Justice R Vijayakumar noted that the student and others had raised their agitation in a peaceful and democratic manner and there was no allegation of any damage to public property. Thus, the court held that continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process of law.

“ The petitioner and others, who belong to a Student Association had conducted a protest in front of a Conference Hall, where a meeting was conducted for eradication of Sanatana Dharma, The petitioner and others have raised their agitation in a peaceful and democratic manner and further, there is no allegation of any damage to any public property. In such circumstances, continuation of the criminal proceedings would only be an abuse of process of law,” the court observed.

The court was hearing a petition filed by Senthoorvelan. Senthoorvelan, along with seven others, had protested against the conduct of a conference for eradication of Sanatana Dharma. The prosecution alleged that despite warnings by police officials, the petitioners and others blocked the road and caused inconvenience to the general public.

The petitioner argued that he had raised his objection with regard to the conduct of the meeting and had peacefully conducted the protest in front of the Conference Hall. The petitioner argued that the same could not be considered an offence. The petitioner also pointed out that the chargesheet had not been filed for the past three years.

The prosecution argued that though the chargesheet was ready, it had not been filed yet.

Noting that the petitioners had conducted their protest peacefully and no public property had been damaged, the court was inclined to quash the case. Thus, the court quashed the FIR not only against the petitioner student but against all other accused also.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. PR. Malan

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. G. Ganesh Kumar Government Advocate (Crl.Side)

Case Title: M Senthoorvelan v State of Tamil Nadu and Another

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 404

Case No: Crl OP (MD) No 16688 of 2026

Justice V Lakshminarayanan closed the plea after taking note of the State's submission that the police officials on the route of the rally have granted permission.

“ The State Public Prosecutor submits that the police officials situated on route of the rally have all granted permission to the petitioner to take the bike rally. His statement is recorded. As the relief sought for by the petitioner is granted, this Writ Petition stands closed,” the court said.

The party had approached the court through its Vice President Kali Poongundran after the State police denied permission for conducting the bike rally. The party argued that it had a right of speech and expression to assemble peacefully and without arms under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. Thus, the party argued that the order of denial for propagating against NEET and EWS was against the Constitution.

The party argued that there cannot be a complete ban or prohibition on expressing the views of citizens or people. The party argued that a total prohibition on the program is against the constitutional mandate and thus the order is liable to be set aside.

When the matter was being heard, the State Public Prosecutor initially submitted that the petitioners could form a human chain if needed and objected to a bike rally. To this, the judge had orally remarked that the State could not dictate how the petitioners should protest and could not suppress the citizens.

The court remarked that the organisation was only expressing its right by riding the bike and not indulging in any anti-social activities. The court highlighted that the State had a duty to protect thoughts which it did not support also.

Later, when the matter was again taken up, the State submitted that it was not against the principles for which the rally was being carried out and that it had also passed a resolution in the Assembly against NEET. However, when the State raised concern against the protest against EWS, the court orally remarked that the police should not be concerned with the content of a protest and are bound to protect it, as long as it doesn't fall under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which permits reasonable restrictions.

The State then informed the court that it was willing to permit the rally if logistic details, including bike details, were provided, so that the State could arrange bandobast. The court had then directed the petitioners to provide details of the bike.

After the State's direction, the petitioner organisation provided the details of the bike, the route through which the rally was to be taken and the time of the rally. The State informed that the same were considered and necessary permissions had been granted.

Considering the same, the plea was closed.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. J. Ravindran Senior Counsel for Mr. M. Senniappan

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. R. John Sathyan State Public Prosecutor Assisted by Mr. R. Ganesh Kumar Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Crl.Side)

Case Title: Dravidar Kazhagam v The Director General of Police and Others

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 403

Case No: WP Crl No 1934 of 2026

Justice B Pugalendhi added that the directions were intended to strengthen the quality of medical evidence before the court, to reinforce confidence in expert witnesses and minimise the possibility of errors. The court highlighted that the efficiency of the justice delivery system relied heavily on the credibility of expert evidence and thus every medical professional needed to discharge their duty with the highest standard of competence.

“ The efficacy of the justice delivery system depends, to a considerable extent, upon the credibility of expert evidence. It is, therefore, imperative that every medical professional entrusted with this responsibility discharges it with the highest standards of competence, objectivity and professional integrity,” the court said.

The court directed that the circular should highlight the ethical standards expected of every expert witness and that every medical witness is expected to depose objectively, honestly and impartially. The court said that the circular should include the necessity of ensuring that Accident Registers, Wound certificates, medico-legal reports and all other medico-legal records accurately record the clinical findings and professional opinion formed at the time of examination.

