The Punjab and Haryana High Court has acquitted a man who was convicted in a 1998 dowry death case, holding that the prosecution must first establish the foundational ingredients of Section 304-B IPC before the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act can be invoked.

Justice Mandeep Pannu observed that where the deceased herself had consistently stated, immediately after sustaining burn injuries and subsequently in a dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, that she had suffered burns accidentally, the prosecution was required to convincingly rule out the possibility of accidental death.

“The prosecution is also required to rule out the possibility of an accidental death before the statutory presumption can be invoked.”

The Court was dealing with an appeal filed by Bhanu Prakash, challenging his conviction under Section 304-B IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri, which had sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The deceased's father had also filed a revision seeking enhancement of the sentence.

The case arose from the death of the appellant's wife, Geetika Sharma, who sustained 90% burn injuries at the matrimonial home on August 4, 1998 and died five days later.

According to the prosecution, Geetika had been subjected to harassment and cruelty in connection with dowry demands. Her father alleged that the appellant had poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.

However, the deceased's earliest account was materially different.

When she was brought to the hospital, she stated that she had sustained the burn injuries accidentally. She subsequently made a statement before a Judicial Magistrate after the Magistrate obtained the doctor's opinion regarding her fitness to make the statement.

In the dying declaration, she stated that she was painting the kitchen wall and, while soaking the paint brush in kerosene oil, the kerosene splashed onto her clothes and the floor. The bottle also fell down and, since the gas stove was switched on, her clothes caught fire.

The High Court noted that the deceased did not implicate her husband or any other member of her matrimonial family in either of these accounts.

The Court held that there was no convincing material to demonstrate that the Magistrate's statement had been recorded under any influence or that the deceased was incapable of understanding the questions and giving rational answers.

“In the present case, the position is somewhat different and, in fact, significant for the appellant. The dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate does not implicate the appellant. Rather, the deceased stated that she had sustained the burn injuries accidentally,” the Court said.

The Court also attached significance to the fact that Geetika survived for approximately five days after the incident. Her parents had reached PGI, Chandigarh, during this period and her mother was present with her. Yet, no complaint alleging dowry harassment or accusing the appellant of setting her on fire was made while she was alive.

The FIR was registered only after her death on August 9, 1998.

Justice Pannu clarified that delay in lodging an FIR is not, by itself, sufficient to discard a prosecution case. However, in the facts of the case, the delay assumed significance when considered alongside the deceased's two contemporaneous accounts of accidental burning.

The prosecution had also relied upon a note dated May 3, 1998, allegedly written by the deceased, in which she had accused her husband, father-in-law and brother-in-law of harassment and stated that they would be responsible in case of her death.

The Court emphasised that merely establishing that a woman died an unnatural death within the matrimonial home is not sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. The prosecution must establish that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry and that such cruelty or harassment occurred “soon before” her death. The expression “soon before”, the Court said, incorporates a requirement of proximity and there must be a “proximate and live link” between the alleged dowry-related cruelty and the death.

The Court further held that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act does not arise automatically merely because the death was unnatural. “The statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, therefore, cannot be invoked mechanically,” the Court said. It explained that the presumption arises only after the prosecution establishes the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the foundational fact that the deceased had been subjected to dowry-related cruelty or harassment by the appellant soon before her death.

The Court noted that the evidence supporting accidental burning included the deceased's earliest statement to the doctor and her subsequent statement before the Magistrate. The prosecution had failed to produce reliable evidence sufficient to render these statements unworthy of belief.

Rejecting this reasoning, the High Court observed that such a possibility could not constitute the basis of a criminal conviction. “A conviction cannot rest upon a possibility or conjecture, particularly when the deceased herself had given a version of accidental burning.”

The Court also reiterated that the burden does not shift to the accused to establish innocence unless the prosecution first establishes the foundational facts constituting the offence.

Holding that the prosecution evidence did not cross the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court.

Case Title: Bhanu Parkash v. State of Haryana & Anr.

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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has directed the Chief Secretaries of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh to issue circulars fixing responsibility on erring Heads of Office wherever they fail to follow the procedure prescribed for timely processing of pension and gratuity papers.

