The Jharkhand High Court has observed that insisting on a prior police complaint regarding assault and torture, or documentary proof of injuries, to establish matrimonial cruelty is “absolutely absurd and unwarranted”.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava made the observation while setting aside an appellate court's decision acquitting a husband of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court restored his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.

The complainant, Sushma Devi, married Sanjay Kumar alias Rajesh Kumar in March 2007. She alleged that at the time of their engagement, her father gave ₹2.5 lakh to the accused persons pursuant to their demand. Jewellery, household articles and electronic items worth around ₹3 lakh were also allegedly given.

According to the complainant, after the marriage, her husband and his family expressed dissatisfaction with the cash and gifts and demanded another ₹2 lakh as dowry. She alleged that when the demand was not fulfilled, she was subjected to physical and mental cruelty and was denied sufficient food and other necessities. She further alleged that on April 15, 2007, she was assaulted by her husband, sister-in-law and brother-in-law and driven out of the matrimonial home, following which she took shelter at her parental home in Jamshedpur.

The trial court convicted the husband and the other accused under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It sentenced them to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000 under Section 498A and two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 under the Dowry Prohibition Act.

In appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the husband of the Section 498A offence, while maintaining his conviction and sentence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The other co-convicts were acquitted of both charges. The husband thereafter approached the High Court against his conviction under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The complainant also filed a revision challenging the acquittal of the accused.

On examining the evidence, the High Court found that the complainant had given a chronological account of the events and the circumstances in which she was allegedly ill-treated and tortured by her husband. Disagreeing with the approach adopted by the appellate court, the High Court observed:

“It further appears that insistence of the learned appellate court upon lodging any case in respect of assault and torture earlier meted with the complainant or any documentary evidence of injury, is absolutely absurd and unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.The complainant is a highly educated lady and she has stated with date of all the chronological events and the circumstances, wherein she was ill-treated and tortured at the hands of her husband.”

The Court held that the appellate court's findings were against the weight of the evidence and that its insistence on the complainant having lodged an earlier case with the police was unwarranted.

It accordingly set aside the appellate court's judgment insofar as it had acquitted Sanjay Kumar alias Rajesh Kumar of the offence under Section 498A IPC and restored the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court.

Case Title: Sanjay Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand and Anr.

Case Number: Cr. Revision No. 1465 of 2016

Appearance: Mr. Salona Mittal, Amicus Curiae, for the Petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 1465 of 2016; Mr. J.N. Upadhyay for the Petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 23 of 2017; Mr. Rajneesh Vardhan, A.P.P. and Mr. Arup Dey, A.P.P. for the State; Mr. J.N. Upadhyay and Mr. Mayank Kumar for O.P. No. 2.

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The Jharkhand High Court has held that merely organising a meeting in a school hall to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti does not amount to undue influence at an election under Section 171F of the IPC.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary quashed criminal proceedings against two persons who were booked over a meeting held during the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

The first petitioner was the principal of Saraswati Shishu Vidya Mandir. The allegation was that he organised a meeting in the school hall on April 14, 2024 without obtaining permission from the competent authority and in violation of the Model Code of Conduct. The second petitioner had posted about the meeting on his social media account.

An FIR was registered on the written report of an Assistant Engineer-cum-Flying Squad Officer. After investigation, the police filed a chargesheet and the Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 171F, 171H and 188 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioners' application for discharge was later rejected.

Before the High Court, the question was whether the allegations, even if accepted as true, made out the offences for which the petitioners were being prosecuted.

On Section 171F, the Court noted that undue influence at an election is defined under Section 171C IPC. It found no allegation that either petitioner had interfered or attempted to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. The Court observed:

“There is no allegation against either of the petitioners of interfering or attempting to interfere with free exercise of any electoral right. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, the mere fact of organizing of meeting in the hall of a school to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti cannot constitute the offence punishable under Section 171F of the Indian Penal Code.”

The Court separately found that Section 188 IPC was also not attracted. It noted that there was no reference to any order promulgated by a public servant which had been disobeyed by the petitioners. The FIR had proceeded on the allegation that the meeting was held without permission.

