The case arose from a government order appointing the second-ranked candidate, arrayed as the fifth respondent, as President of the Commission, instead of the petitioner, who had topped the merit list.

Justice Balaji Medamalli held that under Rule 6(11) of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure of Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020, the State Government's role is confined to verifying the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee, and does not extend to altering the order of merit.

“If the State Government finds some material against the candidate recommended in the order of merit, the only option left with it, is to bring the aforesaid material to the notice of the Selection Committee for taking appropriate action, instead of the State Government changing the list by itself,” the Court observed.

Referring to the provisions governing the roles of the Selection Committee and the State Government under the Rules, the Court said that the committee is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the suitability of the candidates and examining the relevant eligibility criteria.

“ Once the Selection Committee has conducted such an assessment and forwarded the panel in the order of merit, the State Government cannot independently reassess the suitability of the candidates or make an appointment contrary to the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court noted.

The Court placed reliance on a Division Bench ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Tadikonda Suneetha v. Dr. Vajrala V.L. Narsimha Rao & Others, which dealt with a similar appointment dispute. The judgment was subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court, which declined to interfere with the High Court order.

“The legal position is well settled that the scope of interference by the State Government with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee is limited to the extent provided under Rule 6(11) of the Rules. In terms of Rule 6(11) of the Rules, the State Government is required to verify the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee,” the Court said.

It noted that if any adverse material is found against the candidate during the verification process, then it has to be placed before the Selection Committee.

“In the event any adverse material is found during such verification, the State Government is required to place the same, along with its opinion, before the Selection Committee for reconsideration of its recommendation,” the Court observed.

The Court said that after such reconsideration, if the Select Committee reiterates its recommendation, the State Government has no option except to act upon the said recommendation and issue the appointment order.

“The State Government cannot independently alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by overlooking the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court said, holding that the government had deviated from the merit-based recommendations of the Selection Committee.

“Consequently, the appointment of respondent No.5 as President, District Commission, Vijayawada, cannot be sustained,” the Court held.

The Court set aside the appointment order, and directed the State Government to place its opinion, the antecedent verification report and other relevant material before the Selection Committee within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, enabling the Selection Committee to reconsider the matter and take action in accordance with law.

Background

The petitioner, Rayala Kiran Kumar, a practising advocate, had applied for the post of President of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, as per the January 2022 notification. He was found eligible and was called for interview before the Selection Committee.

Later, the fifth respondent was appointed to the post vide G.O.Rt.No.39, dated 28.07.2022.

The petitioner subsequently learnt, through information obtained under the Right to Information Act, that he had secured 21 out of 30 marks and was placed first in the order of merit, whereas the fifth respondent had secured 18 marks and was placed second. The State Government overlooked the recommendations of the Select Committee and the petitioner's superior merit while making the appointment, the petitioner alleged.

The petitioner submitted that the Selection Committee is empowered to determine its procedure for making recommendations under Rule 6(9) and recommend a panel of candidates in order of merit for appointment by the State Government under Rule 6(10). On the other hand, the State Government is only required to verify or cause verification of the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates under Rule 6(11), and cannot alter the recommendations of the committee unless adverse remarks are found against the candidates, particularly during the verification process, the petitioner submitted.

The petitioners alleged that the Government had failed to follow the prescribed procedure and had proceeded with the selection process in violation of the Consumer Protection Recruitment Rules, 2020.

The State Government, on the other hand, requested the dismissal of the writ petition, arguing that mere inclusion of a candidate in the selection list does not confer any vested right to appointment.

Case: Rayala Kiran Kumar vs Union of India & others,

W.P.NO. 30995 OF 2024

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 198

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a habeas corpus petition seeking custody of minor children is not maintainable where the children are in the custody of their father pursuant to a mutually agreed settlement between the parents.[2026 LiveLaw (AP) 197]

A Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Purushottam Kumar Chintalapudi dismissed with costs the mother's petition seeking production and restoration of custody of her two minor children. The Court found that the parents had agreed under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the children would remain in the father's custody.

The Court observed:

“Once it was agreed mutually between the petitioner and the R5 that the custody of the children shall remain solely with the husband, the children cannot be said to be in any illegal custody of the R5-father.

The representation was made without disclosing the aforesaid settlement; Memorandum of Understanding and the order dated 18.09.2025 passed in Crl.P.No.9564 of 2025 by the High Court for the State of Telangana, in which the Memorandum of Understanding was made as part of the order. The Habeas Corpus petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has misused the process of this Court by suppression of the material facts.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court by way of a habeas corpus petition seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution.

She alleged that her husband had forcibly removed their two minor children from her care and custody and that their whereabouts were unknown. She sought directions to trace and produce the children before the Court and restore their custody to her as their mother and natural guardian.

