Justice B Pugalendhi added that the directions were intended to strengthen the quality of medical evidence before the court, to reinforce confidence in expert witnesses and minimise the possibility of errors. The court highlighted that the efficiency of the justice delivery system relied heavily on the credibility of expert evidence and thus every medical professional needed to discharge their duty with the highest standard of competence.

“ The efficacy of the justice delivery system depends, to a considerable extent, upon the credibility of expert evidence. It is, therefore, imperative that every medical professional entrusted with this responsibility discharges it with the highest standards of competence, objectivity and professional integrity,” the court said.

The court directed that the circular should highlight the ethical standards expected of every expert witness and that every medical witness is expected to depose objectively, honestly and impartially. The court said that the circular should include the necessity of ensuring that Accident Registers, Wound certificates, medico-legal reports and all other medico-legal records accurately record the clinical findings and professional opinion formed at the time of examination.

The court also highlighted the importance of making entries in the Accident Register, wound certificate and other records in a clear, legible and unambiguous manner, avoiding illegible handwriting, unexplained abbreviations and ambiguous expressions. The court added that whenever the infrastructure permits, the records may be generated in a typed or computer-generated format so that it is readily comprehensible.

The court also called for preparing a revised proforma for Medico-Legal Examination of Survivors/ Victims of Sexual Violence issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

The court emphasised that the expert witness should familiarise themselves with the relevant medical records before entering the witness box, that the witness should carefully understand every question put during the chief and cross-examination, and wherever any ambiguity exists, to seek appropriate clarification. The court added that the deposition should be carefully read and verified before signing.

The court was hearing a petition filed by two accused in a POCSO case seeking to suspend their sentence while the appeal against conviction was pending. The allegation against the men was that they had sexually abused an 8-year-old victim boy by compelling him to do oral sex and by inserting their private parts into the boy's anal rectum. The men were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 20 years for offences under Sections 6 read with 5(m) and 5(l) of the POCSO Act.

The men argued that the Doctor who treated the boy, in his cross-examination, had said that there was no injury to the anal rectum and the mouth of the victim boy. Thus, arguing that the prosecution case was not proved medically, the men sought to suspend the sentence.

The prosecution, on the other hand, submitted that in the Chief examination, the doctor had stated that he found injuries in the mouth and anal rectum of the victim boy.

Noting the apparent inconsistency, the court sought details from the doctor. The doctor submitted that the initial examination was conducted by another medical officer and that the injuries were entered in the hospital records, but the same were not properly recorded in the Wound certificate, giving rise to the inconsistency.

Considering the explanation, and after perusing the medical records, the court dismissed the plea for suspending sentence after finding that the grounds canvassed by the petitioners lacked merit. However, the court deemed it fit to highlight the importance of medical evidence in POCSO cases, and deemed it fit to issue directions accordingly.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. J. Vivek, Mr. G. Karuppasamy Pandian

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. A. S. Abul Kalaam Azad Government Advocate (Crl.side)

Case Title: Nambu Kaleeswaran and Another v The State of Tamil Nadu

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 402

Case No: Crl MP(MD) Nos.5823 & 6941 of 2025

The Bombay High Court has held that Section 18 of the POSH Act read with Rule 11 of the POSH Rules does not confer any authority or jurisdiction on an employer to create or constitute an Appellate Authority. The Court further cautioned that public institutions must be cautious in interpreting, as a misconceived interpretation can lead to a chaotic situation.

A Division Bench comprising Justice G. S. Kulkarni and Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale was hearing a petition filed by Ashok Upadhyay, challenging the penalty imposed upon him by Union Bank of India following proceedings under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

The Petitioner had initially been exonerated by the Internal Complaints Committee, against which the complainant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Petitioner alleged that the Authority directed reinvestigation without either giving notice to the Petitioner or providing a hearing to him. The second Committee held the Petitioner guilty. Hence, the penalty under challenge was imposed on the Petitioner.

The Court noted that Section 18 provides for an appeal to the “court or tribunal” in accordance with the applicable service rules and, where no such service rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed. The Court observed that Rule 11 provides that an aggrieved person may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority notified under clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

On a cumulative reading of Section 18 and Rule 11, the Court observed:

“A cumulative reading of Section 18 read with Rule 11 do not bring about any authority or jurisdiction with the employer to create or constitute an Appellate Authority. If these provisions are so read, it would amount to defeating the provision(s) as also reading something in the provision which the legislature has avoided to incorporate.”