The Court was dealing with a case where a retired Junior Engineer was denied interest on retiral dues paid more than a year after his retirement.

Justice Sudeepti Sharma directed, "Chief Secretary of Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh are directed to issue circular/instructions to Head of Office and fix the responsibility upon the erring Head of Office for not following Chapter IX ('Determination and Authorisation of the Amounts of Pension and Gratuity') in Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. II, 1953, Chapter IX ('Procedure relating to Pensions Applications for Grant of Pensions') in Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. II, 1953 (as applicable to Haryana) and Chapter VIII ('Determination and Authorisation of the Amounts of Pension and Gratuity') in Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, which are in existence since long."

The Registrar General was directed to supply a copy of the judgment to the three Chief Secretaries for compliance.

The Court recorded that it felt "at pain" to observe that despite dedicated chapters governing pension processing having existed since 1953 for Punjab and Haryana and since 1972 for the Centre, employees continue to be forced to litigate for release of retiral benefits and interest on delayed payment. It noted that a number of such cases remain pending before it for this reason alone.

Since the three sets of rules, governing Punjab, Haryana and the Centre respectively,  are substantially the same, the Court observed that if Heads of Office simply followed the procedure already laid down, "the litigation for retiral benefits would come to an end." It held that for such lapses, ignorance or lethargy, the Head of Office ought to be penalised, and that the employee should not suffer for the employer's failure to follow rules of long standing.

The petitioner retired as a Government employee on 30.06.2016. His claim for interest on delayed payment of gratuity, leave encashment and provident fund was rejected by order dated 19.07.2019, on the ground that the delay was attributable to him for having submitted his pension papers on 03.08.2016, two months after retirement, rather than eight months before it, as required.

The impugned order set out at length the department's version of events: gratuity (DCRG) was finally paid only on 14.10.2017, leave encashment on 16.11.2017, and provident fund on 14.11.2017, each held up at various stages by objections, fresh sanctions required across financial years, and bills returned by the Treasury for lapse of budgetary funds at year-end.

Why The Delay Could Not Be Attributed To The Employee

The Court examined Chapter IX of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume II, 1953 in detail. Rule 9.1 requires the Head of Department to prepare, every quarter, a list of employees due to retire within the next 24 to 30 months. Rule 9.2 requires the Head of Office to write to the Accounts Officer (Rents) at least two years before the anticipated retirement date of an allottee employee for a 'No Demand Certificate'.

Rule 9.3 requires preparation of pension papers  to begin two years before retirement. Rule 9.4 divides that two-year preparatory period into three stages, verification of service, making good omissions in the service book from the employee, all of which "shall" be completed eight months prior to retirement. 

The Court held that the word "shall" makes these obligations mandatory upon the Head of Office, and that the object of the framers was plainly to ensure disbursal of pensionary benefits immediately upon retirement so that pensioners do not suffer for their livelihood.

Observing that it is "not the case of respondents" that any intimation was sent to the petitioner in terms of these rules calling for his papers in advance, the Court held that the department could not rely on provisions it had itself never followed. The delay could not be attributed to the employee "unless and until it is shown by the respondents (employer) that as per the requirement of the above referred to Chapter IX... they called for the papers and tried to obtain the papers from the employee but the employee did not deliver the papers on time." No such material existed on record.

Relying on Supreme Court authorities, the Court held the delay attributable to the respondents and awarded interest at 9% per annum on the delayed payment of gratuity, leave encashment and provident fund.

The writ petition was allowed accordingly.

Title: Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab and others

Appearances: Mr. P.K.S. Gill, Advocate for the petitioner;

Ms. Arundhati Kulshreshtha, AAG, Punjab.

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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed the Haryana Public Service Commission's introduction of minimum qualifying marks for the interview stage in the recruitment of Assistant Professors for Government Medical Colleges, holding that a recruiting authority cannot alter eligibility criteria after the selection process has commenced, particularly once the list of shortlisted candidates already stands published.

Faulting the timing and effect of the change, Justice Harpreet Singh Brar observed that the Commission "cannot afford such doubts regarding its credibility as Caesar's wife must remain above all suspicion."

