, 1944 — Section 2(f) — Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 — First Schedule, Section XVI, Note 6 — Manufacture — Kitting and Assembly of Imported Modules – Held - Grouping and kitting imported photostatic parts, modules, and accessories in sets according to customer specifications, followed by minimal pinning, plugging, or packing in a warehouse for dispatch, does not constitute "manufacture" under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - The Revenue failed to prove physical assembly or transformation resulting in a new, commercially distinct article. Additionally, Note 6 to Section XVI of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 is not attracted when goods are imported, classified, and assessed as complete machines in complete/semi knocked-down (CKD/SKD) condition and cleared from the warehouse in their original packaging without undergoing any process of conversion from an incomplete to a complete machine - Key Rulings & Observations – i. Definition and Tests of "Manufacture" - Manufacture under Section 2(f) requires a transformation where a new and distinct article emerges with a separate commercial identity, name, character, or end-use - Mere processing, kitting, or simple assembly that leaves the commodity commercially the same article does not amount to manufacture, regardless of the labor, skill, or value added – ii. Applicability of Note 6 to Section XVI - Note 6 operates specifically on incomplete or unfinished articles - Where the Revenue assesses and levies customs duty/CVD on imported items as complete machines under Tariff Heading 8471, it cannot simultaneously treat the same items as incomplete/unfinished articles to invoke Note 6 for levying excise duty – iii. Burden of Proof on Revenue - The Revenue cannot rely on generic inferences or unsubstantiated assumptions without proper physical inspection or best evidence showing actual manufacturing operations taking place inside the warehouse. [Relied on Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., (1962) SCC OnLine SC 148; Servo-Med Industries Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai, (2015) 14 SCC 47; Distinguished from M/s Narne Tulaman Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, (1989) 1 SCC 172; Quippo Energy Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Ahmedabad-II, (2025) 152 GST R 264 (SC); Paras 13-19]. Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad-IV v. Xerox India Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 767 : 2026 INSC 805
Central Implementation Committee & Force of Law - The Central Implementation Committee constituted by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) pursuant to Rule 18 read with Rule 38(3) of the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026, is the duty bearer for monitoring and implementing the SWM Rules. Its functioning, orders, and decisions carry the full force of law - Determining environmental compensation under Rule 17 must follow a structured, objective regime based on clarity, certainty, and deterrence rather than unguided discretion - Synthesizing historical and recent legal precedents, the Supreme Court formulated eight essential governing principles – Held that - i. Restitutionary Nature: Environmental compensation is restitutionary in nature to restore ecological damage and is levied in addition to (not as a replacement for) statutory penalties or fines – ii. Temporal Extent: The duty of a polluter to pay compensation continues until the environmental damage caused is fully reversed; iii. Duty of Authorities: State authorities are obligated to undertake valuation of environmental damage and recover compensation required for complete restoration; iv. Tangible & Intangible Harm: Valuation must encompass both direct/tangible costs and indirect/intangible ecological damages; v. Potential Harm Liability: Compensation liability attaches even where actual damage is imminent or where activities pose a potential threat of environmental harm; vi. Financial Capacity & Remediation Cost: Factors such as the financial capacity/prosperity of the enterprise, costs incurred in assessing damage, loss suffered by individuals, and overall restoration costs must guide valuation; vii. Proportionality & Rational Nexus: Compensation levied must strictly be proportional to the damage caused and bear a rational nexus to the specific pollution - All Courts, Tribunals, and Adjudicating Authorities must record explicit reasons detailing the factors considered, standard of valuation used, and formula applied to quantify compensation. [Paras 15-24] Amravati Municipal Corporation v. Ganesh Dadarao Anasane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2026 INSC 796
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956; Section 8(2) – Inter-State Sales Reassessment - Retrospective amendments under State law do not dispense with the statutory rate and conditions mandated under the Central Sales Tax Act - Reassessment of tax on inter-State sales must be strictly recomputed in terms of the applicable provisions of the CST Act, including Section 8(2), after providing a hearing to the assessees. [Paras 85–87, 88(ix), 91(d)] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Andhra Pradesh, Act 19 of 1972) – Sections 1(3), 2(a), 3 – Constitution of India – Fifth Schedule, Article 14, Article 244(1) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 9 – Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 – Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Scheduled Areas – Civil disputes exclusively between Non-Tribal parties - The Supreme Court held that the ordinary Civil Courts have the requisite jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain and adjudicate civil disputes (such as partition and succession) concerning properties located in Scheduled Areas, provided that the dispute is exclusively between non-tribal parties and involves no tribal interest or fetters - The salutary purpose and constitutional objective of establishing Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule and continuing Agency Courts under the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 is to safeguard indigenous tribal communities, protect their lands from exploitation, and preserve their age-old customs and autonomy - Subjecting non-tribal persons to special agency procedures for disputes solely amongst themselves bears no rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Merely because a parcel of land falls within a geographically notified 'Scheduled Area', it cannot attract the blanket exclusion of Civil Courts if all parties involved are non-tribals - If even one party to the dispute is a tribal residing in the Scheduled Area, the Agency Courts alone will retain jurisdiction - The restoration of Civil Court jurisdiction for disputes involving exclusively non-tribal parties applies to pending cases and those arising in the future. [Paras 10-15] Mukkera Venkata Ratnam v. Vantasala China Venkateswarlu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2026 INSC 810
