The Orissa High Court has held that a qualified Radiologist cannot be barred from conducting ultrasonography at two different clinics/medical establishments situated in two different districts, especially when his superior authorities in his permanent employment have issued a 'no-objection certificate' for his practice beyond official working hours. [2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 97]

Clarifying the true purport of Rule 3(3) of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 (the 'PCPNDT Rules'), the Bench of Justice Bibhu Prasad Routray held–

“The plain interpretation of the provisions in Rule 3(3) read with the object of the Act does not contradict to such provisions of the Act or intention of the Legislature by permitting the medical practitioner to conduct ultrasonography in two different clinics in two districts. There cannot be any hindrance in view of the provisions of the PC & PNDT Act and Rules to debar the medical practitioner from conducting ultrasonography in two clinics situating in two different districts and such an interpretation would be not in consonance with the object of the Act.”

The petitioner, who is currently posted as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Radio-Diagnosis in the VIMSAR, Burla, Sambalpur, sought permission for rendering his service at a private clinic situated in Attabira in the district of Bargarh. The Superintendent of VIMSAR issued a 'No Objection Certificate' authorising the petitioner to attend the said hospital beyond his duty hours.

Subsequently, the Chief District Medical and Public Health Officer, Bargarh (CDMO) passed an order, under Rule 3(3) of the PCPNDT Rules, prohibiting the petitioner from working in private hospital. The said Rule states as follows–

“Each medical practitioner qualified under the Act to conduct ultrasonography in a genetic clinic/ultrasound clinic/imaging centre shall be permitted to be registered with a maximum of two such clinics/centres within a district. The Consulting hours for such medical practitioner, shall clinic/centre.”

Impugning such prohibition order, the petitioner approached the High Court through this writ petition. The petitioner argued that when the Superintendent of his Hospital has expressly permitted him to work at the private clinic beyond his duty hours, the CDMO, Bargarh had no authority to debar him.

On the other hand, the State submitted that when the petitioner is working as Assistant Professor in VIMSAR, Burla in the district of Sambalpur, he cannot be permitted to perform USG at a Clinic situated at Attabira in the district of Bargarh. It was further contended that even though the Rules allow doctors to conduct USG at two different clinics in a particular district, it does not permit working in two different districts.

Justice Routray was of the opinion that the PCPNDT Rules do not explicitly prohibit Radiologists from practising in two different clinics situated in two different districts. The terms “within a district” have been employed to keep the doctors under the disciplinary and administrative superintendence of a District Advisory Committee (DAC). Since each district has one DAC, it cannot authorise a doctor to work under it when he is admittedly working under another DAC.

The Court further acceded to the contention of the petitioner that when the Superintendent of the VIMSAR, Burla has no objection to the petitioner working in Bargarh beyond his duty hours, the Bargarh DAC lacks authority to debar him. It also took note of the fact that the distance between the two workplaces is merely 25 KMs.

“Though the Petitioner has been refused to conduct ultrasonography at Rajaram Health Care, Attabira with purported reasons under Rule 3(3) of the PC & PNDT Rules, but on analysis of the same no justification is seen on the part of the District Advisory Committee of Bargarh to apply the provisions of Rule 3(3) of the PC & PNDT Rules to reject the request of the Petitioner, particularly when the Petitioner is admittedly a qualified Radiologist.”

Accordingly, the impugned prohibition order was set aside and the petitioner was allowed to work in the said private clinic.

Case Title: Jagabandhu Barik v. State of Odisha & Ors.

Case No: W.P.(C) No. 14988 of 2026

Date of Judgment: August 06, 2026

Counsel for the Petitioner: Ms. P.S. Mohanty, Advocate

Counsel for the State: Mr. S.K. Jee, Addl. Government Advocate

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 97

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The Jharkhand High Court has modified a State Government notification which restricted the benefit of continuation in office under the Supreme Court's Manendra Bhaskar Limaye ruling to Presidents and Members of Consumer Commissions who retired on or after May 21, 2025.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Deepak Roshan held that the Supreme Court's directions did not restrict the benefit to office-holders who retired on or after the date of its judgment. The Court said May 21, 2025 was merely the date on which the judgment was pronounced and not a qualifying date for entitlement.

The Court was hearing writ petitions filed by former Presidents and Members of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions at Latehar, Jamtara, Simdega and Dumka. The petitioners had been appointed in 2021 for a tenure of four years or until attaining the age of 65 years, whichever was earlier. They retired between September 2024 and February 2025.

The dispute arose after the State Government issued a notification dated October 10, 2025 pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Manendra Bhaskar Limaye (Limaye-II). The notification allowed Presidents and Members who had retired on or after May 21, 2025 to continue until completion of the fresh appointment process.

Since the petitioners had retired before May 21, 2025, they were excluded from its benefit. The State argued that the Supreme Court's directions protected only those Presidents and Members who were still serving when Limaye-II was pronounced on May 21, 2025. It therefore contended that the petitioners, having already retired, could not seek reinstatement.

The High Court disagreed. It said the relevant directions in Limaye-II did not create such a cut-off. The Court observed:

“As a matter of fact, Paragraph 102(4) of Limaye-II nowhere confines the benefit of continuation to Office-holders who retired on or after the date of the judgment itself. Paragraph 102(3) of the directions which governs Presidents and Members appointed and serving prior to Limaye-I entitles such persons to complete their tenure in entirety and, where tenure ends before completion of new recruitment process, to continue in office until that process is completed.”

The Bench noted that all the petitioners had been appointed in October-November 2021, before the Supreme Court's Limaye-I judgment of March 3, 2023. Their tenure subsequently ended before the recruitment process under the new rules was completed.

It therefore held that they fell within the category of Presidents and Members “appointed and serving prior to Limaye-I”. Their entitlement to continue until completion of the fresh recruitment process did not depend upon whether their original tenure ended before or after May 21, 2025.

The Court accordingly modified the October 10 notification to the extent it restricted the benefit to persons retiring on or after May 21, 2025. It directed that Presidents and Members appointed and serving prior to Limaye-I be allowed to complete their tenure and, where that tenure ended before completion of the fresh recruitment process, to continue until the process was completed.

The petitioners were directed to be re-employed in their respective District Consumer Commissions. Their service was also directed to be treated as uninterrupted from their respective dates of retirement until fresh recruitment is made or the Rules are suitably amended.

The writ petitions were accordingly allowed.

Case Title: Umesh Singh v. Union of India and Ors.

Case Number: W.P.(S) No. 7373 of 2025

Appearance: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Mr. Arpan Mishra and Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel for the Petitioners; Mr. M.K. Roy, G.A.-I, Mr. O.P. Tiwary, G.P.-III, Mr. Manish Kumar, G.P.-V and Ms. Bakshi Vibha for the Respondents.

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Justice R Vijayakumar noted that the student and others had raised their agitation in a peaceful and democratic manner and there was no allegation of any damage to public property. Thus, the court held that continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process of law.

