The Supreme Court on Friday (July 18) suggested to all High Courts to incorporate a rule that accused persons should mandatorily mention in their bail applications the earlier bail applications, if any, filed by them, and also their criminal antecedents.

The Court cited a provision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules as an example. The said Rule, Rule 5 of Chapter 1-A(b) Volume-V of the P&H HC Rules, stated :

"5. Bail applications. - In every application for bail presented to the High Court the petitioner shall state whether similar application has or has not been made to the Supreme Court, and if made shall state the result thereof. The petitioner/applicant shall also mention whether he/she is/was involved in any other criminal case or not. If yes, particulars and decisions thereof. An application which does not contain this information shall be placed before the bench with the necessary information.”

The Court suggested that all High Courts incorporate a similar rule. A bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed :

"We feel that every High Court in the country should consider incorporating a similar provision in the respective High Court Rules and/or Criminal Side Rules as it would impose an obligation on the accused to make disclosures regarding his/her involvement in any other criminal case(s) previously registered."

The Court directed that a copy of this order be communicated to the Registrar Generals of all High Courts so that  incorporation of a similar Rule in the respective Rules can be considered.

The bench made these observations while expunging the strictures passed by the Rajasthan High Court against a Judicial Officer in relation to his decision in a bail application. Referring to various precedents, the bench reiterated that High Courts should refrain from making adverse comments against Judicial Officers in respect of the decisions taken by them.

Case : Kaushal Singh vs State of Rajasthan

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 724

Click here to read the judgment 

Related - Supreme Court Directs Petitioners Seeking Bail To Mandatorily Disclose Criminal Antecedents In Petitions 

The Supreme Court on July 18 asked the Bar Council of India to consider having a policy for fee exemption for those candidates who cannot pay the All India Bar Examination fees.

The bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice AS Chandukar was hearing a writ petition over the exorbitant fees of Rs. 3500/- charged for All India Bar Examinations which is contrary to the Court's earlier decision on July 30, 2024. 

On July 30, 2024, the bench of CJI DY Chandrachud and Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra held that the State Bar enrolment fee cannot exceed Rs 750 for advocates belonging to the general category and Rs 125 for advocates belonging to SC/ST categories.

The Advocate representing the BCI stressed that due to the July 30 decision, the sources of revenue has become limited for BCI to carry out other functions. 

Justice Narasimha asked the counsel for BCI to the possibility of re-assessing the AIBE fees policy. 

" Take an assessment and check, we don't want to become the regulator- BCI is the body, which we respect, it takes care of the multiple obligations that they have towards members of the Bar." 

The BCI counsel reverted that the fees of Rs. 3,500/- for the AIBE were very less compared to other mainstream exams that happen. He further added that while most of the young professionals take the exam before entering the industry, few are those who give the exam within 2 years of their entry into the profession. 

At this juncture Justice Narasimha pointed that "fees of NLUs and other Law Schools have also gone very high.....take loans, have to work and then come here (in the profession) , but generally other than those across the country - for everybody to practise, to pay Rs. 3500/- is on the higher- this has to be reflected upon once more and then tell us."

He added that the fees have to be applied considering the spectrum of economic diversity within the legal industry. He said 

"We cannot have a general perspective of how it will effect- because there are different segments of the population. Somebody practising in a district court, is a very big money. In Delhi, if you go out for lunch or dinner, Rs.3500/- just evaporates!" 

The bench was informed that the following is the statistics on the number of people appearing for AIBE in the past 3 years - (1) AIBE 19 (December 2024) - 2.29 Lakhs; (2) AIBE 18 (December 2023) - 1. 44 lakhs; (3) AIBE 17 (February 2022) - 1. 71 Lakhs. 

The bench then pondered the possibility of creating a fund for those who cannot afford the fees of Rs. 3500/- . Justice Narasimha verbally remarked: 

"Is there any part of the scheme for those who cannot afford...have you thought of it? Some funds you create and set aside..somebody makes an application that please exempt- do you have a scheme like that? You must have." 

The counsel agreed to look into the aspect and added that a balanced scheme would be require, else it may 'open floodgates' for such fees exemption applications. 

The matter will now be heard after two weeks. 

Case Details: KULDEEP MISHRA vs. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA| W.P.(C) No. 000767 / 2024 

The Supreme Court on July 14 passed certain directions for the National Task Force ("NTF"), instituted by the Court to investigate the increasing suicide rates in college students, to carry out its work efficiently. It has also passed orders seeking an update on the investigations in connection with the suicide of two IIT Delhi students, one IIT Kharagpur student, and one case in Kota, Rajasthan.

Formed by the order dated March 24, the NTF, chaired by former Supreme Court Judge, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, is meant to address mental health concerns of students and to prevent the rising suicides in higher educational institutions. Directions passed in a petition filed by parents of two IIT Delhi students, who allegedly committed suicide due to caste-based discrimination and academic pressure, require an institution to promptly register a first information report in the event of a suicide on campus.

On July 14, a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan, which had passed an order for the formation of the NTF, heard the matter on the status report filed via the Amicus and Senior Advocate Aparna Bhat.

As per the report, a survey of questionnaires, approved by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences, was piloted through field visits in Jamia Millia Islamia, Ramjas College, Delhi, the Institute of Science and the Bangalore Medical College and Research Institute. 

The NTF has highlighted certain challenges it faces, such as setting up of Secretariat and finding a physical space and creation of a website. As for the need for physical space, the Court passed an order for the Union to provide the same within four weeks, which needs to be accessible in all respects. 

Second, many States are yet to appoint Nodal Officers which are to facilitate necessary information and data. These States are Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tamil Nadu, Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, and Lakshadweep. 

The Court has given two weeks to the States and UTs to appoint Nodal Officers, failing which the Court will take appropriate action against the respective Chief Secretaries. 

Moreover, the NTF has highlighted the issue with the National Crime Records Bureau(NCRB) data, as it does not provide unit-level data on suicides by students. There are gaps in data received by the UGC, AICTE, Dental Council, and the National Medical Council. Therefore, a separation application seeking the appointment of the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, as an ex-officio member has been filed to facilitate access to the data. This application was approved by the Court.

The Court also allowed an impleadment of the Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education, in this matter. The next hearing is on July 21.

Case Details: AMIT KUMAR & ORS. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.|Criminal Appeal No.1425/2025

Click Here To Read Order

Appearances: For Appellant(s) : Mr. Mehmood Pracha, Adv. Mr. R. H. A. Sikander, AOR Mr. Jatin Bhatt, Adv. Mr. Sanawar, Adv. Mr. Kshitij Singh, Adv. Ms. Nujhat Naseem, Adv. Mr. Sikander, Adv.

IA 159139/25 Mr. Sanpreet Singh Ajmani, Adv. Amitoz Kaur, Adv. Mr. Amit Kumar, Adv. Ms. Shivani A., Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, AOR Ms. Chhavi Khandelwal, Adv. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, ASG Mr. Brijender Chahar, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Abhijit Pandove, Adv. Mr. Amit Sharma Ii, Adv. Mrs. Bani Dikshit, Adv. Mr. Varun Chugh, Adv. Mr. Gaurang Bhushan, Adv. Mr. Jagdish Chandra, Adv. Mr. Vatsal Joshi, Adv. Mr. Chitransh Sharma, Adv Ms. Aparna Bhat, Amicus Curiae Mr. Mayank Sapra, AOR Ms. Madhulika Mohta, Adv. Ms. Lalima Das, Adv.

Mr. Sanpreet Singh Ajmani, AOR

Mr. Sameer Abhyankar, AOR Ms. Yashika Sharma, Adv. Mr. Aryan Srivastava, Adv. Ms. Yachna Sharma, Adv. Mr. Aakash Thakur

Adv.Mr. Sudarshan Lamba, AOR Mr. Brijender Chahar, A.S.G. Mr. Abhijeet Pandove, Adv. Mr. Amit Sharma B, Adv. Mr. Gaurang Bhushan, Adv. Ms. Bani Dikshit, Adv. Mr. Jagdish Chandra, Adv. Mr. Karan Chahar, Adv.

Ms. Vidushi Bajpai, AOR Mr. Ravinder Pal Singh, Adv. Mr. Goverdhan Prasad Tiwari, Adv.

Mr. M. R. Shamshad, Sr. Adv. Mr. Manu Krishnang, Adv. Mr. Amith Krishnan H, AOR Mr. K M Natraj, A.S.G. Mr. Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G. Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, AOR Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Aroon Menon, Adv. Ms. Madhavi Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Sanjeevi Seshadri, Adv. Mr. Akshay Agarwal, Adv. Mr. Manish Sharma, Adv. Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR  

In his writ petition before the Supreme Court, Justice Yashwant Varma has contended that the mere recovery of cash from the outhouse of his official residence does not establish his culpability, as the in-house inquiry committee has not determined the ownership of the cash or how it was removed from the premises.

He questioned the in-house committee's findings by contending that they were entered not on the basis of any concrete evidence but on the basis of certain inferences and speculations, which, according to him, are not untenable. As per Justice Varma, the committee adopted a hasty procedure to achieve a predetermined result, without affording him adequate opportunity.

Claiming that he did not dispute the discovery of cash notes at the outhouse, Justice Varma said that its mere discovery is not sufficient to link him to any wrongdoing, without any clear evidence regarding its ownership and control.

According to him, the in-house panel had to answer the following questions:

a. When, how and by whom was the cash placed in the outhouse?

b. How much cash was placed in the outhouse?

c. Was the cash/currency genuine or not?

d. What was the cause of the fire?

e. Whether the Petitioner was in any manner responsible for the “removal” of “remnants of currency” on 15.03.2025?

Since the report did not give answers to these questions, it cannot lead to any inference of guilt against him.

"The mere discovery of cash provides no conclusive resolution. It remains essential to determine whose cash and how much was discovered. These aspects bear directly on the severity of the allegations, and equally, on the potential for orchestrated scandal; added to by the cause of the fire, whether intentional or accidental, and the involvement of the Petitioner in the alleged “removal” of the currency. The Final Report dated 03.05.2025 provides no answers to these pivotal questions," he contended.

Challenging the procedure adopted by the in-house panel, Justice Varma contended :

"The Committee failed to notify the Petitioner of its devised procedure, denied him any opportunity to provide inputs on the evidence to be collected, examined witnesses in his absence and provided him with paraphrased statements instead of video recordings (despite availability), selectively disclosed only “incriminating” material, ignored and failed to collect relevant and exculpatory evidence like CCTV footage (despite Petitioner's requests), denied opportunities of personal hearing, did not put any specific/tentative case to the Petitioner, impermissibly reversed the burden of proof without notice to the Petitioner, and effectively hindered any effective defence by the Petitioner."

Justice Varma also questioned the very in-house procedure, arguing that it has no statutory backing and that it violated the doctrine of powers, as the removal of judges is a matter within the domain of the Parliament. Since the Constitution does not confer any disciplinary authority on the Chief Justice of India over High Court Judges, he cannot order an in-house inquiry.

Justice Varma also took objection to the Supreme Court's public disclosure of the case documents and photos/videos, even before the commencement of the inquiry, saying that it resulted in irreparable loss of his reputation.

"Compounding these issues, media leaks of the Final Report's contents, followed by distorted reportage of the Committee's, were left unaddressed, perpetuating procedural unfairness, breaching the confidentiality inherent to the In-House Procedure, and continuing to inflict irreversible damange on the Petitioner's reputation and dignity," he submitted.

In the case where the Supreme Court ordered authorities to immediately trace a Russian woman who has seemingly gone missing with her child during pendency of a custody battle with her Indian husband, Union government informed the Court today that the woman does not seem to have left the country, at least through legal channels.

A bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi was given the update by Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, who stated that lookout circular, hue and cry notices, wireless messages, etc. have been issued and circulated across the country to trace the missing child and the Russian mother.

The ASG further apprised the Court that the petitioner-woman had frugal means and has less than Rs.200 in her bank account. She had approached the Russian embassy on July 5 and complained about her husband, but was advised to go to the Delhi police. The child has not attended school since after July 7 and efforts are being made to gain access to the woman's social media accounts. Further, the woman's call data records have been obtained and are being analyzed.

In response to a Court query, the ASG further stated that the Russian embassy is cooperating fully with Indian authorities and the Russian ambassador himself issued a Whatsapp communication regarding the matter. As per claims, the mother of the Russian woman as well made a complaint to the embassy that her daughter is not reachable.

When the Court expressed that there may have been collusion on the part of some officials of Russian embassy, at a private level, the ASG replied that the authorities will try to investigate that.

Ultimately, finding it strange how the woman is travelling and taking care of the child with limited means, the Court told the authorities that they need to find the two immediately, in which search the next 2 days would be most crucial. Listing the matter on Monday, the bench further asked the authorities to see if the petitioner is still in national capital region, or has left it, by reaching out to authorities in railways and other modes of transport.

Insofar as the Indian man's family submitted that they can provide authorities names of some persons who were close to the petitioner, the Court ordered, "The husband and his family have some information that may facilitate the police to reach logical conclusion. They may be associated in the entire exercise of tracing the petitioner and the child."

The Court also expressed that the Delhi police, alongwith the Ministry of External Affairs, shall continue an effective dialogue with the Russian embassy.

Yesterday, the Court was apprised that “the Russian mother and the child have vanished into wilderness”. When the petitioner's counsels as well submitted that they were not aware of her whereabouts, the Court passed stringent directions to the Union and Delhi government authorities to trace the petitioner immediately and ensure that she does not leave the country with the child.

Background

The petitioner-wife had filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, wherein several interim orders were passed from time to time. While she is a Russian citizen, the child's father (respondent No.2) is of Indian origin. Their 5-yr old child was born in 2020. Pursuant to the Court's orders, the couple had been residing in Delhi in separate accommodations having joint custody of the child.

There were allegations between the parties regarding treatment of the child. On 22 May, exclusive custody of the child was given to the Russian mother for 3 days in a week. On the remaining days, he was to remain in the exclusive custody of the father.

Recently, the father filed an application seeking compliance with the Court's May 22 order. He pointed out that his wife is not traceable since 7 July, after school hours of the minor child. She is not available on phone, or her residence. The minor child has not been taken to his requisite medical check-up or to the school.

Statedly, several complaints of the father remained unanswered and even his advocates were allegedly misled regarding the child's location. As per claims, the mother was seen entering the Russian embassy through a back door on 4 July along with a Russian diplomat, with whom she is allegedly in some sort of relationship. It was further alleged that the police failed to provide protection to the minor child.

In this backdrop, the Supreme Court passed a stringent order on July 17, calling on the authorities to immediately trace the petitioner and return the custody of the child to the father. It also cautioned that if Russian embassy officials are found involved in commission of an offense, law will take its own course.

Case Title: VIKTORIIA BASU Versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS., W.P.(Crl.) No. 129/2023 

The Supreme Court today (July 18) took a stern view over a lawyer who challenged the appointment of the Bihar Public Service Commission Chairperson, without mentioning accurate facts in the plea. 

While the court initially imposed costs of Rs.10,000/- on the lawyer, it was subsequently removed. The bench remarked that one has to work towards Public Interest Litigation with sincerity and not go behind publicity. 