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 22 — Challenge to Adverse Findings without Cross-Objections - A respondent who supports the ultimate decree passed by the trial court is entitled to impugn an adverse finding recorded against him by the trial court without filing cross-objections or a separate appeal under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC, provided he does not seek any additional relief beyond sustaining the decree. [Paras 31-35] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XVIII Rule 17 & Section 151 — Scope, Object, and Parameters for Recalling Witness / Reopening Evidence - Nature of Power - Power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is a discretionary, facilitator power-cum-discretion exclusively vested in the Court to enable it to clarify any doubt that may have arisen during the examination of a witness - Cannot be used to Fill Gaps or Lacunae: The power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked by a party or by the Court to fill up gaps, omissions, or lacunae in evidence already led and closed, nor to allow a party to embellish, refine, or improve its case at a later stage - Exclusivity of Examination - Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC enables the Court to put questions to a recalled witness - it does not empower the Court to recall a witness for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination by either party - "No Prejudice" Is Not a Valid Ground - Reopening evidence or recalling a witness cannot be permitted merely on the specious ground that doing so would not cause prejudice to the opposing side - Absence of prejudice is not a valid yardstick - an independent justification must exist before invoking Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC - Frequent resort to Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, especially at the fag end of a suit when final arguments are underway, leads to an abuse of the court process, delays litigation, and cannot be allowed routinely or for the mere asking - Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court and Trial Court erred in law - Noted that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is exclusively a discretionary tool for the Court to clarify doubts and cannot be invoked to permit a party to cure lacunae or fill gaps in evidence at the argument stage - held that the "lack of prejudice to the other side" is not a legal ground to grant such recall, and ordering cross-examination of a recalled witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is completely beyond the scope of the provision. [Relied on Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) through LRs v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410; Paras 5-8] K. Bharathamma v. Bandaru Sakku Bai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 764 : 2026 INSC 795
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order VIII Rules 6A to 6G, Order XX Rules 6A & 19, Order XLI Rule 1, Section 96 & Section 11 – Suit and Counterclaim decided by a single common judgment – Maintainability of a Single/Composite Appeal – Requirement of filing two separate appeals – Held - A suit and a counterclaim, when adjudicated and disposed of by a single common judgment, can be challenged by way of a single composite appeal - The requirement to file two separate appeals or the necessity of whether one or two decrees are drawn up pales into insignificance, particularly in view of the post-2002 amendment to Order XLI Rule 1 CPC, which permits an appeal to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment - Conditions for Composite Appeal - The appellant preferring a composite appeal must - Show and formulate the grounds of challenge raised against the decree in the suit and the decree in the counterclaim separately, irrespective of whether one composite decree or two separate decrees have been drawn up; and Value the composite appeal as two separate appeals and pay the requisite court fees on the valuation of both the suit and the counterclaim - Bar of Res Judicata & Estoppel Inapplicable - A single composite appeal satisfying these conditions cannot be dismissed on the grounds of waiver, estoppel, or res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC merely because two separate appeals were not preferred - Rules of procedure are intended to subserve the cause of justice and avoid procedural rigmarole and multiplicity of litigation. [Relied on Rajni Rani & Anr. v. Khairati Lal, (2015) 2 SCC 682; Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. 'Vali Pero' v. Fernandeo Lopez & Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 671; Abdul Nazer v. Lakshmana Das, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41103; Paras 25-30] Basudev v. Sanjay Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2026 INSC 831
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XLI Rule 27 – Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court – Duty of Appellate Court to consider pending application along with main appeal – Jurisdictional error in failing to adjudicate application - An Appellate Court has a statutory duty to deal with an application for additional evidence on its merits, and such an application cannot be ignored while the Court proceeds to pronounce the final judgment - The application filed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC must be considered simultaneously with the hearing of the main appeal on its merits to determine whether the Court "requires" the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The Appellate Court is obligated to pass a specific order either allowing or rejecting the application, recording reasons if admitted - Before evaluating additional evidence, the Court must first examine the party's pleadings to ensure that the foundational case supports the introduction of the proposed evidence - Dismissing an appeal without deciding a pending application for additional evidence constitutes a jurisdictional error and results in a severe miscarriage of justice. [Relied on Jatinder Singh and another v. Mehar Singh and others, (2009) 17 SCC 465; North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das (Dead) By LRs., (2008) 8 SCC 511; Iqbal Ahmed (Dead) by LRs. and another v. Abdul Shukoor, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1787; G. Shashikala (dead) Thr. LRs v. G. Kalawati Bai (dead) Thr. LRs and others, (2019) 15 SCC 201; Paras 11- 13] Chowdappa v. Hanumantharayappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 785 : 2026 INSC 816
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Invocation of Section 319 CrPC to Cure Fatal Defect Permissibility - Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be invoked to arraign a company as an accused at a later stage of the trial to cure a fundamentally defective complaint - Where a complaint suffers from a defect so basic that no valid cognizance could have been taken on it at the threshold, there is no valid institution of proceedings - The trial court/High Court cannot resort to Section 319 CrPC as a device to bypass the period of limitation prescribed under Section 142 of the NI Act or to revive a dead complaint - The High Court erred in directing the Trial Court to suo motu issue notice to the company under Section 319 CrPC - In case of a fatal defect in the initial complaint, the proper course is the filing of a fresh complaint after removing the defect within the prescribed limitation period - If the limitation period under Section 142(1)(b) has expired, the magistrate may only take cognizance under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) if the complainant satisfies the court regarding sufficient cause for the delay. [Relied on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas, (2018) 13 SCC 663; Paras 12–16] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 397 (now Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) — Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Scope & Contours - In the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not act as a court of appeal and cannot embark upon an in-depth, roving re-examination or re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence to substitute its own conclusions over concurrent findings of conviction passed by the lower courts - Revisional interference is impermissible unless the finding of the lower courts is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable, untenable in law, or passed by ignoring material evidence. [Relied on Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 463; Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; Para 