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Plea In Supreme Court Challenges Manan Kumar Mishra's Tenure As BCI Chairman, Seeks Audit Of BCI Finances & Its Law College

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 15:24:21 GMT

At a time when BCI Chairman Manan Kumar Mishra is facing increased public scrutiny following the NALSAR fiasco, a writ petition has been filed in the Supreme Court questioning his continuation as the head of the Bar Council of India.

The writ petition, filed by Advocate Yogamaya MG., challenges Mishra's tenure, and his prolonged continuance in the post.

The petition points out that Mishra first became BCI Chairman in 2012. After a brief break in 2014, he returned to the post in November 2014 and has remained Chairman since then. He was again elected unopposed in March 2025. The petitioner describes this as his seventh consecutive term.

The main challenge is to the five-year tenure notified by the BCI in April 2025. The Gazette notification records Mishra's tenure from April 17, 2025 to April 16, 2030.

The petitioner argues that Rule 12(2) of the BCI Rules provides for a two-year tenure for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, or until cessation of membership, whichever is earlier. The plea says an administrative notification cannot extend the tenure beyond what the Rules permit.

The petitioner also challenges the argument that the continuation of BCI members until their successors are elected can allow the Chairman to continue indefinitely. It argues that the proviso to Section 4(3) of the Advocates Act is only a transitional provision. It does not extend the separate tenure of the Chairman.

Fresh election sought

The plea asks the Supreme Court to quash the April 21, 2025 Gazette notification and direct the BCI to withdraw or rescind it.

It also seeks an order that Mishra and the Vice-Chairman cease to hold office and that fresh elections be conducted within a time-bound period under independent supervision.

The petitioner has also sought rules putting a limit on the number of terms a person can serve as BCI Chairman or Vice-Chairman. It wants a cooling-off period and a transparent rotational system so that representatives from different States and regions get an opportunity to head the BCI.

The plea further seeks safeguards to ensure that term limits cannot be bypassed through acting, ad hoc, officiating or interim appointments.

Political neutrality questioned

The petition also raises questions about the political activities of Mishra while he has remained Chairman of the BCI.

It refers to his becoming a Rajya Sabha member after being nominated by the BJP in 2024. The petitioner does not claim that political affiliation by itself disqualifies him. Instead, it argues that simultaneously holding political office and heading the country's statutory regulator for lawyers raises questions about institutional neutrality and perceived independence.

The plea also refers to public communications issued from the BCI platform on political and public issues. One such communication, dated July 23, 2026, concerned student protests, in which he denounced the movements as foreign-sponsored and led by anti-nationals. The petitioner questions whether such statements were authorised by the BCI's General Council and whether they fall within the statutory functions of the Council.

Independent committee to examine BCI Trust

A major part of the petition concerns the BCI Trust PEARL-FIRST [Bar Council of India Trust for Promotion of Education (Legal and Professional) and Reforms in Law and For Improvement of Research and Social Training]

The petitioner urges the Supreme Court to constitute an independent committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge or former Chief Justice of a High Court. The committee would be assisted by an auditor nominated by the CAG and by financial and technical experts.

The committee is sought to examine the legality and functioning of PEARL-FIRST, including Article 3(iii) of its September 18, 2020 Trust Deed.

The petition says the provision makes 11 Managing Trustees permanent, irrespective of whether they continue as members of the BCI. It argues that this raises questions about democratic accountability and institutional control.

The committee would also examine the relationship between the BCI, the 1974 Trust, PEARL-FIRST and IIULER, Goa.

Audit of funds and Trust accounts

The plea specifically seeks a time-bound audit of BCI statutory funds; All India Bar Examination receipts; institutional receipts; Trust finances; vendor contracts; and related-party transactions.

The petitioner says the AIBE involves compulsory fees paid by thousands of law graduates and that questions remain about the bank accounts receiving the fees, who controls them, expenditure approvals and audited financial statements.

The petition also seeks an examination of the financial and administrative relationship between the BCI and PEARL-FIRST.

IIULER and appointments under scrutiny

The petitioner also raises questions over the law college run by the BCI in Goa - India International University of Legal Education and Research (IIULER)

She seeks that the independent committee must examine appointments, recruitment, promotions and administrative actions from April 2012 onwards, wherever there is prima facie material requiring examination.

The petition specifically refers to allegations concerning appointments in IIULER, Goa, the Trust and related institutions. It seeks records such as advertisements, applications, selection committee proceedings, assessment sheets, appointment orders, service records, relationship disclosures and financial approvals.

The petitioner has stressed that these allegations should not be treated as established findings. It seeks an independent examination of the records.

The plea also asks the Supreme Court to order the immediate preservation and production of original records of the BCI, the 1974 Trust, PEARL-FIRST and IIULER, Goa.

These include Trust deeds, resolutions, agendas, notices, attendance registers, minutes, electronic records and metadata, accounts, bank statements, contracts, tender documents, recruitment records and communications.

It also seeks an order preventing the destruction, alteration or removal of these records while the case is pending.

Greater transparency in BCI functioning

The petition finally seeks directions for more transparent functioning of the BCI.

It asks that every member receive proper notice and the agenda before meetings. It seeks recorded resolutions and publication of confirmed minutes within a fixed period.

