The Telangana High Court has set aside land acquisition used for creating a Resettlement Zone for families displaced by the Mid Manair Reservoir Project, holding that the existence of a public purpose is distinct from an urgency serious enough to justify depriving landowners of their statutory right to object to the acquisition. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 137]

The Court held that an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after issuance of preliminary notification for acquisition is a statutory safeguard available to landowners. The power under Section 17(4) to dispense with this enquiry is exceptional and requires circumstances showing that even the short time required for such an enquiry cannot be afforded the court added. 

For context, Section 4(1) provides for a preliminary notification expressing the Government's intention to acquire land for a public purpose. Section 5-A gives interested persons the right to object and be heard. Section 6 provides for a declaration that the land is required for a public purpose. Section 17 deals with urgent acquisitions: Section 17(1) permits possession before an award in cases of urgency, while Section 17(4) separately empowers the Government to dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry where the urgency provisions apply.

Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy observed:

“ The existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of such urgency as would justify elimination of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A. The Court must examine whether the material placed by the State establishes that the purpose of acquisition could not brook even the short period necessary for completing the statutory enquiry.

That principle assumes particular significance here, because the respondents have taken a categorical stand in their counter-affidavit that no urgency clause under Section 17 was invoked and that, therefore, Section 17(5) has no application...

The material does not disclose circumstances showing an urgency of such a nature that even the summary enquiry under Section 5-A could not have been held. The delay in proceeding thereafter is also inconsistent with the contention that the acquisition required immediate action so as to justify depriving the petitioners of the statutory safeguard.”

Referring to Supreme Court precedent, the Court said the existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of urgency sufficient to eliminate a Section 5-A enquiry. The power to dispense with the enquiry must therefore be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.

The Court also found a contradiction in the State's stand. Its counter-affidavit categorically stated that Section 17 had never been invoked. However, the Government's own Gazette notification expressly recorded invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(2).

The Court observed:

“The Gazette notification dated 24.03.2008, containing the declaration dated 21.03.2008 under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, expressly records invocation of the powers under Section 17(1) and (2) and states that possession could be taken on the expiry of fifteen days from publication of the notice under Section 9(1).... The statement in the counter-affidavit that Section 17 was never invoked is, therefore, contrary to the contemporaneous statutory record.”

The Court clarified that invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(2) does not automatically dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry. A separate exercise of power under Section 17(4) is required.

The State produced no independent order or material showing that this power had been exercised. Its alternative contention that Section 5-A notices had actually been issued also did not establish compliance, as the petitioners disputed service of those notices.

“If the case of the respondents is that the enquiry under Section 5-A was in fact held, they were required to establish compliance with the statutory requirements. If their case is that the enquiry was dispensed with, they were required to establish the lawful exercise of the power under Section 17(4). Neither position has been established.”

The writ petition was filed by Kusa Lachi Reddy and others challenging acquisition of their lands for a Resettlement Zone under the Mid Manair Reservoir Project.

A preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued on January 16, 2008. The Section 6 declaration was subsequently issued on March 21, 2008.

The petitioners contended that they were deprived of their statutory right to object and participate in a Section 5-A enquiry. The State maintained that the lands were required for a genuine public purpose and claimed that Section 5-A notices had been issued, but the petitioners either refused to receive them or failed to submit objections.

The High Court noted that although the Section 6 declaration was issued in March 2008, the State's own case referred to an award enquiry only in August 2009. This delay was inconsistent with a claim of urgency sufficient to deny the Section 5-A safeguard.

The Court did not quash the preliminary notification under Section 4(1), since the public purpose itself had not been found non-existent. Instead, it set aside the Section 6 declaration insofar as it concerned the petitioners' lands.

The Court also declined to hold that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act. Relying on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, it held that the period covered by an interim status quo order obtained by the petitioners had to be excluded while calculating the five-year period. It clarified that this did not cure the independent defects in the acquisition under the 1894 Act.

If the lands are still required for the stated public purpose, the authorities were permitted to proceed afresh under the presently applicable statutory regime.

Case Title: Kusa Lachi Reddy & Ors. v. District Collector, Karimnagar District & Anr.

Case No.: W.P. No. 26095 of 2009

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 137

Appearance: V.V. Ramana Rao for the petitioners; Katta Radha Reddy, Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, for the respondents.