7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Defence Material / Plea of Alibi Based on Unimpeachable Official Records — Distinction from Disputed Questions of Fact - While ordinarily a plea of alibi is a matter of defence to be established by leading evidence at trial and cannot be decided under Section 482 CrPC on the strength of private affidavits, there is no inflexible rule barring the High Court from considering documentary material touching upon the presence or absence of the accused at the threshold where such material consists of official records maintained in the ordinary course of duty by a wing of the Armed Forces of the Union (BSF) whose authenticity is undisputed - Refusing to examine unimpeachable, contemporaneous official records produced from the earliest stage of investigation amounts to elevating procedural formalism over substantial justice and compelling an undeniably absent accused to undergo the ordeal of a full-fledged trial. [Paras 30, 31] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing on the Basis of Defence Material — 4-Step Test - Reiterating the four-step test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, when the defence material is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely rules out the assertions in the charges, is not and cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution, and proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of the court and save judicial time. [Paras 19 - 35] Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 (Punjab Village) / Peppl Act, 1954 – Statutory Vesting – Requirement of Notice to Proprietors - Upon the enactment of the 1953 and 1954 Acts, all rights, title, and interest of proprietors (malkan deh) in lands classified as shamilat deh were statutorily extinguished and vested automatically in the Gram Panchayat - a mutation entry executed in favour of the Gram Panchayat pursuant to statutory vesting cannot be invalidated on the ground of lack of notice or hearing to individual proprietors, as the statutory fiat was absolute and permitted no exemption. [Para 96] Suraj Bhan v. Ashvarya Estate, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2026 INSC 786
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (Haryana) - Section 2(g)(1) read with Section 2(g)(iii), Section 2(g)(viii), and Section 4 – Vesting of Shamilat Deh in Gram Panchayat vs. Exclusion Claims – Requirement of Partition and Individual Cultivating Possession Prior to 26.01.1950 – Significance of Revenue Entries 'Hasab Rasad Biswat' and 'Makbuja Malkan' - Land described as shamilat deh in the revenue records automatically vests in the Gram Panchayat under Section 2(g)(1) read with Section 4 of the Haryana Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 - Merely because the revenue entry reads "shamilat deh hasab rasad biswat" followed by the names of distinct pattis, the character of the land as shamilat deh does not change to shamilat patti, nor does it prove private title or exclude it from vesting - The expression "hasab rasad biswat" merely reflects the shareholding of the proprietary body (malkan deh) for the purpose of potential partition - the revenue entry "makbuja malkan" in the cultivator's column denotes joint possession of the proprietary body in common, not individual or separate cultivating possession - To claim exclusion under Section 2(g)(iii) or Section 2(g)(viii) of the 1961 Act, a claimant must produce proof that the shamilat deh land was partitioned among co-sharers and brought under individual cultivating possession prior to January 26, 1950 - In the absence of evidence showing a formal partition before the cutoff date, the land continues to be shamilat deh and vests in the Panchayat (or its successor Municipal Corporation) regardless of whether it was used for common purposes under Section 2(g)(3) or 2(g)(v). [Relied on Patram v. Gram Panchayat Katwar and others, (2020) 15 SCC 56; Paras 54-64, 106-111] Suraj Bhan v. Ashvarya Estate, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2026 INSC 786
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (Haryana) - Section 2(g)(1) vs. Section 2(g)(3) & Section 2(g)(v) – User for Common Purposes – When Inquiry is Necessary - The statutory requirement to establish that land has been used for common purposes of the village or for the benefit of the village community applies specifically when the land in the revenue records is described as shamilat taraf, shamilat patti, shamilat panna, or shamilat thola under Section 2(g)(3) or Section 2(g)(v) - Where the land is directly recorded as shamilat deh in the revenue records and Sharat-wajib-ul-arz, it falls squarely under Section 2(g)(1), and it is not necessary to separately prove that the land was used for common purposes or for the benefit of the village community for it to vest in the Gram Panchayat. [Paras 52- 64, 107- 111] Suraj Bhan v. Ashvarya Estate, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2026 INSC 786
Constitution of India — Article 141 — Retrospective operation of Supreme Court judgments — Declaration of Law — Subvention Scheme — Stoppage of subvention post-unconstitutionality of the Unni Krishnan scheme – Held - Unless a decision of the Supreme Court explicitly declares its application to be prospective, the law declared by the Court carries a retrospective effect - The subvention scheme formulated via interim orders during the pendency of the TMA Pai Foundation case ceased to exist on October 31, 2002, when the 11-Judge Bench declared the Unni Krishnan scheme unconstitutional - The subvention scheme obligated the Central Government to pay the subvention amount on an annual basis rather than as a lump sum for the entire course; hence, there existed no vested right for educational institutions to claim subvention amounts for the entire 5-year duration of a course for students admitted during or prior to the 2002–03 academic year once the scheme itself was declared unconstitutional. [Paras 10 - 12] Government of India v. Sri Devraj URS Medical College, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2026 INSC 799
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition vs Alternative Remedy - The existence of an alternative remedy (such as raising a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly where the challenge is directly to the legality and validity of the order of termination itself. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others, 2024 INSC 131; Umesh Chandra Yadav v. Inspector General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Northern Railway, New Delhi and Others, (2022) 14 SCC 244; Paras 18-25]. Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829
Constitution of India — Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction — Pleadings and Proof — Distinction between Civil Procedure Code and Writ Petitions — Abstract questions of law requiring factual substantiation - Held: When an issue such as shortfalls in revenue vs. expenditure or claims of financial hardship ostensibly presents a point of law that must be substantiated by facts, the party asserting it in a writ petition must plead and prove such facts through evidence annexed directly to the writ petition or counter-affidavit - Unlike pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure where only material facts are required to be pleaded, a writ petition or counter-affidavit must contain both facts and the evidence in proof thereof - In the absence of specific pleadings or proof showing that revenue generated fell short of expenses incurred, the Court will not entertain such claims. [Relied on P.V. George v. State of Kerala, (2007) 3 SCC 557; Bharat Singh and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, (1988) 4 SCC 534; Paras 6-13] Government of India v. Sri Devraj URS Medical College, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2026 INSC 799