“ The petitioner and others, who belong to a Student Association had conducted a protest in front of a Conference Hall, where a meeting was conducted for eradication of Sanatana Dharma, The petitioner and others have raised their agitation in a peaceful and democratic manner and further, there is no allegation of any damage to any public property. In such circumstances, continuation of the criminal proceedings would only be an abuse of process of law,” the court observed.

The court was hearing a petition filed by Senthoorvelan. Senthoorvelan, along with seven others, had protested against the conduct of a conference for eradication of Sanatana Dharma. The prosecution alleged that despite warnings by police officials, the petitioners and others blocked the road and caused inconvenience to the general public.

The petitioner argued that he had raised his objection with regard to the conduct of the meeting and had peacefully conducted the protest in front of the Conference Hall. The petitioner argued that the same could not be considered an offence. The petitioner also pointed out that the chargesheet had not been filed for the past three years.

The prosecution argued that though the chargesheet was ready, it had not been filed yet.

Noting that the petitioners had conducted their protest peacefully and no public property had been damaged, the court was inclined to quash the case. Thus, the court quashed the FIR not only against the petitioner student but against all other accused also.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. PR. Malan

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. G. Ganesh Kumar Government Advocate (Crl.Side)

Case Title: M Senthoorvelan v State of Tamil Nadu and Another

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 404

Case No: Crl OP (MD) No 16688 of 2026

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that a para-veterinary qualification obtained from a university established by law cannot be denied recognition merely because the university is not separately recognised by the State Government or registered with the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council.

The Court further held that Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council Rules, 2011, to the extent it imposed such additional requirements, was in conflict with the parent Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council Act, 2010 and was therefore liable to be struck down.

A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Justice Ranjan Sharma remarked that: “Rule 14 of the HPPVC Rules, 2011, to the extent it provides that institutions/Universities imparting training shall have to be registered with the State Council, as well as providing that only Universities recognized by the State Government shall be eligible for registration in the State Council, is in direct conflict with the provisions of the HPPVC Act, 2010.” 

Background:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Himachal Pradesh, had completed a Diploma in Veterinary Science and Animal Health Technology from the College of Veterinary Science, Rampura Phul, Punjab, a constituent college of Guru Angad Dev Veterinary and Animal Sciences University (GADVAS University), Ludhiana.

After completing the diploma, she applied for registration with the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council. Her application was rejected on the ground that the diploma was not recognised by the Himachal Pradesh Government and that the institution was not registered with the State Council, as required under Rule 14 of the HPPVC Rules, 2011.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court held that GADVAS University, being a university established by law, falls within the definition of a recognised institution under Section 2(j) of the HPPVC Act, 2010. Therefore, its para-veterinary qualification did not require separate recognition by the Himachal Pradesh Government. 

The Court rejected the respondents' contention that the university was required to be recognised by the State Government or registered with the State Council. It held that Rule 14 could not impose conditions beyond those prescribed by the parent Act. 

The Court held that the portion of Rule 14 requiring universities imparting para-veterinary training to be registered with the State Council and recognised by the State Government was in direct conflict with the HPPVC Act, 2010 and was therefore ultra vires. 

Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned portion of Rule 14 and the rejection communication dated July 28, 2025, and directed the State Council to register the petitioner within one week, subject to completion of other formalities. 

Case Name: Riya Sharma v/s State of H.P. & Ors.

Case No.: CWP No.14874 of 2026

Date of Decision: 15.07.2026

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The case arose from a government order appointing the second-ranked candidate, arrayed as the fifth respondent, as President of the Commission, instead of the petitioner, who had topped the merit list.

Justice Balaji Medamalli held that under Rule 6(11) of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure of Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020, the State Government's role is confined to verifying the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee, and does not extend to altering the order of merit.

“If the State Government finds some material against the candidate recommended in the order of merit, the only option left with it, is to bring the aforesaid material to the notice of the Selection Committee for taking appropriate action, instead of the State Government changing the list by itself,” the Court observed.

Referring to the provisions governing the roles of the Selection Committee and the State Government under the Rules, the Court said that the committee is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the suitability of the candidates and examining the relevant eligibility criteria.

“ Once the Selection Committee has conducted such an assessment and forwarded the panel in the order of merit, the State Government cannot independently reassess the suitability of the candidates or make an appointment contrary to the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court noted.

The Court placed reliance on a Division Bench ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Tadikonda Suneetha v. Dr. Vajrala V.L. Narsimha Rao & Others, which dealt with a similar appointment dispute. The judgment was subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court, which declined to interfere with the High Court order.

“The legal position is well settled that the scope of interference by the State Government with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee is limited to the extent provided under Rule 6(11) of the Rules. In terms of Rule 6(11) of the Rules, the State Government is required to verify the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee,” the Court said.

It noted that if any adverse material is found against the candidate during the verification process, then it has to be placed before the Selection Committee.

“In the event any adverse material is found during such verification, the State Government is required to place the same, along with its opinion, before the Selection Committee for reconsideration of its recommendation,” the Court observed.

The Court said that after such reconsideration, if the Select Committee reiterates its recommendation, the State Government has no option except to act upon the said recommendation and issue the appointment order.

“The State Government cannot independently alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by overlooking the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court said, holding that the government had deviated from the merit-based recommendations of the Selection Committee.

“Consequently, the appointment of respondent No.5 as President, District Commission, Vijayawada, cannot be sustained,” the Court held.

The Court set aside the appointment order, and directed the State Government to place its opinion, the antecedent verification report and other relevant material before the Selection Committee within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, enabling the Selection Committee to reconsider the matter and take action in accordance with law.

Background

The petitioner, Rayala Kiran Kumar, a practising advocate, had applied for the post of President of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, as per the January 2022 notification. He was found eligible and was called for interview before the Selection Committee.

Later, the fifth respondent was appointed to the post vide G.O.Rt.No.39, dated 28.07.2022.

The petitioner subsequently learnt, through information obtained under the Right to Information Act, that he had secured 21 out of 30 marks and was placed first in the order of merit, whereas the fifth respondent had secured 18 marks and was placed second. The State Government overlooked the recommendations of the Select Committee and the petitioner's superior merit while making the appointment, the petitioner alleged.

The petitioner submitted that the Selection Committee is empowered to determine its procedure for making recommendations under Rule 6(9) and recommend a panel of candidates in order of merit for appointment by the State Government under Rule 6(10). On the other hand, the State Government is only required to verify or cause verification of the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates under Rule 6(11), and cannot alter the recommendations of the committee unless adverse remarks are found against the candidates, particularly during the verification process, the petitioner submitted.

The petitioners alleged that the Government had failed to follow the prescribed procedure and had proceeded with the selection process in violation of the Consumer Protection Recruitment Rules, 2020.

The State Government, on the other hand, requested the dismissal of the writ petition, arguing that mere inclusion of a candidate in the selection list does not confer any vested right to appointment.

Case: Rayala Kiran Kumar vs Union of India & others,

W.P.NO. 30995 OF 2024

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 198

Rajasthan High Court took serious note of Municipal Corporation's inaction against encroachers that led to its inability to hand over possession of auctioned plots to the successful bidders, and opined that the body being part of the government was not supposed to function in a manner that led to litigations.