It further noted that there was no allegation that the petitioners knew of any promulgated order which they had violated. The Assistant Engineer-cum-Flying Squad Officer who lodged the FIR was also not alleged to have promulgated any such order.

As regards Section 171H IPC, the Court found that there was “absolutely no allegation” concerning any of the ingredients of the offence.

The High Court held that none of the offences for which the Magistrate had taken cognizance were made out against the petitioners. It accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings, including the chargesheet, cognizance order and the order rejecting their discharge plea.

Case Title: Parmanand Singh and Anr v. State of Jharkhand

Case Number: Cr.M.P. No. 2482 of 2026

Appearance: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Thakur, Advocate, for the Petitioners; Mr. Shiv Shankar Kumar, Addl. P.P., for the State.

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The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that mere protest or use of intemperate language against a public servant, in the absence of any overt act that actually obstructs the discharge of official duties, does not constitute an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Court observed that while “obstruction” need not necessarily be physical, the prosecution must establish an act involving force, threat, or an actual effect of preventing the public servant from carrying out his duties. Passive conduct, without disturbing the public servant in the discharge of official functions, cannot amount to voluntary obstruction under Section 186 IPC.

Justice Sandeep Sharma remarked that: “Mere protesting or using intemperate language, without an overt act, will not be an offense punishable under Section 186 of Indian Penal Code. Passive conduct without disturbing a public servant in discharge of his functions or duties will not amount to voluntarily obstructing a public servant within the meaning of Section 186 of Indian Penal Code.”

Background:

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking quashing of a Kalandra registered under Sections 186 and 189 IPC. The case arose after police officials stopped the petitioners' vehicle during a naka and issued challans for alleged violations under the Motor Vehicles Act, including installation of LED lights. The police alleged that the petitioners made allegations against the officials and thereby obstructed them in the discharge of their duties.

he Court found that the petitioners had stopped their vehicle when signalled by the police and had produced the required documents. Despite the alleged remarks against the police officials, the police were able to perform their duty and proceeded to issue the challan. The Court therefore found no material demonstrating that the petitioners had actually prevented or dissuaded the police official from discharging his public function.

The Court emphasised that Section 186 IPC requires voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of a public function. It held that the expression “voluntarily” contemplates an overt act and that mere passive conduct does not amount to obstruction.

The Court further observed that while obstruction need not necessarily be physical, there must be an act involving force, threat, or an effect that actually obstructs the public servant from carrying out his duties. 

Holding that the basic ingredients of Section 186 IPC were absent and that the chances of conviction were remote, the Court concluded that continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

It accordingly quashed the Kalandra and the consequential proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, and acquitted the accused of the charges.

Case Name: Sanjay Kumar Khanna v/s State of H.P. & anr.

Case No.: CrMMO No. 954 of 2024

Date of Decision: 28.07.2026

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The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that mere attestation of an allegedly fraudulent document, without any specific allegation attributing an active role to the attesting witnesses in the alleged offence, cannot by itself make them criminally liable. [2026 LiveLaw (AP) 195]

The Court accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings against two accused who had been implicated solely on the ground that they had attested a disputed Gift Deed.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tuhin Kumar Gedela observed:

“As could be seen, the Courts have consistently held that the attesters cannot be held liable for merely attesting the documents.

After hearing both the parties, this Court accepting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that neither in the F.I.R nor in the charge sheet, which is filed after a complete investigation, except bald allegations that the petitioners stood as attesters to the document No.2820/2012, dated 23.04.2012, nothing else is stated and the allegations are omnibus and does not constitute any offence.”

“As per the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie case is made out against petitioners/accused Nos.8 and 9.”