It also seeks annual independently audited accounts and publication of material contracts of the BCI and institutions or trusts controlled, promoted or substantially financed by it.

The petitioner wants the BCI to disclose the resolutions and recorded reasons behind decisions that materially affect advocates, students and educational institutions.

Last week, another petition was filed seeking a cap on the term of BCI Chairperson and Vice Chairperson.

The petition is filed through Advocate Deepak Prakash.

LiveLaw Daily| The Kerala Story| 3 year practice rule| Saurav Das| FIITJEE & more

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:49:11 GMT

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Advocate Cannot Disclose Client's Confidential Information Even If She Turns Adversary : Supreme Court Upholds Lawyers' Suspension

Yash Mittal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:14:46 GMT

The Supreme Court on Friday (August 21) affirmed the two-year suspension of an advocate's license to practice, holding that the disclosure of a former client's confidential information could not be justified on the ground of responding to public allegations.

“An advocate's duty is not conditional upon the client's continued good behaviour towards the advocate. An advocate cannot use information received in confidence against his client, and the fact that she has since become his adversary makes no difference.”, observed a bench of Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vijay Bishnoi, while sustaining the Bar Council of India disciplinary committee order to suspend the bar license of the Respondent-advocate for two years.

The case arose from a complaint filed by the Appellant (actress Rehana Khana @ Rozlyn Khan) against her former advocate, i.e., Respondent(Rizwan Siddique), before the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The appellant had engaged the respondent as her counsel in 2013-2014 in connection with allegations of sexual assault against a senior police official.

The crux of the complaint was that on August 5, 2014, the respondent gave television interviews in which he disclosed confidential communications with the appellant, played recorded conversations between them, broadcast messaging exchanges, and publicly characterized her complaint as a "false case of rape" while accusing her of seeking publicity.

The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, by order dated August 11, 2025, found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and suspended his license for two years, imposed a fine of ₹3 lakh payable to the complainant, and directed ₹2 lakh to be deposited in the Bar Council of India's Welfare Fund.

Both the Appellant and Respondent filed appeals against the BCI's decision. The Appellant sought enhancement in the punishment, whereas the Respondent sought setting aside of the punishment.

Sustaining the BCI's bar license suspension order, the judgment authored by Justice Nath disapproved the Respondent's act of revealing the confidential information of her former client. The Court said that merely because of the termination of the client-attorney relationship between them, the Respondent cannot reveal the sensitive and confidential information of her former client to respond to the accusations made against him.

The respondent had challenged the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the order was passed ex parte without proper service of notice. The Court rejected this contention, noting:

"The respondent entered appearance and he filed a written statement refuting the allegations. He was represented by counsel, and he participated in the recording of evidence. It is clear that he knew, from the institution of the disciplinary case, down to the passing of the impugned order in August 2025, that proceedings were pending against him and what those proceedings alleged. A party who has been present throughout cannot be heard to say that he was absent, especially one who is himself an advocate. The ground is flimsy and is, in our view, an afterthought, taken because no better one was available."

The Court further rejected the appellant's prayer for enhancement of punishment, observing that she had not approached the Court with clean hands, having herself participated in a press briefing while the matter was pending.

"The material on record, including exchanges she has herself relied upon, shows that while the engagement subsisted she and the respondent were in discussion about the means by which the police official might be trapped, which is not the conduct of a client simply seeking legal advice. Nor is her account of what followed complete. She appeared before the electronic media on 28th July 2014 of her own volition and spoke of her case, though her grievance before us is that her case was made public. Further, the police official was discharged on 4th December 2015, and that order has never been challenged by her. Having been less than candid about each of these matters, she cannot ask us to enlarge a relief granted to her.", the Court observed.

The Court also dissaproved of the conduct of both the parties for suppressing material information.

Resultantly, the appeals were disposed of, imposing costs of ₹5 lakh each on the appellant and the respondent, to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.

Also from the judgment - Supreme Court Imposes Rs 5 Lakh Costs On Actress & Her Advocate For Wasting Judicial Time

Cause Title: REHANA KHAN VS. RIZWAN SIDDHIQUEE (with connected case)

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Ms. Rehana Khan Petitioner/appellant-in-person Mr. Adit Subramaniam Pujari, Adv. Ms. Karishma Maria, AOR Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, Adv. Mr. Harshwardhan Pushkin Sharma, Adv. Mr. Bhavesh Seth, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Caveator-in-person, AOR Mr. P V Yogeswaran, Adv. * M/S. Ram Sankar & Co, AOR Mr. Adit Subramaniam Pujari, Adv. Ms. Karishma Maria, AOR Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, Adv. Mr. Harshwardhan Pushkin Sharma, Adv. Mr. Bhavesh Seth, Adv.

Supreme Court Dismisses Ex-Punjab Dy CM Sukhbir Singh Badal's Plea To Quash Defamation Complaint By AKJ Leader

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:24:21 GMT

The Supreme Court today(August 21) refused to quash a defamation case against Shirmani Akali Dali president and former Punjab Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal, filed by Rajinder Pal Singh, spokesperson of the religious organisation Akhand Kirtani Jatha.