The Court further observed that the Bank could not point out any authority/jurisdiction in law which would empower the employer to appoint an Appellate Authority of its choice. Hence, the Court held that the Internal Appellate Authority constituted by Respondent No.1 was without jurisdiction, and cannot be labelled an Appellate Authority constituted as per the provisions of Section 18 and/or Rule 11.

“… the entire exercise undertaken by the Respondents leading to the passing of the impugned order, imposing penalty in question, is on the edifice of such patent illegality… the same has caused severe prejudice to the Petitioner… the order passed by the Appellate Authority, in our opinion, was non-est, and that too passed by an inherently illegal Appellate Authority,” the Court remarked.

The Court also expressed its displeasure at the approach of the Bank in dealing with the issue, noting that the same has caused prejudice not only to the petitioner but also to the complainant.

“The Bank and other such public institutions must be cautious and careful while interpreting legal provisions, lest the altogether misconceived interpretation made by the Respondent No. 1/Bank, leading to a chaotic situation,” the Court remarked.

The Court accordingly quashed the impugned orders and allowed the petition.

Case Title: Ashok Upadhyay v. Union Bank of India [Writ Petition No. 2385 of 2024]

Click Here To Read/Download Order

The bench of Justice GR Swaminathan and Justice MD Sumathi noted that when there was no stay on the divorce order, the status of the woman was that of a “divorced woman” and she was thus entitled to remarry. The court thus refused relief to a husband, dismissing an appeal against the order of divorce. 

“ Though the appeal was filed within time, interim stay was not granted. The order granting divorce was fully in force. The status of the respondent [wife] herein was that of a divorced woman. She was, therefore, technically entitled to marry,” the court observed.

During the course of the hearing, the wife informed the court that she had remarried in the meanwhile and thus the appeal itself had become infructuous. The court noted that though the appeal against the order of divorce was filed on time, it was dismissed for non-prosecution and later restored.

The court held that when the appeal was dismissed for default, the rigours of Section 15 of the Act would not apply.

“ Deriving inspiration from Krishnaveni Rai, we would hold that once an appeal has been dismissed for default, Section 15 loses its sting. Section 15 talks about dismissal. This expression would include within its ambit “dismissed for default or non-prosecution” also. When the application for restoration is taken up and it is reported that the respondent has remarried, the appeal has to be dismissed as infructuous. It is irrelevant when the remarriage took place,” the court said.

The court noted that as per Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, either party to the marriage could marry again when the marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce, and either there is no right of appeal or if there is a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal or an appeal has been presented but dismissed.

The court called for an amendment to the Section to make sure that while the appeal is presented in time, the appellant should also obtain an interim stay of the decree of divorce within 2 months thereafter.

“ We would respectfully suggest that Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act deserves an amendment. It should not be enough if the appeal is presented within time. The appellant must also obtain an interim stay of the decree of divorce within two months thereafter,” the court said.

The bench was hearing an appeal filed by a husband against the Family Court's order allowing the wife's plea and granting an order of divorce. The couple got married in 2001 as per Hindu rites and customs and had 2 children from the marriage. The wife had filed the divorce plea alleging cruelty and desertion.

The court noted that the Family Court had granted divorce after noting that the husband had doubted the wife's character and enquired about her conduct with the security guard of the residential quarters. The court noted that the husband had, even as per his own admission, posed certain queries to their daughter about the mother's conduct. Following this, the wife had left the matrimonial home.

The court noted that the husband's suspicion about the wife's conduct would constitute cruelty. The court noted that this seed of suspicion would later take a firm root and would make conjugal company incompatible. The court also added that no self-respecting spouse would put up with such a conduct.

The court also noted that after the wife left the matrimonial home with the children, the husband had not taken any step for reconciliation or maintained the children. The court held that such an attitude would amount to desertion as it would show that the husband was not interested in sustaining the marriage.

“ The appellant had not taken any step for reunion or reconciliation. The respondent cannot be blamed for having left the matrimonial home. As already mentioned, the appellant was elder to her by 11 years. When the appellant doubted the chastity of the respondent, it was bound to cause her mental anguish. From the indifference shown by the appellant, one can conclude that he was not interested in sustaining the marriage. Indifference coupled with failure to maintain the children can certainly constitute willful neglect thereby amounting to desertion. The appellant was guilty of constructive desertion,” the court noted.

Thus, the court dismissed the plea.

Counsel for Appellant: Mr. P. R. Prithiviraj

Counsel for Respondents: Mr. S. Manojkumar

Case Title: R v J

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 400

Case No: CMA (MD) No 672 of 2021

The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that where it is clear that the sex worker is an adult and is participating with consent, the police must refrain from interfering or taking any criminal action. The Court observed that continuation of the criminal proceedings based on such a basis would amount to subjecting a woman to the very harassment against which the Supreme Court had issued specific directions.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal was hearing a petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the FIR under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The petitioner submitted that she was neither present nor residing at Hotel Hayat, Raipur, when the police conducted the alleged raid and that she was subsequently called to the police station and falsely implicated.