The case arose out of allegations concerning a disputed Gift Deed. The de facto complainant alleged that the Gift Deed had been fraudulently created, giving rise to allegations of criminal conspiracy, forgery, use of a forged document as genuine, cheating and criminal trespass under Sections 120-B, 468, 471, 420 and 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

According to the charge sheet, the Gift Deed was allegedly prepared by another accused by changing his name, while the petitioners, arrayed as Accused Nos. 8 and 9, were alleged only to have attested the document. Apart from that, no specific role was attributed to them in the commission of the alleged offences.

Aggrieved by their implication in the case, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the trial court. They submitted that, except for the allegation of attestation, neither the complaint nor the charge sheet contained any specific allegation against them.

The State and the de facto complainant opposed the petition, contending that the truth of the allegations and the involvement of the petitioners were matters to be determined during trial.

The High Court, however, noted that the settled position of law is that attestation, by itself, does not establish knowledge of the contents of a document or participation in the transaction recorded therein.

The Court further noted that an attesting witness cannot be held criminally liable merely for signing a document as a witness, in the absence of material showing a specific role in the alleged offence. 

Finding the allegations against the petitioners to be bald and omnibus, the High Court held that, even if taken at face value, they did not disclose any offence or make out a prima facie case against them.

Applying the settled principles governing its inherent jurisdiction, the High Court found no prima facie case against Accused Nos. 8 and 9 and quashed the proceedings against them.

Case Title: Tadiboyina Narendra Kumar & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 9878 of 2022

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 195

Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused: Siva Rama Krishna Kolluru

Counsel for the Respondents/Complainants: Srinivasa Rao Narra, Public Prosecutor (AP)

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The Jharkhand High Court has held that an assault on a woman, in the absence of any specific overt act towards the commission of rape, would not by itself constitute an attempt to rape.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava altered the conviction of a man from attempt to rape under Sections 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code to the offence of outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 354 IPC.

The appeal was filed against a 2005 judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Palamau at Daltonganj, which had convicted the appellant under Sections 376/511 IPC and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹1,000.

According to the prosecution, the woman was cutting fodder grass in her field when the appellant approached her. She alleged that he rushed towards her and pushed her to the ground. She managed to escape and started running away, but was allegedly caught again and pushed into a paddy field. The woman raised an alarm, following which the appellant fled. She returned home and narrated the incident to her sister-in-law and later to her husband and father-in-law. A Panchayat was convened the next day, after which she approached the police and a case was registered under Sections 376/511 IPC.

The appellant challenged his conviction before the High Court, contending, among other things, that the trial court had placed undue reliance on the woman's testimony despite contradictions between her statement in the FIR and her evidence during trial.

On examining the evidence, the High Court noted that the woman's account was essentially that she had been pushed to the ground twice. However, it found no specific allegation as to any overt act committed by the appellant towards the commission of rape. The Court observed:

“The evidence of the prosecutrix, when considered in its entirety, does not disclose any specific or overt act on the part of the appellant which can be said to constitute an act towards the commission of rape so as to attract the ingredients of an offence punishable under Section 376/511 of the I.P.C. The conduct of the appellant simply shows that he has committed some act of assault with the prosecutrix, which may likely to outrage her modesty and nothing overt act has been committed towards commission of the rape. Therefore, at best the offence falls under Section 354 of the I.P.C.”

The Court further noted that although the woman consistently stated that the appellant had caught hold of her and pushed her to the ground, there was no specific evidence of an attempt to have sexual intercourse or of any act sufficiently proximate to the commission of rape.

It also took note of the woman's immediate disclosures to her family members, which, according to the Court, indicated an assault or “hathapai” and an attempt to outrage her modesty rather than an attempt to commit rape.

At the same time, the High Court found that the woman's consistent account of being caught and pushed to the ground was sufficient to establish that the appellant assaulted her intending to outrage, or knowing that his act was likely to outrage, her modesty.

The Court therefore held that the ingredients of Section 354 IPC were made out and altered the appellant's conviction under Sections 376/511 IPC to one under Section 354 IPC.

Case Title: Shankar Ram v. State of Jharkhand

Case Number: Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 725 of 2005

Appearance: Mr. Pradeep Kumar Deomani for the Appellant; Mr. Fahad Allam, A.P.P. for the State.

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