"Practice sincerely, this is not the way to do it, if you take up Public Interest Litigation, you must give your life to it. You must thoroughly examine every fact, the burden is on you. And don't go behind this publicity business, it will not take you anywhere. It will only discredit you," the Court told him.

The bench of Justices PS Narasimha and AS Chandukar was hearing a writ petition filed by Advocate and petitioner-in-person Brajesh Singh for declaring the appointment of Bihar Public Service Commission Chairperson, Parmar Ravi Manubhai, as "completely illegal" and "arbitrary" on grounds that the appointment has taken place defying the mandate of Article 316(Appointment and term of office of members) of the Constitution of India.

The amicus appointed by the Court on the last hearing, today informed the bench that the appointment has been challenged by the petitioner on three grounds, firstly as per Article 316, only a person with "impeccable integrity" should be appointed as the Chairperson. Contrary to this, the Chairman is facing serious charges of corruption and forgery and as such his "integrity is doubtful", the petitioner argued.

Secondly, there has been an FIR registered against Manubhai, which, as per the petitioner, is still pending and thirdly, that Manubhai, as per the petitioner, was a State Civil Services Officer and continued to serve in the Bihar Cadre while he was appointed to the post. 

However, the amicus clarified that the FIR was filed in 2017, which was subsequently closed in 2022. The appointment of Manubhai was done in March 2024. 

On the aspect of whether any voluntary retirement was taken by Manubhai before being appointed as the Chairperson, the counsel for the State submitted that appointment was within the fold of Rule 2(e) of Bihar Public Service Commission Conditions of Service Regulations 1960 

As per the rule, a service member means " a person who, before his appointment as Member, was in the service of the Government of India or of a State in India, irrespective of whether he joins as Member before or after his retirement from such service" 

The Counsel for the state also stressed that the petitioner is a lawyer and was completely aware of the fact that the FIR was closed against Manubhai.

Taking serious note of the same, the bench asked the advocate/ petitioner to take Public Interest Litigation seriously and not file pleas for the sake of publicity. 

"You should be careful before you file petitions like this. We will impose costs on you. We knew there was something, we were not very confident, that's why we asked the amicus to assist us. You are a very young boy who just enrolled (in 2016)....."

"Practise sincerely, this is not the way to do it, if you take up Public Interest Litigation, you must give your life to it. You must thoroughly examine every fact, the burden is on you. And don't go behind this publicity business, it will not take you anywhere. It will only discredit you."

The bench proceeded to dismiss the petition with costs. The relevant part of the order is : 

" We had accepted this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on the basis of certain facts that were mentioned in the petition. As we were not confident, we had also requested the learned counsel (amicus) to assist us in the matter. 

We are of the opinion that the facts concerned in the writ petition are not accurate. In this view of the matter, the SLP is dismissed with the cost of Rs. 10,000/- payable by the petitioner herein." 

 Upon the apology of the petitioner and assistance by the amicus, the court waived the costs imposed. 

Case Details: BRAJESH SINGH v. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS| W.P.(C) No. 62/2025

The Supreme Court today(July 18) dismissed the anticipatory bail plea of Andhra Pradesh multi-crore liquor scam accused and a member of Parliament from Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party, PV Midhun Reddy, after the Andhra Pradesh High Court on Tuesday denied him bail. 

Appearing for Reddy, Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, tried to convince a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan. Appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh, Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi, reminded the Court that this bench had refused to grant anticipatory bail to other co-accused P Krishna Mohan Reddy and K. Dhananjaya, who served as secretary and OSD, respectively, in the office of ex-CM Jagan Mohan Reddy during the previous YSRCP regime, in May this year.

The bail to the two accused was denied on submission of the State of Andhra Pradesh as the investigation is at the critical juncture, and granting anticipatory bail might cause prejudice to the State's case. 

It is the case of the State that the accused persons, who were public servants, conspired to throttle the competitions and the normal distribution channels of liquor were given to only a particular group. Apparently, this case also went to the Competition Commission of India, where the case was eventually closed.

After hearing brief arguments on both sides, Justice Pardiwala said: "Dismissed."

Dr Singhvi then requested some time to surrender, to which Justice Pardiwala orally said: "Take your time."

Case Details:  P V MIDHUN REDDY PEDDIREDDI VENKATA MIDHUN REDDY Vs THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH|SLP(Crl) No. 10272/2025

The Supreme Court today (July 18) transferred four public interest litigation petitions to itself seeking a ban on opinion trading platforms for promoting illegal activity of betting and gambling. These petitions are transferred from the High Court of Bombay, the High Court of Chhattisgarh and the High Court of Gujarat.

Before a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan, Senior Advocate Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for Probo Media, requested the clubbing of the matters pending in the Chhattisgarh High Court and the Gujarat High Court and that it be transferred to the Bombay High Court. He added that the petitoner is already a party to the matters pending before the Bombay High Court.

Whereas, Senior Advocate Gaurav Aggarwal, appearing for social activist Sumit Kapurbhai, opposed the transfer of the different PILs. He stated that the matter before the Chhattisgarh High Court also raises issues in regards to the legislation on gambling. He added that just because the petitioner is a party to all these PILs, that itself should not be a ground to club all petitions. 

Inclined to hear the matter, Justice Pardiwala said that the Supreme Court will hear the matter. However, Dr Singhvi tried to explain that these are a different batch of petitions and not related to the casinos and gambling matter the Court is hearing currently. 

Nevertheless, the Court passed a common order directing for the transfer of all PILs: "The petitioner, a private limited company, has preferred this transfer petition with the following prayers. Heard Dr Singhvi, learned counsel for petitioner, and Mr Gaurav Aggarwal, appearing for the first Respondent who instituted a PIL before the Chhattisgarh High Court. Dr Singhvi would submit that there are two petitions in the nature of public interest litigation pending before the Bombay High Court, and the third PIL petition is pending before the High Court of Gujarat and the fourth is pending before the High Court of Chhattisgarh. 

He would make a fervent appeal that led all the writ petitions PIL be transferred to the Bombay High Court that all can be heard together. We are of the view that all these four PILs should be heard by this Court. In such circumstances, we direct the High Court of Bombay, High Court of Gujarat, and High Court of Chhattisgarh to transfer all the writ petitions with entire record to this Court at the earliest. Once these four PILs are transferred to this Court, Registry shall notify before this Court as directed by hon'ble Chief Justice of India."

It may be noted that another writ petition filed by Respondent before the Gujarat High Court seeking ban on certain mobile game platforms on the ground that the games in question constitute games of chance and not games of skill was dismissed on the grounds that a similar PIL is pending before the Bombay High Court. The High Court directed him to file an intervention. However, the Respondent filed a special leave petition against Gujarat High Court's dismissal in which a bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan issued notice in February 21.

Case Details: PROBO MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD. Vs SUMIT KAPURBHAI PRAJAPATI|T.P.(C) No. 1527-1529/2025 

The Supreme Court on Friday (July 18) refused to stay the trial proceedings in the case related to the land-for-jobs scam against former Bihar Chief Minister and RJD founder Lalu Prasad Yadav.

A bench comprising Justice MM Sundresh and Justice N Kotiswar Singh was hearing Yadav's petition challenging the Delhi High Court's refusal to stay the trial. On being told that the petition is only challenging an interim order of the High Court and the main matter is pending there, the bench observed that it will not interfere.

"We will not stay. We will dismiss the appeal and we will say that let the main matter be decided. Why should we keep this small matter?," Justice Sundresh said.

The bench however observed that he need not be personally present during the trial. The bench also requested the High Court to expedite the hearing of Yadav's petition challenging the cognizance taken by the trial court. With these observations, the bench disposed of his petition challenging the Delhi High Court's refusal to stay the trial.

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal represented Lalu Prasad Yadav. Additional Solicitor General SV Raju appeared for the CBI.

He had sought stay by contending that there was no prior approval obtained by CBI under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (prior sanction before initiating investigation against public servant). The Delhi High Court while declining to stay the trial, observed that this was a ground which could be raised during the framing of charges.

During the hearing, ASG Raju submitted that S.17A sanction was not required in the present case as it pertained to offences which took place before the 2018 amendment (which insterted S.17A). In response, Sibal submitted, "The enthusiasm is telling. He was a Minister from 2005 to 2009. FIR filed in 2021. Investigation cannot start without a sanction. For all other government servants they have taken sanction except him."

The bench however said that it will not go into the merits of the matter at this stage. 

Background

Yadav challenged a Delhi High Court order that refused to stay the trial court proceedings in the CBI's “land for jobs” case. The Delhi High Court had dismissed Yadav's interim stay application on the ground that there were no compelling reasons to halt the trial proceedings pending before a Special Judge at Rouse Avenue Courts.

Justice Ravinder Dudeja of the High Court issued notice on Yadav's main petition challenging the registration of the FIR, three chargesheets filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and the trial court orders taking cognizance of those chargesheets. However, he declined to stay the proceedings.

Before the High Court Sibal argued that the CBI had initiated the investigation without obtaining prior sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He contended that this omission vitiated the proceedings from inception. He submitted that continuing with the trial without addressing the alleged lack of sanction would render the petition infructuous if charges are framed.

Section 17A mandates prior approval for inquiry or investigation against a public servant when the alleged offence relates to any recommendation made or decision taken by him in the discharge of his official functions. Yadav's petition asserts that the FIR and all subsequent actions, including filing of chargesheets and cognizance by the trial court - are void in the absence of this statutory sanction.

Senior Advocate DP Singh for the CBI opposed the plea and argued that the issue of Section 17A's applicability to offences under the unamended Prevention of Corruption Act is pending before a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court. He submitted that Yadav's objections could be raised during arguments on charge before the trial court.

Dismissing the stay application, the High Court said that Yadav remained free to urge all his contentions before the Special Judge, and there were no compelling grounds to halt the proceedings at this stage.

According to the CBI, the alleged offences relate to appointments made in Group-D posts in various Railway zones between 2004 and 2009, during Yadav's tenure as Union Railway Minister. In return for these appointments, it is alleged that candidates or their family members transferred their land in favour of Yadav's family members and a private company, M/s AK Infosystems Pvt Ltd, which was later acquired by the Yadav family. The CBI filed its chargesheet on October 10, 2022, against 16 accused persons, including Lalu Prasad Yadav, his wife Rabri Devi, and daughter Misa Bharti.

Case no. – SLP(Crl) No. 10097/2025

Case Title – Lalu Prasad Yadav v. Central Bureau of Investigation

The Supreme Court on Friday allowed the private organisation, which is taking efforts for the release of Malayali woman Nimisha Priya, to approach the Central Government seeking permission to travel to Yemen for negotiations to stall her execution for the murder of a Yemeni national.

The organisation is seeking permission to allow a few of its members and a representative of Kerala Sunni Islamic leader Kanthapuram AP Aboobacker Musaliyar - whose interventions reportedly led to the stay of the execution - to travel to Yemen to meet the victim's family to further the negotiations. Efforts are underway to negotiate with the victim's family to persuade them to pardon her after accepting 'blood money' as per the Shariat Law.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta was hearing a writ petition filed by Save Nimisha Priya International Action Council. 

Senior Advocate Ragenth Basant, for the petitioner, informed the bench that the execution, which was scheduled for July 16, was postponed. He submitted that without permisison from the Centre, no Indian can visit Yemen as there is a travel ban in place.

"First step is that the family forgive us, then second stage is blood money. Somebody needs to negotiate with the family. Yemen is a country where not just anybody can go. There is a travel ban unless the government relaxes it. Let 2-3 members of the petitioner and a representative of Kerala Islamic cleric be permitted to go to Yemen. As of now, execution has been stayed. We are thankful to govt of India for all efforts. But we need to go there, there was a revered [Islamic cleric] who intervened..." Basant submitted.

"Ideally, one representative from the government also. If the government deems fit," Basant added. Attorney General for India R Venkataramani however remained non-committal about Government intervention. "I don't think anything can formally happen at this time. We will consider but dont put it on record. There is no next date fixed for execution that means something is working.The family and power of attorney only should be concerned with negotiations. I don't think it will be a different story if the organisation goes there," the AG said.

"We don't want something counter-productive happening. We want this woman to come out safely," AG added.

The bench said that it was not expressing anything on the demand and allowed the organisation to file a representation before the Government. The bench adjourned the hearing, posting the matter for August 14.

To recap, 36-year old Nimisha Priya is facing death sentence for the murder of a Yemeni national in 2017, who allegedly tortured and assaulted her. To retrieve her documents, including passport, from the Yemeni man's possession, Priya apparently tried to sedate him using ketamine, but unfortunately, an overdose caused his death.  

Earlier, Priya was scheduled to be executed on July 16. On July 14, the petitioner-organization prayed before the Supreme Court for Union's support to negotiate a pardon for Priya through diplomatic interference. The Union, however, categorically said that its role in the matter was limited, given where Priya is lodged (Houthi-controlled Sanaa). Be that as it may, it assured that "utmost possible" efforts were being made by the government at private level to prevent Priya from the gallows. During the hearing, Justice Mehta noted that the case was "sensitive" in nature and indeed a "sad" one.

Thereafter, a day before Priya's scheduled execution, reports came in that the execution had been postponed with the help of private interventions. The reprieve however was short-lived, as the family of the victim-Talal Abdo Mahdi, whom Priya is accused of killing, came out with a statement that theyvwill not grant pardon to Priya.

Nimisha Priya, an Indian origin nurse from Kerala, was sentenced to death in 2018 for the murder of Yemeni national Talal Abdo Mahdi. As per claims, Talal was Nimisha Priya's business partner but forged documents to show that she was his wife. Allegedly, he even seized her passport and subjected her to physical and mental torture. One day, in 2017, she injected him with sedatives to retrieve her passport. Unfortunately however, Talal died and Nimisha Priya was sentenced to death.

Pursuant to a challenge, Nimisha Priya was tried again. But in 2020, she obtained the same verdict. At that point, the petitioner-Council was formed by her relatives and supporters to secure her release. In 2023, Yemen's Supreme Judicial Council rejected an appeal preferred by Nimisha Priya. Last year, the Yemeni President approved her death sentence.

Recently, the petitioner-organization filed the present petition seeking directions to the Union Government to secure her release from Yemen through diplomatic channels. The petitioner highlighted that as per Shariat law, a person can be released if the relatives of the victim agree to accept "blood money" and negotiations can be held to explore that option.

Lately, Nimisha Priya's family offered to pay 1 million dollars (Rs.8.6 crores) to Talal's family as 'blood money', a compensation for pardoning her and sparing her life.

Earlier, Nimisha Priya's mother had approached the Delhi High Court seeking permission to travel to Yemen to make efforts for her release. Responding to that petition, the Central Government informed the High Court in November 2023 that the Supreme Court of Yemen had dismissed her appeal. Taking note of that development, the High Court directed the Central Government to take a decision on the mother's representation. The mother had sought permission to travel to Yemen despite a ban on Indian nationals to travel there.

Case Title: SAVE NIMISHA PRIYA INTERNATIONAL ACTION COUNCIL Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANR., W.P.(C) No. 649/2025 

The Supreme Court yesterday (July 17) issued notice on actor-politician S Ve Shekar's plea challenging his conviction in case lodged over derogatory comments against a woman journalist.

A bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi passed the order, extending the interim protection against surrender that was granted earlier in Shekar's favor.

