The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that a para-veterinary qualification obtained from a university established by law cannot be denied recognition merely because the university is not separately recognised by the State Government or registered with the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council.

The Court further held that Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council Rules, 2011, to the extent it imposed such additional requirements, was in conflict with the parent Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council Act, 2010 and was therefore liable to be struck down.

A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Justice Ranjan Sharma remarked that: “Rule 14 of the HPPVC Rules, 2011, to the extent it provides that institutions/Universities imparting training shall have to be registered with the State Council, as well as providing that only Universities recognized by the State Government shall be eligible for registration in the State Council, is in direct conflict with the provisions of the HPPVC Act, 2010.” 

Background:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Himachal Pradesh, had completed a Diploma in Veterinary Science and Animal Health Technology from the College of Veterinary Science, Rampura Phul, Punjab, a constituent college of Guru Angad Dev Veterinary and Animal Sciences University (GADVAS University), Ludhiana.

After completing the diploma, she applied for registration with the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council. Her application was rejected on the ground that the diploma was not recognised by the Himachal Pradesh Government and that the institution was not registered with the State Council, as required under Rule 14 of the HPPVC Rules, 2011.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court held that GADVAS University, being a university established by law, falls within the definition of a recognised institution under Section 2(j) of the HPPVC Act, 2010. Therefore, its para-veterinary qualification did not require separate recognition by the Himachal Pradesh Government. 

The Court rejected the respondents' contention that the university was required to be recognised by the State Government or registered with the State Council. It held that Rule 14 could not impose conditions beyond those prescribed by the parent Act. 

The Court held that the portion of Rule 14 requiring universities imparting para-veterinary training to be registered with the State Council and recognised by the State Government was in direct conflict with the HPPVC Act, 2010 and was therefore ultra vires. 

Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned portion of Rule 14 and the rejection communication dated July 28, 2025, and directed the State Council to register the petitioner within one week, subject to completion of other formalities. 

Case Name: Riya Sharma v/s State of H.P. & Ors.

Case No.: CWP No.14874 of 2026

Date of Decision: 15.07.2026

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The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that mere protest or use of intemperate language against a public servant, in the absence of any overt act that actually obstructs the discharge of official duties, does not constitute an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The Court observed that while “obstruction” need not necessarily be physical, the prosecution must establish an act involving force, threat, or an actual effect of preventing the public servant from carrying out his duties. Passive conduct, without disturbing the public servant in the discharge of official functions, cannot amount to voluntary obstruction under Section 186 IPC.

Justice Sandeep Sharma remarked that: “Mere protesting or using intemperate language, without an overt act, will not be an offense punishable under Section 186 of Indian Penal Code. Passive conduct without disturbing a public servant in discharge of his functions or duties will not amount to voluntarily obstructing a public servant within the meaning of Section 186 of Indian Penal Code.”

Background:

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking quashing of a Kalandra registered under Sections 186 and 189 IPC. The case arose after police officials stopped the petitioners' vehicle during a naka and issued challans for alleged violations under the Motor Vehicles Act, including installation of LED lights. The police alleged that the petitioners made allegations against the officials and thereby obstructed them in the discharge of their duties.

he Court found that the petitioners had stopped their vehicle when signalled by the police and had produced the required documents. Despite the alleged remarks against the police officials, the police were able to perform their duty and proceeded to issue the challan. The Court therefore found no material demonstrating that the petitioners had actually prevented or dissuaded the police official from discharging his public function.

The Court emphasised that Section 186 IPC requires voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of a public function. It held that the expression “voluntarily” contemplates an overt act and that mere passive conduct does not amount to obstruction.

The Court further observed that while obstruction need not necessarily be physical, there must be an act involving force, threat, or an effect that actually obstructs the public servant from carrying out his duties. 

Holding that the basic ingredients of Section 186 IPC were absent and that the chances of conviction were remote, the Court concluded that continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

It accordingly quashed the Kalandra and the consequential proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, and acquitted the accused of the charges.

Case Name: Sanjay Kumar Khanna v/s State of H.P. & anr.

Case No.: CrMMO No. 954 of 2024

Date of Decision: 28.07.2026

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The Court made the observation while dealing with a petition challenging the rejection of a woman's candidature for the post of Van Mitra, after she married during the pendency of the selection process. It held that her eligibility had to be assessed with reference to the date of her application and that her subsequent change in marital status could not, by itself, disentitle her from appointment.

Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: there is no law in this country which ordinarily says that if an unmarried lady applies for a post, then she is under legal obligation not to change her marital status till the recruitment process is over that too for posts like Van Mitra

Background:

The Himachal Pradesh Forest Department invited applications for engagement as Van Mitra, with December 30, 2023 as the last date. Nitu Kumari applied for the post for Drang Beat and was ranked first after clearing the physical efficiency test.