A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu dismissed his special leave petition. Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal appeared for Badal.

It may be recalled that Pal Singh in 2017 filed a complaint against Badal under Section 499(defamation) of the Indian Penal Code. He alleged that Badal, when he was the Deputy CM, made certain defamatory statements in several newspapers alleging that the complainant and the AKJ were a "political front" of the largest terrorist outfit, Babbar Khalsa International.

This, the complainant said, was made because the then Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal had come to meet him. The Magistrate on March 4, 2020, prima facie concluded that the petitioner had made defamatory statements and summoned him under Sections 500 and 501 of the IPC.

Badal approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the complaint as well as the summoning order by the Judicial Magistrate. However, the High Court dismissed his petition.

Case Details: SUKHBIR SINGH BADAL v RAJINDER PAL SINGH|Diary No. 35327-2026

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“Courtroom Most Profound Classroom”: Justice Vinod Chandran Dissents On Relaxing 3 Year Practice Rule For Judicial Service

Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 14:17:25 GMT

Justice K Vinod Chandran has dissented from the Supreme Court judgment modifying the three-year practice requirement and reducing it to one year for recruitment as Civil Judge (Junior Division), holding that there was no ground to review the earlier judgment restoring the requirement.

Describing the courtroom as “the most profound of all classrooms”, Justice Chandran disagreed with the decision to replace the three-year practice requirement with a transitional arrangement of one year of deemed practice followed by one year each of training and law clerkship.

“The forensic and analytical skills of an adjudicator are better learnt in the profession by observing what happens in the Courts; not necessarily as a Presiding Officer controlling it, but as a keen and eager student of law; the Court room being the most profound of all classrooms. A Presiding Officer's mistake puts to peril a litigant, and her remedy is only by way of an appeal. A lawyer's mistake can be remedied by an experienced Presiding Officer, a seasoned Senior or an astute colleague, or even by a ministerial staff of the Court with first-hand experience of the proceedings. The requirement of experience is the need of the hour and essential in the immediate future, otherwise we would be accused of creating a cadre of careerists rather than of jurists capable of enriching a robust system, alive to the needs of the nation, society and its people”, the observed.

Justice Chandran also rejected the argument that the practice rule is futile as three years of practice did not equip young lawyers for judicial service because fledgling lawyers may not initially be entrusted with briefs or have opportunities to argue in court.

He pointed out that this contention raises a question on suitability of fresh lawyers being given decision-making responsibilities. “The question that arises immediately is that when a senior lawyer or litigant would not entrust a case to a lawyer who is fresh out of college, will it be safe to entrust such persons with the decision-making process in a case; when even legal services require an amount of experience to ensure; not mere representation, but quality assistance”, he highlighted.

Supporting the 3-year practice requirement, he emphasised that the initial years of practice involved much more than conducting trials or making arguments. A young lawyer learns by working with seniors, handling files, interacting with other lawyers and observing court proceedings, he observed, adding that drafting, research, cross-examination and formulating arguments were among the skills acquired through such experience.

Justice Chandran further disagreed with equating judicial service with other public services such as the IAS, IPS and IFS. He highlighted that judicial officers exercise adjudicatory powers without supervisory interference in their judicial acts, with errors being corrected through appeals, revisions or the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. For this reason, he said judicial service could not be equated with other public services in the context of recruitment requirements.

He also questioned the two-year training arrangement prescribed by the majority. He noted that requiring new recruits to undergo two years of training would mean that they would continue for two years on half the pay of a Civil Judge (Junior Division), while the period would not be reckoned as service. He opined that this would prejudice new recruits and place a strain on the exchequer, while vacancies in the judiciary would remain unfilled during the training period.

He further objected to making regular appointment dependent on the satisfaction of the High Court judge supervising the law clerkship, observing that this could create another hurdle in the transition from training to active service. He also pointed to the possibility of two classes of candidates emerging from the same recruitment process, with some having one year of practice and others having two, three or more years.

Justice Chandran agreed with the majority that some prior experience of court functioning was desirable for judicial recruits but said he could not agree with the structured two-year training program adopted by the majority. He observed that the 2025 judgment had been based on the views of a vast majority of High Courts and States, which had supported prior experience at the Bar.

He stressed that experience at the Bar was essential for law graduates “steeped in academics” to understand the affairs of people and the difficulties faced by litigants before deciding their cases. He also rejected criticism that the High Courts' views were based on anecdotal observations, prejudices and subjective reviews, pointing out that High Courts exercise administrative control over the District Judiciary and regularly assess the performance of judicial officers.

The three-year practice requirement had been removed by a three-judge bench in the 2002 All India Judges Association judgment and restored by another three-judge bench in 2025. Justice Chandran rejected the argument that the subsequent decision could not have altered the earlier judgment because it was a Coordinate Bench holding that this argument was “outrightly fallacious”.

“Quite attractive, in the normal circumstances, but outrightly fallacious in the scenario of a 'continuing mandamus'. The 1st All India Judges' Association v. Union of India case [(1992) 1 SCC 119] also decided by a three-judge bench; issued directions to improve the conditions of service of the judicial officers, found necessary to maintain independence of the judiciary”, he said.