The Court was dealing with Shekar's petition against a Madras High Court order of January, whereby the Court refused to interfere with his conviction.

To recap, cases against Sheker were registered after he forwarded an abusive, derogatory and vulgar comment on his Facebook account in April 2018. In February 2024, a Sessions Court in Tamil Nadu convicted him for making offensive posts against women journalist(s).

Shekar was sentenced to 1-month simple imprisonment and a fine of RS. 2500/- for the offence under Section 504 IPC and 1-month simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2500/- for the offence under Section 509 of the IPC. He was further sentenced to 1 month simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 for the offence under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act 2002.

Shekar approached the Madras High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against him, but the court refused to grant him relief.

Seeking revision of the order, Shekar argued that the Special Court had failed to note the serious lapses in the investigation and that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. It was further contended that the original forwarded message was never produced before the court. Shekar also submitted that he had no criminal intention or mens rea to commit any offence.

The High Court however was not inclined to accept the submissions and noted that Shekar had forwarded the message with full knowledge of its content and consequences. The court also added that once the prosecution had proved that the petitioner had sent the message in Facebook, certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act was not necessary. Accordingly, the revision application was dismissed.

“Mere tendering apology itself would not be sufficient. When once the contents are released and it is also seen by various persons, certainly, the image of the de-facto complainant and other journalists would be degraded and subsequent tendering apology will not remove the image from the public. Therefore, this is a fit case where the petitioner has to be convicted", the Court said.

Aggrieved, Shekar approached the Supreme Court. In March, the top Court granted him interim protection from surrender. The next month, when he sought time to convince the complainant to accept his unconditional apology, the interim protection was extended.

Yesterday, Advocate Balaji Srinivasan, appearing for Shekar, submitted, "I can't contact her. So I reached out through friends. I sent a detailed letter giving unconditional apology. I'm in your lords' hands".

Hearing him, the Court issued notice on the plea and continued the interim protection granted earlier.

Case Title: S. VE. SHEKAR Versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU, SLP(Crl) No. 4548-4549/2025 

Justice Yashwant Varma has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the in-house inquiry committee's report which indicted him in the cash-at-residence row. He has also challenged the recommendation made by the former Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna to the President and the Prime Minister to initiate impeachment proceedings against him.

This is an unprecedented development where a sitting judge has approached the Supreme Court seeking to quash an inquiry report against him.  The writ petition was filed yesterday (July 17) afternoon. The Union of India and the Supreme Court of India are the respondents.

Justice Varma's move comes ahead of the Parliament's monsoon session, which commences next Monday, when the impeachment motion against him is likely to be introduced.

Justice Varma argues that the in-house inquiry committee made the findings without giving him a fair opportunity to respond. He alleged that the committee proceeded in a pre-determined fashion and even without finding any concrete evidence, merely drew adverse inferences against him after reversing the burden of proof.

"The Committee failed to notify the Petitioner of its devised procedure, denied him any opportunity to provide inputs on the evidence to be collected, examined witnesses in his absence and provided him with paraphrased statements instead of video recordings (despite availability), selectively disclosed only “incriminating” material, ignored and failed to collect relevant and exculpatory evidence like CCTV footage (despite Petitioner's requests), denied opportunities of personal hearing, did not put any specific/tentative case to the Petitioner, impermissibly reversed the burden of proof without notice to the Petitioner, and effectively hindered any effective defence by the Petitioner," the petition stated.

Also Read -  'Mere Cash Discovery Doesn't Establish Guilt': Justice Yashwant Varma In Supreme Court Petition

The issue relates to the accidental discovery of a huge pile of currency notes at an outhouse of the official residence of Justice Varma, then a judge of the Delhi High Court, during a fire-fighting operation on March 14. After the discovery led to a huge public controversy, the then CJI Sanjiv Khanna constituted an in-house inquiry committee of three judges- Justice Sheel Nagu (then Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana High Court), Justice GS Sandhawalia (then Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh High Court), and Justice Anu Sivaraman (Judge, Karnataka High Court). Justice Varma was repatriated to the Allahabad High Court and judicial work was withdrawn from him pending the inquiry.

The committee submitted its report to CJI Khanna in May, which the CJI forwarded to the President and the Prime Minister for further action, after Justice Varma refused to heed the CJI's advice to resign.

The 3-judge in-house inquiry committee termed Justice Varma's conduct after the fire incident on March 14 - which led to the discovery of the currency notes - unnatural, leading to certain adverse inferences against him.

After examining 55 witnesses, including Justice Varma and his daughter, and electronic evidence in the form of videos and photographs taken by the members of the fire brigade, the committee held that cash was found in his official premises. Finding that the storeroom was within the “covert or active control of Justice Varma and his family members”, the committee held that the burden was upon him to explain the presence of cash. Since the judge could not discharge his burden by offering a plausible explanation, except giving a "flat denial or a bald plea of conspiracy", the committee found sufficient grounds to propose action against him.

Case : XXX v. Union of India | Diary No.38664/2025

The links of the Supreme Court reports published on July 17, 2025 here :

1. Motor Accident Claims : Can Passenger In Vehicle Claim Compensation Under Third Party Policy? Supreme Court Refers To Larger Bench
2. Pension A Constitutional Right, Can't Be Reduced Without Proper Procedure : Supreme Court
3. Supreme Court Extends Time To FSSAI Expert Committee For Report On Warning Labels On Packaged Foods
4. Supreme Court Grants Last Chance To HCs For Compliance Report On Directions For Toilets For Women, Disabled & Transgender Persons
5. Supreme Court Reviews Order Granting Custody To Father After Child Developed Stress Due To Separation From Mother
6. Are Bar Councils Following Judgment On Enrollment Fee Cap? Supreme Court Seeks BCI Chairperson's Response
7. Rehabilitation Not Necessary In Land Acquisition Cases Except For Those Who Lost Residence Or Livelihood : Supreme Court
8. 'Scandalous, Publicity Stunt' : Supreme Court Rebukes Advocate For Plea Seeking FIR Against Delhi HC Judges, Tribunal Members
9. Supreme Court Stays Karnataka HC Order Impleading Union Minister HD Kumaraswamy In Contempt Case
10. TN Idol Theft Cases : CBI Seeks To Restrain Retd. IPS Officer Pon Manickavel From Giving Media Interviews, Supreme Court To Hear On July 21
11. 'Trace Her' : Supreme Court Asks Centre To Prevent Russian Wife From Fleeing With Indian Man's Child
12. 'Not Convinced' : Supreme Court Questions HC Order Granting Bail To Kannada Actor Darshan In Renukaswamy Murder Case
13. Supreme Court Affirms Conviction Of Woman For Fiance's Murder; Allows Her & Aides To Seek Governor's Pardon
14. Supreme Court Upholds HP Govt Right To 18% Free Power From JSW, Says CERC Cap Doesn't Override Contractual Terms
15. 'Excluding Female Heirs From Inheritance Discriminatory' : Supreme Court Allows Tribal Women Equal Succession Rights As Men
16. Exclusion Of Natural Heirs Without Reasons Raises Doubt About Genuineness Of Will : Supreme Court
17. Supreme Court Rejects Plea Against Allahabad HC's Requirement Of Personal Appearance For Photo Affidavits
18. Supreme Court Commutes Death Penalty Of Man Convicted For Rape-Murder Of 10 Yr Old Girl To Life Term Without Remission

The Bombay High Court on Thursday dismissed the petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and also of the section 124A (sedition) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

A division bench of Justices Ajay Gadkari and Dr Neela Gokhale while pronouncing their judgment today said, "The UAPA in its present form is constitutionally valid...Challenge fails."

A detailed copy of the judgment is yet to be made available. 

The judges were seized with a plea filed by one Anil Babura Baile, who was issued notice on July 10, 2020 by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in connection with the Elgaar Parishad case. He argued that the provisions of the UAPA and section 124A are unconstitutional.

Appearing for Baile, advocate Prakash Ambedkar assisted by Hitendra Gandhi, claimed that the UAPA granted "unbridled power" to the executive to declare an organisation or an individual and their activity as unlawful without defining the same in the law. 

In an extraordinary instance, the Supreme Court on July 14, while upholding the life sentence of a female convict guilty of murdering her fiancé, granted her an opportunity to seek pardon before the Karnataka State Governor. 

The Court also held that the powers of the Governor under Article 161 to grant pardon reflect the wider "constitutional ethos, goal and culture" towards reformation. The Court stressed that the convict, who was being forced to marry the deceased against her will, adopted "the wrong course of action in order to address her problem."

Counsel for Appellants : Senior Counsel Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, Mr. Siddhartha Dave, and Mr. R. Nedumaran

Counsel for State :  Additional Advocate General (AAG) Mr. Muhammed Ali Khan and learned Senior Counsel Mr. Tomy Sebastian 

Case Details : KUM. SHUBHA @ SHUBHASHANKAR VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR | CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1029 OF 2011

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715

Click here to read the judgment

The Supreme Court today(July 17) orally remarked that it is not at all convinced in the manner the Karnataka High Court exercised its discretion in granting bail to actor Darshan in the Renukaswamy Murder Case. It also orally asked Darshan's lawyers to give good reasons as to why the court should not interfere with the High Court's decision. 

A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan was hearing a special leave petition filed by the State of Karnataka against the December 13, 2024, judgment of the High Court granting bail to the actor who is allegedly involved in the killing of his 33-year-old 'fan' over sending obscene messages to actress Pavithra Gowda. The notice on the SLP was issued on January 24.

Darshan had allegedly abducted the deceased from Chitradurga and had him tortured for three days in a shed in Bengaluru in June 2024. The deceased later succumbed to the abuse, with his body thrown out in a drain as per the police report.  Accused Darshan, Pavitra, Anu Kumar, Lakshman M, V Vinay, Jagadeesh, Pradoosh S Rao and Nagaraju R had moved the high court seeking bail after the sessions court had rejected it.

At the outset, Justice Pardiwala said that he is not convinced by the manner the High Court exercised its discretion in granting bail. Justice Pardiwala told Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for actor Darshan: "What do you have to say Mr Sibal? To be very honest with you, we are not convinced with the manner in which the high court has exercised discretion. Very honestly, we will say this. We will hear you because your clients are on bail, they have come for cancellation of bail and you must have seen the manner in which the high court had dictated the order."

Sibal responded that keeping aside the High Court's decision, the court can look into the Section 161 and 164 statements and two to three key witnesses, including police. 

Keeping the matter for next Tuesday, Justice Pardiwala  said: "You need to convince us that there is no good reason for this court to interfere."

When Sibal asked which part of the High Court's order the bench finds problematic, Justice Pardiwala replied: "That part of the order, Mr Sibal, where the High Court was really panting how to release them on bail."

The Court also asked Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra, appearing for the State of Karnataka, if there are any antecedents of the Respondent, and if there are any, it may highlight them in the next hearing.

Luthra responded that not just antecedents but also post-bail conduct needs to be highlighted. He said: "He is sitting on the stage with one of our key witnesses in a public function. It is a little disturbing."  Sibal responded that he is not a key witness, to which Luthra remarked that if he was not a key witness, then what was the definition of key witness.

Case Details:  THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs SRI DARSHAN ETC. ETC.|SLP(Crl) No. 516-522/2025 

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

The Supreme Court will hear on July 21 a plea filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation seeking to restrain retired IPS officer Pon Manickavel, who is accused of falsely implicating police officials in Idol Theft cases, from giving any interviews to the media.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta adjourned the matter today till the said date.

To recap, the FIR against Manickavel was lodged at the behest of suspended Deputy Superintendent of Police Kader Batcha, who was arrested over alleged collusion in theft of idols from a Pazhavoor temple in 2005.

In August last year, Manickavel was granted anticipatory bail by the Madras High Court, subject to certain conditions. One of the conditions was that he shall appear before CBI daily at 10.30 a.m. for a period of 4 weeks and thereafter, as and when required for interrogation. Another condition was that he shall not tamper with evidence or witness either during investigation or trial.

Allegedly, after appearing before CBI and the interrogation, Manickavel started giving media interviews about how the investigation was being carried out, which according to Batcha, amounted to interference with the investigation and violation of the bail conditions. Aggrieved, Batcha made a representation to CBI.

Recently, the present petition was filed by CBI seeking imposition of 2 more bail conditions on Manickavel, related to impounding of his passport and restrain on media interviews. In May, the top Court issued notice to Manickavel.

Notably, Batcha also filed a petition before the Madras High Court against Manickavel's interviews. In March, Manickavel submitted that since filing of the said petition, he stopped giving interviews to media and would not do so in the future as well. Under Court orders, he also gave an undertaking in writing, after which the petition was disposed of.

Case Title: CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Versus A.G. PONN MANICKAVEL, SLP(Crl) No. 7200/2025

Also Read - SC Upholds Madras HC's Direction Appointing Retired Police Officer To Head SIT Probing Idol Theft Cases [Read Judgment]

The Supreme Court today(July 17) issued notice in a special leave petition filed by JD(S) MP HD Kumaraswamy (now a Union Minister) against the Karnataka High Court's order wherein the high court issued notice in the ongoing contempt proceedings against the Union Minister. The high court's order of April 17, which impleaded him as a party, has also been kept in abeyance. 

The issue arises out of a writ petition filed by Samaj Parivartana before the High Court alleging large-scale encroachment of land by the Union Minister and his family. It sought inquiry into the 2011 Lokayukta's interlocutory report against illegal encroachment of government lands in Kethaganahalli village, Bidadi. Thereafter, based on the statement by the Advocate General of the State that they will act upon the Lokayukta's report, the high court closed the matter on January 14, 2020. Subsequently, citing jurisdictional restraint, the proceedings before the Lokayukta were also closed in 2021.

The State had formed a special investigation team of senior officials and found the allegations of encroachment prima facie true. Kumaraswamy has denied the allegations of encroaching on the said land and alleged a conspiracy initiated by the Congress Government.

Thereafter, a contempt was filed and admitted against the authorities by the high court, over alleged failure to comply with the Lokayukta's order ordering that the illegally encroached lands in Kethaganahalli village should be reclaimed by the Government.

 In the ongoing proceedings, the eviction notices were issued against the Union Minister, who approached the Supreme Court stating that despite not being a party to the contempt proceedings, eviction notices were issued and he is at risk of being evicted. 

On March 28, the Supreme Court disposed of his plea and asked him to approach the high court, pursuant to which the Union Minister filed an application clarifying that eviction notices should not be issued to him as he has been dropped from the proceedings. Instead, as he alleges in the present SLP, the high court made him a party to the ongoing proceedings.

Appearing before a bench comprising Justices Pankaj Mithal and PB Varale, Senior Advocate Aryaman Sundaram submitted that despite the Supreme Court's order "dropping" him before the case, the High Court has made him an accused. Sundaram also questioned the ongoing contempt proceedings.

Sundaram said: "High Court now makes me a respondent. See the rules of contempt, there are only two parties to the contempt-petitioner and the accused. I have been made accused again. Your lordship grants me leave and say, bring it to the notice of the court that I am not a party."