"Merely 06 days before the interview process was scheduled to commence, has cast an air of doubt around the methodology adopted by the respondent-HPSC. Being a State-run recruiting agency, the respondent-HPSC cannot afford such doubts regarding its credibility as Caesar's wife must remain above all suspicion," the judge said.

The Director General Medical Education and Research, Haryana (DGMER) advertised 189 posts of Teaching Faculty (Assistant Professor) in Super Speciality and Broad Speciality disciplines on 31.05.2022. The prescribed scheme awarded 75 marks on a detailed pre-merit academic criteria and 25 marks for interview, with no minimum qualifying threshold mentioned for either component. A corrigendum dated 27.09.2022 made no change to this scheme.

The two main petitioners, doctors working as Senior Residents at PGIMS, Rohtak, applied respectively for posts in Orthopaedics and Anesthesiology under the BCA category, scored 44 and 40 marks on the pre-merit criteria, and were called for interview by announcements dated 07.12.2022 and 08.12.2022, with interviews scheduled for 19.12.2022 and 20.12.2022.

On 13.12.2022, six days before interviews were to begin, and after the shortlist was already public — HPSC issued an announcement prescribing minimum qualifying marks for the interview: 50% for the general category and 45% for reserved categories. Both petitioners appeared for interview but failed to clear this newly introduced threshold. The result declared on 23.12.2022 excluded them, and their representations went unanswered.

Senior Advocates for the petitioners, led by Mr. Akshay Jindal, argued that no minimum marks for interview had been prescribed either in the original advertisement or in the shortlisting announcements, and that HPSC had thereby changed the rules of the game mid-process, contrary to K. Manjushree v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008), Hemani Malhotra v. High Court of Delhi, 2008, and Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala (2023).

It was pointed out that against 189 posts only 90 candidates were called for interview, and in the BCA category only one candidate had reached this stage for each of the two posts in question, making the academic pre-merit criteria, not the interview, the more meaningful measure of a post-graduate doctor's suitability.

HPSC, represented by Senior Advocate Gaurav Chopra among others, submitted that the interview remained worth 25 marks as originally advertised and that no fresh criterion had been "added", only a minimum qualifying threshold introduced to maintain competence standards, since candidates were otherwise assessed solely on academic qualifications.

Weightage is not the same as a qualifying threshold

After hearing the submissions, the Court drew a sharp distinction, "While the weightage of a stage pertains to how much a component counts towards the aggregate, the qualifying threshold answers a different question i.e. whether a candidate can be eliminated from consideration, regardless of aggregate merit."

The interview remained worth 25 marks in name, but HPSC's announcement altered eligibility itself, attempting, in the Court's words, "to nullify the effect of the marks obtained in terms of the carefully curated pre-merit criteria."

Who owns the selection scheme

The Court held that the scheme had been laid down by DGMER as employer, HPSC being "merely engaged for conducting interviews", with nothing on record indicating it was authorised to modify the criteria. Relying on Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade, (2019) 6 SCC 362, the Court reiterated that it is the employer who is best placed to decide the qualifications and standards a candidate must meet.

Arbitrariness and timing

Invoking Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020), that where the rule of law disappears, "we are ruled not by laws but by the idiosyncrasies and whims of those in power" — the Court held that introducing an eligibility-limiting condition six days before interviews were to commence, with the shortlist already known to HPSC, "cast an air of doubt around the methodology adopted."

While no direct evidence of mala fide was found, the Court held the surrounding circumstances raised concern, particularly since the modification would exclude candidates from the zone of consideration on interview marks alone, contrary to a scheme that contemplated selection on aggregate merit.

The Court quashed the announcement dated 13.12.2022 and set aside the result of 23.12.2022 to the extent it excluded candidates for failing to meet the newly introduced qualifying marks.

HPSC was directed to re-evaluate and finalise the selection afresh, strictly on the criteria originally stipulated in the advertisement, aggregate merit out of 100 marks (75 for pre-merit academic credentials, 25 for interview), without any minimum qualifying cut-off for the viva voce.