The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand was hearing a bunch of petitions that alleged non-handing over of possession of auctioned plots by the government, as well as impleadment applications by other people alleging right over the said plots on account of having possession, who were being treated as encroachers by the Municipal Corporation.

“By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the mind of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the State must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto.”

In the background of disputed questions of rights and titles over the subject properties, the Court directed constitution of a committee comprising of Higher Officials of Department of Local Self Government and Commissioner of Jodhpur Municipal Corporation, to decide the representations of the petitioners as well as the applicants.

For context, the matter pertained to 4 plots at Kabir Marg, Jodhpur, who were alleged to have been allocated to the petitioners in an auction. However, their possession was not handed over to the petitioners. On the other hand, certain other people, who had filed applications for impleadment, were contending their rights over the plots based on possession.

The latter set of people (applicants) were treated as encroachers by the Municipal Corporation based on a report by a Joint Commission, and the Court highlighted that it was based on their encroachment that the Corporation was unable to hand over possession to the petitioners.

In this background, the Court referred to Surendra Prasad Mishra Vs. O.N.G.C. (1987) where the Calcutta High Court held that where Govt. or Governmental agency makes a promise knowing or intending that it could be acted upon by the promisee and if the promise acting in accordance therewith and thereby alters his position, the Govt. or the Governmental agency would be held to be bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. or the Governmental agency at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise or that the promise has not been reduced to writing…

The Court observed that since the possession could not be handed over owing to encroachment, there was no fault of the petitioners and they could not be allowed to suffer due to “negligence, callousness and non-maintenance of the essential record” by the Corporation.

While highlighting inaction on part of the Corporation against the encroachers, it was held the Corporation could not be allowed to sit over the matter, and take any excuse regarding handing over the possession. They were duty bound to do so.

At the same time, while underscoring Article 21 and the Magna Carta, the Court highlighted the requirement of following due process of law before taking any action against any individual or establishment.

Hence, the State was directed to constitute the aforementioned committee to adjudicate upon the representations of the petitioners as well as the applicants to close the allotment process, within a period of 3 months.

Accordingly, the petitions were disposed of.

Title: Smt. Kiran v Municipal Corporation & Anr., and other connected petitions

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 344

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The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a habeas corpus petition seeking custody of minor children is not maintainable where the children are in the custody of their father pursuant to a mutually agreed settlement between the parents.[2026 LiveLaw (AP) 197]

A Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Purushottam Kumar Chintalapudi dismissed with costs the mother's petition seeking production and restoration of custody of her two minor children. The Court found that the parents had agreed under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the children would remain in the father's custody.

The Court observed:

“Once it was agreed mutually between the petitioner and the R5 that the custody of the children shall remain solely with the husband, the children cannot be said to be in any illegal custody of the R5-father.

The representation was made without disclosing the aforesaid settlement; Memorandum of Understanding and the order dated 18.09.2025 passed in Crl.P.No.9564 of 2025 by the High Court for the State of Telangana, in which the Memorandum of Understanding was made as part of the order. The Habeas Corpus petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has misused the process of this Court by suppression of the material facts.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court by way of a habeas corpus petition seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution.

She alleged that her husband had forcibly removed their two minor children from her care and custody and that their whereabouts were unknown. She sought directions to trace and produce the children before the Court and restore their custody to her as their mother and natural guardian.

The State informed the High Court about a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into between the petitioner and her husband to resolve their matrimonial disputes. Under the settlement, the husband agreed to a financial settlement, while “the custody and care of the children” were to remain solely with him.

The Court noted that the same MoU had also been referred to in an earlier order of the Telangana High Court in criminal proceedings against the petitioner's husband and another accused. In those proceedings, the Telangana High Court had quashed the criminal case against them after taking the settlement between the parties into account.

The present petitioner had been impleaded as a respondent in those proceedings. Although notice was issued to her, it was returned with the endorsement “unclaimed” and was consequently treated as duly served.

The Court further noted that, although the petitioner was provided Legal Aid Counsel after stating that she did not understand English, her counsel stated that she knew English. The petitioner had herself provided counsel with the MoU and the Telangana High Court order, and also read the MoU fluently in English before the Court. When asked why these documents were not disclosed in her earlier representation, she stated that she did not consider them relevant.

The Court observed that the petitioner had set the Court's machinery in motion without disclosing the material facts, resulting in the appearance of her husband, mother-in-law and two children before it.

Holding that the petition was not maintainable and involved suppression of material facts, the Bench dismissed it and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- on the mother. 

The amount was directed to be invested in fixed deposits in the names of the two children, with Rs. 25,000/- each payable upon attaining majority. The Court also declined to accept her apology.

Case Title: In Re v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

Case No.: W.P. No. 18034 of 2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 197

Counsel for the Petitioner: Smt. Santhi Sree Vallabhaneni

Counsel for Respondent(s): Sri J. Krishna Praneeth, AGP

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The Jharkhand High Court has observed that insisting on a prior police complaint regarding assault and torture, or documentary proof of injuries, to establish matrimonial cruelty is “absolutely absurd and unwarranted”.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava made the observation while setting aside an appellate court's decision acquitting a husband of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court restored his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.

The complainant, Sushma Devi, married Sanjay Kumar alias Rajesh Kumar in March 2007. She alleged that at the time of their engagement, her father gave ₹2.5 lakh to the accused persons pursuant to their demand. Jewellery, household articles and electronic items worth around ₹3 lakh were also allegedly given.

According to the complainant, after the marriage, her husband and his family expressed dissatisfaction with the cash and gifts and demanded another ₹2 lakh as dowry. She alleged that when the demand was not fulfilled, she was subjected to physical and mental cruelty and was denied sufficient food and other necessities. She further alleged that on April 15, 2007, she was assaulted by her husband, sister-in-law and brother-in-law and driven out of the matrimonial home, following which she took shelter at her parental home in Jamshedpur.

The trial court convicted the husband and the other accused under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It sentenced them to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000 under Section 498A and two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 under the Dowry Prohibition Act.

In appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the husband of the Section 498A offence, while maintaining his conviction and sentence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The other co-convicts were acquitted of both charges. The husband thereafter approached the High Court against his conviction under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The complainant also filed a revision challenging the acquittal of the accused.

On examining the evidence, the High Court found that the complainant had given a chronological account of the events and the circumstances in which she was allegedly ill-treated and tortured by her husband. Disagreeing with the approach adopted by the appellate court, the High Court observed:

“It further appears that insistence of the learned appellate court upon lodging any case in respect of assault and torture earlier meted with the complainant or any documentary evidence of injury, is absolutely absurd and unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.The complainant is a highly educated lady and she has stated with date of all the chronological events and the circumstances, wherein she was ill-treated and tortured at the hands of her husband.”

The Court held that the appellate court's findings were against the weight of the evidence and that its insistence on the complainant having lodged an earlier case with the police was unwarranted.

It accordingly set aside the appellate court's judgment insofar as it had acquitted Sanjay Kumar alias Rajesh Kumar of the offence under Section 498A IPC and restored the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court.

Case Title: Sanjay Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand and Anr.

