The case arose from a government order appointing the second-ranked candidate, arrayed as the fifth respondent, as President of the Commission, instead of the petitioner, who had topped the merit list.

Justice Balaji Medamalli held that under Rule 6(11) of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure of Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020, the State Government's role is confined to verifying the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee, and does not extend to altering the order of merit.

“If the State Government finds some material against the candidate recommended in the order of merit, the only option left with it, is to bring the aforesaid material to the notice of the Selection Committee for taking appropriate action, instead of the State Government changing the list by itself,” the Court observed.

Referring to the provisions governing the roles of the Selection Committee and the State Government under the Rules, the Court said that the committee is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the suitability of the candidates and examining the relevant eligibility criteria.

“ Once the Selection Committee has conducted such an assessment and forwarded the panel in the order of merit, the State Government cannot independently reassess the suitability of the candidates or make an appointment contrary to the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court noted.

The Court placed reliance on a Division Bench ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Tadikonda Suneetha v. Dr. Vajrala V.L. Narsimha Rao & Others, which dealt with a similar appointment dispute. The judgment was subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court, which declined to interfere with the High Court order.

“The legal position is well settled that the scope of interference by the State Government with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee is limited to the extent provided under Rule 6(11) of the Rules. In terms of Rule 6(11) of the Rules, the State Government is required to verify the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee,” the Court said.

It noted that if any adverse material is found against the candidate during the verification process, then it has to be placed before the Selection Committee.

“In the event any adverse material is found during such verification, the State Government is required to place the same, along with its opinion, before the Selection Committee for reconsideration of its recommendation,” the Court observed.

The Court said that after such reconsideration, if the Select Committee reiterates its recommendation, the State Government has no option except to act upon the said recommendation and issue the appointment order.

“The State Government cannot independently alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by overlooking the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court said, holding that the government had deviated from the merit-based recommendations of the Selection Committee.

“Consequently, the appointment of respondent No.5 as President, District Commission, Vijayawada, cannot be sustained,” the Court held.

The Court set aside the appointment order, and directed the State Government to place its opinion, the antecedent verification report and other relevant material before the Selection Committee within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, enabling the Selection Committee to reconsider the matter and take action in accordance with law.

Background

The petitioner, Rayala Kiran Kumar, a practising advocate, had applied for the post of President of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, as per the January 2022 notification. He was found eligible and was called for interview before the Selection Committee.

Later, the fifth respondent was appointed to the post vide G.O.Rt.No.39, dated 28.07.2022.

The petitioner subsequently learnt, through information obtained under the Right to Information Act, that he had secured 21 out of 30 marks and was placed first in the order of merit, whereas the fifth respondent had secured 18 marks and was placed second. The State Government overlooked the recommendations of the Select Committee and the petitioner's superior merit while making the appointment, the petitioner alleged.

The petitioner submitted that the Selection Committee is empowered to determine its procedure for making recommendations under Rule 6(9) and recommend a panel of candidates in order of merit for appointment by the State Government under Rule 6(10). On the other hand, the State Government is only required to verify or cause verification of the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates under Rule 6(11), and cannot alter the recommendations of the committee unless adverse remarks are found against the candidates, particularly during the verification process, the petitioner submitted.

The petitioners alleged that the Government had failed to follow the prescribed procedure and had proceeded with the selection process in violation of the Consumer Protection Recruitment Rules, 2020.

The State Government, on the other hand, requested the dismissal of the writ petition, arguing that mere inclusion of a candidate in the selection list does not confer any vested right to appointment.

Case: Rayala Kiran Kumar vs Union of India & others,

W.P.NO. 30995 OF 2024

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 198

Rajasthan High Court took serious note of Municipal Corporation's inaction against encroachers that led to its inability to hand over possession of auctioned plots to the successful bidders, and opined that the body being part of the government was not supposed to function in a manner that led to litigations.

The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand was hearing a bunch of petitions that alleged non-handing over of possession of auctioned plots by the government, as well as impleadment applications by other people alleging right over the said plots on account of having possession, who were being treated as encroachers by the Municipal Corporation.

“By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the mind of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the State must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto.”

In the background of disputed questions of rights and titles over the subject properties, the Court directed constitution of a committee comprising of Higher Officials of Department of Local Self Government and Commissioner of Jodhpur Municipal Corporation, to decide the representations of the petitioners as well as the applicants.

For context, the matter pertained to 4 plots at Kabir Marg, Jodhpur, who were alleged to have been allocated to the petitioners in an auction. However, their possession was not handed over to the petitioners. On the other hand, certain other people, who had filed applications for impleadment, were contending their rights over the plots based on possession.