Constitution of India – Knowledge as a Pre-requisite for Suppressio Veri / Suggestio Falsi: Knowledge of a fact is a necessary pre-requisite for its non-disclosure - The concept of suppression presupposes awareness of that which is suppressed; a person cannot be said to have withheld or concealed something of which they had no knowledge in the first place - Where the very existence of a criminal antecedent is not shown to have been within the candidate's knowledge at the relevant time (substantiated by cogent material such as character certificates, lack of summons/arrest, and subsequent deletion of name after investigation), the candidate cannot be held guilty of suppression or supplying false information - the onus lies upon the candidate to substantiate the claim of bona fide ignorance with reliable material, and a bare plea of ignorance will not suffice - Termination is not an automatic consequence of the mere existence/disclosure of criminal antecedents. An employer must not act mechanically and must evaluate the candidate's suitability rather than passing an order of termination without applying its mind to the nature of the post, the gravity of the offence, and the final outcome of the case. [Paras 20–34] Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 136 — Scope of Interference with High Court Order of Acquittal - Scope of Appellate Restraint - The Supreme Court will not interfere under Article 136 with a High Court judgment of acquittal unless it is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, or productive of a gross miscarriage of justice. If the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the accused is a reasonable and possible view based on material on record, it cannot be substituted merely because another view of the evidence might be possible - While defects in investigation alone do not warrant acquittal if substantive evidence is credible, where substantive ocular testimony is itself infirm and compromised by unsealed/tampered case property and unexplained FIR discrepancies, the benefit of such investigative lapses enures to the accused. [Relied on Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 712; Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another, 2026 INSC 735; Eknath Ganpat Aher and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2010) 6 SCC 519; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; Paras 23 – 46] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Contract Act, 1872 – Section 56 – Doctrine of Frustration vs. Effluxion of Time – Self-Induced Frustration – Distinction - Frustration occurs when an unforeseen supervening extraneous event makes performance impossible or unlawful, whereas effluxion of time is the natural closure/expiry of a contract - Self-Induced Frustration Inapplicable - The doctrine of frustration under Section 56 does not apply where the stalling or suspension of the contract is the result of the default, act, or election of one of the contracting parties (self-induced frustration) - Where a contract is suspended due to non-payment and neither party invokes the termination clause, the contract continues to subsist. [Relied on Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 135; Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 353; Next Education India (P) Ltd. v. K12 Techno Services, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1117; B. Prashanth Hegde v. SBI, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 197; Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries (P) Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 1; Paras 40–46, 89–91, 98-100]. Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Criminal Jurisprudence — Defective Investigation, Unexplained Injuries on Accused & Non-Examination of Independent Witnesses - Unexplained Injuries on the Accused - Non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused creates serious doubt as to whether the prosecution has presented the true genesis and origin of the incident, particularly when all prosecution witnesses are related/interested - Failure to examine independent witnesses from a residential locality where dozens of neighbours gathered, relying exclusively on related witnesses, warrants an adverse inference against the prosecution. [Paras 36 - 41] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Criminal Law — Evidence — Injured Witness vs. Stereotyped/Identical Testimony — Group Assault & Constructive Liability under Section 149 IPC - Reliability of Injured Witness versus Detailed Attribution in Unlawful Assembly - The presence of an injured witness at the crime scene carries an inherent guarantee of presence and reliability regarding the assault upon himself; however, it does not automatically render their testimony a reliable inventory of the specific, minute roles and weapons attributed to each of the multiple members of a large assembly - Parrot-like / Tutored Narration - Where multiple witnesses (both injured and eye-witnesses) present a verbatim, identical, and stereotyped account—assigning distinct overt acts, weapons, and body parts assaulted across 23 accused persons without individual variation—it raises serious doubts of tutoring rather than truthful recollection - In cases involving group rivalries and constructive liability under Section 149 IPC, safe identification is foundational, and convictions cannot safely rest solely on interested and stereotyped testimony. [Paras 27- 35] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 5(21) – Operational Debt vs. Damages - Scope of Operational Debt in Works Contracts - Amounts payable as consideration for completed stages/milestones in a works/EPC contract fall within the definition of "operational debt" under Section 5(21) of the IBC - Unadjudicated Damages Cannot Constitute Operational Debt - Claims for suspension charges, idling costs, or demobilization expenses arising from an alleged breach of contract are in the nature of damages (liquidated or unliquidated) - They cannot be treated as an operational debt unless and until they are formally assessed, adjudicated, and crystallized by a court or arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction. [Paras 48–54, 90-93] Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 3(12), 9, & 238A r/w Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137 & Section 18 – Starting Point of Limitation – Continuing Cause of Action – Unilateral Legal Notices - Non-payment of Debt as a Singular Default - A default arising out of non-payment of a due and payable amount provides a cause of action on the date when the default occurs and does not constitute a "continuing cause of action" - While an unpaid debt may cause continuing damage, it does not cause continuing legal injury - The mere subsistence of an EPC contract does not extend the statutory limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act - Each Invoice Generates Its Own Default - Where a claim is founded on multiple invoices or milestone payments, each invoice/milestone generates its own date of default - Limitation cannot be treated in the aggregate from the date of the first or last invoice, and only defaults occurring within the three years preceding the filing of the Section 9 application can be entertained - Unilateral Notices Do Not Reset Limitation - Mere service of statutory/legal demand notices by the creditor without any written acknowledgment of liability by the debtor under Section 18 of the Limitation Act cannot extend or reset the limitation period - The IBC is not intended to revive or give a new lease of life to time-barred claims. [Paras 69–73, 75, 76, 81–85, 97–100] Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 8 & 9 – Pre-Existing Dispute – Corporate Debtor's Silence - Standard for Dispute: To bar an application under Section 9, a dispute must truly exist, be substantive, and not be spurious, hypothetical, or illusory - It is not strictly necessary for a civil suit or arbitration to be pending prior to the Section 8 notice - Silence as Evidence of No Dispute - While silence cannot as a general rule be treated as an indicator of "no dispute", consistent and total silence on the part of the corporate debtor across multiple notices over several years, without raising any contestation until filing a reply to the Section 9 application, shows that the defence is an afterthought, establishing the absence of a pre-existing dispute. [Paras 56–64, 94–96] Srinivasa Reddy Velagala v. Sravanthi Infratech Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2026 INSC 835
Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Evidence — Direct Conflict & Improbability - Mismatch Between Number of Blows/Assailants and Post-Mortem Findings - When the ocular version attributes continuous blows with iron pipes to the victim's head by four separate assailants over 2 to 3 minutes, but the post-mortem report reveals only a single laceration with a frontal bone fracture, and the medical expert testifies that repeated blows by four persons would have crushed the skull, the ocular account is medically improbable - Exaggeration vs. Inconsistency - Exaggeration explains overstatement of ferocity, but it cannot explain how an assault deposed to have been delivered by four assailants with separate weapons registered as a single point of impact - Such a fundamental mismatch creates reasonable doubt that goes to the root of the prosecution case. [Paras 30-33] Nirmala Bai Devidas Chavhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 779 : 2026 INSC 787
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 146, 147, 149, 196, 207 & Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999 — Section 14 — Non-compliance of Section 146 MVA — Uninsured Vehicles — Technology Integration & Structural Framework Directions - Noting that nearly 56% of vehicles plying on Indian roads remain uninsured, creating severe impediments to motor accident victims receiving timely compensation, the Supreme Court issued wide-ranging directions under public interest: i. ANPR Integration for e-Challans - Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras on highways and roads must be integrated with data from the Insurance Information Bureau (IIB) and VAHAN portal to issue automatic e-challans to uninsured vehicles; ii. Handheld Devices for Traffic Police - State Police forces are to be equipped with handheld digital devices or apps linked to IIB and VAHAN portals for real-time verification of insurance status on the ground; iii. Four-Layer Structure for Private Vehicle Policies - IRDA to implement a standardized four-tier insurance policy structure for private vehicles (1. Mandatory Third-Party Only; 2. Optional Occupant/Pillion Cover; 3. Personal Accident Cover for Owner/Driver/Occupants; 4. Own Damage Cover) accompanied by a mandatory 'Customer Option Form' and 'Customer Information Sheet'; iv. Enhancement of Mandatory Multi-Year Cover Duration - Extending its earlier mandate in S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, the Court enhanced the mandatory third-party insurance period at the time of purchase/registration of new vehicles from 3 years to 4 years for new cars and from 5 years to 6 years for new two-wheelers; v. Pilot Projects — Fuel Denial & Toll Automation - IRDA and MoRTH to evolve a pilot project linking fuel supply at petrol pumps to valid insurance status (denying fuel to uninsured vehicles via ANPR cameras) - MoRTH to also implement toll plaza automation through automatic detection to eliminate congestion. [Paras 23-30] National Insurance v. Thungala Dhana Laxmi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 759 : 2026 INSC 793
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 159 (formerly Section 158(6)) & Section 166 — Motor Accident Claims Procedure — Pending Pre-2022 Cases - To resolve long-pending Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) cases relating to accidents occurring prior to 31.03.2022, the Supreme Court directed the State Police to promptly file Detailed Accident Reports (DAR) along with relevant documents (FIR, MLC, post-mortem report, insurance policy, permit) before the concerned MACT, and assist in prompt service/production of witnesses for speedy disposal - Courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach in motor accident compensation claims - Pursuant to the IRDA Circular dated 16.11.2009, insurance companies under a comprehensive/package policy are liable to compensate for any occupant/passenger travelling in the vehicle - Held, High Court rightly awarded compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased owner/occupant travelling as a passenger under a comprehensive insurance policy. [Relied on S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 447; General Insurance Council v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2007) 12 SCC 354; Shishu Pal @ Shish Ram & Ors v. Surjeet & Ors, 2026 INSC 63; In Re: Phalodi Accident v. National Highways Authority of India and Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 646; Abhijeet Kumar Pandey v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine Pat 279; Paras 31-34] National Insurance v. Thungala Dhana Laxmi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 759 : 2026 INSC 793
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 168 — Child Victim Suffering Permanent Disability — Method of Determination of Just Compensation — Assessment Parameters - Child Victims vs. Adults - Child victims suffering permanent or near-total disability constitute a distinct and special category - Compensation cannot be evaluated through the same lens applied to adults. Loss suffered by a child is lifelong, continuing, and irreversible, depriving them not merely of physical capacity, but of their entire future life and human dignity - Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability - A conceptual distinction exists between medically certified physical impairment and functional disability felt in daily life - Where a 6-month-old infant suffered 90% permanent locomotor disability (post-traumatic myelopathy with paraplegia) rendering her completely dependent on others for life, her functional disability must be treated as 100% because her future earning capacity stands completely extinguished - For a minor child (up to 15 years) suffering catastrophic permanent disability, the multiplier to be applied is 18 - The High Court erred in applying a multiplier of 15 - Minor children who suffer death or permanent disability cannot be placed in the category of non-earning individuals or unskilled labourers - The loss of income must necessarily be calculated based on the matrix of minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the respective State at the relevant time plus 40% towards future prospects - Compensation towards attendant charges for a severely disabled child requiring lifelong 24-hour assistance must be determined using the multiplier method (taking full-time skilled assistance rates and applying a multiplier of 18) rather than awarding a lump-sum nominal amount - Compensation enhanced from ₹45,40,800/- to ₹83,38,360/- along with 9% per annum interest. [Relied on Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413; Master Ayush v. Reliance General Insurance Company Limited, (2022) 7 SCC 738; Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmed Simon, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3692; Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel v. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3446; Shankar Dutt v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1193; Paras 31-76] Gayatree Pattnaik for Shreejita Pattnaik v. Arundhati Sahoo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 756 : 2026 INSC 785