Case Number: Cr. Revision No. 1465 of 2016

Appearance: Mr. Salona Mittal, Amicus Curiae, for the Petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 1465 of 2016; Mr. J.N. Upadhyay for the Petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 23 of 2017; Mr. Rajneesh Vardhan, A.P.P. and Mr. Arup Dey, A.P.P. for the State; Mr. J.N. Upadhyay and Mr. Mayank Kumar for O.P. No. 2.

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The Jharkhand High Court has held that merely organising a meeting in a school hall to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti does not amount to undue influence at an election under Section 171F of the IPC.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary quashed criminal proceedings against two persons who were booked over a meeting held during the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

The first petitioner was the principal of Saraswati Shishu Vidya Mandir. The allegation was that he organised a meeting in the school hall on April 14, 2024 without obtaining permission from the competent authority and in violation of the Model Code of Conduct. The second petitioner had posted about the meeting on his social media account.

An FIR was registered on the written report of an Assistant Engineer-cum-Flying Squad Officer. After investigation, the police filed a chargesheet and the Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 171F, 171H and 188 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioners' application for discharge was later rejected.

Before the High Court, the question was whether the allegations, even if accepted as true, made out the offences for which the petitioners were being prosecuted.

On Section 171F, the Court noted that undue influence at an election is defined under Section 171C IPC. It found no allegation that either petitioner had interfered or attempted to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. The Court observed:

“There is no allegation against either of the petitioners of interfering or attempting to interfere with free exercise of any electoral right. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, the mere fact of organizing of meeting in the hall of a school to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti cannot constitute the offence punishable under Section 171F of the Indian Penal Code.”

The Court separately found that Section 188 IPC was also not attracted. It noted that there was no reference to any order promulgated by a public servant which had been disobeyed by the petitioners. The FIR had proceeded on the allegation that the meeting was held without permission.

It further noted that there was no allegation that the petitioners knew of any promulgated order which they had violated. The Assistant Engineer-cum-Flying Squad Officer who lodged the FIR was also not alleged to have promulgated any such order.

As regards Section 171H IPC, the Court found that there was “absolutely no allegation” concerning any of the ingredients of the offence.

The High Court held that none of the offences for which the Magistrate had taken cognizance were made out against the petitioners. It accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings, including the chargesheet, cognizance order and the order rejecting their discharge plea.

Case Title: Parmanand Singh and Anr v. State of Jharkhand

Case Number: Cr.M.P. No. 2482 of 2026

Appearance: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Thakur, Advocate, for the Petitioners; Mr. Shiv Shankar Kumar, Addl. P.P., for the State.

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The Rajasthan High Court enhanced the compensation payable to a teacher terminated illegally, from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 20 lakh, observing that the amount awarded by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal was “shockingly disproportionate”.

The Court was dealing with a plea by a Hindi teacher who had served the respondent-school for around 20 years before her services were terminated in 2015 on the ground that there were no students for the subject of Hindi. The Tribunal had held the termination to be bad in law but, as the teacher had subsequently attained the age of superannuation, awarded her lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1 lakh in lieu of reinstatement.

The bench of Justice Anuroop Singhi took note of the fact that the teacher was a permanent employee, had rendered unblemished service for around 20 years, was not terminated for any misconduct and was not gainfully employed between the date of her termination and superannuation. The finding that her termination was bad in law had also attained finality, as the school had not challenged it.

“…keeping in view the mathematical calculation of the minimum emoluments which the petitioner would have earned during the interregnum period, this Court is of the considered view that the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- awarded by the Tribunal is shockingly disproportionate, and it would be just and proper to direct the respondent-School to make a lump-sum payment of Rs.20,00,000/- to the petitioner, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.”

For context, the petitioner was appointed in 1995, and after around 20 years of services, was terminated by the school in 2015 on the ground that there were no students for her subject i.e. Hindi. This was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal ruled the termination to be bad in law and awarded compensation of Rs. 1 Lakh to the petitioner.

The present petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the quantum of the compensation. It was argued that she should have been awarded her entire salary and benefits which she would have been entitled to had the termination not taken place.

It was submitted that not granting such benefits allowed the respondent to take advantage of their wrong and legitimized an illegal act.

After hearing the contentions, the Court affirmed the finding of the Tribunal about petitioner's termination being bad in law. However, the Court observed that no one could be allowed to benefit from their own fault

“…it was equally incumbent upon the Tribunal to determine the dues payable to the petitioner, which would have met the minimum respectable yard-stick, not only in monetary terms, but also to pay back the respect and honor which the petitioner would have earned, if she would have rendered the services for the entire period…the quantification of amount to be paid to the petitioner could have been such which would have kept the respondents in a win-win position and left the petitioner high and dry and is shockingly disproportionate.”

The Court observed that the petitioner's monthly salary was Rs. 50,000/- and there was a period of more than 67 months between her termination and date of superannuation. This resulted in a figure of around Rs. 33,50,000/-.

However, the Court held that this figure itself could not be treated as determinative basis for awarding compensation. In this background, the Court took into account other factors, as elaborated above.

The Court also took into account several principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases in this regard, and taking guidance from the same, enhanced petitioner's compensation from Rs. 1 Lakh to Rs. 20 Lakhs, payable within 2 months.

Accordingly, the petition was disposed of.

Title: Rani Gupta v Management Committee, Maheshwari Public School and Anr.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 343

For Petitioners: Mr. Sunil Samdaria with Mr. Arihant Samdaria

For Respondents: Mr. Vinod Goyal; Mr. Bhavya Kala for Mr. Devansh Sharma, Dy.GC

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The Gauhati High Court has clarified that the amount mentioned in a bail or surety bond cannot be treated as an amount required to be deposited in cash for securing release on bail.

Justice Budi Habung observed, “it is hereby clarified that the amount specified in a personal/bail bond or surety bond does not mean that a cash deposit is required to be made before the police or the Court merely for securing release on bail. The accused and the surety shall, however, be required to execute the requisite bonds in accordance with law. No authority shall insist upon the deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash merely because such amount is mentioned in the bail order.”

The observation came in an application under Section 483(1)(b) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking modification of the bail conditions imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daporijo, in a Bail Application. The accused, Anar Ali, had been arrested in a case under Sections 318(2) and 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After filing of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate granted him bail on execution of a bail bond of ₹2 lakh with one local surety for the like amount.

The petitioner submitted that the accused was a mason and daily-wage earner and was unable to furnish the bail bond of ₹2 lakh or arrange a local surety. It was also submitted that since he was a resident of Assam, he could not arrange a local surety in Arunachal Pradesh and that the police authorities were insisting upon deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash. Consequently, despite the order granting bail, he continued to remain in custody.

The Additional Public Prosecutor did not oppose modification of the bail conditions and submitted that similar situations arose in different parts of Arunachal Pradesh. He sought a clarification that the amount mentioned in a bail bond or surety bond should not be treated as an amount required to be deposited in cash before the police or the Court.

The High Court noted that although the accused had been found entitled to bail, he had been unable to avail himself of the benefit of the order because of his inability to furnish the stipulated bail bond and local surety.