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The Telangana High Court has dismissed two appeals by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) against an order setting aside its revocation of Layout Regularisation Scheme (LRS) permissions for two plots, after refusing to condone delays of 820 and 794 days in filing the appeals. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 136]

The Court also found little prima facie merit in GHMC's allegation that the plot owners' vendor had committed fraud, noting that the Corporation had regularised the plots with full knowledge that they were situated in the open space of an unapproved layout.

A Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Renuka Yara held that GHMC had itself collected penal and pro-rata charges for the shortfall in open space before granting LRS permissions and subsequent building permissions. It therefore could not claim that it had been kept in the dark about the reduction of open space.

The Bench observed:

"It is the petitioners who with full knowledge about shortfall of open area granted LRS proceedings and also granted building permissions. This fact pattern shows that even in case the case of petitioners to condone delay is considered on the basis of merits, there is little scope for prima facie case of fraud or misrepresentation."

The Bench particularly rejected GHMC's reliance on election duties to explain the subsequent delay. It observed:

"Even assuming that all the aforementioned sequence of events are sufficient cause for delay, the time period thereafter allegedly was taken up on account of entrustment of Special Election Duties for the State Telangana Assembly Elections followed by Parliament Elections. This reason seems far-fetched, as the staff of petitioner-corporation may be engaged in election duties, but the Zonal Commissioner can always take a decision about filing the Writ Appeal. The City Planner also could have sought necessary instructions for filing Writ Appeal or not.

The staff being busy with election duty does not seem a convincing reason for the simple reason that while the staff are busy with election duties, the decision makers could have always decided whether or not to file a Writ Appeal and inform the same to the Standing Counsel, who were appointed by proceedings in G.O.Ms.No.517 dated 10.10.2022. Even in case the staff are busy, the Standing Counsel would not be engaged with election duties and therefore they could have always prepared the grounds of Writ Appeal. Further, the petitioners waiting to seek legal opinion from the Standing Counsel till the culmination of elections does not seem convincing"

The appeals arose from two writ petitions filed by Siri Constructions and Darshinee Infra Projects against GHMC's July 23, 2018 revocation notices concerning Plot Nos. 22/A and 19/A respectively. A Single Judge had, by a common order dated April 25, 2022, allowed the writ petitions and set aside the revocation notices. GHMC filed appeals against this order after delays of 820 and 794 days.

Explaining the delay, GHMC said that the zonal official dealing with the matter, M. Narsimha Ramulu, had been apprehended by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on April 21, 2022 in a disproportionate assets case. Another City Planner was thereafter placed in additional charge, followed by the appointment of a regular City Planner in August 2022. GHMC's Standing Counsel were also changed in October 2022.

GHMC further submitted that when the respondents subsequently sought restoration of their building permissions, the file was put up in November 2023. However, officials were then occupied with the Telangana Assembly elections and subsequently the Parliamentary elections, delaying the process of obtaining legal advice on whether an appeal should be filed.

The developers opposed condonation. They pointed out that they had submitted representations on May 24, 2022 and March 7, 2023, along with copies of the Single Judge's order, seeking restoration of their building permissions and grant of occupancy certificates. They argued that GHMC therefore had full knowledge of the judgment but failed to challenge it within time.

The Division Bench agreed that the reasons offered by GHMC did not explain the entire delay. It said that even if the ACB case against the concerned official justified some initial delay, a regular City Planner had been appointed by August 2022 and a decision on filing an appeal ought to have been taken within a reasonable period thereafter.

Similarly, while a change of Standing Counsel could require some time for the new counsel to take over, the Court noted that no action was taken for more than a year. It found that GHMC "did not take up any initiative to file the Writ Appeals" until the developers sought implementation of the earlier judgment.

The Court also considered GHMC's argument that the merits should not be shut out merely on limitation because public interest was involved in preserving open spaces. However, it found that the Corporation had complete knowledge of the location of the plots when it granted regularisation.

Since GHMC had collected penal and pro-rata charges for the shortfall in open space, the Court held that there could be no question of the vendors having concealed this fact from it. It therefore found "little scope for prima facie case of fraud or misrepresentation" even if the merits were considered while deciding the applications for condonation.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed GHMC's applications seeking condonation of delays of 820 and 794 days. Consequently, both writ appeals were also dismissed.