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138 read with Section 141 — Dishonour of Cheque — Non-Impleadment of Company as Accused — Maintainability of Complaint against Director/Authorised Signatory — Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Arraignment of Company is Mandatory - For maintaining a prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arraigning the company as an accused is an express condition precedent - Where a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by a company, commission of the offence by the company is a prerequisite to attract vicarious liability against its directors or authorised signatories - A complaint filed solely against a director/authorised signatory without impleadment of the company suffers from a fatal, fundamental defect and is non est in law. [Paras 11 - 14] Manjula Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 763 : 2026 INSC 789
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138, Section 118(a), Section 139 — Presumption in favour of holder & Rebuttal — Financial capacity of complainant & Ex post facto defense - Once the drawer admits their signature on the cheque, mandatory statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise in favour of the holder - The onus then shifts to the accused to displace the presumption by leading cogent direct or indirect evidence - A bare denial, plausible theories, or ex post facto creation of evidence (such as sending a legal notice demanding return of cheques after the commencement of prosecution evidence) does not rebut the statutory presumption - where the accused fails to reply to the statutory demand notice under Section 138 to specifically plead lack of financial capacity of the complainant, the complainant cannot be expected to adduce evidence establishing his financial capacity at the initial stage - The financial capacity of the complainant is sufficiently demonstrated where evidence shows mobilization of funds through relatives/friends and investments in chit funds. [Paras 5-7] Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 765 : 2026 INSC 790
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 376 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378 — Appeal against acquittal — Scope of interference by the High Court — Medical Evidence and Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report conflicting with ocular testimony — Rape of a 4.5-year-old child alleged - The High Court overturned the trial Court's acquittal without considering the medical report and the FSL report - The informant (PW-2) and the child victim (PW-3) consistently claimed that the victim sustained injuries and that her clothes had bloodstains - the medical examination conducted within 12 hours of the incident revealed no injuries, inflammation, redness, or bruising on the body or private parts of the victim, with the hymen found intact - the State Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report confirmed that even after performing the Benzidine test (a reliable screening test capable of detecting blood up to multiple washings) as well as the Acid Phosphatase test, neither blood nor semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the seized mat/bedding from the alleged place of occurrence - There were also irreconcilable contradictions regarding the place of occurrence (cot vs. kitchen where no cot existed) - Held, the entire prosecution evidence must be considered in totality - Where oral testimonies alleging bleeding/injury are directly belied by prompt medical examination and negative forensic reports, a grave doubt is cast on the prosecution's case - The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by ignoring the medical and FSL reports. Conviction set aside; trial court's acquittal restored. [Paras 9–16]. Ram Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2026 INSC 830
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 498A — Applicability to Live-In Relationships — "Relationship in the Nature of Marriage" — Purposive Interpretation — Fundamental Rights — Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India – i. Applicability of Section 498A IPC to Live-In Relationships - Held, Section 498A IPC applies to "live-in relationships" that qualify as "relationships in the nature of marriage," provided that the intent to marry is established as an intrinsic element - Giving a restrictive or purely literal interpretation to the word "husband" to exclude live-in partners would defeat the social, reformative, and protective legislative objective of the provision – ii. Constitutional Imperative (Article 14) - Creating a distinction between a legally wedded wife and a female partner in a relationship in the nature of marriage for protection against domestic cruelty lacks any rational nexus with the legislative objective of curbing domestic abuse - Differentiating solely on the basis of formal ceremonial marriage violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India – iii. Individual Choice and Autonomy (Article 21) - The right to choose a life partner is an intrinsic facet of individual autonomy and dignity under Article 21, encompassing spatial and associational privacy - The protection of criminal law against household cruelty cannot depend on whether a woman has formally solemnized her union – iv. Distinction between Civil Protection (DV Act) and Criminal Remedy (Section 498A IPC) - Civil protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) is insufficient by itself, as civil/monetary consequences cannot substitute for the deterrent effect of criminal law. [Paras 12-23] Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 753 : 2026 INSC 784
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 498-A, 304-B — Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Sections 3, 4 — Quashing of Proceedings Qua Husband — Effect of Acquittal of Co-Accused Parents on Identical Evidence: Where co-accused parents have already been acquitted after a full-fledged trial on the self-same allegations and evidence, and the solitary additional allegation against the husband regarding telephonic dowry demands is unsubstantiated by any Call Detail Records (CDR) and stands neutralised by unimpeached official proof of his deployment on BSF duty outside the State, continuing criminal proceedings against the husband alone constitutes an abuse of the judicial process whose substratum has collapsed. Continuation of proceedings falls within categories (1), (3), and (6) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and warrants quashing. [Relied on Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330; Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2023) 15 SCC 488; Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293; Paras 32–37]. Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 786 : 2026 INSC 825
Precedent – Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter / Judicial Deference – Inversion Test - The earlier decision in Nagarjuna Gramin Bank v. Medi Narayana did not lay down a binding proposition of law - An order passed out of judicial deference to an executive/legislative policy decision (such as the report of a High-Powered Committee of the State) without undertaking an independent legal interpretation of statutory provisions and their constitutional intent does not create a binding legal precedent - Applying the Wambaugh Inversion Test, the ratio decidendi consists strictly of the statements of the principles of law necessary for deciding the legal problem disclosed by the facts, rather than mere factual conclusions or judicial deference to executive domain. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51; Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society, (2023) 16 SCC 458; State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, (2025) 1 SCC 1; T.N. Medical Officers Assn. v. Union of India, (2021) 6 SCC 568; Paras 9 - 15] Mukkera Venkata Ratnam v. Vantasala China Venkateswarlu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2026 INSC 810
Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Limits on Enforcement of Retrospective Levy – Penalty and Interest - Retrospectivity cannot be enforced in a penal or oppressive manner against dealers who acted strictly under the earlier exemption regime, whose original assessments were completed as exempt by the department, and who did not collect indirect tax from purchasers - While the State is entitled to determine and recover the principal tax liability upon lawful reassessment, no penalty can be imposed for past periods since penalty presupposes contumacious conduct, culpable failure, or deliberate breach of an existing obligation - interest cannot be levied retrospectively from the date of the original transactions or assessment periods, as doing so would operate punitively; interest shall run only from the date of a fresh lawful demand raised pursuant to reassessment. [Paras 72–84, 88- 91] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Validity of Retrospective Amendment (Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001): The insertion of the words “produced or manufactured in India” with retrospective effect via a deeming clause is substantively a withdrawal/restriction of an exemption and not merely clarificatory - The State Legislature possesses plenary competence under Entry 54 of List II to enact retrospective fiscal legislation, grant exemptions, and subsequently withdraw or restrict them in public interest - Retrospective withdrawal of a fiscal exemption is not unconstitutional per se. [Relied on Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667; Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1581; M/s. Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 216; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283; P. Kannadasan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 5 SCC 670; Kasinka Trading v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 274; Shrijee Sales Corporation v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 398; Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 314; R.C. Tobacco (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 725; CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1; Paras 64–71, 80-88] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka); Section 8, Fifth Schedule (Entry 31-B / Entry 51) – Exemption on Sugar – Scope of pre-2001 entry – Retrospective withdrawal of exemption via Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001 – Reassessment, Penalty and Interest - Scope of Pre-2001 Exemption Entry: Prior to Karnataka Act No. 5 of 2001, imported sugar fell within the exemption entry relating to “sugar” under the Fifth Schedule to the KST Act - The reference in the entry to the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 was incorporated solely for identifying and describing the commodity and did not introduce an origin-based or territorial limitation excluding imported goods - Strict construction requires interpreting the entry according to its text without reading in words of limitation such as “produced or manufactured in India” before they were expressly enacted. [Relied on State of Kerala v. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., (1999) 9 SCC 102; Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1985 Supp SCC 205; Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 667; Paras 16–18, 40-44, 53, 56–88] Asia Sugar & Chemical Co., Devangere v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 778 : 2026 INSC 693
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 – Regulation 4(1) Note – Rebuttable Presumption – Motive & Application of Proceeds Irrelevant - When a person trades in securities while in possession of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI), the trades are presumed to be motivated by the knowledge and awareness of such UPSI - The reasons for trading or the specific purposes to which the proceeds are applied (such as funding or bailing out the company) are completely irrelevant under the 2015 PIT Regulations to determine whether insider trading has occurred - Once possession of UPSI and the execution of trades are established, the insider can only avoid liability by proving innocence within the statutory exceptions/defences provided under the proviso to Regulation 4(1) or circumstances of a similar nature. [Paras 9-19] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 – Regulation 4(1) Proviso – Scope of Defences – Rule of Construction - The defences listed in the proviso to Regulation 4(1) are preceded by the word “including”, indicating that the six enumerated defences are illustrative and not exhaustive - any non-enumerated defence sought to be pleaded must be of the same and similar nature as those explicitly provided under the regulation. [Para 13] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 vs. Regulations, 2015 – Distinction Explained - The ruling in SEBI v. Abhijit Rajan (2024) was rendered in the context of the erstwhile 1992 PIT Regulations, where no Note barred consideration of the underlying intent or the application of sale proceeds - Post the notification of the 2015 PIT Regulations, the statutory Note to Regulation 4(1) precludes courts and tribunals from entertaining defences based on motive or "legitimate corporate purpose" (such as rerouting funds to avoid corporate bankruptcy/NPA downgrading) to escape insider trading liability. [Relied on Vikram Singh v. Union of India, (2015) 9 SCC 502; Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 458; P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Paras 14-19]. Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – Section 11B & Section 15G – Insider Trading – Disgorgement & Avoidance of Loss - Disgorgement under Section 11B includes the power to direct any person who averted loss by engaging in transactions in contravention of the Act/Regulations to disgorge an amount equivalent to the wrongful gain made or loss averted - The fact that there was little or no profit made is of no consequence when significant losses were avoided by trading prior to the UPSI becoming public. [Paras 11-16] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Rajeev Vasant Sheth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2026 INSC 826
Service Law – National Institute of Technology First Statutes, 2009 – Statute 30 – Effectiveness of Resignation – Communication & Notice Period - Effective Date of Resignation: Under the proviso to Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, a resignation takes legal effect immediately on the date of its acceptance by the appointing authority - Its legal efficacy is neither conditional upon formal communication nor held in abeyance during the serving of the notice period - While Paragraph 3 of Office Memorandum dated 11.02.1988 permits withdrawal of an accepted resignation prior to actual relieving, the competent authority retains the discretion to reject such withdrawal request by recording rational and communicated reasons. [Relied on High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 239; National Institute of Technology & Anr. v. Pannalal Choudhury & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 669; Municipal Commissioner, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. R.M. Doshi, (2024) 20 SCC 742; Air India Express Ltd. & Ors. v. Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu, (2019) 17 SCC 129; Paras 27-30] Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2026 INSC 797