The Court said, “Thus, despite having been granted the concession of bail, the accused continues to languish in custody for more than three months. This fact, in itself, indicates that the conditions relating to the bail bond and local surety are excessive and onerous, particularly when the accused has been unable to make arrangements for the same.”

The Court also found the requirement of a local surety to be “excessive and unduly onerous” in the facts and circumstances of the case.

“The mere fact that the accused is a resident of another State cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient ground for insisting upon a local surety, particularly when such a condition has the effect of frustrating the very order granting bail. The purpose of requiring a bond or surety is to secure compliance with the conditions of bail and to ensure the presence of the accused during the investigation and trial. Such a requirement is not intended to impose a condition which is incapable of being complied with,” the Court added.

Accordingly, the Court modified the condition and directed that the accused be released on furnishing a personal bond of ₹50,000 with one surety for the like amount. It further directed that the surety would not be required to be a local resident, subject to verification of identity and solvency in accordance with law.

On the alleged insistence upon deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash, the High Court noted that the Magistrate's order had not specifically directed the accused to deposit the bail amount in cash and only required execution of a bail bond with one local surety.

The Court stated, “It is necessary to clarify that a bail bond constitutes an undertaking or obligation undertaken by the accused in the amount specified in the bond, subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the Court. Mere specification of an amount in a bail bond does not, by itself, require the accused to deposit such amount in cash. Similarly, a surety bond constitutes an undertaking by the surety in respect of the amount specified therein and does not, merely by reason of such specification, require the surety to deposit the said amount in cash.”

The Court directed that upon execution and acceptance of the requisite personal bond and surety bond, the accused be released forthwith unless his detention was required in connection with any other case or proceeding. The remaining conditions imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate were left unaltered.

The order was also directed to be furnished to the concerned Superintendent of Police for information and necessary circulation among the police officers under his command for compliance.

Case Name: Shri Kamin Taloh & Anr. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr.

LL Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Gau) 126

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The Court found that the petitioner had incorporated additional sentences in a medical certificate to justify his unauthorized absence from service for nearly seven years, and directed the Registrar Judicial, Srinagar, to file a criminal complaint against him for offences under Sections 336 and 340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by a former employee of the J&K State Road Transport Corporation challenging the treatment of his absence period from 21.10.2011 till his joining duties as 'dies non'. The petitioner had been terminated from service in 2006, reinstated by the High Court in 2017, and after an enquiry, his absence period was treated as 'dies non' by the Corporation.

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar, while dismissing the petition, observed,

"Once it has been found that the petitioner has produced a forged certificate before this Court, it would not be permissible for this Court to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of petitioner."

Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Conductor with the J&K State Road Transport Corporation and then terminated in 2006. The petitioner challenged his termination before the Court contending that no enquiry had been conducted and that his absence was occasioned on account of serious ailment. The writ petition was allowed, quashing the termination order and directing reinstatement.

The Court directed that payment of consequential benefits for the period from November 2004 till the decision of the writ petition would depend on the enquiry to be conducted by the respondents.

Pursuant to the directions, the petitioner was reinstated and an enquiry was held. Vide an Order the period of absence from 01.11.2004 till 20.10.2011 was treated as leave of whatever kind due, whereas the period from 21.10.2011 till date of joining was treated as 'dies non'.

The petitioner challenged this order, contending that no enquiry was held and that the treatment of the period as 'dies non' amounted to punishment. The petitioner relied upon a medical certificate issued by the Government Psychiatric Disease Hospital, Srinagar, to show that he was under treatment from 01.11.2004 to 20.10.2011.

The respondent-Corporation challenged the genuineness of the certificate, stating that it had come to their notice that the certificate was forged, which was verified by the hospital. The Court then directed the Deputy Director, Health Services, Kashmir, and Medical Superintendent, Government Psychiatric Diseases Hospital, Srinagar, to file a detailed report regarding the authenticity of the certificate.

Court's Observation:

The Court examined the compliance report filed by the authorities and found that the certificate produced by the petitioner was forged. The Medical Superintendent, Government Psychiatric Diseases Hospital, Srinagar, in his communication admitted that a medical certificate was issued to the petitioner in May 2016. However, the certificate actually issued did not contain the last two sentences that appeared in the certificate annexed as Annexure-D to the writ petition.

The Court observed,

"There is a marked difference between the two certificates, inasmuch as the certificate dated 24.05.2016, which the Medical Superintendent has reproduced in his letter dated 07.10.2023, the last two sentences... which are part of the Medical Certificate annexed as Annexure-D to the writ petition do not find mention."

The Court noted that the certificate issued by the hospital did not mention that the patient was under treatment since 01.11.2004 to 20.10.2011 on OPD basis, nor did it mention that an attested passport size photograph was appended. The Court observed,

"These two sentences, it seems, have been incorporated by the petitioner by preparing another certificate with more or less same language as is mentioned in the actual certificate... It appears that the petitioner, in order to justify his absence from duty from 01.11.2004 to 20.10.2011, has incorporated these sentences in the certificate, which does not find mention in the certificate actually issued."

The Court also noted that the signatories had declared the certificate as not genuine. While it may be correct that the petitioner had been a patient undergoing treatment, he had produced a forged certificate to explain his unauthorized absence.

The Court applied the settled legal position that fraudulent documents cannot form the basis for exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction. The Court relied upon Prestige Lights Ltd v. SBI (2007) 8 SCC 449, wherein the Supreme Court held that a person invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to place all facts without reservation, and if there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts, the High Court would be justified in refusing to entertain the petition.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition and directed the prosecution of the petitioner for having used a forged document to support his claim before the Court.

"While dismissing the writ petition, the petitioner cannot be allowed to go scot-free. There is material on record to prima facie disclose commission of forgery and allied offences. Section 336 of BNS makes an offence of forgery punishable... Section 340 of BNS makes the act of using as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, punishable. Both these offences, prima facie, seem to have been committed by the petitioner, as such, he deserves to be prosecuted in accordance with law.", the court remarked.

The Court directed the Registrar Judicial, Srinagar, to file a complaint against the petitioner before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, for his prosecution in accordance with law.

Case Title: Bashir Ahmad Ganai v. State of J&K and Ors.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326

Appearances

Petitioner: Mr. I. Sofi, Advocate

Respondents: Mr. Shakir Haqani, Advocate

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Justice V Lakshminarayanan closed the plea after taking note of the State's submission that the police officials on the route of the rally have granted permission.

“ The State Public Prosecutor submits that the police officials situated on route of the rally have all granted permission to the petitioner to take the bike rally. His statement is recorded. As the relief sought for by the petitioner is granted, this Writ Petition stands closed,” the court said.

The party had approached the court through its Vice President Kali Poongundran after the State police denied permission for conducting the bike rally. The party argued that it had a right of speech and expression to assemble peacefully and without arms under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. Thus, the party argued that the order of denial for propagating against NEET and EWS was against the Constitution.

The party argued that there cannot be a complete ban or prohibition on expressing the views of citizens or people. The party argued that a total prohibition on the program is against the constitutional mandate and thus the order is liable to be set aside.