Whereas, Advocate Prashant Bhushan, for Samaj Parivartana, refuted this claim and clarified that the Supreme Court's order was limited to asking him to approach the High Court and get impleaded. However, Justice Mithal clarified that the Court "never said that". He said: "We permitted the petitioner to bring it to the notice of the high court that the petitioner has been deleted from the contempt proceedings..."

Justice Mithal then asked Bhushan how the contempt proceedings were going on when Lokayukta had closed the matter. Bhushan clarified that the matter was closed because of jurisdictional constraints. 

Nevertheless, Bhushan submitted that even if the petitioner has been wrongly impleaded, he is entitled to put his grievances before the High Court, and there is no reason to approach this court. But Justice Mithal questioned: "How are you maintaining the contempt proceedings?...The Advocate General makes a statement and on the basis, the High Court passed an order let the order such and such of the Lokayukta be complied with. That order of the Lokayukta ceased to exist and the matter has been closed."

The Court issuing notice, ordered: "It is submitted that contempt proceedings are drawn before the High Court for the disobedience of order dated 14 January, 2020, passed by the division bench of the High Court in writ petition 49/2020. The above order in the writ petition was passed by the High Court on the basis of the statement by the Additional Advocate General wherein he stated that the State will comply with the order dated 5 August, 2014, passed by the Karnataka Lokayukta within a period of three weeks. It is submitted that the aforesaid order of Lokayuta was a detailed order but was interlocutory in nature and finally, the Lokayukta had closed the proceedings wide order dated 3.3.21 and therefore, the order of Lokayukta does not have any independent existence and stands quashed. In such a situation, the proceedings for contempt can't go on.

The second submission is, that at the relevant time, the petitioner was not a party to the contempt proceedings but even then, the actions were taken against them for eviction. Therefore, this court wide order dated 28.5.25 disposed of the SLP preferred by the petitioner with liberty to bring to the notice of the high court that he has been deleted from the contempt proceedings.  In pursuance thereof, the petitioner made an application to the court for which the contempt court has directed for the impleaded of the petitioner. The submission is, he has not filed for impleadment but has brought it to the notice of the court as directed by this court. Issue notice...Response to the petition within four weeks...In the meanwhile, the effect and operation of impugned order dated 17 April 2025 remain in abeyance."

Case Details: H.D. KUMARASWAMY Vs SAMAJ PARIVARTANA SAMUDAYA SPS|SLP(C) No. 14420/2025

Appearances: Senior Advocate Mr. C.A. Sundaram appeared on behalf of Mr. Kumaraswamy, assisted by Mr. Balaji Srinivasan (Advocate-on-Record) and Mr. Nishanth A.V.

Samaj Parivartana, the complainant in the contempt case before the Karnataka High Court, was represented by Senior Advocate Mr. Prashant Bhushan

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

The Supreme Court today rebuked an advocate for filing a plea seeking registration of FIR against 6 sitting/former judges of High Courts and/or Members of Tribunals.

On the petitioner's asking however, a bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi appointed Senior Advocate Dr S Muralidhar (former Judge, Delhi High Court) as Amicus Curiae.

Notably, the petition impleaded Justice C Hari Shankar (Delhi High Court), Justice Girish Kathpalia (Delhi High Court), Justice Suresh Kumar Kait (former Judge, Delhi High Court and Chief Justice, Madhya Pradesh High Court), Justice Dinesh Gupta (former Judge, Allahabad High Court), Ms. Harvinder Oberoi (Judicial Member, Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi) and Mr KN Shrivastava (former Member, Central Administrative Tribunal).

At the outset of the hearing, the bench called the petition "scandalous" and a "publicity stunt". In response to a query, it was informed that the petitioner had a bachelor's degree in engineering from Delhi University and was also an IIM Kozhikode graduate. He enrolled into law only to pursue personal cases, but was also taking pro bono corruption cases.

"This kind of publicity stunt we understand and appreciate very well...don't you think that when you indulge in this kind of scandalous petition, [then how it's likely to affect you?]" Justice Kant posed to the petitioner.

The petitioner, on his part, argued that the concerned Tribunal bench said during the hearing that his original application would be allowed, but dismissed it behind his back, and the same thing happened in the Delhi High Court as well. "The case remains pending before every bench, every bench looks into the gravity of the matter, calls the ASG, calls an affidavit from the PMO...there's admission by Union of India that there's no such rule...then how can same plea be taken by Division Bench to appease the government?", he urged.

"Tell us under which provision of law, judges of High Court and members of Tribunal, who have given judgment against you, are liable to be prosecuted?" asked Justice Kant.

At this point, the petitioner raised an allegation of fabrication in a judicial order and submitted that the Supreme Court is his last resort. "If there's illegal, erroneous, perverse kind of order or judgment rendered by the judicial forum, you will implead judges by name? And you will ask for registration of FIR?", asked Justice Kant.

When the petitioner submitted that he had placed all legal provisions before the concerned Courts/Tribunals, the judge responded by saying, "You are such a learned fellow, you know law more than everyone on the earth...such caliber, we need Amicus' assistance to understand you".

The bench also questioned the petitioner as to why he tendered "unconditional apology" before the concerned Tribunal when it was going to issue contempt against him. Replying to this, the petitioner alleged that while the Tribunal adjourned his case during the hearing, 10 days later, he got a call from the Court officer saying the order had been destroyed and a judgment uploaded. "The bench was unaware that I had already obtained certified copy of original order", the petitioner said.

Ultimately, on his asking, the Court appointed Dr Muralidhar as an Amicus.

Case Title: RAVI KUMAR Versus JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR AND ORS., Diary No. 57941-2024 

While dealing with a case alleging criminal trespass, a Delhi Court has asked four accused persons to “stand in the court with their hands straight in the air till its rising” as a punishment for wasting judicial time and failing to furnish their bail bonds in time.

Judicial Magistrate First Class Saurabh Goyal of Dwarka Courts held the accused persons guilty for contempt of court proceedings and convicted them for the offence under Section 228 (intentionally insulting or interrupting a public servant while they are engaged in judicial proceeding) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

On May 06, the accused persons were directed to furnish their bail bonds on July 15, failing which the judge said that Rs. 15,000 costs shall be imposed on them.

On July 15, when the matter was fixed for pre trial evidence, the Court noted that despite waiting and calling the matter twice from 10:00 AM till 11:40 AM, the bail bonds were not furnished by the accused persons.

“For wasting the time of the court, which is in contempt of the order duly promulgated on last date of hearing, the accused persons are hereby held guilty for contempt of court proceedings and are convicted for offence U/s 228 IPC. They are directed to stand in the court till the rising of this court with their hands straight in the Air,” the Court ordered.

Further, the judge said that despite waiting since morning, the bail bonds were not furnished by one of the accused Kuldeep. Therefore, the Court ordered that he be taken into custody and remanded him to 14 days of judicial custody.

However, later an application was filed by the accused seeking bail and stating that surety was available. The surety bonds were then furnished which were accepted by the Court and he was released from judicial custody.

The development ensued in a complaint case filed in 2018 by one Harkesh Jain against accused persons- Anil, Ram Kumar, Anand, Kuldeep, Rakesh & Upasana Sehrawat. Notably, accused Ram Kumar and Anil expired during pendency of the proceedings.

The complainant had alleged that in March 2018, the accused persons tired to grab his property and constructed an illegal structure after tresspassing on the said property.

It was alleged that the accused persons threatened him for his life and hatched a preplaned criminal consipracy to grab his property.

The complainant had prayed that the accused be summoned for the offences under Section 351 (assault), 441 (criminal trespass), 442 (house trespass), 506 (criminal intimidation), 120B (criminal conspiracy) and 34 (criminal intent) of IPC.

In September last year, the Court summoned the accused persons for the offences under Section 441, 506 and 34 of IPC. 

Click here to read order 

The Supreme Court on July 15 passed an order seeking the presence of the Chairman of the Bar Council of India and Senior Advocate, Manan Mishra, to assist the Court on whether the directions issued by the Court in its July 30, 2024, order directing State Bar Councils to not charge extraorbitant fees for enrollment have been complied with or not. 

In Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that the Bar Councils cannot charge enrollment fees beyond what is prescribed under Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Therefore, it stated that as stipulated in Section 24, the enrolment fee cannot exceed Rs.750 for advocates belonging to the general category and Rs.125 for advocates belonging to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes categories.

The present case is a contempt petition moved by petitioner-in-person K. L. J. A. Kiran Babu, who has argued that the Bar Councils are in contempt of the 2024 judgment as they have failed to comply with the directions issued. 

Before a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan, the petitioner appeared in person. When he was asked about his locus as to how he is aggrieved by the non-compliance, he responded that any person can move the contempt petition. 

Without further indulging in the debate, the bench decided not to issue notice in this contempt petition. However, it passed an order asking Mishra to be present in the court on August 8 and explained whether there has been compliance with the directions or not. 

The court ordered: "For the present, we are not inclined to issue notice, however, we would like to know from the Bar Council of India whether the directions issued in the main judgment i.e. para 109 are being complied with in their letter and spirit or not. We request Mr. Manan Mishra, the learned counsel, who also happens to be the Chairman of the Bar Council of India to appear in this matter and assist us."

The directions referred to in para 109 of the 2024 judgment are:

"a. The SBCs cannot charge "enrolment fees" beyond the express legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) as it currently stands;

b. Section 24(1)(f) specifically lays down the fiscal pre-conditions subject to which an advocate can be enrolled on State rolls. The SBCs and the BCI cannot demand payment of fees other than the stipulated enrolment fee and stamp duty, if any, as a pre-condition to enrolment;

c. The decision of the SBCs to charge fees and charges at the time of enrolment in excess of the legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) violates Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; and

d. This decision will have prospective effect. The SBCs are not required to refund the excess enrolment fees collected before the date of this judgment."

In January, this year, the BCI moved an application in the 2024 judgment seeking to enhance the enrollment fees to Rs 25,000.

Case Details: K. L. J. A. KIRAN BABU v KARNATAKA STATE BAR COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY RAMESH S NAIK (FDA)|Diary No. 16629-2025 PIL-W

Click Here To Read Order

The Supreme Court on July 16 gave one last opportunity to the high courts to file a compliance report in the January 15 judgment, wherein it issued a set of directions for the construction of toilet facilities especially for women, specially-abled persons and transgender persons in Court premises and tribunals across the country.

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

The Supreme Court on Tuesday (July 15) extended the time for an expert committee under the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) to give its recommendations within three months on the proposed amendments for nutrition warning labels on the front of packaged food items.

On April 9, the Court had granted three months' time to the committee for its recommendations on the amendments proposed by the FSSAI on Front-of-Package Warning Labels (FOPL) on packaged foods so that the customers can know about the sugar, salt and fat contents.

On July 15, a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan allowed the extension application filed by the FSSAI, granting further time of three months as a last opportunity.

“We grant further time of 3 months for one last time failing which we will take appropriate steps as per law," the bench ordered

The direction was passed in a PIL filed by 3S and Our Health Society who highlighted the urgent need for interpretive labels that clearly indicate levels of sugars, salt, and saturated fat in packaged foods. The petition argued that such labels shall empower consumers to make informed dietary choices, help reduce the prevalence of diabetes and other non-communicable diseases (NCDs), and address public health concerns related to obesity, hypertension, and cardiovascular conditions.

An affidavit was filed by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India mentioning that in order to implement Front-of-Pack Nutrition Labelling (FOPNL) requirements, FSSAI had notified a draft of the proposed amendment to FSS (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020 on 13.09.2022 and made it available to the public for objections/suggestions.

Following the notification, over 14,000 comments were received from public stakeholders, including Food Businesses, Consumers, Consumer organizations, etc. To analyze the public feedback, FSSAI constituted an Expert Committee on 17.02.2023 which, in its 5th meeting, prepared a report of its recommendations. The report of the expert committee and the amended final (draft) notification of FSS (Labelling and Display) Amendment Regulations, 2022 were to be submitted to the Scientific Committee for recommendation and approval.

Notably, as per FSSAI's affidavit, the amendment sought to be brought in proposes an Indian Nutrition Rating (INR) for FOPNL. This format adopts a star-rating system (from 0.5 to 5 stars) that presents simplified nutrition information on the front-of-pack of pre-packaged foods and provides information on the overall nutritional value of the food and/or on nutrients included in the FOPNL.

Under the INR system, a higher star rating indicates a healthier product. The design is aimed at simplifying the complex nutritional content of packaged foods, enabling consumers to assess products at a glance and encouraging healthier dietary decisions.

Case Title: 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No.437/2024

Click here to read the order

The Supreme Court on July 14 referred to a larger bench the issue whether a passenger sitting in a car is covered under a third-party policy in insurance claims.

The bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice PB Varale was hearing a challenge by New India Insurance to the Kerala High Court Order, which upheld the compensation granted by the Motor Accident Compensation Tribunal to a passenger in an auto-rickshaw.

The passenger had died when the auto-rickshaw turned after hitting a sand rubble. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal held the insurer liable to compensate  by treating the deceased as a 'third party'. The High Court approved the MACT's view.

Before the Supreme Court, the bench noted that the plea raises the issue of "whether under a third party policy, a person sitting in a car would be covered and entitled to compensation ?"

It further noted the issue of "whether the third party includes all other persons other than the insured, who is the first party and the insurer, who is the second party, has been referred to a larger Bench." 

Observing the same, the bench issued notice in the plea and tagged it with other pending matters. 

Notably, in 2022, a bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and Vikram Nath referred to a larger bench the issue of whether a pillion rider on a motorcycle is a "third party" in an Act-only policy(Mohana Krishnan S vs K.Balasubramaniyam | SLP(C) 3433/2020)

The Court also stayed the execution proceedings, subject to the condition that the insurance company deposits the entire compensation sum with updated interest before the MACT in six weeks. 

Counsel for the petitioner : Mr. Aditya Kumar, Adv.; Ms. Ila Nath, Adv.; Mr. C. George Thomas, AOR

Case Details : THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER v. RADHA SANTHOSH & ORS.| SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO(S). 17630/2025

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

A Delhi Court has observed that the word 'randi' is not a word which is used simply to insult a person and is bound to insult the modesty of any hardworking woman.

Judicial Magistrate First Class Harjot Singh Aujla of Dwarka Courts convicted a man for offence punishable under Section 506 (criminal intimidation) and 509 (insulting modesty of woman) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The FIR was registered against the accused in 2021 by the complainant alleging that he abused her by using abusive or filthy language insulting her modesty and also threatened to rape her.

It was alleged that the accused used the word “Darwaja Khool de mujhe tere saath sex karna hai” and “Randi tujhe mai bataunga bahut samajhdar apne to samajahti hai".

Convicting the accused, the judge said that when the word 'randi' is used to a woman, it denotes that she is not loyal.

The Court also said that the words used by the accused were not simple insult but it directly hit at the sex of a woman and it shows that the word is intended to mean that the woman is promiscuous and further casts an aspersion on her character. “It is bound to insult the modesty of any woman. The words also mean that she is engaged in sexual intercourse with various people,” the Court said.

“Hence, the court is of the view that the words spoken by the accused are intended to insult the modesty of complainant. Thus, ingredients of section 509 IPC are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt,” it added.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that the accused used direct threats by using the words in question which clearly amounted to criminal intimidation as defined under section 503 of IPC.