The petitioner contended that the registration of the FIR, her arrest and filing of the charge-sheet are contrary to the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for protecting the rights and dignity of adult consenting sex workers.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Budhadev Karmaskar Vs. State of West Bengal & Others [Criminal Appeal No. 135/2010], wherein directions were issued that sex workers are entitled to equal protection of law and that criminal law must apply equally on the basis of age and consent.

It further noted the Supreme Court's direction that since voluntary sex work is not illegal and only running the brothel is unlawful, the sex workers concerned should not be arrested, penalised, harassed or victimised.

“… where it is clear that the sex worker is an adult and is participating with consent, the police must refrain from interfering or taking any criminal action. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further directed that whenever there is a raid on any brothel… the sex workers concerned should not be arrested, penalised, harassed or victimized,” the Court noted.

The Court observed that in the present case, the allegations against the petitioner were essentially that she was a sex worker and was found in connection with the alleged activities at Hotel Hayat. The petitioner had specifically disputed her presence at the place of occurrence.

The Court noted that the material placed on record did not disclose any specific allegation demonstrating that she was engaged in any independent act which would constitute the ingredients of the offences alleged against her, apart from the allegation regarding her status as a sex worker.

The Court observed that continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would amount to subjecting an adult woman to the very harassment and victimisation against which the Supreme Court had issued specific directions.

The Court accordingly allowed the petition and quashed the criminal case against the petitioner.

Case Title: Xyz Nill v. State of Chhattisgarh [CRMP No. 1613 of 2023]

Click Here To Read/Download Order

The bench of Justice GR Swaminathan and Justice V Lakshminarayanan noted that there were correctional requirements which needed to be adopted by the stakeholders. The court added that the law relating to children was still developing and needed constant tweaking and readjustments.

“ We have to note that there are some correctional requirements which have to be adopted by all the stakeholders implementing the laws relating to children. The deficiencies and the manner of rectification of the same are set forth in a tabular column hereunder. For the sake of understanding, we have divided the implementation plan as regards the police, the healthcare professionals, the Courts and the Juvenile Justice Boards. This is not an exhaustive list. It only identifies the areas which require improvement and contains our suggestions. The law relating to children is still developing. It requires constant tweaking and readjustments. This is one such attempt,” the court noted.

Starting with the police force, the court noted that there was an issue of non-awareness of court orders which led to children being subjected to coercive action resulting in trauma, stigma, and unnecessary separation from their families. The court suggested having supervisory monitoring of compliance and clearing of bureaucratic roadblocks.

Another issue that the court identified was that the investigation in POCSO cases was being confined to All Woman Police Stations, which was slowing the investigation. The court suggested that the investigation could be shifted to units with both men and women officers and that Assistant Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners who supervise the cases could be given training.

The court also noted that FIRs were being registered even in cases of consensual relationship between minors. The court noted that the male child was often being unfairly criminalised and his family was being drawn to the Juvenile Justice Board and the families were being treated unequally in the same offence. The court suggested that whenever the girl's parents insisted on registering an FIR, the police inform them that the male child has the same option and inform his parents or guardians accordingly.

With respect to disclosure of identity of the victims, the court suggested that a Standard Operating Procedure could be issued, prescribing the manner in which a child's identity may be shared with schools, hospitals, and other agencies only on a need-to-know basis, with supervisory oversight. The court also suggested that the investigating officers could obtain a written undertaking from every person to whom the child's identity is disclosed during the investigation, and record the reasons for such disclosure.

The court also noted that there were barriers arising out of mandatory reporting of cases. The court noted that the fear of exposure and police involvement deterred the families from reporting incidents. The court suggested that the hospitals could develop standard consent forms enabling the minor and her parents to record whether they consent to disclosure of identifying particulars and prescribe a procedure for communicating reports to the police without revealing the child's identity.

On noting that the potency tests were still being continued despite their limited evidentiary value, the court suggested that the tests could be discontinued and whenever paternity or identity is in issue, biological samples could be collected for DNA analysis.

The court also took note of the delay in recording the statement of the victim child, which prolongs the anxiety and repeated recollection of trauma. The court suggested mandatory adherence to the 30-day timeline to minimise stress and anxiety for the victim child.