The State informed the High Court about a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into between the petitioner and her husband to resolve their matrimonial disputes. Under the settlement, the husband agreed to a financial settlement, while “the custody and care of the children” were to remain solely with him.

The Court noted that the same MoU had also been referred to in an earlier order of the Telangana High Court in criminal proceedings against the petitioner's husband and another accused. In those proceedings, the Telangana High Court had quashed the criminal case against them after taking the settlement between the parties into account.

The present petitioner had been impleaded as a respondent in those proceedings. Although notice was issued to her, it was returned with the endorsement “unclaimed” and was consequently treated as duly served.

The Court further noted that, although the petitioner was provided Legal Aid Counsel after stating that she did not understand English, her counsel stated that she knew English. The petitioner had herself provided counsel with the MoU and the Telangana High Court order, and also read the MoU fluently in English before the Court. When asked why these documents were not disclosed in her earlier representation, she stated that she did not consider them relevant.

The Court observed that the petitioner had set the Court's machinery in motion without disclosing the material facts, resulting in the appearance of her husband, mother-in-law and two children before it.

Holding that the petition was not maintainable and involved suppression of material facts, the Bench dismissed it and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- on the mother. 

The amount was directed to be invested in fixed deposits in the names of the two children, with Rs. 25,000/- each payable upon attaining majority. The Court also declined to accept her apology.

Case Title: In Re v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

Case No.: W.P. No. 18034 of 2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 197

Counsel for the Petitioner: Smt. Santhi Sree Vallabhaneni

Counsel for Respondent(s): Sri J. Krishna Praneeth, AGP

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The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that mere attestation of an allegedly fraudulent document, without any specific allegation attributing an active role to the attesting witnesses in the alleged offence, cannot by itself make them criminally liable. [2026 LiveLaw (AP) 195]

The Court accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings against two accused who had been implicated solely on the ground that they had attested a disputed Gift Deed.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Tuhin Kumar Gedela observed:

“As could be seen, the Courts have consistently held that the attesters cannot be held liable for merely attesting the documents.

After hearing both the parties, this Court accepting the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that neither in the F.I.R nor in the charge sheet, which is filed after a complete investigation, except bald allegations that the petitioners stood as attesters to the document No.2820/2012, dated 23.04.2012, nothing else is stated and the allegations are omnibus and does not constitute any offence.”

“As per the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that no prima facie case is made out against petitioners/accused Nos.8 and 9.”

The case arose out of allegations concerning a disputed Gift Deed. The de facto complainant alleged that the Gift Deed had been fraudulently created, giving rise to allegations of criminal conspiracy, forgery, use of a forged document as genuine, cheating and criminal trespass under Sections 120-B, 468, 471, 420 and 447 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

According to the charge sheet, the Gift Deed was allegedly prepared by another accused by changing his name, while the petitioners, arrayed as Accused Nos. 8 and 9, were alleged only to have attested the document. Apart from that, no specific role was attributed to them in the commission of the alleged offences.

Aggrieved by their implication in the case, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings pending before the trial court. They submitted that, except for the allegation of attestation, neither the complaint nor the charge sheet contained any specific allegation against them.

The State and the de facto complainant opposed the petition, contending that the truth of the allegations and the involvement of the petitioners were matters to be determined during trial.

The High Court, however, noted that the settled position of law is that attestation, by itself, does not establish knowledge of the contents of a document or participation in the transaction recorded therein.

The Court further noted that an attesting witness cannot be held criminally liable merely for signing a document as a witness, in the absence of material showing a specific role in the alleged offence. 

Finding the allegations against the petitioners to be bald and omnibus, the High Court held that, even if taken at face value, they did not disclose any offence or make out a prima facie case against them.

Applying the settled principles governing its inherent jurisdiction, the High Court found no prima facie case against Accused Nos. 8 and 9 and quashed the proceedings against them.

Case Title: Tadiboyina Narendra Kumar & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 9878 of 2022

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 195

Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused: Siva Rama Krishna Kolluru

Counsel for the Respondents/Complainants: Srinivasa Rao Narra, Public Prosecutor (AP)

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Dismissing pleas by Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation (GVMC) and the District Collector challenging a GO granting ryotwari patta rights, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the District Collector designated by government to perform statutory duties, cannot file a writ petition against the Government's own revisional order.

[2026 LiveLaw (AP) 194]

“An Officer designated by the Government to perform statutory duties cannot file a writ petition to challenge the Government's own orders, as the Officer is fundamentally bound by the State's hierarchical decision. This is clearly impermissible in law besides being an antithesis to the 'doctrine of finality' in view of the judgment referred to supra,” Justice Sumathi Jagadam observed, while referring to the Apex Court's ruling in Roop Chand vs State of Punjab.