“Based on the above discussion, the court is of the view that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused stands convicted for offence u/s 506(part 2)/509 IPC,” the Court said.

Click here to read order 

The Supreme Court today stayed the Madras High Court order of July 4, which directed fresh elections for the Tamil Nadu Football Association (TNFA) noting that there was non-compliance with its earlier directives.

A bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi passed the order, while issuing notice on two pleas, including one filed by the Chennai Football Association against the High Court order.

"The affairs of the Tamil Nadu Football Association shall continue to be looked after by the Administrative Committee which was earlier appointed by the High Court", the Court said.

Briefly put, one of the cases filed before the High Court challenged the manner in which TNFA, the apex body of football in Tamil Nadu, was functioning. It alleged that the office bearers of the association continued to manage affairs even though their tenure had ended, without conducting fresh elections. It further claimed that the office bearers were functioning against the constitution and principles of natural justice.

In 2023, a Division Bench of the High Court constituted an administrative committee to look into the affairs of TNFA till a new administrative body was appointed. Later, certain directions were issued, including that the Administrative Committee shall administer TNFA till such time a new administrative body was elected and approved by the Court.

In July, 2024, the Administrative Committee appointed the Election Officer. As per election notification dated 21.04.2025, it wrote a letter to the Election Officer stating that it had taken a considered decision to conduct elections of TNFA immediately, excluding Coimbatore, Tiruchirappalli, Chennai, Krishnagiri, Dharmapuri and Kanyakumari District Football Associations. 

On May 31 this year, TNFA elections took place, however, did not get the High Court approval. In the impugned order of July 4, the High Court observed that the election notification did not give district football associations an opportunity to raise objections to the list of approved candidates.

"But the more alarming aspect is that, over and above 22 members that had been approved as on 21/22.04.2025, four (4) other members have been added to the list, viz., 1 district on 22.04.2025 (Tirunelveli) and 3 districts on 26.05.2025 (Chennai, Coimbatore and Trichy)", the High Court said.

Though justifications were offered regarding inclusion of Chennai, Coimbatore and Trichy District Associations to the approved list, the High Court was not convinced.

"it is a fact that those districts, Trichy, Coimbatore and Chennai, were included in the approved list of districts only on 26.05.2025, just four days prior to the date of election. There is no dispute on this aspect and we are hence constrained to direct re-elections as the procedure is clearly contrary to that directed by the Division Bench."

Aggrieved by the High Court order, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court.

Appearance: Senior Advocates Gopal Shankarnarayanan and Shailesh Madiyal (for petitioners)

Case Title: CHENNAI FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION Versus TAMILNADU FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION AND ORS., Diary No. 36957-2025 (and connected case)

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal said before the Supreme Court today that the film "Udaipur Files : Kanhaiya Lal Tailor Murder" was generating hate against one particular community.

"[Udaipur Files] movie generates violence, it is vilification of an entire community," he said, during the hearing of pleas seeking reliefs related to the controversial movie.

Such a film which generates hate against one community should not be allowed to be seen by millions in a democratic country, the senior counsel emphasized.

The matter was before a bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi which adjourned the hearing to await the Centre's decision on a revision petition filed against the movie's certification.

Sibal, appearing for Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind President Maulana Arshad Madani (writ petitioner before the Delhi High Court) apprised the bench that he had watched the movie in a private special screening allowed by the Delhi High Court, which suggested that he should watch it to ascertain if any objectionable content remained after the 55 cuts ordered by the Central Board of Film Certification. According to Sibal, even the revised version is objectionable and alleged that the film peddled a communal agenda.

"When High Court asked us to see the movie, I personally saw it. Once I saw the movie, I was shaken in every sense of the word. If any judge were to see it [will be shocked]. It is a complete thematic dissertation of hate against the community...Just see the movie. It is something that generates violence. It seeds violence. It's vilification of an entire community. Not one positive aspect about the community is projected in the movie...violence, hate, homosexuality, denigration of women by one community, child abuse and judicial matters...it is unthinkable that a democratic nation would allow this kind of movie to be certified...I don't think in any nation, such kind of agenda should be allowed to be viewed by millions."

Senior Advocate Gaurav Bhatia, for the film producer, countered Sibal, saying that the movie was based on the real-life beheading of a person and was not against any community. He further asserted that the message sought to be conveyed was against radical elements and about the effect of such incidents on families of victims.

However, Sibal maintained his stance, underlining that the movie does not show even a single positive aspect about the Muslim community. He highlighted that the movie portrays judicial matters as well, which contention was supported by Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy as well, who was appearing for an accused in the Kanhaiya Lal murder case.

A detailed report on the proceedings can be read here.

Case Title: MOHAMMED JAVED Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS., W.P.(C) No. 647/2025 and JANI FIREFOX MEDIA PVT. LTD v. MAULANA ARSHAD MADANI AND ORS, SLP(C) No. 18316/2025 

The Supreme Court today issued notice on a public interest litigation seeking a grievance redressal mechanism for breach of advocates' privileges.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the matter and tagged it with the suo motu case initiated in connection with summoning of lawyers by investigation agencies over legal advice given to clients (Ref: In Re : Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues).

Briefly put, the petition is filed by a practicing advocate, praying that the Bar Council of India adopt certain rules for the protection of privileges of Advocates, which is one of its "mandated statutory functions" under Section 7(d) of the Advocates Act.

The PIL seeks constitution of a Committee for the purpose of safeguarding advocates' privileges, so that the issues/grievances regarding breach of privilege of Advocates can be effectively examined through a "uniform, accessible and transparent mechanism".

As per averments made in the petition, the petitioner has been pursuing the Advocates (Protection) Bill before the Union Government since 2014, which has been referred to the Law Commission of India. In this regard, it is further stated that in March this year, the petitioner applied to the BCI to adopt draft rules - the Advocates (Protection of Privileges) Rules, 2025 - proposed by him, "which lie within the power" of BCI, but the rules have not been adopted.

The petition further states that it is necessitated in light of incidents that are reported regarding assaults and killing of advocates or their framing in cases.

"Advocates are Officers of the Court and any attack on Advocates that meddles with their duties as Advocates must be looked into by the respective State Bar Council in order to determine whether such an incident should be treated as an assault on the privileges of an Advocate."

It urges that adoption of uniform rules for protecting advocates' privileges would make the process of seeking protection and granting thereof by the concerned State Bar Council moving the appropriate Court more streamlined and systematic.

The petition is filed through AoR Ganu Suvarna Siddhanath.

Case Title: AADITYA GORE Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS., W.P.(C) No. 632/2025

Click Here To Read/Download Order

Also Read - 'Undermines Legal Profession's Autonomy' : Supreme Court Raises Concerns At Police Summoning Advocates Over Client Advice

A Delhi Court today imposed costs of Rs. 5,000 on Aam Aadmi Party leader Somnath Bharti's wife for failing to appear in a criminal defamation case filed by her against Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman.

ACJM Paras Dalal of Rouse Avenue Courts noted that none appeared on behalf of the complainant- Lipika Mitra, despite repeated calls and passed over the matter at 2:30 PM.

In the post lunch session, none again was present on behalf of Mitra, either in Court or on VC. On this, the judge ordered:

“As per last order, date and time was fixed as per convenience of both the sides. In view of none appearance, cost of Rs.5,000/- is imposed on the complainant to be deposited with Central Delhi Court Bar Association.”

The Court has granted last opportunity to Mitra to comply with the previous order to file reply and address arguments.

The matter is now listed for arguments on August 02 at 2 PM.

The complainant, Lipika Mitra, filed the criminal defamation case against Sitharaman alleging commission of offences under Section 356(1) and 356(2) of BNS, 2023 for allegedly making and publishing defamatory, derogatory and libelous remarks in print and electronic media against her.

The complaint alleges that Sitharaman has made defamatory, false, and malicious statements in a press conference published on YouTube, which was broadcasted on Republic TV and NDTV news channels on May 17.

Mitra has alleged that Sitharaman's statements were made by her during the election campaign of Loksabha, 2024, with the sole intention to tarnish her husband's reputation, and weaken his chances of winning from New Delhi Parliamentary Constituency as India Alliance Candidate.

The complaint says that the alleged statements have caused immense mental anguish to Bharti and damaged his public standing as an elected representative.

“The accused deliberately is trying to cause larger damage to the marriage which complainant and her husband have successfully saved and in turn is also causing mental agony not only to the complainant and her husband but also to their children. The accused thus attempted to, tarnish the reputation of the Complainant's husband and damage his social standing and goodwill in the society,” the complaint reads. 

Sadhguru's Isha Foundation has moved the Supreme Court seeking to restrain Tamil media outlet Nakkheeran Publications from "continuing" to publish allegedly defamatory content against it.

The plea was mentioned today before a bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi by Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi (appearing for Isha Foundation), which listed it on next Monday.

To recap, last year, Isha Foundation filed a defamation suit against Nakkheeran Publications before the Delhi High Court, claiming that some of its content maligned the Foundation's reputation. The suit demanded Rs.3 crores as damages.

Subsequently, Nakkheeran Publications filed a transfer petition before the Supreme Court, seeking transfer of the defamation case from Delhi to Chennai. Isha Foundation has now filed an application in Nakkheeran's transfer petition seeking to restrain publication of any defamatory content by it.

During today's mentioning, Rohatgi argued that the Tamil Media outlet is continuing its "vilification campaign" against Isha Foundation and has filed a transfer petition before the Supreme Court, saying that the defamation suit ought to be pursued in Chennai.

He further informed that a chamber judge has issued notice on the Publications' transfer plea and contended that the aforesaid cannot be a ground for transfer. On being questioned about the relief sought in the application, the senior counsel said,

"He can't have a transfer and carry on this...IA is to stop him from carrying on this defamatory campaign, why moving transfer here and stultifying...he must stop if he wants the jurisdiction of this Court to be utilized...we are a charitable organization with disciples all across the world...today, on social media, he's going on and on..."

Hearing him, the bench said that the case will be listed on Monday.

Case Title: NAKKHEERAN PUBLICATIONS v. GOOGLE LLC, T.P.(C) No. 1403/2025 

The Supreme Court today(July 15) granted bail to Ileshkumar Valabhai Kher, who was the district Chief Fire Officer, when the TRP Game Zone Fire incident  took place wherein twenty-seven individuals, including four children, perished in the massive fire that engulfed the game zone in Rajkot's Nana-Mava locality on May 25, 2024.

The Court orally said that the responsibility of the Chief Fire Officer in this case was "extremely remote" and observed in its order that the Appellant has been granted bail, considering that he has suffered one year of incarceration and that there is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future. 

A bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan set aside the January 30 order of the Gujarat High Court denying bail to Kher.

"This appeal arises from the order of the Gujarat High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the applicant in connection with the FIR no...An unfortunate fire incident occurred at a gaming zone, resulting in the death of 27 persons and injuring several others. A detailed investigation was carried out, and the chargesheet was filed against several accused, citing 365 witnesses. The appellant herein is the district Chief Fire Officer, who has been indicted alleging that he failed to perform his duties to prevent such fire incidents when the law required he had to be vigilant and ensure that proper prevention safety measures are in place where such activities is to take place. The culpability of the appellant is highlighted by the fact that a similar fire incident has occurred, though not of such magnitude, on 4.9.2023 and therefore, the present fire incident was a repeat act. 

The fresh bail prayer, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted, that in the worst case, this case would be of negligence in performance of his duties and the charge would under no circumstances would travel to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It was submitted that the appellant has already suffered incarceration of over a year and 365 witnesses are to be examined in the trial, there is no possibility of the completion of the trial in the near future. In such circumstances, it is prayed that he may be released on bail. It is also submitted that the appellant is a person with clean antecedents and there is no possibility that he would misuse the liberty. 

The learned counsel for Respondent submitted that there is a case where there has been a delerection of duties not once but twice and since the activity was carried at such a large scale, the law required the appellant to carry out inspections and stop the activities in the absence of fire satefy measures. Such circumstances, what offence would be made out against the appellant depend upon the trial and therefore, it would not be appropriate to observe on the merits of the charges.

Having regards to the facts of the fact and also that the appellant was in his supervisory capacity as the chief fire officer and has been in jail for a period exceeding 1 year, with there being remote possibility of the trial to commence in near future, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail pending trial. Appeal is allowed and the bail rejecting order...is set aside..."

Appearing for the State of Gujarat, Additional Solicitor General S.V. Raju had opposed the bail plea. He submitted that this was the second time the fire occurred in the TRP game zone. In 2023, a fire occurred on account of welding activities, and he had not taken preventive steps for safety. Therefore, there has been a dereliction of duty by the petitioner. 

Further, Raju said that there is a PIL before the Gujarat High Court regarding fire incidents, wherein in the judgment, there was an undertaking that he would inspect all buildings, temporary or otherwise, and also would consider the safety and fire angle, if any.

On this, Justice Misra responded that the State can file a contempt against the violation of the undertaking, but there is no point in denying him bail, especially when there is possibility of trial commencing soon. He said: "You can proceed under the contempt for violation of the undertaking but that is not the ground for criminalising him."

ASG Raju then requested the court for the bail order not to be considered as a precedent. To this, Justice Misra replied that bail orders are never treated as precedent, unless parity with other accused is claimed. "You can never argue that bail orders are treated as precedents," Justice Misra told ASG Raju.

The Gujarat High Court granted bail to Rajeshbhai Narsinhbhai Makwana, assistant town planning officer; Jaydipbhai Balubhai Choudhary, assistant engineer, and Gautam Devshankar Joshi, assistant town planning officer at the time.

The Supreme Court today(July 16) granted liberty to former Delhi University Professor Hany Babu to approach either the trial court or the High Court seeking bail in the Bhima Koregaon-Elgar Parishad conspiracy case under the UAPA over alleged Maoist links.

The Court also said that Babu could seek revival of his earlier Special Leave Petition filed in the Supreme Court, which was withdrawn.

A bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice PB Varale, granted this liberty to the petitioner while dismissing a Miscellaneous Application filed by him seeking a clarification that his earlier withdrawal of the SLP did not prevent the High Court from hearing his bail matter.   

In September 2022, the High Court had denied bail to Babu, who was arrested in July 2020 by the NIA under the UAPA over alleged links to Maoists in the Bhima Koregaon case. In May 2024, he withdrew the special leave petition filed in the Supreme Court, saying that he wanted to approach the High Court for bail, citing a change in circumstances.

On May 2, the High Court observed that the Supreme Court's order allowing the withdrawal did not reserve his liberty to approach the High Court. Hence, the High Court said that Babu was required to seek clarification from the Supreme Court.

When the matter was taken up today, Advocate Payoshi Roy, appearing for Hany Babu, submitted that he has spent five years as an undertrial and had withdrawn the SLP to approach the high court because eight other accused persons were granted bail on grounds of prolonged incarceration, etc. She added that in comparison to these accused, the petitioner is better placed. 

The Bombay High Court has so far granted bail to Rona Wilson and activist Sudhir Dhawale, Sudha Bharadwaj, while the Supreme Court has granted bail to P Varavara Rao on medical grounds, Shoma Sen, Vernon Gonsalves and Arun Ferreira on merits. 