He concluded that there was no scope for review of the earlier judgment and dismissed the review petitions.

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110 / 2025 and connected cases

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

Regular Appointment Can't Be Terminated Without Due Process: Jharkhand High Court While Staying Cancellation Of Recruitments Via JPSC Exams

Malavika Prasad — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:04:21 GMT

While staying Jharkhand government's orders cancelling recruitments made through 11th to 13th Jharkhand Public Service Commission Exams, the High Court High Court prima facie observed that regular appointments cannot be disturbed or terminated without following the principles of natural justice.

The Court made the observation while staying a notification cancelling the recruitment of Food Safety Officers pursuant to a 2023 Advertisement. It noted that there was no material before the State to show which candidates were involved in the alleged corruption and the investigation was still underway.

The petitioners contended that they were duly appointed pursuant to Advertisement No. 18 of 2023; however, all of a sudden, due to notification dated 18.08.2026, the entire examination/recruitment process has been cancelled and resultantly their services have been disengaged.

Petitioners' counsel said that without following natural justice, but "rather due to some pressure" as per his instruction, this action has been taken by the concerned respondent.

Senior Additional Advocate General submitted that though the counter-affidavit has not been filed, but as per his instructions, upon various allegations made by different citizens of the State, the State has already started in-depth enquiry by the Investigating Agency i.e. Crime Investigation Department (CID) and few arrests have also been made.

On principles of natural justice, he said that there was a mass bungling in the entire recruitment process and only due to that reason the Government has rightly cancelled the entire appointment pursuant to the Advertisement No. 18 of 2023.

Justice Deepak Roshan in his interim order observed:

"Having regard to the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is prima facie of the view that a regular appointment cannot be disturbed/terminated without following principles of natural justice. Till now, there is no material with the respondents to show as to which candidates are involved in corruption or else; inasmuch as, the Investigating Agency is already in action.

Further, so far as the issue of interim protection is concerned; this Court feels that interest of justice is paramount and in the instant case the interest of justice demands stay of the Notification dated 18.08.2026 (Annexure-4); inasmuch as, in effect they have been terminated without following any due process of law. Accordingly, learned counsel for the respondents are directed to file counter-affidavit giving in detail about the investigation and/or any further development. List this case on 15.09.2026 at 2:30 P.M. In the meantime, the operation, implementation and execution of the Notification No. 06/LO.S.A.-01-07/ 5404 of 2026 (Annexure-4) dated 18.08.2026 with regard to Advertisement No. 18 of 2023 shall remain stayed till further orders"

The court directed the Sr. AAG to inform the concerned department to allow the petitioners and other similar situated persons who are affected by the notification, to continue their work till disposal of the writ petition.

"However, looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, all the petitioners are directed to file an affidavit/undertaking to the effect that the final order passed by the trial court in connected criminal case shall be binding on them and the Government would be free to take appropriate action in accordance with law," the high court added.

The matter is listed on September 15.

Case title: Saurav Singh & Ors. v/s State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand & Ors.

W.P.(S) No. 6450 of 2026

Appearance:

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Adv Mr. Amritansh Vats, Adv Mr. Arpan Mishra, Adv Mr. Ankit Vishal, Adv Ms. Prerna Jhunjhunwala, Adv Mr. Kumar Abhishek, Adv Mr. Arpan. M. Ekka, Adv Mr. Ashish Choudhary, Adv Mr. Rahul Ranjan, Adv Mr. Akhouri Sankalp, Adv Mr. Sudhanshu Shekhar, Adv Mr. Suman Roy, Adv

For the Respondent (s) : Mr. Achyut Keshav, Sr. AAG Mr. J.F.Toppo, G.A.V Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Adv

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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Supreme Court Imposes Rs 5 Lakh Costs On Actress & Her Advocate For Wasting Judicial Time

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:14:29 GMT

The Supreme Court today (August 21) strongly disapproved of the conduct of Mumbai-based Advocate Rizwan Siddiquee and actress Rehana Khan, alias Rozlyn Khan, for wasting more than 11 years of the judiciary just for the sake of their reputation.

In view of the conduct of both sides, the Court also imposed costs. The appellant and the respondent were each directed to pay ₹5 lakh to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks, with the Court directing that the amount would be recovered in accordance with law in the event of non-payment.

To briefly state, the issue arose after Khan accused Siddiquee of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, alleging that he breached the fiduciary relationship by disclosing confidential client information to the media, issuing a public notice without consent, and making derogatory remarks about his client public. Khan made a complaint to the Bar Council of India, which initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the advocate.

The committee found Siddiquee guilty of professional misconduct and suspended his license for 2 years, and he was ordered to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the complainant and Rs. 2 lakh to the BCI. Both challenged the BCI's order before the High Court and then before the Supreme Court.

Neither party approached the Court with clean hands'

A bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed that both parties suppressed materials and didn't approach the Court with clean hands.

The Supreme Court took a critical view of the manner in which both sides had conducted the litigation. The Bench noted that the parties had withheld relevant material and that the record disclosed instances of suppression, embellishment and claims developed after the fact.

The Court emphasised that judicial proceedings cannot be used as a means for parties to settle personal scores, repair reputations damaged by their own conduct, or obtain an advantage from disputes in which they themselves had played a substantial role.