The Court said that “delegate” means little more than an agent, adding that an agent does not exercise personal powers, but rather acts on behalf of the principal.

“Because the authority emanates from the statute directly to the Government, any officer the Government appoints to exercise that statutory power is doing so on behalf of the Government,” the Court said.

It added, “The District Collector, who passed the order, was delegated power under the statute by the Government, as such, he is not exercising any administrative power. Therefore, the contention of the learned Government pleader that the District Collector is an aggrieved party by the order of the State Government cannot be countenanced at all,” holding that the petition by the District Collector was “not maintainable.”

However, as GVMC had also challenged the same Government order, the Court proceeded to deal with the merits of the case in both petitions.

Not Barred by Limitation

The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the claim of unofficial respondents seeking ryotwari patta was barred by limitation. The petitioners pointed out that the Settlement Fair Adangal (revenue record) was prepared during the settlement operations in 1959, but the claimants approached the authorities, under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act, much later in 1995.

The Court noted that the application of the unofficial respondents filed before the Settlement Officer under Section 11(a) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, was already rejected on the ground of limitation in 1995, and the same was subsequently upheld in revision.

However, when the matter reached High Court in 1999, the Court in its 2003 order directed the Government to consider their representations on merits, without being influenced by the earlier findings.

The court held that this earlier High Court direction had put the issue of limitation to rest.

“This Court is of the view that the directions issued in W.P.No.9038 of 1999, directing the Government to consider the representations of the unofficial respondents on merits, had put to rest the dispute of limitation once for all,” the Court held.

Nature Of Land and Possession

The petitioners contended that the disputed land was “Water Works Poramboke” and therefore could not be assigned to private individuals. The Court rejected the contention after examining the Settlement Fair Adangal and other revenue records.

It noted that the Settlement Fair Adangal entries recording the predecessors of the private respondents as ryots in possession of the land were subsequently modified without any proceedings by striking off the relevant extracts.

“Therefore, the records clearly established that on the date of survey and settlement operation and at the time of preparation of Settlement Fair Adangal, the unofficial respondents' forefathers were in possession of the subject land and their names were registered in the Settlement Fair Adangal as roitys,” the Court said, holding that the subject lands were not “Water Works Poramboke”.

The Court also noted the existence of cist receipts pertaining to 1929, 1939, 1946 and 1947 and other documentary material supporting the unofficial respondents' claim of possession.

“The undisputed fact remains that the predecessors of the unofficial respondents are ryots and the land is zeroity. Their names are recorded in the Settlement Fair Adangal and other related records. They were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property prior to the cut off date 01.07.1945, which is also evident from the various proceedings filed before this Court and discussed elaborately by the Revisional Authority in the impugned order,” the Court said.

The Court found that the Revisional Authority had considered the nature of the land, the possession claimed by the respondents and the relevant pre- and post-abolition records before arriving at its conclusion.

Scope of Certiorari Jurisdiction

The Court said that the petitioners had failed to make out a case for issuance of a writ of certiorari against the revisional order.

Relying on the Supreme Court's judgments in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, the Court reiterated that certiorari is a supervisory, and not appellate, jurisdiction.

“The writ petitioners could not make out any case that warrants interference of this Court, more particularly, a Writ of Certiorari which, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, cannot be issued on mere asking,” the Court held.

The Court upheld the revisional order, observing, “The revisional order dated 21.12.2017 passed by the Revisional Authority does not warrant any interference, as the writ petitioners did not make out any substantive ground for issuance of Writ of Certiorari.”

The Court dismissed both writ petitions, finding them devoid of merit.

Background

The dispute concerned various land parcels measuring 11.15 acres in Mudasarlova village, Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal. Mudasarlova village formed part of the erstwhile Vizianagaram Estate, which was abolished following the enactment of the Estates Abolition Act.

The predecessors of the private respondents claimed ryotwari patta rights over the land, relying on their alleged long-standing possession and entries in the revenue records.

Their applications under Section 11(a) were initially rejected by the Settlement Officer in 1995 on the ground of limitation. The subsequent revisions before the Director of Settlements and the Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records were also unsuccessful.

The claimants thereafter approached the High Court. In 2003, the High Court directed the Government to consider their representations on merits without being influenced by the earlier findings.

Following the direction, the District Collector rejected the claimant's case in 2006, finding that the they had failed to establish possession prior to July 1, 1945 and that the land had been resumed by the Government.

Later, the claimants filed a revision petition before the Government. The Special Chief Secretary, Revenue Department, exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 11, allowed the claimants' revision on December 21, 2017.

GVMC and the District Collector thereafter challenged the Government's order before the High Court.

Case title: Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation v/s The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

WRIT PETITION NOs: 5306 and 11889 OF 2018

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 194

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