However, the Counsel, for NIA, opposed the plea and submitted that the MA is not maintainable because the fresh bail petition lies before the NIA Court. Since UAPA charges are involved, the high court sits as a court of appeal. He said: "This is an interim bail couched as an MA"

It should be noted that the trial court had rejected the bail application against which the petitioner had approached the Bombay High Court, which also denied bail to the petitioner. Against which, the petitioner had approached the Supreme Court but later withdrew the SLP.

Justice Mithal suggested that the petitioner approach the trial court: "Your primary ground is, some other accused has been granted bail, that can also be considered by the trial court."

Responding to this, Roy submitted that this ground can't be considered by trial court because the high court granted bail relying on judgments like K.A. Najeeb, which allows constitutional courts to grant bail even against the embargo of Section 43D(5) of UAPA if right to speedy trial is being violated. She said: "Section 43D(5) places certain restrictions on the court from granting bail. However, this court in Najeeb and other judgments had said that this despite the restrictions of UAPA, the courts exercising constitutional jurisdictions on grounds of delayed trial and violation of Article 21 can grant bail and ignore the 43D(5)."

Justice Mithal stated that, indeed, the constitutional courts can grant bail, but he added: "But can we direct the high court to consider a matter which does not lie before it?"

He further added that the grounds invoked by the petitioner are that seeking parity with other co-accused and not the ground of delayed trial. 

Hearing nothing further, the Court passed an order: "The miscellaneous application is dismissed, leaving it open to seek remedies either before the trial court or the high court or seek revival of the SLP."

Case Title: HANY BABU v. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY AND ANR|MA 1208/2025 in SLP(Crl) No. 1596/2024 

The Supreme Court on Wednesday (July 16) clarified that it will not interfere with this year's admission process based on the revised mark list of the Kerala Engineering Architecture Medical (KEAM) entrance exam. At the same time, the Court agreed to hear the question of law raised regarding the power to change the formula to standardise the marks of different boards.

A bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice AS Chandurkar was hearing a Special Leave Petition filed by some students of the State Board challenging the Kerala High Court's judgment which set aside the KEAM exam results on the ground that the standardisation formula as provided in the original prospectus was changed midway. Following the High Court's order, the State Government published revised results as per the unamended prospectus, leading to students of the CBSE board occupying most of the top ranks.

Declining the request made by Advocate Prashant Bhushan, the petitioners' lawyer, for an urgent hearing next week, the bench posted the matter after four weeks, asking the State to file its counter. "4 weeks! It is too long, kindly have it next week," Bhushan pleaded.  

At the outset, Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta, for the State of Kerala, submitted that the State was not filing any petition against the High Court's order, as it does not want to delay the admission process. "Let me make it clear, we wanted to file an appeal but we didn't want to upset the process," Gupta said, adding that the State was supporting the petitioners' plea on merits.

The bench repeated the concern it raised yesterday regarding the Court's interference causing uncertainty in the minds of several students waiting for admission. 

"Mr.Prashant Bhushan, we are not inclined to interfere. But the question which needs to be reflected, we will examine, we will hear," Justice Narasimha. When Bhushan submitted that the question can be examined for this year also, the bench refused, saying it will "cause uncertainty."

"What I am requesting is, your lordships may hear it next week," Bhushan requested. "We don't have time," Justice Narasimha replied. "This will cause great injustice to the State Board students, it is a short point which can be heard next week," Bhushan submitted. However, the bench refused, and posted the matter after four weeks.

Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran appeared on caveat on behalf of certain students who secured positions based on the revised rank list.

Background

Before the High Court, a writ petition was filed challenging the last-minute changes to the original KEAM prospectus. The State of Kerala, on the date of publication of the rank list, amended the prospectus.

As per the amendment, the ratio of subject marks in Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry was changed to 5:3:2 instead of the original 1:1:1 ratio. The weightage given to students from CBSE/ICSE syllabus was taken away by the State.

The single bench of Justice D.K. Singh thus set aside the rank list published as per the amended prospectus and directed that a new, revised rank list be published in accordance with the un-amended prospectus.

On appeal by the State of Kerala before the division bench, the bench of Justice Anil K Narendran and Justice Muralee Krishna S said that it "finds no ground to interfere" with the reasoning of the single judge.

The present petition is filed by candidates from the State Higher Secondary Board who qualified the KEAM-2025 Exam and whose names were included in the rank list published on 01.07.2025 following the amendment made to the prospectus vide order dated 01.07.2025.

The main contention of the petitioners is threefold: (1) the amendment to the prospectus was done with the objective of "curing the defect of disparity caused by the earlier formula that put the State Board students at a disadvantageous position and as a result of the amendment all candidates, regardless of their respective 10+2 Board examination, would be treated equally";

(2) The old formula applied was "disproportionate and disadvantageous to the majority of students studying under the state syllabus in government schools. It is important to note that in Kerala government school students predominately come from middle- and lower-income backgrounds"; (3) cancellation of the results would result in "causing grave prejudice to the Petitioners herein by allowing the disparity that was sought to be rectified by the order dated 01.07.2025 to prevail to the peril of the Petitioners, denying them a level paying field".

The petition was filed through Zulfikar Ali PS AOR.

Case : Mufeeda P and others v. State of Kerala and others | Diary No. 37302-2025

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

A Delhi Court has restrained educational technology company Unacademy from publishing, uploading or using the original videos or any copyrighted work or content of news agency Asia News International (ANI), including on its YouTube channel.

District Judge Hemani Malhotra of Patiala House Courts further directed Unacademy to remove and take down the videos or any other content infringing the copyrighted work of ANI.

The judge passed the interim order in favour of ANI in its suit against Unacademy, observing that irreparable harm will be caused to the news agency, in case it is not granted an ad interim ex-parte injunction.

It was ANI's case that Unacademy illegally and unauthorizedly reproduced three videos comprising the news agency's works on its You Tube Channel “Pathfinder by Unacademy” and also on syndicated newsfeed which is exclusively available to its subscribers.

It was alleged that without obtaining any authorization, licence or permission from ANI, Unacademy had systematically disseminated content incorporating the news agency's works on the said channel.

Ruling in favour of ANI, the Court said:

“Having gone through the submissions made by ld. counsel for plaintiff and on perusal of material placed by plaintiff on record, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and balance of convenience in its favour.”

The counsel appearing for Google LLC submitted that infringing videos had already been taken down from Unacademy's YouTube channel.

To this, the judge ordered that in future, Google LLC will take down, block and disable access to the infringing content published by Unacademy on its YouTube channel as prayed for in the plaint.

The Court issued summons in the suit and listed the matter for hearing on September 11.

Click here to read order 

The Supreme Court adjourned the hearing of the petitions relating to the controversial movie "Udaipur Files : Kanhaiya Lal Tailor Murder", taking note of the fact that the Union Government is set to hear today at 2.30 PM the revision petitions against the CBFC certification of the film.

The Court said that it expected the Centre's committee to take its decision "immediately, without loss of time" and posted the matters to next Monday, considering the urgency expressed by the makers of the film.

Since the producer and director of the film as well as the son of slain Kanhaiya Lal expressed that they were receiving death threats, the Court allowed them to make a representation to the SP/Comissioner of Police of the area, who were directed to assess the threat perception and do the needful to prevent harm if there is substance in their apprehension.

A bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi was dealing with two petitions - first, a writ petition filed by one of the accused in the Kanhaiya Lal Teli murder case (on which the movie is based), and second, filed by the makers of the movie against Delhi High Court's stay over its release.

Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy, for accused-Mohammad Javed, submitted that the petitioner was challenging the release of the film on the ground that it would affect his right to fair trial. Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, for Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind President Maulana Arshad Madani (the petitioner in the Delhi High Court who has been allowed to file revision before the Centre) informed the bench that the Union Government will hear the matter at 2.30 PM today.

The bench at this juncture expressed the view that it would prefer to await the Centre's decision. However, Senior Advocate Gaurav Bhatia, for movie producer-Jani Firefox Media Pvt. Ltd., urged the Court to hear the matter today itself, contending that the High Court's order was erroneous. Once the film was certified by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), there is a presumption of legality in its favour, Bhatia submitted, arguing that the High Court erred in stalling the film's release on the eleventh hour and allowing the petitioners to seek revision before the Centre.

The bench however observed that Section 6 of the Cinematography Act 1952 conferred the Union Government with the power to de-certify a movie and that the High Court only allowed the petitioners to avail the statutory remedy. In response, Bhatia contended that the High Court passed the order without ascertaining the credentials of the petitioners and that the stay order violated the makers' right to freedom of speech and expression as well as their right to carry out business.

Balance of convenience with parties' opposing the movie, says the bench

Justice Surya Kant further opined that the balance of convenience lay with the parties who opposed the movie's release, as if the film is released, their petitions will become infructuous; any loss suffered by the producer due to the delay could be compensated monetarily, the judge added.

"Balance of convienience is in their favor...if movie is released, it can lead to irreparable loss...but if there is delay, you can be compensated," Justice Kant said. Justice Kant also said in a lighter vein that if there is a controversy, the movie is likely to perform well.

Guruswamy submitted that the movie was initially titled "Gyanvapi Files", and was dealing with two sub-judice issues- the Gyanvapi case as well as the Kanhaiya Lal murder case. "The movie portrays the judiciary as well in a certain way. The movie is bordering on hate, and bringing the judiciary into disrepute. There is much at stake. They can't claim free speech to violate fair trial or lower judiciary's reputation," she submitted. She also requested the bench to allow Javed (who was not a petitioner before the Delhi HC) to attend the hearing before the Centre. The bench allowed this request.

Justice Kant however expressed disagreement that a film can sway the mind of judges. "Our judicial officers are not school-going children that they can be swayed by movie dialogues...absolutely confident about their objectivity...sense of detachment," Justice Kant said.

'This movie generates violence' : Sibal

Sibal submitted that he had seen the film in a special private screening, after the 55 cuts ordered by the CBFC, and even that version was highly problematic. Such a film which generates hate against one community should not be allowed to be seen by millions in a democratic country, he urged.

"When HC asked us, I personally saw the movie. I was shaken in every sense of the word. If any judge were to see it, they will be shocked. Its complete theme is of hate against the community..It is something that generates violence. It's vilification of a community. Not one positive aspect about the community shown...homosexuality, judicial matters, treatment of women...a democratic nation certifying such movie...unimaginable...I don't think in any nation, such agenda based movie should be allowed."

Bhatia countered, saying that the film was based on the real-life beheading of a person and asserted that the film was not against any community and was only spreading a message against extremism. He also submitted that the producer, director and the son of Kanhaiya Lal were receiving death threats.

Background

Kanhaiya Lal Teli, an Udaipur-based tailor, was brutally murdered in June 2022, allegedly by one Mohammad Riyaz and one Mohammad Ghous. The perpetrators later released a video claiming the murder was in retaliation for Kanhaiya Lal allegedly sharing a social media post in support of Nupur Sharma, former BJP spokesperson, soon after she made controversial comments about the Prophet.

The case was investigated by the National Investigation Agency, and offences under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Indian Penal Code framed against the accused. While the trial is progressing before a Special NIA Court in Jaipur, the movie - based on the case - is sought to be released.

On July 10, the Delhi High Court stayed the release of the film, allowing the petitioners before it to approach the Central Government in revision against the certification granted by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The order was passed in a batch of pleas, including a plea filed by Islamic cleric's body, Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind President Maulana Arshad Madani, which contended that it was communally divisive.

On July 14, Senior Advocate Gaurav Bhatia, on behalf of the producer of the movie (Jani Firefox Media Pvt. Ltd), mentioned before the Supreme Court the plea challenging Delhi High Court's stay order and sought its urgent listing. A day later, accused-Mohammad Javed's petition was mentioned by Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy, who prayed that it may be listed alongwith the movie makers'.

Case Title: MOHAMMED JAVED Versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS., W.P.(C) No. 647/2025 and JANI FIREFOX MEDIA PVT. LTD v. MAULANA ARSHAD MADANI AND ORS, SLP(C) No. 18316/2025

Click Here To Read/Download Order 

The NEET-UG 2025 candidates who suffered power outage in centres in Madhya Pradesh have approached the Supreme Court, challenging the refusal of the Madhya Pradesh High Court to order a re-test for them.

The petition was mentioned today by a counsel before a bench comprising Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi for urgent listing. When the bench agreed to list the matter next week, the counsel sought an earlier posting, saying that the counselling is about to start on July 21. However, the bench refused, saying that there are several rounds of counselling and that the petitioners will have opportunities if they succeed in the case.

A single judge of the High Court had directed the National Testing Agency to conduct re-test of the NEET-UG 2025 exam for candidates affected by power outage at the centres in Indore and Ujjain. Since the petitioners were put at a disadvantage for no fault of theirs, the Court observed that a re-test was necessary.  The single bench also observed that the counselling process will be subject to the re-test.

However, last week, a division bench set aside the single bench's decision. The division bench took note of a report of an expert committee which opined that even though there was power outage at some centres, there was sufficient natural light enabling the candidates to take the test. The court also noted that only 70 out of the 27,264 students had filed the original writ petitions. 

Justice Sanjiv Khanna, former Chief Justice of India, has joined Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, as a 'Distinguished' Professor. He has previously been associated with the University in the capacity of a Visitor.

Justice Khanna, who retired on May 13, 2025, served as the 51st Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India. He was elevated to the Supreme Court of India on 18th January, 2019.

In May this year, another Former Chief Justice of India, Justice DY Chandrachud, joined the National Law University (NLU) Delhi as a 'Distinguished' Professor. 

In an electricity distribution dispute, the Supreme Court recently held that Electricity Regulatory Commissions (ERCs) cannot entertain a matter solely on the ground of public interest.

An ERC must consider matters in public interest wherever mandated by the Electricity Act, i.e., in matters relating to tariff determination, procurement of power processes, and utility/licensee management, "which requires safeguarding of consumer interest alongside the commercial principles".

"A perusal of the Regulation compels us to conclude that the UPERC had jurisdiction to entertain a petition praying for investigation under Section 128...In the same breath, we also clarify that as a principle of law, the ERCs are not competent to entertain a matter on the singular ground of public interest", observed a bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan.

The Court further observed that the Electricity Act does not provide for direct regulatory oversight over distribution franchisees. Any regulation thereof can only be through the distribution licensees.

Factual Background

Respondent No.4 filed a petition before the Uttar Pradesh ERC challenging a Distribution Franchisee Agreement (DFA) entered between the appellant (distribution franchisee) and respondent No.3 (distribution licensee). He prayed for an investigation into the conduct of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in appointing the appellant as a franchisee for distribution of electricity in Agra's urban area without purportedly seeking prior approval of the UPERC for transfer of its utility to the appellant.

The appellant contested the petition on the grounds of maintainability and jurisdiction. However, UPERC concluded that respondent No.4's petition was maintainable on the grounds of public interest and ERCs were empowered to look into DFAs to assess the benefits of such franchisee for DISCOMs and general public. Besides, the Commission ordered investigation of the appellant's role as a Distribution Franchisee.

Aggrieved, it filed an appeal before APTEL, which opined that public interest litigations are not maintainable before ERCs, however, held that respondent No.4's petition before UPERC was maintainable as it was not in public interest. The APTEL further observed that ERCs are empowered to exercise regulatory oversight on distribution licensees.