'Eleven years' of judicial time consumed

The Bench expressed particular concern over the length of the litigation. It noted that the dispute had occupied the attention of the Bar Council of India, the High Court and the Supreme Court for approximately 11 years.

The Court stressed that judicial time is a limited public resource and that the time consumed by this dispute could otherwise have been devoted to litigants whose cases required genuine and timely judicial intervention.

The Bench consequently recorded its strong disapproval of the conduct of both parties, holding that each had contributed substantially to the controversy and its prolonged litigation.

Court's observations

It observed: "It is sometimes said that in a trial the parties already know the truth and it is the judge on the trial. The observation is a sobering one and the present case illustrates why. Before us are two litigants, each of who have approached the court in the confident expectation of vindication, and neither of whom has been candid with it. Every fact of consequence has had to be prised out of a record in which suppression, embellishment and afterthought are the common currency of both sides. The machinery of justice is not a facility placed at the disposal of parties to settle scores, to salvage reputations they themselves imperilled, or to extract advantage from a controversy of their own making. We say at the outset, giving our reasons in what follows, that neither the appellant nor the respondents leave this court with credit.

We are left with the observations with which we began: each of these parties has come to us complaining of a wrong, and each has been the author of a good part of it. Between them, they have occupied the time of the Bar Council of India, a High Court and this Court for eleven years. That time belonged to other litigants waiting for release they genuinely need. We record our strong disapproval of the conduct of both. In view of the above observations, the impugned order dated 11th August 2025 is upheld. civil appeal no. 12256/ 2025, civil appeal no. 7959/2026 and transfer case no. 30/ 2026 are all dismissed.

In view of the conduct of each party, we deem it fit to impose costs. The appellant and the respondent shall each pay Rs. 5 lac to be deposited to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks, failing which it shall be recovered in accordance with law. The pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."

After the judgment was pronounced, one counsel requested that the names of the parties may be redacted. However, Justice Nath refused and orally remarked that when advocates have been fighting all over on social media, there is no need for their names to be redacted in a Court's order. "Both of you have been putting everything on social media, you gave that interview."

Also from the judgment - Advocate Cannot Disclose Client's Confidential Information Even If She Turns Adversary : Supreme Court Upholds Lawyers' Suspension

Case Details: REHANA KHAN v RIZWAN SIDDHIQUEE|C.A. No. 12256/2025 & RIZWAN SIDDIQUEE v REHANA KHAN|C.A. No. 7959/2026

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

CJP's Saurav Das Moves Delhi High Court Against Abhijit Iyer Mitra, Jaipur Dialogues Etc For Revealing Personal Info

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 10:31:02 GMT

Cockroach Janta Party's Saurav Das has filed a suit before the Delhi High Court against commentator Abhijit Iyer Mitra, and certain web portals over allegations of revealing his residential address and personal information on social media.

The suit seeks mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendants, which also include portals such Sunday Guardian, Jaipur Dialogues, Pamphlet and Lawbeat. The suit also names Google LLC and X Corp (formerly Twitter) as defendants.

The suit claims violation of Das' right to privacy, dignity and security. Das has also sought damages against the Defendants for intrusion into and publication of his private life.

Das has claimed that the defendants have unlawfully discovered, recorded, published and repeatedly disseminated his residential address and other deeply personal and sensitive information concerning his background, particulars of parents and his sexuality.

Relying on various videos posted on social media, Das claims that by reason of his journalistic work, disclosures made in the public interest and political engagement, he has been subjected to violent threats and targeted hostility even in the past.

He has said that repeated disclosure and amplification of his precise residential address creates a real and foreseeable risk of his being subjected to violence at and around his home.

As per him, such a disclosure also places other occupants of the premises at risk and has caused him a grave and continuing apprehension for their safety and security.

He has also alleged that the Pamphlet's representatives have trespassed the shared residential premises where he lives and that videos have been recorded of the portions of his house, including the interiors, and have been published on X.

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Lawyer Accused Of Colluding With Judge's Secretary For TMC Leader's Case Records Opposes Claims, Requests Calcutta HC To Preserve CCTV

Srinjoy Das — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:29:09 GMT

Calcutta High Court judge, Justice Suvra Ghosh had yesterday recused from hearing former TMC minister Sujit Bose's bail plea, after alleging that an advocate for the petitioner had made contact with her private secretary to access the case records in her chambers.

Advocate Mousumi Bhowal, who was appearing as the Advocate-on-Record for Sujit Bose in the bail proceedings before the Calcutta High Court, has placed on record her opposition to the version of events surrounding the controversy that arose after the matter had been reserved for judgment.

She has sought an enquiry to prove her innocence and requested for the CCTV footage of the front room of the judge's chamber to be preserved.

In an affidavit filed before the High Court, Bhowal has categorically denied that she had connived with the Court Officer or made any attempt to obtain access to the case records with an oblique motive.

Bhowal stated that she was engaged as the Advocate-on-Record for Bose in CRM(R) No. 58 of 2026. According to her, after hearing the parties, Justice Suvra Ghosh had reserved the matter for pronouncement of judgment on August 17, 2026. She submits that she was called by the court officer to supply judgments relied on during arguments.