The court also highlighted the importance of making entries in the Accident Register, wound certificate and other records in a clear, legible and unambiguous manner, avoiding illegible handwriting, unexplained abbreviations and ambiguous expressions. The court added that whenever the infrastructure permits, the records may be generated in a typed or computer-generated format so that it is readily comprehensible.

The court also called for preparing a revised proforma for Medico-Legal Examination of Survivors/ Victims of Sexual Violence issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

The court emphasised that the expert witness should familiarise themselves with the relevant medical records before entering the witness box, that the witness should carefully understand every question put during the chief and cross-examination, and wherever any ambiguity exists, to seek appropriate clarification. The court added that the deposition should be carefully read and verified before signing.

The court was hearing a petition filed by two accused in a POCSO case seeking to suspend their sentence while the appeal against conviction was pending. The allegation against the men was that they had sexually abused an 8-year-old victim boy by compelling him to do oral sex and by inserting their private parts into the boy's anal rectum. The men were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years for offences under Sections 6 read with 5(m) and 5(l) of the POCSO Act.

The men argued that the Doctor who treated the boy, in his cross-examination, had said that there was no injury to the anal rectum and the mouth of the victim boy. Thus, arguing that the prosecution case was not proved medically, the men sought to suspend the sentence.

The prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that in the Chief examination, the doctor had stated that he found injuries in the mouth and anal rectum of the victim boy.

Noting the apparent inconsistency, the court sought details from the doctor. The doctor submitted that the initial examination was conducted by another medical officer and that the injuries were entered in the hospital records, but the same were not properly recorded in the Wound certificate, giving rise to the inconsistency.

Considering the explanation, and after perusing the medical records, the court dismissed the plea for suspending sentence after finding that the grounds canvassed by the petitioners lacked merit. However, the court deemed it fit to highlight the importance of medical evidence in POCSO cases, and deemed it fit to issue directions accordingly.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. J. Vivek, Mr. G. Karuppasamy Pandian

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. A. S. Abul Kalaam Azad Government Advocate (Crl.side)

Case Title: Nambu Kaleeswaran and Another v The State of Tamil Nadu

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 402

Case No: Crl MP(MD) Nos.5823 & 6941 of 2025

The bench of Justice CV Karthikeyan and Justice R Sakthivel had noted that the grievance of the petitioner was that in one scene of the movie, objectionable remarks were made against his village “Pappapatti” in Usialampatti Taluk, Madurai.

The court, however, perused the script of the movie and found that the movie only made reference to a fictional village “Pappampatti” and not the petitioner's village. The court remarked that though it aligned with the anguish expressed by the villagers, the reference in the movie was only to a fictional village and the producers never intended to harm the reputation of the village.

“ We align ourselves with the expressions of anguish of the villagers of Papappatti, but we would only assure that the reference in the movie was certainly not to ''PAPPAPATTI'' village in Usialampatti Taluk, Madurai District, but to an entirely fictional village. We are confident that the producers of the movie never had an intention to harm the reputation or even to cause any mental harm to any of the villagers of ''PAPPAPATTI'' village,” the court held.

The court was hearing a plea filed by M Chinnasamy. Chinnasamy contended that in one of the scenes in the movie, a voice-over is made in the line that while the elections were being held all over Tamil Nadu, the people of Pappampatti village boycotted the elections for the third time due to caste issues.

The petitioner argued that the reference to Pappampatti was actually a reference to the petitioner's village and it was very coincidental since the petitioner's village was afflicted with caste issues and had boycotted elections.

The court, however, noted that as per the script, the name of the village was Pappampatti and not Pappapatti. The court also noted that the script did not make any reference to a Taluk or to a District and was only a creative imagination of the script writer.

The court was thus inclined to dismiss the plea. However, understanding the grievance of the petitioner, the court instead recorded that it was disposing the plea.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. S. Vidhya Sagar

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. M. Karthikeya Vengadachalapathy CGSTC

Case Title: M Chinnasamy v The Chairperson CBFC

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 401

Case No: WP(MD) No 21450 of 2026

The bench of Justice GR Swaminathan and Justice MD Sumathi noted that when there was no stay on the divorce order, the status of the woman was that of a “divorced woman” and she was thus entitled to remarry. The court thus refused relief to a husband, dismissing an appeal against the order of divorce. 

“ Though the appeal was filed within time, interim stay was not granted. The order granting divorce was fully in force. The status of the respondent [wife] herein was that of a divorced woman. She was, therefore, technically entitled to marry,” the court observed.

During the course of the hearing, the wife informed the court that she had remarried in the meanwhile and thus the appeal itself had become infructuous. The court noted that though the appeal against the order of divorce was filed on time, it was dismissed for non-prosecution and later restored.