Case Title: Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v. Siri Constructions; Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v. Darshinee Infra Projects

Case Nos.: I.A. No. 1 of 2024 in/and W.A. No. 1028 of 2024; I.A. No. 1 of 2024 in/and W.A. No. 1033 of 2024

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 136

Appearance: A. Sudarshan Reddy, Advocate General, for GHMC and the other appellants; K. Durga Prasad for the respondents.

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The Telangana High Court has directed that children of Central Government, Central Government Corporations and Central Public Sector Undertakings (CPSUs) employees who studied outside State due to their parent's posting, must be given benefit of local candidature for medical and dental admissions on same terms as children of State Government employees. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 135]

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh and Justice G.M. Mohiuddin held that, pending a formal amendment, the proviso to Rule 3(a)(iii) of the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission Rules, 2017 must be read to include these categories. The Court said there was no justifiable reason to exclude children of Central Government employees when similar exceptions had already been carved out for other categories of transferable employees.

The Bench observed:

“From the plain reading of the aforesaid clauses, it is relevant to note that if exceptions can be carved out for those categories, reflected in the aforesaid clauses of exceptions, then is no justifiable reason for excluding the Central Government employees posted outside of State of Telangana and their children from availing benefit of the said exception so carved out.”

The Court accordingly directed:

“It is hereby declared that the proviso to Rule 3(a)(iii) of the Telangana Medical & Dental Colleges Admission (Admission into MBBS & BDS Courses) Rules, 2017, as amended by G.O.Ms.No.150, Health, Medical & Family Welfare (C1) Department, dated 08.09.2025, shall, pending the issuance of a formal amendment, be read to include children of employees of the Central Government, Central Government Corporations, and Central Public Sector Undertakings, who have served or are serving outside Telangana, for the extension of the benefit of the said proviso, on the same terms and conditions as are applicable to the children of State Government employees.”

The Court passed the order on a petition filed by Kodimela Samhitha, who qualified NEET (UG)-2026 with 385 marks and sought admission to MBBS/BDS courses for the academic year 2026-27.

The petitioner's father is an employee of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (ESIC), a corporation under the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment. He joined service in 1997 and served at different places in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

While the family was residing in Hyderabad, her father was transferred to Tirupati in December 2016 and continued to serve there until May 2024, when he was transferred back to Hyderabad.

Consequently, although the petitioner had studied from Nursery to Class IV in Hyderabad, she pursued Classes V to X and her Intermediate education in Tirupati. She was therefore unable to satisfy the requirement of studying for four consecutive academic years in Telangana to qualify as a local candidate.

The petitioner relied on a Nativity Certificate issued by the Tahsildar, Hyderabad District, certifying that her father was a native of Telangana and that her education outside the State was occasioned by his official transfer.

However, she was excluded from local candidature under Rule 3(a)(iii), as amended by G.O.Ms.No.150 dated September 8, 2025.

The Rule generally requires a candidate seeking admission under the Competent Authority Quota to have studied in Telangana for at least four consecutive academic years ending with the year in which they appeared for the qualifying examination.

The proviso, however, makes exceptions for candidates who studied outside Telangana during this period because of their parent's service. These include children of Telangana State Government employees; serving or retired officers belonging to the Telangana cadre of the All India Services; specified defence personnel, ex-servicemen and Central Armed Police Force personnel; and employees of corporations, agencies or instrumentalities under the Telangana Government who are liable to be transferred anywhere in India.

It did not extend the same exception to children of Central Government employees or employees of Central Government Corporations and Undertakings.

The petitioner challenged this exclusion as arbitrary and discriminatory under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

She argued that the purpose of the exception was to protect students who were compelled to study outside Telangana because of the transferable nature of their parent's employment. There was no rational distinction, she submitted, between children of State and Central Government employees where both had to leave Telangana because of an official transfer.

The petitioner contended that the relevant consideration should be why the student studied outside Telangana and not whether the parent happened to be employed by the State or Central Government. The exclusion was therefore manifestly under-inclusive, she argued.

The State told the High Court that while framing the proviso pursuant to a Supreme Court judgment dated September 1, 2025, it had confined the exception to categories of employees having a direct nexus with the Telangana Government.

However, the Advocate General fairly conceded that the rationale underlying the exception — protecting children compelled to study outside Telangana because of their parents' official transfers — would equally apply to children of Central Government employees.

The State assured the Court that the issue was under active consideration and that an appropriate amendment or clarification was likely to be issued.

In view of this concession, the High Court did not adjudicate the constitutional validity of the impugned provision. Instead, it adopted what it described as a “purposive and constructive approach” to prevent hardship to the petitioner and similarly situated candidates while the proposed amendment was being finalised.

