The Allahabad High Court recently quashed an FIR lodged by a Judicial Official of the State against his doctor-wife and two others after finding that the criminal proceedings were "not bona fide but malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court".

A Bench of Justice Rajeev Misra and Justice Dr. Ajay Kumar-II allowed a writ petition filed by the wife and two others while setting aside the FIR lodged by a Judicial Officer in January this year.

The Court took into account two circumstances: the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and, more significantly, the contradiction between the FIR's allegation that the wife was refusing to cooperate in the divorce proceedings unless paid ₹1 crore and the admitted fact that the divorce decree had already been passed several months before the FIR was lodged.

" …impugned criminal proceedings have been engineered by first informant respondent-4 on account of an ulterior motive and for an extraneous consideration. As such, criminal prosecution of petitioners is not bona fide but malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court", the bench observed in its order.

Case in brief

The FIR alleged that the incidents took place on various dates between May 26, 2021 to November 18, 2025. However, the FIR did not explicitly mentioned any specific day, date or time as to when those occurrences took place.

The primary allegation against the wife was that she refused to grant a divorce until she was paid ₹1 Crore. Challenging the FIR, the wife moved the High Court, arguing that the FIR was belated.

Accepting this submission, the division bench noted that the delay in lodging the FIR had not been sufficiently explained.

The Court then examined the circumstances underlying the FIR. It found a fundamental contradiction between the allegation of demand for money and the undisputed chronology on record.

The wife/petitioner pointed out that her husband had instituted a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which was allowed, and divorce was decreed by the Family Court on September 8, 2025. The FIR, however, was lodged only on January 17, 2026.

Taking note of the same, the High Court questioned as to why the factum of the divorce decree granted by the competent Court in September 2025 was not disclosed in the FIR.

" Above statements of fact occurring in the FIR which is also the admitted case of the first informant respondent-4 is contrary to the record inasmuch as prior to the lodging of the FIR itself divorce decree had already been passed by the competent Court i.e. on 08.09.2025 whereas, the FIR was lodged on 17.01.2026", the Court remarked.

Thus, the allegation that the wife refused to cooperate in the divorce proceedings until the alleged ₹1 crore demand was met was found inconsistent with the fact that the divorce had already been granted before the FIR was registered.

After considering the unexplained delay and the contradiction concerning the divorce decree, the High Court remarked thus:

" …impugned criminal proceedings have been engineered by first informant respondent-4 on account of an ulterior motive and for an extraneous consideration…As such, criminal prosecution of petitioners is not bona fide but malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court".

The Court therefore concluded that the criminal prosecution arising from the FIR "cannot be sustained in law and fact".

Earlier, the couple had been referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, High Court, Allahabad, after the petitioners submitted that the dispute was essentially private and matrimonial in nature.

However, the mediation report dated June 20, 2026, indicated that no settlement had been reached between the parties. The Court thereafter examined the challenge to the FIR on its merits.

The High Court ultimately allowed the writ petition and quashed the FIR lodged under Sections 318(1), 115(2), 352, 308(6), 329(1), 324(4), 351(2) and 221 of the BNS.

Advocate S. M. Faraz I. Kazmi, appeared for the petitioners.

AGA appeared for State-respondents 1, 2 & 3.

Advocate Kapil Tyagi, represented the first informant-respondent-4.

Case title - SR and two others vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 608

Case Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 608

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Hearing the suo moto PIL concerning the severe waterlogging crisis in Prayagraj due to incessant rain, the Allahabad High Court today directed the Municipal Corporation, Prayagraj, to ensure that sufficient water pumps are deployed on the ground so that all low-lying areas of the city facing waterlogging issues are cleared within the next 24 hours.

A Bench of Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Garima Prashad passed the directions today while hearing the suo motu proceedings concerning waterlogging and failure of civic amenities in Prayagraj.

The Court is also concerned with the non-implementation of the State Government's December 20, 2024 policy for the preparation of a Drainage Master Plan.

It may be noted that Yesterday, the Court had directed the authorities, particularly the Municipal Commissioner, to clear low-lying, waterlogged areas within 24-48 hours and permitted the pumping of accumulated rainwater through Mori Gate, Daraganj, as an emergency measure.

HC Gives 24-Hour Deadline To Clear Waterlogging

Appearing before the Court today, Municipal Commissioner Seelam Sai Teja, informed the bench that he was hopeful that rainwater accumulated in low-lying areas would be pumped out within the next 4 to 8 hours.

He added that sanitation work would simultaneously be undertaken to prevent health hazards arising from stagnant rainwater.

He further informed the Bench that sufficient pumps had been installed at various locations with the assistance of U.P. Jal Nigam (Urban), Prayagraj, and that the process of removing rainwater was underway.