According to the advocate, on August 18, 2026, at around 2.25 PM, she received a telephone call and WhatsApp message from Advocate Nahid Ahmed, the junior of Senior Advocate Sabyasachi Banerjee, who was also appearing for the petitioner.

Bhowal stated that Ahmed informed her that Shikha Mukherjee, the Court Officer posted in Court Room No. 15 and Personal Secretary to Justice Ghosh, had called her to the courtroom for supplying copies of judgments.

She thereafter went to Court Room No. 15 at around 2.35 PM and met the Court Officer.

Bhowal stated that the Court Officer requested her to accompany her to the Sesquicentenary Building so that she could identify the judgments which were required to be supplied.

The advocate's affidavit states that the Court Officer then took her to the Judges' corridor and the front room of Justice Ghosh's chamber between approximately 2.40 PM and 2.42 PM, where two court staff members were present.

According to Bhowal, the Court Officer asked her to sit on a chair and thereafter asked a court staff member sitting outside the chamber to show the records of the case. "I have not uttered any word," Bhowal stated.

She further stated that the court staff member informed the Court Officer that the case file was with Justice Ghosh and, therefore, could not be shown to her.

"I have immediately left the said place without saying anything," the advocate stated.

Bhowal has specifically rejected any suggestion that she had attempted to enter the chamber of Justice Ghosh or had acted in concert with the Court Officer to access the case file.

"I have never connived with the learned Court Officer to bring out the record of the case with an oblique motive," the affidavit states.

She further asserted, "I have never tried to enter the chamber of Her Ladyship the Hon'ble Justice Suvra Ghosh" during the relevant period.

Bhowal stated that after leaving the area outside the chamber, the Court Officer requested her in the corridor of the Sesquicentenary Building to hand over copies of the judgments which had been referred to by Senior Advocate Sabyasachi Banerjee during the hearing.

She stated that she subsequently supplied two judgments to the Court Officer at Court Room No. 15 at around 3.10 PM.

The judgments, according to the affidavit, were orders delivered by Justice Ghosh in CRM(SB) No. 84 of 2024 on December 16, 2024 and CRM(SB) No. 29 of 2025 on December 19, 2025.

The advocate has also stated that she subsequently learnt from Nahid Ahmed that the Court Officer had called the registered clerk of Senior Advocate Sabyasachi Banerjee on August 18 for the purpose of obtaining copies of the judgments.

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Supreme Court Rejects Plea To Treat Post-Graduation As Equivalent To Practice At Bar For Civil Judge Recruitment

Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:03:27 GMT

The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that post-graduation in law should be treated as equivalent to practice at the Bar for the purpose of eligibility for recruitment as Civil Judge (Junior Division).

A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran rejected the contention while deciding review petitions challenging the Court's May 20, 2025 judgment restoring the requirement of prior legal practice for entry-level judicial service.

The Chief Justice, while pronouncing the judgment, said: “The contention that post-graduation should be treated equivalent to practice, that we have not been able to accept.”

The Court, however, by 2:1 (Justice Chandran dissenting),modified the manner in which the practice requirement would operate. For recruitment notifications issued between May 20, 2025 and March 31, 2027, all law graduates will be eligible to apply notwithstanding the three-year practice requirement.

Candidates selected through these recruitments will undergo one year of training at the State Judicial Academy followed by one year of structured law clerkship, with the two years treated as equivalent to practice for the purpose of the requirement.

For recruitment notifications issued on or after April 1, 2027, candidates will be required to have at least one year of actual practice before appearing for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination.

The review petitions challenged the May 2025 judgment which had restored the three-year practice requirement for candidates seeking direct entry into the judicial service. The Court had held that prior exposure to the functioning of courts was desirable for a person entering judicial service.

In the present judgment, the Court maintained that conclusion but held that practical experience could be acquired through a structured combination of institutional training and supervised law clerkship. It also noted that the sudden restoration of the three-year requirement had caused hardship to law graduates who had prepared for judicial examinations under the regime prevailing for more than two decades.

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110/2025

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

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Bail Bond Amount Need Not Be Deposited In Cash For Release Of Accused: Gauhati High Court

Bhavya Singh — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:09:37 GMT

The Gauhati High Court has clarified that the amount mentioned in a bail or surety bond cannot be treated as an amount required to be deposited in cash for securing release on bail.

Justice Budi Habung observed, “it is hereby clarified that the amount specified in a personal/bail bond or surety bond does not mean that a cash deposit is required to be made before the police or the Court merely for securing release on bail. The accused and the surety shall, however, be required to execute the requisite bonds in accordance with law. No authority shall insist upon the deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash merely because such amount is mentioned in the bail order.”

The observation came in an application under Section 483(1)(b) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking modification of the bail conditions imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daporijo, in a Bail Application. The accused, Anar Ali, had been arrested in a case under Sections 318(2) and 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After filing of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate granted him bail on execution of a bail bond of ₹2 lakh with one local surety for the like amount.

The petitioner submitted that the accused was a mason and daily-wage earner and was unable to furnish the bail bond of ₹2 lakh or arrange a local surety. It was also submitted that since he was a resident of Assam, he could not arrange a local surety in Arunachal Pradesh and that the police authorities were insisting upon deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash. Consequently, despite the order granting bail, he continued to remain in custody.