When the matter was being heard, the State Public Prosecutor initially submitted that the petitioners could form a human chain if needed and objected to a bike rally. To this, the judge had orally remarked that the State could not dictate how the petitioners should protest and could not suppress the citizens.

The court remarked that the organisation was only expressing its right by riding the bike and not indulging in any anti-social activities. The court highlighted that the State had a duty to protect thoughts which it did not support also.

Later, when the matter was again taken up, the State submitted that it was not against the principles for which the rally was being carried out and that it had also passed a resolution in the Assembly against NEET. However, when the State raised concern against the protest against EWS, the court orally remarked that the police should not be concerned with the content of a protest and are bound to protect it, as long as it doesn't fall under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which permits reasonable restrictions.

The State then informed the court that it was willing to permit the rally if logistic details, including bike details, were provided, so that the State could arrange bandobast. The court had then directed the petitioners to provide details of the bike.

After the State's direction, the petitioner organisation provided the details of the bike, the route through which the rally was to be taken and the time of the rally. The State informed that the same were considered and necessary permissions had been granted.

Considering the same, the plea was closed.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. J. Ravindran Senior Counsel for Mr. M. Senniappan

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. R. John Sathyan State Public Prosecutor Assisted by Mr. R. Ganesh Kumar Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Crl.Side)

Case Title: Dravidar Kazhagam v The Director General of Police and Others

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 403

Case No: WP Crl No 1934 of 2026

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that mere protest or use of intemperate language against a public servant, in the absence of any overt act that actually obstructs the discharge of official duties, does not constitute an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Court observed that while “obstruction” need not necessarily be physical, the prosecution must establish an act involving force, threat, or an actual effect of preventing the public servant from carrying out his duties. Passive conduct, without disturbing the public servant in the discharge of official functions, cannot amount to voluntary obstruction under Section 186 IPC.

Justice Sandeep Sharma remarked that: “Mere protesting or using intemperate language, without an overt act, will not be an offense punishable under Section 186 of Indian Penal Code. Passive conduct without disturbing a public servant in discharge of his functions or duties will not amount to voluntarily obstructing a public servant within the meaning of Section 186 of Indian Penal Code.”

Background:

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking quashing of a Kalandra registered under Sections 186 and 189 IPC. The case arose after police officials stopped the petitioners' vehicle during a naka and issued challans for alleged violations under the Motor Vehicles Act, including installation of LED lights. The police alleged that the petitioners made allegations against the officials and thereby obstructed them in the discharge of their duties.

he Court found that the petitioners had stopped their vehicle when signalled by the police and had produced the required documents. Despite the alleged remarks against the police officials, the police were able to perform their duty and proceeded to issue the challan. The Court therefore found no material demonstrating that the petitioners had actually prevented or dissuaded the police official from discharging his public function.

The Court emphasised that Section 186 IPC requires voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of a public function. It held that the expression “voluntarily” contemplates an overt act and that mere passive conduct does not amount to obstruction.

The Court further observed that while obstruction need not necessarily be physical, there must be an act involving force, threat, or an effect that actually obstructs the public servant from carrying out his duties. 

Holding that the basic ingredients of Section 186 IPC were absent and that the chances of conviction were remote, the Court concluded that continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

It accordingly quashed the Kalandra and the consequential proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, and acquitted the accused of the charges.

Case Name: Sanjay Kumar Khanna v/s State of H.P. & anr.

Case No.: CrMMO No. 954 of 2024

Date of Decision: 28.07.2026

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Justice B Pugalendhi added that the directions were intended to strengthen the quality of medical evidence before the court, to reinforce confidence in expert witnesses and minimise the possibility of errors. The court highlighted that the efficiency of the justice delivery system relied heavily on the credibility of expert evidence and thus every medical professional needed to discharge their duty with the highest standard of competence.

“ The efficacy of the justice delivery system depends, to a considerable extent, upon the credibility of expert evidence. It is, therefore, imperative that every medical professional entrusted with this responsibility discharges it with the highest standards of competence, objectivity and professional integrity,” the court said.

The court directed that the circular should highlight the ethical standards expected of every expert witness and that every medical witness is expected to depose objectively, honestly and impartially. The court said that the circular should include the necessity of ensuring that Accident Registers, Wound certificates, medico-legal reports and all other medico-legal records accurately record the clinical findings and professional opinion formed at the time of examination.

The court also highlighted the importance of making entries in the Accident Register, wound certificate and other records in a clear, legible and unambiguous manner, avoiding illegible handwriting, unexplained abbreviations and ambiguous expressions. The court added that whenever the infrastructure permits, the records may be generated in a typed or computer-generated format so that it is readily comprehensible.

The court also called for preparing a revised proforma for Medico-Legal Examination of Survivors/ Victims of Sexual Violence issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

The court emphasised that the expert witness should familiarise themselves with the relevant medical records before entering the witness box, that the witness should carefully understand every question put during the chief and cross-examination, and wherever any ambiguity exists, to seek appropriate clarification. The court added that the deposition should be carefully read and verified before signing.

The court was hearing a petition filed by two accused in a POCSO case seeking to suspend their sentence while the appeal against conviction was pending. The allegation against the men was that they had sexually abused an 8-year-old victim boy by compelling him to do oral sex and by inserting their private parts into the boy's anal rectum. The men were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years for offences under Sections 6 read with 5(m) and 5(l) of the POCSO Act.

The men argued that the Doctor who treated the boy, in his cross-examination, had said that there was no injury to the anal rectum and the mouth of the victim boy. Thus, arguing that the prosecution case was not proved medically, the men sought to suspend the sentence.

The prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that in the Chief examination, the doctor had stated that he found injuries in the mouth and anal rectum of the victim boy.

Noting the apparent inconsistency, the court sought details from the doctor. The doctor submitted that the initial examination was conducted by another medical officer and that the injuries were entered in the hospital records, but the same were not properly recorded in the Wound certificate, giving rise to the inconsistency.

Considering the explanation, and after perusing the medical records, the court dismissed the plea for suspending sentence after finding that the grounds canvassed by the petitioners lacked merit. However, the court deemed it fit to highlight the importance of medical evidence in POCSO cases, and deemed it fit to issue directions accordingly.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. J. Vivek, Mr. G. Karuppasamy Pandian

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. A. S. Abul Kalaam Azad Government Advocate (Crl.side)

Case Title: Nambu Kaleeswaran and Another v The State of Tamil Nadu

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 402

Case No: Crl MP(MD) Nos.5823 & 6941 of 2025

The Gauhati High Court has reiterated that a litigant should not suffer due to the negligence of his counsel, while restoring an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution and condoning a delay of 123 days in seeking its restoration.

Justice Pranjal Das observed, “The decision in Solim Manyu Vs. Benglum Manyu, CRP/21(AP)/2025 and N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurty reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, would not come in the way of this revisional court approaching the matter in a justice-oriented manner, keeping in mind the contentions of the petitioner and the principles laid down in the above discussed judgments.”

The observation came in a civil revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the judgment passed by the District Judge, Yupia in a Civil (Misc.) Appeal which arose from the order of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Yupia dismissing the petitioner's application seeking condonation of 123 days' delay and restoration of his first appeal.