He also stated that an emergency short-term plan and a State policy for a long-term plan were in place to prevent recurrence of such waterlogging during heavy rainfall.

Senior Advocates appearing before the Court, however, submitted that the situation remained "grim and pathetic". The bench was informed that several areas are still waterlogged and that lawyers' chambers and residential areas had also been affected.

A need for sufficient pumps and sanitation work was also stressed upon. Considering the same, the bench directed the Municipal Corporation to ensure thus:

" ...all the low lying areas of city Prayagraj which are facing grim situation on account of waterlogging due to heavy rain, get cleared and complete sanitation work is carried out by the municipal corporation in these areas to ensure that no health issue emerges out on account of this emergent situation that has happened".

The Municipal Commissioner was specifically directed to ensure that enough pumps were installed wherever waterlogging continued and that the rainwater was pumped out within the next 24 hours.

The Court further directed that the required pumps be obtained from U.P. Jal Nigam (Urban), Prayagraj. If the Jal Nigam lacks sufficient pumps, the State Government has been directed to make the requisite number available within 12 hours.

The Municipal Commissioner was also directed to assess the situation within 2-3 hours and arrange the required pumps. The Court made it clear that it did not want to hear at the next hearing that the city's low-lying areas were still waterlogged.

The Court also directed the Municipal Commissioner to file a personal affidavit of compliance containing ward-wise and area-wise details of the portions of Prayagraj that had faced waterlogging due to incessant rain.

The Court has also sought details of those drains that are still choked, for whatever reason and whether desilting of the drains had been done in the recent past before the monsoon arrived.

The Court specifically sought details of the plan for removing silt from the underground drain passing under the railway bridge of Jawahar Lal Nehru Road, George Town and Sohabatiyabagh.

Importantly, Additional Advocate General Manish Goel placed before the Bench a personal affidavit of the Secretary, Urban Planning and Development, Government of Uttar Pradesh, along with directives issued under the December 20, 2024 notification concerning a long-term plan for controlling waterlogging and storm-water management.

The Court was also informed that an Apex Level Committee, chaired by the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, had been constituted for project implementation and that its meeting minutes had been placed on record.

Considering these submissions, the bench opined that these short-term measures may not be sufficient to ensure that the city of Prayagraj does not face such problems in the future.

It added that desilting of drains, construction of new drains and development of central area of rain water drain, would be long drawn plan and it would be a matter of larger public interest

In view of this, the Court appointed Senior Advocate Rakesh Pande as Amicus Curiae to assist it in the proceedings.

Noting that the matter concerns the "larger public interest affecting the life of the citizens of Prayagraj", the bench permitted affected persons and those wishing to place plans or suggestions before the Court to do so through the Amicus Curiae.

The Municipal Commissioner has been directed to submit a fresh personal affidavit of compliance, failing which he will have to appear before the Court. The matter has been listed for August 25, 2026 at 2 PM.

Earlier on August 18, the High Court had taken suo moto note of the waterlogging caused by incessant rain in the city of Prayagraj. The bench was informed that the issue had affected several parts of Prayagraj and that advocates and their clerks were unable to reach the Court.

The Court had observed that the inability of advocates and their clerks to reach Court and the destruction of case records “directly affects the Administration of Justice.”

The Allahabad High Court has observed that to attract 'common intention' liability under Section 34 IPC, the participation of a co-accused must have a "functional relationship with the offense in question".

The bench clarified that the mere fact that several persons participated in the same occurrence does not make each of them liable for every offence committed during it. 

A Bench of Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Padam Narain Mishra made this observation while dismissing a criminal appeal filed by an accused who was convicted of murder with the aid of Section 34 in connection with a 1985 case.

Briefly put, on December 18, 1985, the deceased Mamman Hussain, along with his son and daughter, was assaulted. Hussain later died of his injuries.

According to the prosecution, the accused entered the enclosure where the deceased and his son were proceeding to cut fodder and assaulted them with a lathi and tabals.

The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced them to life. Though all the other accused died during the pendency of their appeal before the High court, the appeal qua appellant-Jabir survived for consideration.

While considering the question as to whether common intention could be attributed to the appellant, the High Court explained that Section 34 requires participation connected to the offence for which constructive liability is sought to be imposed.

The Bench observed that Section 34 requires participation in the commission of the offence charged, however, the mere fact that several persons participated in the same occurrence does not make each of them liable for every offence committed during it.

The Court clarified that the participation of the co-accused must have a functional relationship with the offence in question so as to attract the common intention liability under Section 34 IPC.

Against this backdrop, when the Court examined the facts of this case, it found that common intention was established on the facts before it.