Challenging the APTEL order, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Issues

i) Whether any individual can invoke jurisdiction of a State ERC on the plea of public interest?

ii) Whether ERCs have jurisdiction to review the functioning of a distribution licensee to supply electricity through a franchisee?

Court Observations

On the first issue, the Court said that ERCs, being creatures of a statute, derive their jurisdiction and powers from the provisions of the 2003 Act. "Therefore, it would not be permissible for them to exercise powers not expressly vested in them."

It referred to Sections 79 and 86 of the Act, which govern adjudicatory functions of ERCs, and noted that while jurisdiction of State ERCs (under Section 86) is broader than that of Central ERC (under Section 79), the same does not extend to cases involving consumer disputes/grievances, irrespective of whether they are raised in public interest.

"The State ERCs have a comparatively broader jurisdiction under Section 86, to adjudicate upon all disputes between the licensees and generating companies, without being limited to categories specified in (a) to (d) of Section 79. However, even this enlarged jurisdiction of the State ERCs, more particularly the UPERC, does not include within its fold the power to adjudicate disputes involving consumers and by extension their grievances, irrespective of whether such issue is raised in furtherance of public interest."

Distinguishing the case at hand however, the Court observed that respondent No.4's petition was not under Section 86. Rather, it sought investigation under Section 128 of the Act. In this backdrop, the Court agreed with the APTEL's decision on jurisdiction of UPERC.

The appellant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission v. Reliance Energy Ltd. to contend that a State ERC cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the consumer grievance redressal forum established under Section 42(5). The Court, however, opined that the judgment was not applicable to the case, as it pertained to the State of Uttar Pradesh, which enacted UP ERC (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum & Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations in 2007, according to which the consumer grievance redressal forum cannot entertain a complaint regarding matters under Section 128.

The Court further stated that unless some satisfactory grounds are given for initiating an investigation, a petition under Section 128 cannot be held maintainable. In the facts of the case, it was observed that though respondent No.4 levelled serious allegations against respondent No.2 and the appellant, he did not provide any reasons or material to show how they were in violation of tariff orders.

"the investigation to be conducted by an authority under Section 128 is to be limited to only two eventualities: (i) if the licensee fails to abide by the terms of its license, and (ii) if the licensee acts in contravention to the provisions of the Act, 2003 and the regulations thereunder...the threshold of “satisfaction” required to order an investigation under Section 128 was not met by the respondent no. 4." 

While dealing with the second issue, the Court said that an ERC may not directly regulate a franchisee, but it exercises regulatory oversight over the distribution licensee's functions and duties, including the process of a distribution licensee delegating some of its functions and activities to a franchisee.

"Sections 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the Act, 2003 respectively, prescribe that the ERC can stipulate/review the terms and conditions under which a distribution licensee may delegate its electricity distribution responsibilities to a franchisee. Such stipulation/review occurs as a part of ERC's regulatory functions."

The Court noted that the 2003 Act does not provide for direct regulatory oversight over distribution franchisees and the same can be regulated only though the distribution licensee. Therefore, under Section 128, it is the distribution licensee which can be investigated, not its franchisee.

"Therefore, even an investigation under Section 128 can only happen in respect of a distribution licensee and not its franchisee. This is in consonance with the principle of agency. Any action of the franchisee is equivalent to such action having been committed by a distribution licensee. Therefore, only the distribution licensee can be questioned for any action that its agent commits."

Lastly, it was also stated that UPERC and APTEL could not have micromanaged the distribution franchisee transaction obliquely or questioned the various aspects of the franchisee's (appellant's) functioning. 

Conclusion

The Court allowed the appellant's appeal and set aside APTEL's order. The same, as a result, rendered insignificant the report of an Expert Committee constituted by the UPERC.

Case Title: TORRENT POWER LIMITED VERSUS U.P. ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION & ORS., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 23514 OF 2017

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705

Click here to read the judgment 

The Supreme Court today(July 15) observed that while the State has moral and constitutional obligations to ensure that prison facilities are as the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2016, the right to reasonable accommodation does not extend to creating an obligation on authorities to ensure personalised or costly food items to prisoners with disabilities.

It said that the inability of the prison authorities to provide preferred diets to prisoners with disabilities stems from institutional shortcomings and cannot be said to be a violation of human rights. 

"Prisons are correctional institutions – not extensions of civil society's comforts. The non-supply of non-essential or indulgent items does not amount to a constitutional or human rights violation unless it results in demonstrable harm to health or dignity."

A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan, while issuing guidelines for prisons across Tamil Nadu, observed:

"The appellant specifically contended that he was not provided with adequate protein-rich food, such as eggs, chicken and nuts, on a daily basis. While persons with disabilities constitute a particularly vulnerable class and are entitled to reasonable accommodations under domestic law and international conventions, the mere non-supply of preferred or costly food items cannot ipso facto be treated as a violation of fundamental rights. The right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution undoubtedly extends to all prisoners, including those with disabilities. However, this does not confer a right to demand personalised or luxurious food choices. The State's obligation is to ensure that every inmate, including those with disabilities, receives adequate, nutritious, and medically appropriate food, subject to medical certification."

In this case, the petitioner, an advocate with disability, was arrested in connection with a civil dispute. He alleged custodial torture by the police officer during arrest and failure of the prison authorities to provide basic facilities such as a protein-rich diet, such as eggs, meat, chicken, nuts on a daily basis etc, and adequate medical treatment. 

When the petitioner was granted bail, he approached the Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission seeking compensation for the violation of his human rights by the police officer and the prison authorities. The commission awarded him 1 lac compensation and directed disciplinary action against the police officer. It was held that the arrest was illegal. However, this complaint against prison authorities was dismissed as no human rights violation was attributable to them.

Against this, he filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court, which enhanced the compensation to Rs. 5,00,000. But it dismissed the complaint against the jail authorities, taking a similar view as was taken by the commission.

Upholding these views, the judgment authored by R Mahadevan observed that as against the petitioner's claim that he was not provided with protein-rich food or specialised medical intervention, it stems not from the deliberate neglect or malice on the part of the jail authorities but from institutional limitations within the prison system. Therefore, the court observed that the shortcomings do not amount to, per se, violation of human rights attributable to the jail authorities. 

Further, the court held that prisons are correctional institutions and cannot be considered as an extension of civil society's comfort. Therefore, it found that the compensation enhanced by the high court was justified and needed no interference.

Prisons are "tail-end," need reforms 

While the court clarified that the deficiencies are per se not attributable to the jail authorities, it nevertheless emphasised the current need for prison reforms, particularly the implementation of disability-sensitive infrastructure.

"This Court expresses deep concern over the plight of incarcerated individuals with disabilities, who are among the most marginalized and vulnerable groups, within the justice system. The social and structural barriers they face in society are only magnified within the prison environment. Unlike the minimal safeguards afforded to women prisoners, there is currently no specific legal or policy framework that guarantees dignity, accessibility, and protection for persons with disabilities or for members of the transgender community in prisons. From the stage of arrest through trial and incarceration, persons with disabilities face systemic disadvantage due to the lack of training and sensitivity among police and prison personnel."

It said that most prison facilities are structurally inaccessible to individuals with mobility, sensory or cognitive impairment. Such inaccessibility and denial of basic care violates Article 14 and 21 and are in breach of Sections 6, 25, and 28 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, which mandate States to ensure healthcare and non-discriminatory treatment for persons with disabilities, including those in custody.

"Institutional routines and infrastructure are not designed to accommodate diverse needs, making it difficult – or at times impossible – for such prisoners to use toilets, dining areas, libraries, or health clinics. Additionally, due to the absence of trained caregivers or appropriate custodial policies, persons with disabilities are often denied help with essential daily activities such as bathing, dressing, or eating. This neglect results in indignity, mental distress, and, at times, serious physical harm." 

Concluding, the Court also flagged the lack of disaggregated data on persons with disability. It said that the data gap has far-reaching implications.

"Lawful incarceration does not suspend the right to human dignity. The punishment lies only in the restriction of liberty – not in the denial of humane treatment or reasonable accommodations. Failure to meet these obligations inflicts disproportionate suffering on disabled prisoners and betrays the constitutional role of the State as a custodian – not a tormentor – of those it detains."

Case Title: L. MURUGANANTHAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & OTHERS|SLP (C) No. 1785 OF 2023

In a significant judgment today(July 15) for disability rights, the Supreme Court issued guidelines for prisoners with disabilities across all prisons in Tamil Nadu, including that all prisons must be equipped with disability-friendly infrastructure such as accessible toilets, ramps, and there must be dedicated spaces for physiotherapy etc. 

The directions, issued in the larger public interest to uphold the dignity and the healthcare rights of the prisoners with disabilities, also direct the State to amend the State Prison Manual within 6 months to make it in compliance with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) and the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan issued these guidelines in a special leave petition filed by an advocate, a person with disability, who was arrested in connection with a civil dispute, but during incarceration, suffered due to the lack of proper and essential food, medical care and infrastructure and facilities such as accessible sanitation facilities, ramps, a law sensory environment for rest available in the prison for persons with disabilities. 

While issuing these guidelines, the judgment authored by Justice R Mahadevan also emphasised that the State has a constitutional and moral obligation to uphold the rights of prisoners with disabilities. This right is not restricted to ensuring non-discriminatory treatment also carries with it an affirmative right to ensure effective rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 

"The State has a constitutional and moral obligation to uphold the rights of prisoners with disabilities. This includes not only ensuring non-discriminatory treatment but also enabling their effective rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This Court emphasizes that reasonable accommodations are not optional, but integral to any humane and just carceral system. A systemic transformation is urgently required – one grounded in compassion, accountability, and a firm constitutional commitment to dignity and equality. The disabilities of incarcerated individuals must not become a basis for further deprivation or suffering; rather, the prison system must evolve to affirm their rights and provide the care necessary for rehabilitation."

The directions issued are:

1) All prison authorities shall promptly identify prisoners with disabilities at the time of admission. Each prisoner shall be given an opportunity to declare any disability and provide information about their specific needs.

1.1) All rules, regulations, and essential information about prison life shall be provided to such prisoners in accessible and understandable formats (e.g., Braille, large print, sign language, or simplified language).

2) All prison premises shall be equipped with wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments to ensure universal accessibility.

3) All prisons shall designate and maintain dedicated spaces for physiotherapy, psychotherapy and other necessary therapeutic services.

4) A State-level access audit of all prisons in Tamil Nadu shall be completed within six months by an expert committee comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, the Department for the Welfare of Differently Abled Persons, and certified access auditors.

4.1) Periodic audits shall thereafter be conducted and updated regularly in accordance with the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India (2021).

5) The prison authorities shall ensure complete compliance with Sections 40 and 45 of the RPwD Act, 2016, Rule 15 of the 2017 Rules and the Harmonized Guidelines, 2021 in all prison infrastructure and services.

6) The State shall provide healthcare for prisoners with disabilities equivalent to that available in the community, including access to physiotherapy, speech therapy, psychiatric services, and assistive devices (such as wheelchairs, hearing aids, and crutches).

7) All prison medical officers shall be adequately trained and sensitized to address disabling conditions, ensuring provision of appropriate accommodations and treatment without discrimination or bias. Furthermore, regular awareness and sensitization programmes shall be conducted in all prisons.

8) Every prisoner with a disability shall be provided a nutritious and medically appropriate diet, tailored to their specific health and dietary needs.

9) Lifesaving treatments, including regular and need-based physiotherapy and psychotherapy must be made available on-site or through linkage with government health facilities.

10) All prison staff shall undergo comprehensive training on the rights of persons with disabilities. This training shall include:- awareness of equality and non-discrimination principles, - proper handling of disability-related challenges - use of appropriate language and behaviour, as per the UN Handbook on Prisoners with Special Needs.

11) The State Prison Manual shall be reviewed and appropriately amended within six months to ensure conformity with the RPwD Act, 2016 and the UNCRPD.

11.1) A specific section must be incorporated to prohibit discrimination against prisoners with disabilities and promote equal treatment and reasonable accommodation.

11.2) The revised Manual shall be prominently displayed in every prison establishment.

12) The State shall undertake periodic consultations with civil society organisations working in the disability sector to develop inclusive policies and identify accommodations based on real needs.

13) The State shall constitute a monitoring committee to conduct periodic inspections and submit compliance reports every three months.

14)The State shall maintain and update disaggregated data on the disability status of prisoners, including records on accessibility, reasonable accommodations, and medical requirements.

14.1) This is to ensure compliance with Article 31 of the UNCRPD and the RPwD Act, 2016.

14.2) The data shall be made available in the public domain, subject to privacy safeguards.

15) The Director General of Prisons shall file a comprehensive compliance report before the State Human Rights Commission within three months from the date of this judgment, detailing all steps taken in furtherance of these directions.

Background

The petitioner/appellant suffers from Becker Muscular Dystrophy, Autism, Spectrum Disorder, and associated psychological conditions. It was argued that due to a lack of accommodation, his condition further deteriorated.

When the petitioner was released on bail, he approached the Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission seeking compensation for the deprivation of life and liberty in this regard and also for funds to the Disability Rights Public Fund under the RPwD Act. He was duly granted 1 lac rupees as compensation from the Government of Tamil Nadu.

The Tamil Nadu Human Rights Commission had also recommended that the Tamil Nadu Government make all State prisons accessible to persons with disabilities as per the RPwD Act and in consonance with the 2017 Supreme Court's Rajiv Raturi judgment, wherein the court recognised the right to create accessible physical infrastructure as a part of Article 21.

Against this, the petitioner approached the Madras High Court, which dismissed its writ petition on November 29, 2022. Now, against the high court's order, the petitioner was before the Supreme Court.

Case Title: L. MURUGANANTHAM v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & OTHERS|SLP (C) No. 1785 OF 2023

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 702

Click Here To Read Judgment

Expressing concerns over delayed claims for disability pensions by ex-army men, the Supreme Court today (July 15) asked the Union to consider revising its Policy to ensure there is no misuse of the law. 

The bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice AS Chandurkar was hearing a plea by the Union challenging the Delhi High Court's order, which, in a batch of petitions, upheld the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), which granted disability pensions to two ex-army men.

Justice Narasimha informed the SG Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Union, that the Attorney General has already been asked to look into the present disability pension policy, considering that a large number of such matters are being filed for seeking disability pensions at a belated stage. 

He verbally expressed: "We had asked the Attorney General to look into this matter...look into it and get this policy examined. Why is it that so many people are coming, and these things are happening? After 15-20 years, they are coming, that is an abuse (of policy)." 

However, he further added that even in fresh cases, the government ends up challenging the AFT decisions, thus necessitating a policy review. 

"Even in a normal case where somebody works in Siachin or some other hard place....then also the government is coming. So we thought, this policy needs to be revamped." 

The SG replied that he had a meeting with the Defence Secretary and said, "We would request your lordships to lay down the parameters." 

Justice Narasimha interjected, "It's your policy! Why should we lay down? We will not even touch it." 

The SG explained that for delayed army pension claims, the Court's guidance would be imperative. 

Justice Narasimha suggested that the Union explore the possibility of a new policy which balances out the interests of the ex-army men as well as the Union. 

"Have a meeting and decide if you can come up with a new policy, by which both interests can be taken care of it." 