The Court directed Kaloji Narayana Rao University of Health Sciences to treat the petitioner as a local candidate for admission to MBBS/BDS courses for the 2026-27 academic year under the Competent Authority Quota and permit her to participate in the ongoing counselling process.

It further directed the Telangana Government to expeditiously issue the necessary clarification or formal amendment to G.O.Ms.No.150 to include employees of the Central Government, Central Government Corporations and CPSUs within the exception.

The Court clarified that its declaration and the relief granted to the petitioner would operate pro tanto pending issuance of the formal amendment by the State.

Case Title: Kodimela Samhitha v. State of Telangana & Anr.

Case No.: W.P. No. 23998 of 2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 135

Appearance: Rajkumar Gummi for the petitioner; A. Sudershan Reddy, Advocate General, for the State; T. Sharath, Standing Counsel for Kaloji Narayana Rao University of Health Sciences, for Respondent No. 2

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While quashing FIR against four staff members of a diagnostic centre for issuing an allegedly false positive Hepatitis B report to a woman before her hernia surgery, the Telangana High Court said that not criminal law cannot be invoked to punish every instance of professional negligence. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 134]

In doing so the court held that mere inadvertence, an error of judgment, or a lapse in the exercise of due care cannot, by themselves, constitute an offence under Section 336 (Act endangering life or personal safety of others) IPC.

Justice N. Tukaramji held that even if there was a lapse in issuing the initial reactive HBsAg screening report without awaiting confirmatory testing, it could at the highest give rise to civil or consumer proceedings for deficiency in medical services. Criminal liability requires negligence of such a gross and reckless degree that it endangers human life.

The Court observed:

“Even assuming that there was some lapse in issuing the initial screening report without awaiting confirmatory testing, such omission, at its highest, may furnish a cause of action in civil law or under the consumer protection jurisdiction for alleged deficiency in medical services. However, such conduct falls far short of satisfying the stringent threshold required for constituting an offence punishable under Section 336 IPC. Criminal law cannot be invoked to punish every instance of professional negligence. Penal liability arises only where the negligence is so gross and reckless as to endanger human life within the meaning of the Penal Code. Mere inadvertence, an error of judgment, or a lapse in the exercise of due care cannot, by themselves, constitute an offence under Section 336 IPC"

The criminal case arose after the complainant, who had been advised to undergo a major surgical profile before hernia surgery, visited Vijaya Diagnostic Centre on June 10, 2022. Her blood sample was tested for HBsAg through a rapid screening test and was reported as “Reactive”.

According to the prosecution, the report caused her severe mental trauma, depression and suicidal thoughts. It also allegedly increased the anticipated cost of her proposed surgery.

On the advice of doctors at Yashoda Hospital, the complainant underwent another HBsAg test, which returned a “Non-Reactive” result. She subsequently approached the diagnostic centre and questioned its staff about the conflicting reports.

The retained blood sample was thereafter tested using the Chemiluminescent Microparticle Immunoassay (CMIA) method. This test also returned a “Non-Reactive” result.

During the investigation, the accused explained that the first test was only a rapid screening test conducted as part of the surgical profile. They said that such tests were susceptible to occasional false-positive results and that the complainant had declined to provide a fresh blood sample for further testing.

The Investigating Officer obtained an opinion from the Superintendent of Gandhi Hospital. The opinion stated that where an HBsAg rapid test gives a reactive result, it should be confirmed through another method such as CMIA, CLIA or ELISA, preferably using a repeat blood sample, before a final report is issued.

Relying on this opinion, the police concluded that the accused had negligently issued the reactive report without conducting a confirmatory test. A charge sheet was consequently filed against them for an act endangering the life or personal safety of others under Section 336 of the IPC.

The petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings. They argued that, even accepting the charge sheet in its entirety, the allegations did not satisfy the ingredients of Section 336 IPC.

They further contended that the report itself carried a disclaimer stating that the rapid screening test should not be treated as the sole criterion for diagnosis and that confirmatory testing was required. They relied on scientific literature to contend that rapid HBsAg tests can produce false-positive results.

The State opposed the plea. It argued that issuing a report showing the complainant as HBsAg reactive had created unnecessary panic and caused her severe mental and financial trauma. It further contended that the individual roles of the petitioners and whether they were negligent were factual questions which should be decided at trial.