The court held that when the appeal was dismissed for default, the rigours of Section 15 of the Act would not apply.

“ Deriving inspiration from Krishnaveni Rai, we would hold that once an appeal has been dismissed for default, Section 15 loses its sting. Section 15 talks about dismissal. This expression would include within its ambit “dismissed for default or non-prosecution” also. When the application for restoration is taken up and it is reported that the respondent has remarried, the appeal has to be dismissed as infructuous. It is irrelevant when the remarriage took place,” the court said.

The court noted that as per Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, either party to the marriage could marry again when the marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce, and either there is no right of appeal or if there is a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal or an appeal has been presented but dismissed.

The court called for an amendment to the Section to make sure that while the appeal is presented in time, the appellant should also obtain an interim stay of the decree of divorce within 2 months thereafter.

“ We would respectfully suggest that Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act deserves an amendment. It should not be enough if the appeal is presented within time. The appellant must also obtain an interim stay of the decree of divorce within two months thereafter,” the court said.

The bench was hearing an appeal filed by a husband against the Family Court's order allowing the wife's plea and granting an order of divorce. The couple got married in 2001 as per Hindu rites and customs and had 2 children from the marriage. The wife had filed the divorce plea alleging cruelty and desertion.

The court noted that the Family Court had granted divorce after noting that the husband had doubted the wife's character and enquired about her conduct with the security guard of the residential quarters. The court noted that the husband had, even as per his own admission, posed certain queries to their daughter about the mother's conduct. Following this, the wife had left the matrimonial home.

The court noted that the husband's suspicion about the wife's conduct would constitute cruelty. The court noted that this seed of suspicion would later take a firm root and would make conjugal company incompatible. The court also added that no self-respecting spouse would put up with such a conduct.

The court also noted that after the wife left the matrimonial home with the children, the husband had not taken any step for reconciliation or maintained the children. The court held that such an attitude would amount to desertion as it would show that the husband was not interested in sustaining the marriage.

“ The appellant had not taken any step for reunion or reconciliation. The respondent cannot be blamed for having left the matrimonial home. As already mentioned, the appellant was elder to her by 11 years. When the appellant doubted the chastity of the respondent, it was bound to cause her mental anguish. From the indifference shown by the appellant, one can conclude that he was not interested in sustaining the marriage. Indifference coupled with failure to maintain the children can certainly constitute willful neglect thereby amounting to desertion. The appellant was guilty of constructive desertion,” the court noted.

Thus, the court dismissed the plea.

Counsel for Appellant: Mr. P. R. Prithiviraj

Counsel for Respondents: Mr. S. Manojkumar

Case Title: R v J

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 400

Case No: CMA (MD) No 672 of 2021

Justice V Lakshminarayanan decided to consider the matter on merits after the counsel for the parties informed the court that the mediation talks had failed. Meanwhile, the court has dispensed with the personal appearance of the Minister before the Judicial Magistrate Court.

It may be noted that on July this year, the court had ordered mediation after being informed that there was a possibility of amicable settlement between the parties, since they were close relatives. The court had thus directed the Mediation and Conciliation Centre attached to the High Court to take up the case and conclude the mediation proceedings on or before August 17 and to submit a report before the court.

Following this, when the matter came up for hearing before the court, the counsel appearing for the de facto complainant (sister-in-law) informed the court that they did not want to mediate the issue.

Wilson's counsel alleged that the de facto complainant was changing their stance and though four rounds of mediation talks had taken place, it did not lead to any positive result.

The de facto complainant informed the court that she had agreed to mediation only because the court had suggested the same and that she did not wish to mediate the matter. When Wilson's counsel insisted that the matter be sent for mediation, the court asked how it could force a party to mediate when they did not want to do the same.

The court added that though the de facto complainant may have agreed to mediate in the previous hearing, she could decide otherwise at any time during the mediation proceedings. The court thus decided to hear the case on merits and adjourned the case to August 28.

The case against the Minister was lodged by the Puducherry Lawpet Police Station for offences under Sections 448, 427, 324, 506(i), 294(b) read with Section 34 of IPC. It was alleged that the Minister and his father had trespassed into the house of the sister-in-law, abused and assaulted her and her husband (the Minister's brother) with a wooden log, causing injuries, and had criminally intimidated them. It was alleged that the assault arose out of a dispute relating to the adoption and upbringing of a minor child.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr. Ramasamy Meiyappan Government Advocate

Case Title: Marie Wilson v The Station House Officer and Another

Case No: Crl OP No. 18057 of 2026