The petitioner and the respondent, were husband and wife and had acquired two plots of land at Hollongi under Balijan Circle. They separated in 2010. According to the petitioner, he continued in peaceful possession of the land and obtained Land Possession Certificates in 2018. The respondent later complained before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Balijan that the certificates had been fraudulently and dishonestly obtained, following which they were recalled and cancelled. The petitioner challenged the cancellation before the High Court.

Meanwhile, on a complaint by the respondent, the Gaun Baura, Hollongi (village headman in Assam) passed an order granting full rights of ownership over the disputed land to her. The petitioner challenged the order in a Civil Appeal. Though the Civil Judge initially stayed the order and directed the parties to maintain status quo, the appeal was dismissed for default after the petitioner's counsel remained absent on three dates.

The petitioner's case was that his counsel had not informed him of the dismissal and that he came to know about it only when the respondent started undertaking activities on the property. He thereafter engaged a new counsel and sought restoration of the appeal.

The High Court noted that the impugned order had also taken into account the previous defaults of appearance of the counsel representing the petitioner.

“Upon perusing the impugned order, it appears that the learned court also took into account the previous default of appearance of the learned counsel representing the present petitioner,” the Court said and also recorded the petitioner's explanation for the non-appearance and the delay.

It further added, “The petitioner has contended that he was unaware of the non-appearance of the learned counsel on the 3 (three) dates and the dismissal of the proceeding for non-prosecution and that he came to know about it only when the respondent started some activities on the concerned property. The petitioner has contended that thereafter, he took steps to engage the new counsel and eventually filed the petition for restoration. The petitioner has also tried to explain the delay in such circumstances.”

The High Court had earlier noted the principle that litigants should not suffer for lapses on the part of their counsel and that sufficient cause for delay must be considered with a justice-oriented approach.

Applying those principles to the petitioner's case, the Court held that the decisions relied upon would not prevent the revisional court from approaching the matter in a justice-oriented manner, keeping in mind the petitioner's contentions and the principles discussed in the judgment.

Accordingly, the High Court set aside the order dismissing the First Appeal, the judgment of the District Judge in Civil (Misc.) Appeal, and the order dismissing the IA. It also condoned the delay of 123 days in filing the restoration application.

The Court stated, “Accordingly, the judgment and order dated 09.08.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Yupia in First Appeal No. 05/2023 and the judgment and order dated 18-05-2026 passed by the Learned District Judge, Yupia in Civil (Misc.) Appeal No. 2 of 2025 and the order dated 04-08-2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Yupia dismissing IA No. 7/2025 – are hereby set aside. The delay of 123 days in filing the application for restoration of the appeal is also condoned.”

The first appeal was restored for fresh adjudication by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Yupia after giving new opportunities to both sides. The petitioner was, however, directed to deposit Rs. 5,000 as costs before the District Legal Services Authority, Papumpare, Yupia. Both parties were directed to appear before the Civil Judge on September 7, 2026.

Case No.: Crl.Petn./101/2026

Case Title: Kabak Bhatt v. Ms Biki Shapiong

LL Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Gau) 127

Case Number: CRP/48/2026

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The Bombay High Court has held that Section 18 of the POSH Act read with Rule 11 of the POSH Rules does not confer any authority or jurisdiction on an employer to create or constitute an Appellate Authority. The Court further cautioned that public institutions must be cautious in interpreting, as a misconceived interpretation can lead to a chaotic situation.

A Division Bench comprising Justice G. S. Kulkarni and Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale was hearing a petition filed by Ashok Upadhyay, challenging the penalty imposed upon him by Union Bank of India following proceedings under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

The Petitioner had initially been exonerated by the Internal Complaints Committee, against which the complainant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Petitioner alleged that the Authority directed reinvestigation without either giving notice to the Petitioner or providing a hearing to him. The second Committee held the Petitioner guilty. Hence, the penalty under challenge was imposed on the Petitioner.

The Court noted that Section 18 provides for an appeal to the “court or tribunal” in accordance with the applicable service rules and, where no such service rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed. The Court observed that Rule 11 provides that an aggrieved person may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority notified under clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

On a cumulative reading of Section 18 and Rule 11, the Court observed:

“A cumulative reading of Section 18 read with Rule 11 do not bring about any authority or jurisdiction with the employer to create or constitute an Appellate Authority. If these provisions are so read, it would amount to defeating the provision(s) as also reading something in the provision which the legislature has avoided to incorporate.”

The Court further observed that the Bank could not point out any authority/jurisdiction in law which would empower the employer to appoint an Appellate Authority of its choice. Hence, the Court held that the Internal Appellate Authority constituted by Respondent No.1 was without jurisdiction, and cannot be labelled an Appellate Authority constituted as per the provisions of Section 18 and/or Rule 11.

“… the entire exercise undertaken by the Respondents leading to the passing of the impugned order, imposing penalty in question, is on the edifice of such patent illegality… the same has caused severe prejudice to the Petitioner… the order passed by the Appellate Authority, in our opinion, was non-est, and that too passed by an inherently illegal Appellate Authority,” the Court remarked.

The Court also expressed its displeasure at the approach of the Bank in dealing with the issue, noting that the same has caused prejudice not only to the petitioner but also to the complainant.

“The Bank and other such public institutions must be cautious and careful while interpreting legal provisions, lest the altogether misconceived interpretation made by the Respondent No. 1/Bank, leading to a chaotic situation,” the Court remarked.

The Court accordingly quashed the impugned orders and allowed the petition.

Case Title: Ashok Upadhyay v. Union Bank of India [Writ Petition No. 2385 of 2024]

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The bench of Justice CV Karthikeyan and Justice R Sakthivel had noted that the grievance of the petitioner was that in one scene of the movie, objectionable remarks were made against his village “Pappapatti” in Usialampatti Taluk, Madurai.

The court, however, perused the script of the movie and found that the movie only made reference to a fictional village “Pappampatti” and not the petitioner's village. The court remarked that though it aligned with the anguish expressed by the villagers, the reference in the movie was only to a fictional village and the producers never intended to harm the reputation of the village.

“ We align ourselves with the expressions of anguish of the villagers of Papappatti, but we would only assure that the reference in the movie was certainly not to ''PAPPAPATTI'' village in Usialampatti Taluk, Madurai District, but to an entirely fictional village. We are confident that the producers of the movie never had an intention to harm the reputation or even to cause any mental harm to any of the villagers of ''PAPPAPATTI'' village,” the court held.

The court was hearing a plea filed by M Chinnasamy. Chinnasamy contended that in one of the scenes in the movie, a voice-over is made in the line that while the elections were being held all over Tamil Nadu, the people of Pappampatti village boycotted the elections for the third time due to caste issues.

The petitioner argued that the reference to Pappampatti was actually a reference to the petitioner's village and it was very coincidental since the petitioner's village was afflicted with caste issues and had boycotted elections.

The court, however, noted that as per the script, the name of the village was Pappampatti and not Pappapatti. The court also noted that the script did not make any reference to a Taluk or to a District and was only a creative imagination of the script writer.