The High Court noted that Section 336 IPC does not criminalise every negligent act. Criminal negligence, it said, is “qualitatively different” from civil negligence and must be gross, culpable or of such a high degree as to exhibit utter disregard for the life and safety of others.

Examining the expert opinion relied upon by the prosecution itself, the Court found that it did not state that a reactive result from a rapid screening test was necessarily erroneous. Nor did it say that issuing such a report without prior confirmation would, by itself, amount to gross or criminal negligence.

Rather, the opinion reflected the accepted laboratory protocol that a reactive screening result should ordinarily be followed by confirmatory testing before reaching a definitive diagnosis.

The Court said:

“The subsequent CMIA report yielding a non-reactive result merely establishes a discrepancy between the screening test and the confirmatory test. Such discrepancy, by itself, cannot automatically lead to an inference of criminal negligence.”

The Court further noted that the diagnostic centre's report itself stated that the screening test was not intended to be the sole basis for diagnosis and required clinical correlation and confirmatory testing.

It also found that the petitioners' explanation that rapid HBsAg screening tests can occasionally yield false-positive results had not been effectively controverted through an independent expert medical opinion meeting the parameters laid down in Jacob Mathew.

The Court separately found that the charge sheet failed to attribute any specific act to the four petitioners. Petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 were the Associate Director (Microbiology), General Manager (Operations) and Cluster Manager (Operations), respectively, while petitioner No. 1 was a Consultant Microbiologist.

Holding that criminal liability is personal unless a statute specifically creates vicarious liability, the Court said a person cannot be prosecuted merely because they hold a managerial or supervisory position.

“Their implication appears to be founded primarily upon the official positions held by them within the Diagnostic Centre,” the Court noted. It found no specific allegations establishing each petitioner's individual involvement, knowledge or culpable conduct.

The Court ultimately held that the dispute essentially concerned an alleged deficiency in professional services arising from discrepant laboratory reports. The material fell short of establishing the gross rashness or criminal negligence required under Section 336 IPC.

Accordingly, it quashed the proceedings in C.C. No. 8530 of 2022 against all four petitioners.

Case Title: Manisha Singh & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr.

Case No.: Criminal Petition No. 1226 of 2023

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 134

Appearance: Raja Sripathi, Senior Counsel, appearing for B. Dileep Kumar, for the petitioners; Syed Yasar Mamoon, Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State.

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The Telangana High Court has held that the statutory obligation to identify affected families and determine their Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) entitlements does not end merely because land acquisition proceedings have been completed and possession has been taken. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 133]

The Court said that this obligation is owed individually to every affected family and can be discharged even after completion of the acquisition.

Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy made the observation while dealing with petitions filed by persons claiming to be landless agricultural labourers dependent on lands acquired for the Hyderabad Green Pharma City project. While refusing to set aside the acquisition declarations, the Court directed the District Collector to enquire into their claim for R&R benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

The Court observed:

“It is, however, necessary to emphasise what the refusal to set aside the declarations does not mean. The obligation of the statutory authorities to identify affected families and to determine and extend Rehabilitation and Resettlement entitlements is not extinguished merely because the acquisition has been completed and possession has been taken. That obligation is owed to each affected family individually, and its discharge in respect of the petitioners does not depend upon the survival or otherwise of the declarations under Section 19(1). An enquiry into the entitlement of the petitioners, followed by an appropriate award under Section 31 in the event they are found eligible, is fully capable of being undertaken even now, and would afford them substantial and effective relief.”

The Court further held that landless agricultural labourers who claim dependence on acquired land are not strangers to the acquisition. The 2013 Act deliberately expanded protection beyond landowners to include agricultural labourers, tenants, sharecroppers and artisans whose primary source of livelihood is affected by acquisition.

The two writ petitions arose from acquisition proceedings initiated from 2016 for establishing the Hyderabad Green Pharma City in Medipally and Kurmidda villages in Yacharam Mandal. The State resorted both to compulsory acquisition under the 2013 Act and voluntary procurement under State Government Orders and the Telangana Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 2017.

The petitioners claimed that they were landless agricultural labourers and project-affected families whose livelihoods were entirely dependent on the agricultural lands proposed to be acquired. Apart from working on these lands, they said they depended on them for collecting biomass for household and cattle use and were beneficiaries under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS).

They claimed that they qualified as “affected families” under the 2013 Act and were therefore entitled to statutory R&R benefits.