Agreeing to the same, the SG further stressed, in certain cases the pension policy is being abused by those who don't have a genuine claim for disability. He submitted : 

"We will also show how this jurisdiction is being abused by those who do not deserve (the disability pensions). Those who deserve, we (Union) should not come (challenging the claims).... a substantial part of the defence budget goes into this. And these are all generated litigations." 

Justice Narasimha, however pointed that one should not forget that the claimants have also served the country. He said :

"It's not like that, they have served the country ....have a relook at the policy and ensure there is no misuse and at the same time-" 

"They are not brought to the Court unnecessarily, I bow down", the SG completed. 

The bench issued notice on the Union's SLP and listed it along with other similar batches of matters for hearing after 4 weeks. 

Case Details : UNION OF INDIA vs. GAWAS ANIL MADSO| Diary No. - 28845/2025 

Click Here To Read/Download Order

"To preserve religious and communal harmony and fraternity among people of diverse religious beliefs and faiths residing in the Punjab", The Punjab Government introduced the 'The Prevention Of Offences Against Holy Scriptures Bill, 2025' on Monday in the legislative assembly. 

The Bill proposes punishment up to life imprisonment and fine of up to Rs 10 lakh for committing "offence" under the proposed Act against Holy Scriptures.

"Holy Scriptures" is defined as any of the following Scriptures considered sacred and held as "Holy" by respective religious denominations and may include Sri Guru Granth Sahib or extracts there of including Pothis and Gutka Sahib, Srimad Bhagavad Gita, Quran Sharif and Holy Bible;

The definition of "offence" includes any sacrilege, damage, destruction, de-facing, disfiguring, de-colouring, de-filing, decomposing, burning, breaking or tearing of any Holy Scripture, or part thereof.

The words not defined in the Bill to have same meaning as defined within BNS, 2023.

The investigation of the offences punishable under the Act is proposed to be conducted by the police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Punishment

The Punishment under the Bill is rescued to be not less than ten years and which may extend to life imprisonment and shall also be liable to pay fine of 5 lakhs which may extend unto 10 lakhs.

"Any person who attempts to commit an offence under this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years and which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to pay a fine which may extend upto rupees three lacs," it added.

Objective

The Object of the Act stated that in the recent past there have been attempts to disturb peace and communal harmony in the State by committing sacrilege of Sri Guru Granth Sahib ji, Srimad Bhagwat Gita and holy Quran and any other holy scripture. "Government is determined not to allow such incidents and ensure deterrent action against all those who commit such sacrilege." 

In a development in the Pune Porsche accident case, a Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) on Tuesday rejected an application filed by the Pune Police, which sought the board's permission to try the minor accused, who was driving the vehicle, as an adult in the case. 

Confirming the development, special public prosecutor Shishir Hiray told Live Law, "We had filed an application to try the minor boy as an adult in the trial citing that he killed two people by driving his car recklessly and under the influence of alcohol. We highlighted the fact that this is a serious and a sensitive case. However, the JJB today rejected our application. We are yet to know the reasoning of the JJB for rejecting our application."

A detailed copy of the JJB's order is yet to be made available. 

As per the prosecution's case, in the early hours of May 19, 2024, a Porsche car driven by a minor aged 17 years and 8 months, who was allegedly under the influence of alcohol and driving at high speed, crashed with a motorcycle carrying two riders, killing them on the spot.

An FIR was registered against the minor for offences under Sections 304A, 279, 337, 338, 427 of the IPC, and Sections 184, 190, and 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Eyewitnesses recorded statements attributing the accident to the minor's rash and negligent driving.

As a result, the court noted, the minor faced public outrage and was manhandled before being apprehended and produced before the Juvenile Justice Board, Pune. The minor got bail on the same day by the Juvenile Justice Board.

However, on May 21, 2024, the prosecution filed an application under Section 104 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, after the insertion of Section 304 of the IPC in the FIR. This application highlighted that the minor was not licensed to drive, was heavily intoxicated, and drove recklessly, resulting in the fatalities. The application sought to review the earlier bail order based on new evidence, including CCTV footage showing the CCL consuming alcohol and smoking before the incident.

On May 22, 2024, JJB issued an amended order under Section 104 of the Act, not intending to revoke the bail but to place the minor in an Observation Home for rehabilitation. The order cited discrepancies in the investigation reports and the need for the minor's psychological treatment and safety, considering public anger and the potential for mob violence.

Subsequent applications by the investigating officer led to extensions of the minor's stay in the Observation Home until June 25, 2024.

The paternal aunt of the minor approached the Bombay High Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release, arguing that once bail was granted, he could not have been placed in an Observation Home under the guise of rehabilitation.

The High Court by an order passed on June 26, 2024 ordered the release of the minor boy. 

The Supreme Court today (July 15) directed the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) to give internship stipend arrears to 11 Foreign Medical Graduates (FMGs) within 2 weeks. 

The bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Aravind Kumar was hearing the plea filed by 11 medical students who completed their primary medical education from foreign institutions and qualify as FMGs. They are now completing their internship at Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College, Aligarh- a constituent college of AMU. 

The petitioners, represented by Advocate Charu Mathur, are aggrieved by the non-payment of stipends given to them compared to Indian Medical Graduates (IMGs) at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) who are undergoing Compulsory Rotating Medical Internship (CRMI). 

The bench directed AMU to disburse the stipend of Rs. 26,300/- per month to the petitioners within two weeks. Thus, ensuring that the FMGs get the same amount of stipend, which is already being paid to IMGs.

As per the plea, IMGs are being paid Rs. 26,300/- as stipend by the AMU. In contrast, FMGs at other central universities like BHU are also being paid the same amount. However, the FMGs at the AMU are not being paid any stipend, which amounts to unreasonableness. 

Notably,  Clause 3 (Schedule IV) of the National Medical Commission (Compulsory Rotating Medical Internship) Regulations, 2021 provides for a mandatory stipend to all medical interns. It states :

(a) All interns shall be paid a stipend as fixed by the appropriate authority applicable to the institution/ University or State.

(b) Stipend may not be paid during any period of extension except in the case of maternity or paternity leave or medical leave, as may be recommended and approved by the Medical Board. Total stipend paid for the entire internship may be for fifty-two weeks (Twelve months) only.

It is the claim of the petitioners that the AMU is not disbursing the funds allocated to it by the University Grants Commission (UGC). The plea refers to the Annual Report for 2023-2024 which shows the balance of Rs 83.3117 Crores under the salary head allotted to AMU. 

On calculation, the plea states that the total sum due for the 11 FMG petitioners over 12 months is Rs. 34,71,600/- (Thirty-Four Lakhs Seventy-One Thousand Six Hundred only).

The plea further states : "Despite having access to the necessary funds, the Respondent University is unjustifiably delaying the payment of stipends to the Petitioners. In a manifestation of bureaucratic inertia, the University has resorted to repeated correspondence with the UGC, seeking additional funds for stipend disbursement. However, the UGC has already clarified in its communication that stipends are to be paid from the salary head of the grant (OH-36). Despite the availability of funds. Respondent No.l has inexplicably failed to release the stipend, thereby perpetuating an unjust and discriminatory situation against the Petitioners." 

Notably, the bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and K Vinod Chandran is also considering the issue of non-payment of stipend to foreign medical graduates (FMGs) who were interning at Mahaveer Institute of Medical Sciences, Bhopal. 

In 2024, the Apex Court issued a clear directive to the National Medical Commission (NMC) to submit details regarding the stipend status of medical colleges across all States.

Case Details : ZABIHULLAH vs. ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY | W.P.(C) No. 000232 / 2025  

The Supreme Court on Tuesday (July 15) granted interim protection to Indore based cartoonist Hemant Malviya, who has been booked over a cartoon shared on Facebook that allegedly contains derogatory references to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the RSS. The court listed the matter after August 15th for further hearing.

The order was passed after Malviya submitted an apology. The Court directed him to file the apology in Hindi in the form of an affidavit and directed the parties to complete the pleading till the next date.

A bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Aravind Kumar was hearing a special leave petition filed by cartoonist Hemant Malviya challenging a Madhya Pradesh High Court order which denied him anticipatory bail in a case related to a cartoon he had posted on Facebook.

The cartoon in question, made in 2021, posing questions about the efficacy of Covid vaccines, was reused by a Facebook user in May 2025 along with certain objectionable comments in the context of the Government's decision to hold a caste census. Malviya re-shared the post and endorsed the comments. This led to an FIR against him.

Yesterday, after the Court expressed disapproval of the cartoonist's conduct, Advocate Vrinda Grover agreed to delete his post and to make a statement that he was not endorsing the objectionable comments.

Today, at the outset, Advocate Vrinda Grover for Malviya informed the bench that, in addition to deleting the post as agreed the previous day, the petitioner was offering an apology. She said, “In addition to deletion, my lords had sought something. I think this will satisfy the court.” Grover added that the petitioner was a Hindi speaker and sought permission to submit the apology in Hindi as well.

Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj, appearing for the State, submitted certain screenshots of objectionable social media posts allegedly made by Malviya.

Grover objected, stating that the posts were unrelated to the FIR in question. “There is no date. The person can have a critical opinion about things, it does not constitute an offence,” she said. She further argued, “Can he not say something just because there is an FIR against him? Has he lost that liberty?”

ASG Nataraj submitted, “The manner he has done is clearly an offence...He does not deserve any indulgence.” Grover responded, “Why is this being put here to prejudice my client? I am just now receiving this. This is not related to the case.”

The bench remarked that one of the posts was “very very offensive.” Justice Dhulia said, “What is happening today, this is all kinds of statements are being made. The language they use. There are some among the lawyer community also doing this.”

In response, Grover submitted, “Let them place those on record and give the man an opportunity to... Give an opportunity to a person who has on social media gone haywire to come back.”

The Court ordered the respondents to file an affidavit putting the aforementioned posts on record and asked Malviya to file a response to the same.

Grover then sought the court's permission to delete the posts. ASG Nataraj submitted that if the posts were to be deleted, copies of the deleted posts must be furnished for investigation. Justice Dhulia said that the bench has recorded the statement made on behalf of the petitioner that he intended to delete the posts, but no order to delete the posts was passed.

Case no. – SLP(Crl) No. 9906/2025

Case Title – Hemant Malviya v. State of Madhya Pradesh

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An MP-MLA Special Magistrate Court in Lucknow today granted bail to Rahul Gandhi, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, in connection with a case concerning allegedly defamatory statements made against Indian soldiers during his Bharat Jodo Yatra

Gandhi personally appeared before the Additional chief judicial magistrate Alok Verma and surrendered to seek bail after remaining absent during the last five hearings in the case.

His counsel, Advocate Pranshu Agrawal argued that Gandhi is innocent and no offence is made out against him

On the other hand, the counsel for the Complainant argued that Gandhi had hurt the dignity and respect of the Indian army and attempted to bring its morale down and thus, he be not granted bail.

The court, however, granted him bail on the condition of furnishing his personal bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/- with two sureties of the like amount. Next date of hearing is August 13.

He appeared following the rejection of his plea by the Allahabad High Court in May, wherein he had challenged both the defamation case and the summoning order passed in February 2025 by an MP-MLA court in Lucknow.

Dismissing his plea, the Allahabad High Court had observed that freedom of speech and expression does not include the freedom to make statements which are defamatory to the Indian Army.

A bench of Justice Subhash Vidyarthi had noted, "No doubt, Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India guarantees freedom of speech and expression, this freedom is subject to the reasonable restrictions and it does not include the freedom to make statements which are defamatory to any person or defamatory to the Indian Army".

Briefly put, the defamation complaint, filed by former Border Roads Organisation (BRO) Director Uday Shankar Srivastava, states that the alleged derogatory remarks by Gandhi were made on December 16, 2022, during his Bharat Jodo Yatra.

Gandhi was represented by Advocates Pranshu Agrawal, Mohd Yasir Abbasi and Mohammed Samar Ansari. 

The Supreme Court today(July 15) allowed the petitioner, a life convict, to challenge a rule in the Jammu & Kashmir Prison Manual, 2022, which disallows premature release to those convicted in relation to a terrorism offence.  The allegations against the petitioner are that he illegally obtained weapons and killed certain surrendered militants who were working as a local source to the Indian Army.

A bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, allowed the petitioner to file an interlocutory application, since the main petition was only limited to premature release and not a challenge to the policy.

Senior Advocate Colin Gonsalves, for the petitioner, had submitted that there was no allegation of terrorism against him. Nor were the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act charges applicable to him as per the trial court's order. 

Against this, Additional Solicitor General K.M. Nataraj submitted that his case was considered and he was denied remission on grounds that although TADA was not applied to him, he was arrested in connection with a case where the element of terrorism was involved in the backdrop.

As per the allegations, when the dead bodies of the people he murdered were inspected, 5 bullets, 11 empty cartridges of an AK 47 rifle and one UGBL grenade thrower were recovered on the spot. 

On this, Justice Ahsanuddin said: "Mr. Gonsalves, two things. If he was not charged under TADA, it does not matter. The policy for remission is separate. The policy that your act was not connected in any way which is related to an act amounting to terrorism. Here, you enter into a person's house and force him to give...and then you kill him because he was an informer. He said, you got the wrong person, I am innocent, this is what is written!...It is a terrorist act that you want to create fear that nobody can report about illegal activity to the authorities on side of the law..."

Justice Ahsanuddin stated that it does not matter that he is being denied remission despite no terrorist-related offences applying to him because he had "terrorist connections" and the court cannot shut its eyes to it. 

However, Gonsalves continued to argue that the trial court's order nowhere mentions that he had terrorist connections. Nor is it there in the high court's order.

Against this, Justice Ahsanuddin said: "If terrorists are entitled to [remission] after 20 years, that may be an argument but without challenging this policy we don't find anything in this."

ASG Nataraj submitted that the policy disallowing remission to convicts related to terrorism is not under challenge in this case. Therefore, the Court suggested that the petitioner may first challenge the policy.

The order passed: "Learned ASG has filed an affidavit to put on record an order passed by competent authority rejecting premature release to the petitioner...under the policy of the State Government, any person convicted for life imprisonment in connection to terrorist crime cannot be released. The learned senior counsel after some arguments in view of the aforesaid position is that he may be permitted to file an amended interlocutory application challenging the policy as it is against the constitutional provisions. Further, the policy is under challenge in another pending case. In view of the facts, the application seeking amendment is allowed and kept after two weeks."

On the order, ASG Nataraj expressed reservations that in a case where the policy is under challenge, the court had already said that it can't be challenged in the Supreme Court and that the petitioner will have to go to the high court.

The writ petition has been filed under Article 32 seeking premature release of the petitioner, having undergone 24 years and 11 months as on October 31, 2023. The petitioner was convicted of murder under the Ranbir Penal Code and Section 7/27 of the Indian Arms Act by a Sessions Judge, Budgam in 2010. He was sentenced to rigorous life imprisonment.

It is the case that the petitioner is squarely covered under Rule 20.09 of the Jammu & Kashmir Prison Manual, 2022 and also under the Model Prison Manual, 2026, which allows remission for life convictions after having completed 14 years of actual imprisonment.

Case Title:  GHULAM MOHAMMAD BHAT Vs UNION TERRITORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR|W.P.(Crl.) No. 66/2024 

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