" All the accused/appellants came together, were armed and actively joined in the assault upon the deceased and PW-1 and, when Sharifan intervened, the assault extended to her as well. The participation of all the appellants, including the surviving appellant no.2, was thus directly connected with the offences for which the appellants were charged. The circumstances as a whole establish the requisite common intention," the division bench observed.

The Court specifically noted that surviving-appellant (Jabir) was armed with a tabal and he actively participated in the assault, and hence, his participation was established and the common intention was also attracted.

The High Court also rejected the accused counsel's challenge to the credibility of the 2 injured eyewitnesses. The bench said that minor discrepancies, variations in narration, errors in estimating time or sequence and omissions which do not affect the core of the prosecution case ordinarily do not justify rejection of otherwise credible testimony.

The counsel for the accused had also argued that the prosecution withheld independent and material witnesses named in the FIR, including Ahsan, Jahri and Bashir.

The Court, however, rejected the argument as an absolute proposition. It observed thus:

" Non-examination of a material witness is not by itself a ground for discarding evidence which is otherwise natural, trustworthy and convincing. The effect of withholding such a witness has to be considered in the circumstances of each case".

Ultimately, the Bench found that the evidence of the two injured witnesses was consistent on the material features and supported by medical examination and the surrounding circumstances.

The Court concluded that the prosecution had established surviving appellant's guilt “beyond reasonable doubt” and that the trial court's findings did not suffer from any illegality warranting interference.

Accordingly, the High Court affirmed his conviction under Sections 302/34, 307/34 and 323/34 IPC. The appeal was dismissed; the surviving appellant was directed to surrender before the trial court by September 20, 2026, to serve the sentence.

Advocate Sanjeev Kumar appeared for the petitioner

AGA Nagendra Kumar Srivastava appeared for the state

Case Title - Asgar and others vs. State 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 607

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 607

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The Allahabad High Court on Wednesday acquitted a man convicted of culpable homicide in connection with the burning death of his wife, observing that the dying declaration was recorded in the presence of relatives/family members and therefore could not be safely relied upon.

A Bench of Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Achal Sachdev allowed the criminal appeal filed by Jagan against the judgment of the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 3, Moradabad, which had convicted him under Section 304 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Briefly put, the appellant was accused of pouring kerosene oil on his wife (named Triveni) and setting her on fire on December 23, 2015. She was taken to the Government Hospital, Moradabad, where a dying declaration was recorded after the doctors certified that she was fit to give a statement.

In the dying declaration, Deceased-Triveni stated that her husband (appellant) had burnt her by sprinkling kerosene oil and setting her on fire.

However, the High Court found circumstances that cast doubt on the reliability of the dying declaration.

The Court noted that PW-1, the deceased's brother, had categorically stated during his cross-examination that the Magistrate had recorded the statement of the deceased in the presence of all family members, including her son, his wife and his bua.

Taking note of this same, the Bench observed thus:

" In view of the fact that the dying declaration was got recorded in the presence of all the family members, no importance could be attached to it".

The High Court also noted that the appellant-husband himself had suffered burn injuries while attempting to save his wife.

"…there were sufficient evidence to the fact that the husband had tried to save his wife and in the process he had also got burnt", the Court noted.

A doctor who was examined by the defence also stated that the injuries suffered by the appellant could have been caused when a person attempted to douse a burning person. Another defence witness, also a Doctor, testified that the deceased had been brought to the hospital by the appellant's mother.

The Court also considered the circumstances preceding the incident, as it noted that the appellant and the deceased had been married for 18 years and had no children.

It noted that the evidence indicated that disputes between the couple arose over the question of which side's child should be adopted. While the deceased's family wanted a child from her parental side to be adopted, the appellant's side wanted his brother's child to be adopted.

The Court observed:

" The incident had occurred on account of there being a tussle in the family as to which child of which family had to be adopted".

The Bench further observed that, considering the marriage had lasted for 18 years, “it could not in any manner be presumed that there was any kind of demand etc. of dowry from the side of the first informant.”

The High Court therefore examined whether Triveni had burnt herself or whether it was the “misdeed of the accused.”

Considering the dying declaration having been recorded in the presence of family members, the appellant's burn injuries while attempting to save his wife and the surrounding circumstances, the Court opined thus:

" …it could not with any certainty be said that the deceased was put on fire after pouring kerosene oil by the accused. Having held thus, we are of the view that definitely the husband could not be outrightly blamed for the incident".

In view of this, the appeal was allowed and the trial court's judgment of 2018 was set aside. The appellant-husband was "honourably acquitted" of the charges.

Senior Advocate VP Srivastava, assisted by Advocate Prarabadh Jain, for the appellant.

AGA Amit Sinha, for the State.

Case Title - Jagan vs. State of UP 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 606

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 606

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