The State opposed the petitions and said that the acquisition had already attained finality. Awards were passed during June and July 2021, approximately ₹1,097.82 crore was paid as compensation to landowners, and possession was taken and handed over to the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (TGIIC).

Observing that these questions required factual determination, the court said that whether the petitioners were in fact agricultural labourers dependent upon the acquired lands which cannot be decided under Article 226. However, the Court rejected the broader argument that they lacked standing merely because they did not own the acquired land.

It observed that under the 2013 Act:

“A landless agricultural labourer asserting dependence upon the acquired land is, therefore, not a stranger to the acquisition but a person upon whom the statute itself confers substantive entitlements.”

The Court added that whether the petitioners ultimately establish their entitlement was distinct from their right to have their claims considered. The disputed nature of their claims was “a reason for directing an enquiry into the claim, and not a reason for shutting out the petitioners at the threshold.”

Turning to the statutory scheme, the Court said Sections 16 to 18 impose a mandatory obligation on the R&R Administrator to conduct a survey and census of affected families, identify landowners as well as landless persons whose livelihood primarily depends on the acquired land, and prepare an R&R Scheme after inviting objections and conducting public hearings. The Collector must thereafter pass an R&R Award under Section 31.

The Court stressed that this exercise was not an “optional or purely departmental formality”. Section 38 also prohibits the Collector from taking possession until compensation and R&R entitlements have been provided for. Identification of affected families is therefore contemplated before the declaration and taking of possession, rather than being an exercise that can be postponed at the acquiring authority's convenience.

The Court found that no such exercise had been undertaken in relation to the petitioners despite their repeated representations. There was nothing on record to show that a survey or census identifying landless persons dependent on the acquired lands had been conducted or that the petitioners' claims had been examined and rejected after an enquiry.

However, the Court refused to set aside the Section 19 declarations. It noted that awards had already been passed, over ₹1,097 crore had been disbursed, possession had been taken and the lands had been transferred to TGIIC. Quashing the declarations would therefore unsettle a completed acquisition involving numerous landowners who were not before the Court.

The Court also noted that the petitioners had approached it only after the awards were passed and that their own pleadings showed that they knew about the acquisition by at least October 2020. Their belated challenge to the declarations therefore suffered from delay.

Instead, the Court said a writ court could mould the relief to address the actual grievance without causing “disproportionate public injury”. The petitioners' real grievance was that their claims had never been examined, which could be remedied by directing the competent authority to conduct the statutory enquiry without undoing the completed acquisition.

The Court also dealt with lands obtained through negotiated purchase. It held that an R&R claim cannot be rejected merely because some of the land comprising the project was procured through negotiated purchase rather than compulsory acquisition.

It observed that the R&R provisions address the loss of livelihood resulting from land being taken over for a project, rather than the mode by which title to that land changes hands.

“A landless agricultural labourer working upon a particular parcel of land loses his source of livelihood equally, whether the landowner is divested compulsorily or parts with the land under a negotiated arrangement.”

Accordingly, the Court directed the District Collector to treat the petitioners' earlier representations as claims invoking the statutory provisions of the 2013 Act. The Collector was directed to conduct an enquiry under the Act, give the petitioners and others an opportunity of hearing and permit them to produce documentary and oral evidence.

If they are found to be eligible affected families, the authorities must extend the R&R benefits admissible under the Act and Rules. The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on whether the petitioners were actually eligible for the benefits.

Case Title: Kanemoni Saradamma & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Ors. with Sanda Vajramma & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Ors.

Case Nos.: W.P. Nos. 14670 and 24626 of 2021

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 133

Appearance: Ch. Ravi Kumar for the petitioners; Advocate General for the State; M. Srikanth Reddy, Standing Counsel for TGIIC.

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The Telangana High Court has upheld the termination of a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) constable who was diagnosed with depression and declared medically unfit for basic training and service. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 132]

It noted that the Review Medical Board had considered the inherent stress of CRPF training and the risk arising from easy access to firearms before recommending his termination.

Justice Pulla Karthik held that the constable had been afforded ample opportunity and subjected to repeated medical evaluations before the Review Medical Board recommended his termination. The Court found no fault with the CRPF's decision to terminate his services under Rule 6 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.