The court listed out the issues and suggestions in its order while disposing of a plea, seeking directions to the State to file a curative petition against the acquittal of the accused in the rape and murder of a 7-year-old child in Chennai in 2017. The petitioner had alleged that the acquittal was obtained by committing fraud on the Supreme Court.

It may be noted that in October last year, the Supreme Court acquitted Dashwanth after holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the vital circumstances, such as the CCTV camera footage, the confessional disclosure statement, the FSL report, etc. The Supreme Court had thus set aside the 2018 judgment of the Madras High Court, which upheld his conviction and confirmed the death sentence awarded by the Trial Court.

The petitioner argued that though initially the Supreme Court had issued a limited notice regarding the question of sentence, it had later taken the criminal appeal on file, noting that the High Court had granted leave to appeal.

The petitioner submitted that through an RTI response, it was revealed that the High Court had not issued any Certificate to appeal in the matter, and in the absence of such a certificate, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter on merits.

When the matter was heard by the court, the State informed the court that it intended to file a curative petition in the case. The court had taken the submission on record and decided to close the plea.

In the order copy, which was issued on August 10, the court also took note of the systematic laps that existed in the implementation of the POCSO Act in the State and made suggestions.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. S. N. Ravichandran

Counsel for Respondents: Mr. L.S.M. Hasan Fizal Additional Govt. Pleader, Mr. C. R. Malarvannan Additional Public Prosecutor

Case Title: S Venkatesh v The State of Tamil Nadu and Others

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 399

Case No: WP 18454 of 2026

The Karnataka High Court on August 20 (Thursday) allowed a petition filed by B. Nagendra, a Cabinet Minister in the Karnataka Government, permanently relaxing a bail condition imposed on him in a Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) case arising out of the alleged misappropriation of funds from the Valmiki Scheduled Castes Development Corporation. [2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 311]

The single judge bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna deleted the condition imposed by the trial court requiring Nagendra to obtain prior written permission before leaving Karnataka. The Court, however, made it clear that he cannot travel outside India without the permission of the concerned trial court or the High Court.

“….in light of him being a minister in the cabinet, and holding the portfolio…. would necessarily require him to travel beyond the shores of this jurisdiction. In light of the said circumstances, while observing that petitioner cannot travel without the permission of concerned court or this court beyond the shores of this nation, petitioner is free to travel within the country, as not permitting him to travel within the court would curtail his liberty and the post he is holding today …The Criminal Petition is hereby allowed…. Condition No. (c) imposed in the bail order dated 14.10.2024 in Crl. Misc. No. 7892/2024, which reads "The petitioner shall furnish his passport to the Court and shall not leave the State without obtaining written permission from the Court," stands deleted …”, the court said.

The condition deleted by the Court had required the petitioner to surrender his passport and not leave the State without obtaining written permission from the Court.

The Court had earlier granted interim relaxation of the condition after Nagendra was inducted into the State Cabinet and given a ministerial portfolio. Making the relaxation permanent, the Court noted that the circumstances had changed since the grant of bail, as his responsibilities as a Cabinet Minister could require him to travel outside Karnataka.

When the matter was taken up today, Senior Counsel K.N Phanindra for the petitioner submitted that the present circumstance is fundamentally different [changed circumstances] from when the bail was originally granted. It was argued that as a Cabinet Minister holding a portfolio, the petitioner may be required to travel beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court frequently.

It was further contended by the counsel that approaching the concerned trial court every time for permission would be impractical given the time consumed by such applications, which are not decided ex-parte but after hearing the State, and following the requisite procedure.

The Additional Solicitor General (ASG), appearing for the respondent ED, opposed the petition on several grounds: firstly that the petitioner ought to have approached the concerned trial court itself for dilution of the condition rather than directly approaching the High Court, and secondly that while changed circumstances may entitle an accused to seek relaxation, the petitioner had, for the last two years, consistently sought ad-hoc relaxation from the trial court whenever he needed to travel. Having accepted the condition for two years, he cannot now approbate and reprobate by seeking its permanent deletion, ASG argued further.

ASG asserted that since the petitioner had availed the remedy before the trial court all throughout, the proper remedy lies before that court alone.

Hearing both sides, the court reasoned that the exigencies of his office require him to travel beyond the shores of the State's jurisdiction.

The petitioner was earlier granted bail by the trial court in a case where he is booked for offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002.

The petitioner, who was initially an ordinary citizen facing criminal proceedings, has since been inducted into the Cabinet of Ministers in the Government of Karnataka. This induction necessitated that the Court hear the matter urgently, the court had noted in the earlier interim order too.

Case Title: B Nagendra v. Enforcement Directorate

Case No: Criminal Petition No. 12007/2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 311