The Additional Public Prosecutor did not oppose modification of the bail conditions and submitted that similar situations arose in different parts of Arunachal Pradesh. He sought a clarification that the amount mentioned in a bail bond or surety bond should not be treated as an amount required to be deposited in cash before the police or the Court.

The High Court noted that although the accused had been found entitled to bail, he had been unable to avail himself of the benefit of the order because of his inability to furnish the stipulated bail bond and local surety.

The Court said, “Thus, despite having been granted the concession of bail, the accused continues to languish in custody for more than three months. This fact, in itself, indicates that the conditions relating to the bail bond and local surety are excessive and onerous, particularly when the accused has been unable to make arrangements for the same.”

The Court also found the requirement of a local surety to be “excessive and unduly onerous” in the facts and circumstances of the case.

“The mere fact that the accused is a resident of another State cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient ground for insisting upon a local surety, particularly when such a condition has the effect of frustrating the very order granting bail. The purpose of requiring a bond or surety is to secure compliance with the conditions of bail and to ensure the presence of the accused during the investigation and trial. Such a requirement is not intended to impose a condition which is incapable of being complied with,” the Court added.

Accordingly, the Court modified the condition and directed that the accused be released on furnishing a personal bond of ₹50,000 with one surety for the like amount. It further directed that the surety would not be required to be a local resident, subject to verification of identity and solvency in accordance with law.

On the alleged insistence upon deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash, the High Court noted that the Magistrate's order had not specifically directed the accused to deposit the bail amount in cash and only required execution of a bail bond with one local surety.

The Court stated, “It is necessary to clarify that a bail bond constitutes an undertaking or obligation undertaken by the accused in the amount specified in the bond, subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the Court. Mere specification of an amount in a bail bond does not, by itself, require the accused to deposit such amount in cash. Similarly, a surety bond constitutes an undertaking by the surety in respect of the amount specified therein and does not, merely by reason of such specification, require the surety to deposit the said amount in cash.”

The Court directed that upon execution and acceptance of the requisite personal bond and surety bond, the accused be released forthwith unless his detention was required in connection with any other case or proceeding. The remaining conditions imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate were left unaltered.

The order was also directed to be furnished to the concerned Superintendent of Police for information and necessary circulation among the police officers under his command for compliance.

Case Name: Shri Kamin Taloh & Anr. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr.

LL Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Gau) 126

Click here to read the judgment

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97 Murder, Serious Crime Cases Recalled From Muzaffarnagar Judge After 22 Death Sentences In 4 Months

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 06:40:48 GMT

As many as 97 pending cases involving murder and other serious offenses have been 'recalled' from the court of Additional District and Sessions Judge Ravi Kumar Diwakar in Muzaffarnagar district, days after he awarded 22 death sentences in 10 different cases over a 4-month period.

The cases were recalled through an administrative order issued by Muzaffarnagar District & Sessions Judge Virendra Kumar Singh. The cases include offences punishable with death or life imprisonment.

The development comes shortly after Diwakar's recent judgments awarding record capital punishments made to headlines. Between April and August 2026, he awarded death sentences to 22 convicts in 10 separate cases.

The administrative order pertains to 97 pending files relating to murder and other heinous offences. Now, the matters will be dealt with by District & Sessions Judge Virendra Kumar Singh himself.

Though the administrative order does not state any reason for the recall of the cases, the timing of the development is crucial as it comes amidst reports highlighting the unusually high number of death sentences awarded by Judge Diwakar.

It may be noted that the first of these judgments was pronounced on April 6, when 3 accused were sentenced to death in connection with the murder of lawyer Sameer Saifi. 4 more death sentences were awarded on April 28 in another murder case pertaining to the year 2019.

On May 30, he awarded the death penalty to a 50-year-old man for killing a woman and her six-year-old son in a case dating back nearly 15 years.

Thereafter, on June 20, he sentenced 2 persons to death in connection with the murder of one Rajendra Saini. On July 2, he convicted a man of murdering a home guard on duty and awarded him the death sentence.

On July 6, he sentenced a former village head and his associate to death in a 2010 murder case over panchayat elections' enmity. Then, on July 17, he sentenced 4 other men to death for the murder of a farmer in 2011 during an attempted robbery in the Shamli district.

On August 12, he awarded the death penalty to a man for kidnapping and killing a wood trader for ransom nearly 27 years ago. On August 13, 4 people were sentenced to death in a 12-year-old murder case.

By August 13, the number of death sentences awarded by Judge Diwakar's court (since April) had reached 22.

It is important to note, however, that a death sentence imposed by a Sessions Court is not final and the same must be confirmed by the High Court before it can be executed, as per Sections 407 to 412 of the BNSS.

Judge Diwakar has been posted in Muzaffarnagar since November 2025. He first came into the spotlight in 2022 while serving as a civil judge in Varanasi when he ordered a videographic survey of the Gyanvapi Mosque premises in Varanasi.