Case Title: Dr. Surender Singh and another v. State of Haryana and others, and connected matters

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The Central Government on Thursday notified the appointment of nine advocates as Additional Judges of Punjab and Haryana High Court. 

Union Law Minister Arjun Ram Meghwal took to X to notify the appointments. The post states,

"In exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution of India, after consultation with Chief Justice of India, the President is pleased to appoint the following Advocates as Additional Judges in the Punjab and Haryana High Court..."

The appointees are: 

1. Monica Chhibber Sharma,

2. Harmeet Singh Deol,

3. Pravindra Singh Chauhan

4. Rajesh Gaur

5. Puja Chopra,

6. Sunish Bindlish,

7. Minderjeet Yadav,

8. Divya Sharma,

9. Ravinder Malik

The Supreme Court Collegium had on May 4 approved the elevation of ten advocates as judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court including advocate Navdeep Singh, whose name does not form part of the list of appointees notified today.  

It may be noted that Pravindra Singh Chauhan is currently the Advocate General of Haryana, Rajesh Gaur and Mininderjeet Yadav are Additional Advocate general for Haryana and Harmeet Singh Deol is Additional Advocate General of Punjab.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has expressed concern over remarks made by a Senior Advocate during the hearing of anticipatory bail pleas, observing that such conduct was “never expected” from senior members or designated Senior Advocates of the Bar.

Justice Sanjay Vashisth made the observation while hearing two connected petitions filed by ex-DSP Gursher Singh Sandhu, seeking anticipatory bail in separate cases registered under provisions of the IPC/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The first FIR, registered in October 2024, concerns allegations under Sections 419, 465, 467,468 and 471 IPC, corresponding provisions of the BNS, and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The second FIR, registered in June 2025, invokes provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 61(2) BNS, corresponding to Section 120-B IPC.

During the hearing, the Court noted that the prosecution case originated from a complaint by Baljinder Singh, following an earlier criminal writ petition filed by him before the High Court seeking protection of his life and liberty.

An inquiry was thereafter conducted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Rupnagar Range, pursuant to directions issued by the High Court, following which registration of the FIR was recommended.

As per the prosecution case, it was prima facie found that Sandhu, while posted as DSP, had allegedly been involved in large-scale extortion by arranging false complaints against different persons and thereafter compelling them to pay money under threat of criminal proceedings.

The prosecution also alleged that he was involved in benami transactions and laundering of proceeds of crime.

However, during the hearing, the Court also turned its attention to the role of the complainant.

The Court recorded that the State had assured that the complainant's role would also be examined to determine whether the alleged offences were made out against the petitioner alone or against the complainant or any other person as well.

The Court observed that despite this assurance, the State had not undertaken the exercise so far.

“Respondent State was expected to look into the said aspect on its own. However, till date no such consideration or exercise seem to have been undertaken by the respondent-State, thus, the delay on such aspect is attributable to the State itself,” the Court recorded.

At this stage, Senior Advocate G.K. Mann, appearing for the complainant, questioned why such a direction had been issued to the State at the preliminary stage when the complainant had not been heard.

The Senior Counsel further submitted that the observation made by the Court reflected “complete bias” on its part.

The Court, however, chose not to comment further on the remarks.

Justice Vashisth observed:

“ This Court would refrain from commenting upon the remarks made by Ms. G.K. Mann, learned Senior Advocate, and would rather leave it to Ms. G.K. Mann, learned Senior Advocate, to examine the remarks, which were not conducive to the proceedings, after leaving the Court and upon considering the matter in its entirety.”

The Court then expressed its concern over the conduct, observing:

“ However, this Court would express its concern that such conduct or such remarks are never expected from worthy senior members/designated Senior Advocates of the Bar.”

The Court clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations or the factual and legal issues involved at this stage.

It accordingly deferred detailed consideration of the anticipatory bail pleas and directed the State to place before it the complete factual and legal position, including the role of the complainant and any other person, if warranted.

The Court directed that the matter be listed on September 7, 2026.

Till the next date of hearing, the arrest of Sandhu was stayed.

Title: GURSHER SINGH SANDHU V/S STATE OF PUNJAB

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