During the recruitment process, she married in March 2024. By the time her documents were verified in November 2024, she had shifted to her husband's village and was no longer listed as part of a BPL family in her parental Gram Panchayat. The Department consequently denied her the relevant marks and selected another candidate for the post.

Aggrieved, Nitu Kumari approached the High Court challenging the rejection of her candidature and the appointment of the other candidate.

The High Court held that the petitioner's candidature could not be rejected merely because she married during the recruitment process. Since she was eligible when she applied, her eligibility had to be assessed as on the date of her application.

The Court observed that the Department had taken nearly a year to verify the candidates' documents and could not expect the petitioner to remain unmarried until the recruitment process was completed. Her change in marital status could not deprive her of the benefit of the status she held when she applied.

As the petitioner was the most meritorious candidate for Drang Beat, the Court held that the rejection of her candidature was bad in law. It quashed the rejection and directed the authorities to appoint her as Van Mitra with effect from the date the other selected candidates were appointed, along with consequential monetary and seniority benefits.

However, the Court did not disturb the appointment of the private respondent, noting that she was not at fault. The Department was directed to either continue her in the same Beat or adjust her to another nearby Beat.

Case Name:Nitu Kuamri v/s State of H.P. & Ors.

Case No.: CWP No.7895 of 2025

Date of Decision: 03.08.2026

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Background Facts

The respondent was working as an employee. He was promoted to the post of Senior Assistant on 01.03.2017. The Revised Pay Regulations of 2022 were issued by Office Order No.1 dated 12.04.2022. The respondent exercised an option for pay fixation by a factor of 2.59 on 09.05.2022 within the stipulated time.

Later, Office Order dated 13.04.2022 was issued which provided for a 15% hike with effect from the date of promotion for employees promoted between 01.01.2016 and 12.04.2022. The respondent was posted in the field, so he became aware of this Office Order only when he was posted at Headquarters in January 2023. He noticed disparity in his pay as compared to his juniors who were drawing a higher salary. He found that the pay disparity was attributable to the option exercised by his juniors in terms of Office Order dated 13.04.2022.

The respondent filed a representation dated 02.05.2024 seeking to exercise option with respect to 15% hike with effect from 01.05.2017. The representation was rejected on the ground that it was submitted at a belated stage.

Aggrieved by the rejection, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court. The Single Judge allowed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants filed the appeal before the Himachal Pradesh High Court against the Single Judge order.

It was argued by the appellants that the respondent had been given sufficient time to exercise option, which was extended up to 12.10.2022. It was contended that the representation was rejected because it was submitted at a belated stage. The appellants further submitted that the extensions of time granted by Office Orders pertained to the Revised Pay Regulations, 2022. Further that sufficient opportunity was given to employees to exercise their option.

On the other hand, it was argued by the respondent that he was not aware of Office Order dated 13.04.2022 as he was posted in the field. When he was posted at Headquarters in January 2023 then he became aware of the disparity in his pay as compared to his juniors. He submitted that the pay disparity was attributable to the option exercised by his juniors in terms of Office Order dated 13.04.2022.

Findings and Observations of the Court

It was noted by the Division Bench that the respondent had exercised an option for pay fixation by a factor of 2.59 within a period of two months from the issuance of Revised Pay Regulations, 2022. It was further observed that Office Orders extending time had nothing to do with Office Order dated 13.04.2022 which provided for a 15% enhancement.

It was found by the Bench that in Office Orders, conspicuous by absence was a mention of the Office Order dated 13.04.2022, whereby the option of a 15% hike with effect from the date of promotion had been granted. It was further observed that the respondent had been promoted on 01.03.2017 and therefore satisfied the condition specified in Office Order dated 13.04.2022.

It was observed that the Office Order dated 13.04.2022 was related to financial aspects and has serious implications towards the monthly salary of the respondent. Therefore, just stating that the said letter was in the public domain, i.e., on the website of the respondents, was not enough to dispense with the requirement of bringing it to the notice of the employee.

The case of Harla vs. State of Rajasthan was relied upon wherein it was held that promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential for a law to become operative. Further the judgment in Satish Kumar vs. State of H.P. & Ors. was also relied upon by the Division Bench.

It was held by the Bench that there was no delay on the part of the respondent as the petition was only filed once the respondent became aware of Office Order dated 13.04.2022.

With the aforesaid observations, the order of the Single judge was upheld by the Division Bench. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed by the Division Bench.

Case Name : HPSEBL and Anr. v. Narender Kumar

Case No. : LPA No.36 of 2026

Counsel for the Appellants : Sunita Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Aman Hansretta, Advocate

Counsel for the Respondent : Surender Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Sidharth Negi, Advocate