The court was thus inclined to dismiss the plea. However, understanding the grievance of the petitioner, the court instead recorded that it was disposing the plea.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. S. Vidhya Sagar

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. M. Karthikeya Vengadachalapathy CGSTC

Case Title: M Chinnasamy v The Chairperson CBFC

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 401

Case No: WP(MD) No 21450 of 2026

The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that mere attestation of an allegedly fraudulent document, without any specific allegation attributing an active role to the attesting witnesses in the alleged offence, cannot by itself make them criminally liable. [2026 LiveLaw (AP) 195]

The Court accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings against two accused who had been implicated solely on the ground that they had attested a disputed Gift Deed.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tuhin Kumar Gedela observed:

“As could be seen, the Courts have consistently held that the attesters cannot be held liable for merely attesting the documents.

After hearing both the parties, this Court accepting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that neither in the F.I.R nor in the charge sheet, which is filed after a complete investigation, except bald allegations that the petitioners stood as attesters to the document No.2820/2012, dated 23.04.2012, nothing else is stated and the allegations are omnibus and does not constitute any offence.”

“As per the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie case is made out against petitioners/accused Nos.8 and 9.”

The case arose out of allegations concerning a disputed Gift Deed. The de facto complainant alleged that the Gift Deed had been fraudulently created, giving rise to allegations of criminal conspiracy, forgery, use of a forged document as genuine, cheating and criminal trespass under Sections 120-B, 468, 471, 420 and 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

According to the charge sheet, the Gift Deed was allegedly prepared by another accused by changing his name, while the petitioners, arrayed as Accused Nos. 8 and 9, were alleged only to have attested the document. Apart from that, no specific role was attributed to them in the commission of the alleged offences.

Aggrieved by their implication in the case, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the trial court. They submitted that, except for the allegation of attestation, neither the complaint nor the charge sheet contained any specific allegation against them.

The State and the de facto complainant opposed the petition, contending that the truth of the allegations and the involvement of the petitioners were matters to be determined during trial.

The High Court, however, noted that the settled position of law is that attestation, by itself, does not establish knowledge of the contents of a document or participation in the transaction recorded therein.

The Court further noted that an attesting witness cannot be held criminally liable merely for signing a document as a witness, in the absence of material showing a specific role in the alleged offence. 

Finding the allegations against the petitioners to be bald and omnibus, the High Court held that, even if taken at face value, they did not disclose any offence or make out a prima facie case against them.

Applying the settled principles governing its inherent jurisdiction, the High Court found no prima facie case against Accused Nos. 8 and 9 and quashed the proceedings against them.

Case Title: Tadiboyina Narendra Kumar & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 9878 of 2022

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 195

Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused: Siva Rama Krishna Kolluru

Counsel for the Respondents/Complainants: Srinivasa Rao Narra, Public Prosecutor (AP)

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The Telangana High Court has set aside land acquisition used for creating a Resettlement Zone for families displaced by the Mid Manair Reservoir Project, holding that the existence of a public purpose is distinct from an urgency serious enough to justify depriving landowners of their statutory right to object to the acquisition. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 137]

The Court held that an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after issuance of preliminary notification for acquisition is a statutory safeguard available to landowners. The power under Section 17(4) to dispense with this enquiry is exceptional and requires circumstances showing that even the short time required for such an enquiry cannot be afforded the court added. 

For context, Section 4(1) provides for a preliminary notification expressing the Government's intention to acquire land for a public purpose. Section 5-A gives interested persons the right to object and be heard. Section 6 provides for a declaration that the land is required for a public purpose. Section 17 deals with urgent acquisitions: Section 17(1) permits possession before an award in cases of urgency, while Section 17(4) separately empowers the Government to dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry where the urgency provisions apply.

Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy observed:

“ The existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of such urgency as would justify elimination of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A. The Court must examine whether the material placed by the State establishes that the purpose of acquisition could not brook even the short period necessary for completing the statutory enquiry.

That principle assumes particular significance here, because the respondents have taken a categorical stand in their counter-affidavit that no urgency clause under Section 17 was invoked and that, therefore, Section 17(5) has no application...

The material does not disclose circumstances showing an urgency of such a nature that even the summary enquiry under Section 5-A could not have been held. The delay in proceeding thereafter is also inconsistent with the contention that the acquisition required immediate action so as to justify depriving the petitioners of the statutory safeguard.”

Referring to Supreme Court precedent, the Court said the existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of urgency sufficient to eliminate a Section 5-A enquiry. The power to dispense with the enquiry must therefore be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.

The Court also found a contradiction in the State's stand. Its counter-affidavit categorically stated that Section 17 had never been invoked. However, the Government's own Gazette notification expressly recorded invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(2).

The Court observed:

“The Gazette notification dated 24.03.2008, containing the declaration dated 21.03.2008 under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, expressly records invocation of the powers under Section 17(1) and (2) and states that possession could be taken on the expiry of fifteen days from publication of the notice under Section 9(1).... The statement in the counter-affidavit that Section 17 was never invoked is, therefore, contrary to the contemporaneous statutory record.”

The Court clarified that invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(2) does not automatically dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry. A separate exercise of power under Section 17(4) is required.

The State produced no independent order or material showing that this power had been exercised. Its alternative contention that Section 5-A notices had actually been issued also did not establish compliance, as the petitioners disputed service of those notices.

“If the case of the respondents is that the enquiry under Section 5-A was in fact held, they were required to establish compliance with the statutory requirements. If their case is that the enquiry was dispensed with, they were required to establish the lawful exercise of the power under Section 17(4). Neither position has been established.”

The writ petition was filed by Kusa Lachi Reddy and others challenging acquisition of their lands for a Resettlement Zone under the Mid Manair Reservoir Project.

A preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued on January 16, 2008. The Section 6 declaration was subsequently issued on March 21, 2008.

The petitioners contended that they were deprived of their statutory right to object and participate in a Section 5-A enquiry. The State maintained that the lands were required for a genuine public purpose and claimed that Section 5-A notices had been issued, but the petitioners either refused to receive them or failed to submit objections.

The High Court noted that although the Section 6 declaration was issued in March 2008, the State's own case referred to an award enquiry only in August 2009. This delay was inconsistent with a claim of urgency sufficient to deny the Section 5-A safeguard.

The Court did not quash the preliminary notification under Section 4(1), since the public purpose itself had not been found non-existent. Instead, it set aside the Section 6 declaration insofar as it concerned the petitioners' lands.

The Court also declined to hold that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act. Relying on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, it held that the period covered by an interim status quo order obtained by the petitioners had to be excluded while calculating the five-year period. It clarified that this did not cure the independent defects in the acquisition under the 1894 Act.

If the lands are still required for the stated public purpose, the authorities were permitted to proceed afresh under the presently applicable statutory regime.

Case Title: Kusa Lachi Reddy & Ors. v. District Collector, Karimnagar District & Anr.

Case No.: W.P. No. 26095 of 2009

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 137

Appearance: V.V. Ramana Rao for the petitioners; Katta Radha Reddy, Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, for the respondents.

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