The Court observed:

“ From the above, it is clear that the petitioner was afforded ample opportunity at every stage of proceedings. However, he was not cured well. Further, the Review Medical Board has also taken note of the inherent stress suffered by the petitioner during the basic training in CRPF and also the high risk related to easy access to firearms, which is endanger to the life of the petitioner as well as others, before recommending the termination of the services of the petitioner.”

The petitioner was appointed as a constable in the CRPF in April 2021 and sent to the Recruit Training Centre at Suratgarh for basic training.

According to the CRPF, within six weeks of commencing training, he was admitted to the ATC Hospital at Suratgarh with complaints of excessive negative thoughts, restlessness and mood swings. He subsequently underwent treatment at various hospitals and was prescribed anti-depressants and Benzodiazepines.

He was relegated from basic training and returned to the CRPF Group Centre at Hyderabad. A psychiatric evaluation at the CRPF Composite Hospital in Hyderabad in June 2021 found that he continued to have negative thoughts and diagnosed him with "Mixed Anxiety and Depression". He was provisionally declared unfit for basic training and advised to continue medication.

When reviewed again in August 2021, the psychiatrist found him unfit for basic training and advised continuation of medication.

The petitioner, however, contended that he had sought leave during his training to visit his parents but the request was refused. According to him, the authorities suspected that he was depressed because his leave had not been granted and subjected him to psychiatric examination.

He claimed that a psychiatric test conducted in March 2022 showed him as normal. Despite this, he was transferred to Hyderabad and allegedly made to perform menial work, including watering plants, sweeping and mixing cement and sand.

The petitioner further alleged that on May 10, 2022, he was handed his termination letter at around 8 PM and made to leave the CRPF campus. He argued that no reasons were assigned and no show-cause notice was issued before his termination, in violation of the principles of natural justice.

He subsequently approached the Government Hospital for Mental Care at Erragadda seeking another psychiatric examination. According to him, the hospital informed him that such examination could be conducted only on a reference from the CRPF. His requests to the CRPF authorities seeking such a reference were not accepted, he contended.

The CRPF disputed the petitioner's account. It told the Court that after his earlier examinations, approval was obtained for a Review Medical Examination at the CRPF Composite Hospital in New Delhi.

A Review Medical Board consisting of medical officers, including psychiatrists, was constituted. When the petitioner reported for examination on March 4, 2022, he stated that he had not taken medication for the preceding 40 days and denied having fresh complaints. He initially appeared normal and was admitted for observation without medication. However, according to the CRPF, he subsequently developed uneasiness and discomfort.

He was then referred to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi, for psychodiagnostic evaluation by a clinical psychologist.

On April 5, 2022, the Review Medical Board considered his treatment records, clinical examination and the psychodiagnostic evaluation from RML Hospital. It concluded that he was suffering from depression and was unfit for CRPF basic training and service.

The Medical Board recorded:

“The psychodiagnostic evaluation of RML Hospital, New Delhi also confirmed the diagnosis of DEPRESSION. DEPRESSION is a major mental illness characterised by stress in basic training and service, personal life and domestic problems. Keeping in view of inherent stress during basic training in CRPF and high risk related to easy access to firearms which is endanger to the lift of himself and others. No. 215145083 Recruit/GD Prasanth K of GC Hyderabad was found unfit for Basic Training and service in CRPF and recommended for termination/invalidation from CRPF as per the rules and regulation of CRPF.”

On the Medical Board's recommendation, the CRPF terminated the petitioner's services with effect from May 10, 2022 under Rule 6 of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.

The CRPF further submitted that the petitioner's appeal against his termination was considered and rejected by the Appellate Authority on August 31, 2023. His subsequent representations were also answered. It argued that there was no provision under the applicable Rules requiring another medical or psychiatric examination.

Considering the medical history, the High Court noted that the petitioner had undergone continuous treatment and repeated psychiatric evaluations. It also took note of the Review Medical Board's finding that the RML Hospital evaluation had confirmed the diagnosis of depression.

The Court found that the Medical Board had specifically considered the inherent stress involved in CRPF basic training and service, as well as the risk associated with access to firearms, before finding the petitioner unfit.

It consequently held that the termination order dated May 10, 2022 "cannot be faulted with" and dismissed the writ petition.

Case Title: Kubeer Prashanth v. Union of India & Ors.

Case No.: W.P. No. 24885 of 2023

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 132

Appearance: Dr. B. Karthik Navayan for the petitioner; B. Jithender, Central Government Standing Counsel, for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4; Government Pleader for Services-I for Respondent No. 5.

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