Judge Diwakar came back into the spotlight in March 2024 when he hailed Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath as a prime example of a “religious person” holding a seat of power in the State. He also likened CM Adityanath to the idea of a 'Philosopher King' as outlined by Plato in his Socratic dialogue, Republic.

These observations were made by Judge Diwakar while summoning a Muslim cleric and politician, Maulana Tauqeer Raza Khan, to face the trial for serious criminal charges, including 'attempt to murder', in connection with the communal violence that took place in Bareilly in the year 2010. He added that in India, rarely has the mastermind who instigated a riot been punished.

Judge Diwakar further underscored that accused Maulana Tauqeer would have incited yet another riot in Bareilly if there were no Yogi Adityanath Government in the state.

However, just days later, the Allahabad High Court EXPUNGED these remarks by observing that it is not expected of the judicial officer to express or depict his personal or preconceived notions or inclinations in the matter.

" The judicial order is meant for public consumption and such type of order is likely to be misconstrued by the masses. It is expected from judicial officer that he should use a very guarded expression while focusing upon the issue in hand and should not use any observation which are tangent or alien to the core issue," the HC had remarked adding that his unwarranted remarks contained Political over-tones.

In June 2024, a Special Judge of the NIA Court wrote to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court, seeking security for Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Bareilly, Ravi Kumar Diwakar.

" ...from the investigation so far (in the FIR against Khan), the fact is coming to light that a conspiracy is being hatched by Islamic fundamentalist forces to kill the Additional District Judge, Mr. Ravi Kumar Diwakar by declaring him an infidel, which is a very sensitive matter”, the letter stated.

In December 2024, Judge Diwakar, as Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bareilly, sentenced a father-son duo to death for killing the father's brother over a property dispute by referring to the selfless love between Lord Rama and Bharata in the Hindu epic Ramayana.

The court observed that while Lord Rama's brothers Lakshman and Bharata fulfilled their duties as brothers, setting an example of great sacrifice and devotion, the actions of the accused, on the other hand, starkly contrast with this ideal.

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Supreme Court Waives Prior Practice Requirement For Civil Judge (Junior Division) Exams Till March 2027

Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:50:26 GMT

The Supreme Court has waived the three-year practice requirement for candidates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) examinations pursuant to recruitment notifications issued between May 20, 2025 and March 31, 2027.

A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran (dissenting) said all law graduates would be eligible to apply during this transitional period, notwithstanding the three-year practice requirement.

The Court said such candidates would be deemed to have completed one year of active practice for the purposes of their applications. They will not be required to furnish a separate certificate of practice for the deemed period.

“In light of the above discussions, we consider it appropriate to issue the following directions which would apply to all recruitment notifications, advertisements issued through the post of Civil Judge Junior Division in the transitional period, namely from the date the judgment was in May 25 pronounced and up to 31st March 2027. The directions are – all law graduates shall be eligible to apply notwithstanding the 3-year practice requirement. Having regard to the fact that more than one year has elapsed since the judgment under review was pronounced, such candidates shall, for the purposes of their applications, be deemed to have completed one year of active practice. There shall not be required to furnish a separate certificate of practice in report of the said deemed period”, the Court held.

Candidates selected pursuant to these recruitments will, however, be appointed initially as Trainee Judicial Officers. They will undergo one year of intensive training at the concerned State Judicial Academy, followed by one year of structured law clerkship. The clerkship will include six months under the supervision of the Principal District Judge, District and Sessions Judge or a member of the Higher Judicial Service, and six months under a sitting judge of the concerned High Court.

The Court said the training and clerkship periods will be treated as equivalent to two years of practice at the Bar for the purposes of the three-year requirement.

The direction has been issued as a transitional arrangement after the Court restored the three-year practice requirement in its May 20, 2025 judgment. The Court held that the sudden restoration of the requirement without a transitional arrangement had caused hardship to law graduates when had prepared for judicial examinations under the earlier regime.

“The sudden restoration of the requirements without any transitional arrangement has visited hardship upon law graduates who had prepared their professional lives on the basis of the regime that prevailed for over two decades”, the Court observed.

The Court has otherwise retained the requirement of prior practical exposure, but reduced the requirement to one year for recruitments after the transitional period. For recruitment notifications issued on or after April 1, 2027, candidates will have to possess at least one year of actual practice before appearing for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination. The selected candidates will have to undergo training for one year and clerkship for one year thereafter ( 6 months under District Judge and 6 months under High Court judge).

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110/2025

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

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3 Year Practice Rule : Live Updates From Supreme Court Verdict

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 06:04:30 GMT

The Supreme Court will pronounce its verdict today on a batch of review petitions challenging its earlier judgment which made three years of legal practice mandatory for candidates seeking entry into the judicial service through direct recruitment as Civil Judges (Junior Division).

A Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice August George Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran will pronounce the verdict at 10.30 AM today.

As per the causelist, the judgment is to be pronounced by Justice Chandran.

The review petitions seek reconsideration of the Court's May 2025 decision restoring the three-year practice requirement for entry-level judicial officers, contending that the mandate may discourage meritorious law graduates from joining the judiciary immediately after graduation.

The Court also heard a writ petition seeking the relaxation of the 3-year rule for persons with disabilities.

Follow this page for live-updates from the verdict pronouncement.

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