Service Law – Recruitment / Verification of Antecedents – Suppression of Criminal Cases – Two-Pronged Enquiry Test – Knowledge as Pre-requisite for Suppression - Service Jurisprudence – Suppression of Criminal Antecedents / Non-Disclosure: The enquiry to be undertaken by the employer prior to terminating the services of an employee on the ground of suppression of information regarding criminal antecedents is essentially two-pronged – i. Factual Enquiry: Whether there has, in truth, been any deliberate suppression or furnishing of false information by the candidate, having regard to the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the circumstances in which the declaration came to be made – ii. Application of Mind / Gravity Assessment: The employer/authorities must apply their mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, including the type/nature of suppression, the nature of allegations, role and gravity of the offence, the nature of the post and duties attached to it, and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings (if concluded), to arrive at a considered conclusion as to whether continuation in service is feasible or if termination is the only available option. [Paras 24-30] Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829
Service Law – Resignation – Withdrawal of Resignation – Unauthorised Acceptance and Subsequent Ratification – Relation-back Doctrine – Principle against Approbation and Reprobation - Effect of Ratification by Competent Authority - An acceptance of resignation originally made by an officer lacking competence or holding merely additional charge stands validated upon subsequent ratification by the competent authority - Under the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur, a valid ratification operates retrospectively, relating back to the date of the original unauthorized acceptance and curing the defect of lack of prior authority - Once an unauthorized acceptance is ratified by the competent authority, the acceptance relates back to the original date of relieving - there remains no resignation in existence in the eyes of the law that an employee can subsequently withdraw - An employee who requests a waiver of notice period, accepts full settlement (no-dues certificate, last pay certificate, experience certificate), and utilizes the same to secure employment elsewhere is precluded from challenging the resignation's acceptance on technical grounds or alleging lack of authority under the principle against approbation and reprobation. [Para 17 - 25] Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2026 INSC 797
Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 — Rule 16, Rule 17, Rule 18, Rule 38(3) — Environmental Governance — Institutionalisation of Regulatory Bodies — Determination and Imposition of Environmental Compensation — Essential Principles - Institutionalisation of Environmental Regulatory Bodies - Constitutional Courts and the National Green Tribunal have a legal duty to ensure that statutory mandates and rules are translated into effective enforcement systems - The Supreme Court emphasized that establishing regulatory bodies requires ensuring their formal notification, appointment of members, provision of infrastructure and human resources, and clear definition of powers accompanied by accountability - Constitutional Courts must provide necessary hand-holding to enable regulatory bodies to function with discipline, efficiency, integrity, and fairness, thereby moving away from micromanaging environmental governance while earning public trust. Amravati Municipal Corporation v. Ganesh Dadarao Anasane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 760 : 2026 INSC 796
Specific Performance — Termination of Agreement — Maintainability of Suit without Declaratory Relief - Where an agreement to sell does not confer any explicit contractual right on the vendor to unilaterally terminate the agreement, a unilateral cancellation constitutes a breach by repudiation - The aggrieved vendee can treat the contract as subsisting and maintain a suit for specific performance without seeking a formal declaratory relief that the unilateral termination is bad in law, provided the issue of maintainability/validity of termination is adjudicated by the trial court. [Relied on Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker (D) Through LRs & Ors., 2026 INSC 214; Janardan Das and Others v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine 2937; Major Gen. Darshan Singh (D) By LRs & Anr. v. Brij Bhushan Chaudhary (D) By LRs, 2024 INSC 157; Paras 36, 37] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Specific Performance — Locus Standi & Non-Examination of Vendee - Suppressio Veri & Unclean Hands - Where the power-of-attorney holder (husband of the vendee) lodges a criminal complaint seeking refund/recovery of advance money alleging fraud by the vendor, and the named vendee (wife) neither steps into the witness box to clarify her stance nor disowns the criminal complaint, the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to "blow hot and cold" by simultaneously seeking refund in criminal proceedings and specific performance in civil proceedings - A plaintiff who approaches the court with unclean hands by adopting inconsistent positions (such as alleging an assignment of rights to a third party in one proceeding while denying it in the main suit) and by withholding material documents/MoUs from the plaint is disentitled from claiming the equitable relief of specific performance - A long lapse of time (over two decades) during which the dynamics between the parties have materially altered, coupled with the advanced age of the defendant/vendor, constitutes a significant hardship factor under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, militating against the grant of specific performance. [Paras 28-51] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c) & Section 20 — Specific Performance — Continuous Readiness and Willingness — Inconsistent Conduct & Clean Hands — Discretionary Relief - Continuous Readiness & Willingness - The remedy for specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Under Section 16(c), the plaintiff must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract from the date of the execution of the agreement till the date of the decree - A mere production of funds/demand draft at the appellate stage is insufficient to establish continuous readiness when the plaintiff lacked funds at the time of institution of the suit and had instances of dishonoured cheques during the transaction. [Paras 38 - 41] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 54 — Validity of Sale Deed — Non-payment or failure to pay balance sale consideration — Remedy of Vendor — Actual payment of the entire sale consideration at the time of execution and registration of a sale deed is not a sine qua non for the completion of a sale. Even if part consideration alone has been paid and the balance is promised to be paid or retained to satisfy debts/dues of the transferor, title passes to the transferee upon execution and registration of the sale deed. The transaction of sale does not become void, invalid, or inoperative merely due to non-payment or failure to pay the remaining/balance sale price. In such circumstances, the remedy of the vendor/transferor is to institute a suit for recovery of the unpaid balance consideration (with interest), and not to seek cancellation of the sale deed or a declaration that the sale deed is null and void. [Relied on Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 573; Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives & Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 10-17]. Raziya Begum & Ors. Versus Nafisa Begum Abdul Hamid, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2026 INSC 814