The latter set of people (applicants) were treated as encroachers by the Municipal Corporation based on a report by a Joint Commission, and the Court highlighted that it was based on their encroachment that the Corporation was unable to hand over possession to the petitioners.

In this background, the Court referred to Surendra Prasad Mishra Vs. O.N.G.C. (1987) where the Calcutta High Court held that where Govt. or Governmental agency makes a promise knowing or intending that it could be acted upon by the promisee and if the promise acting in accordance therewith and thereby alters his position, the Govt. or the Governmental agency would be held to be bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. or the Governmental agency at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise or that the promise has not been reduced to writing…

The Court observed that since the possession could not be handed over owing to encroachment, there was no fault of the petitioners and they could not be allowed to suffer due to “negligence, callousness and non-maintenance of the essential record” by the Corporation.

While highlighting inaction on part of the Corporation against the encroachers, it was held the Corporation could not be allowed to sit over the matter, and take any excuse regarding handing over the possession. They were duty bound to do so.

At the same time, while underscoring Article 21 and the Magna Carta, the Court highlighted the requirement of following due process of law before taking any action against any individual or establishment.

Hence, the State was directed to constitute the aforementioned committee to adjudicate upon the representations of the petitioners as well as the applicants to close the allotment process, within a period of 3 months.

Accordingly, the petitions were disposed of.

Title: Smt. Kiran v Municipal Corporation & Anr., and other connected petitions

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 344

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The Telangana High Court has set aside land acquisition used for creating a Resettlement Zone for families displaced by the Mid Manair Reservoir Project, holding that the existence of a public purpose is distinct from an urgency serious enough to justify depriving landowners of their statutory right to object to the acquisition. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 137]

The Court held that an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after issuance of preliminary notification for acquisition is a statutory safeguard available to landowners. The power under Section 17(4) to dispense with this enquiry is exceptional and requires circumstances showing that even the short time required for such an enquiry cannot be afforded the court added. 

For context, Section 4(1) provides for a preliminary notification expressing the Government's intention to acquire land for a public purpose. Section 5-A gives interested persons the right to object and be heard. Section 6 provides for a declaration that the land is required for a public purpose. Section 17 deals with urgent acquisitions: Section 17(1) permits possession before an award in cases of urgency, while Section 17(4) separately empowers the Government to dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry where the urgency provisions apply.

Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy observed:

“ The existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of such urgency as would justify elimination of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A. The Court must examine whether the material placed by the State establishes that the purpose of acquisition could not brook even the short period necessary for completing the statutory enquiry.

That principle assumes particular significance here, because the respondents have taken a categorical stand in their counter-affidavit that no urgency clause under Section 17 was invoked and that, therefore, Section 17(5) has no application...

The material does not disclose circumstances showing an urgency of such a nature that even the summary enquiry under Section 5-A could not have been held. The delay in proceeding thereafter is also inconsistent with the contention that the acquisition required immediate action so as to justify depriving the petitioners of the statutory safeguard.”

Referring to Supreme Court precedent, the Court said the existence of a public purpose is distinct from the existence of urgency sufficient to eliminate a Section 5-A enquiry. The power to dispense with the enquiry must therefore be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.

The Court also found a contradiction in the State's stand. Its counter-affidavit categorically stated that Section 17 had never been invoked. However, the Government's own Gazette notification expressly recorded invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(2).

The Court observed:

“The Gazette notification dated 24.03.2008, containing the declaration dated 21.03.2008 under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, expressly records invocation of the powers under Section 17(1) and (2) and states that possession could be taken on the expiry of fifteen days from publication of the notice under Section 9(1).... The statement in the counter-affidavit that Section 17 was never invoked is, therefore, contrary to the contemporaneous statutory record.”

The Court clarified that invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(2) does not automatically dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry. A separate exercise of power under Section 17(4) is required.

The State produced no independent order or material showing that this power had been exercised. Its alternative contention that Section 5-A notices had actually been issued also did not establish compliance, as the petitioners disputed service of those notices.

“If the case of the respondents is that the enquiry under Section 5-A was in fact held, they were required to establish compliance with the statutory requirements. If their case is that the enquiry was dispensed with, they were required to establish the lawful exercise of the power under Section 17(4). Neither position has been established.”

The writ petition was filed by Kusa Lachi Reddy and others challenging acquisition of their lands for a Resettlement Zone under the Mid Manair Reservoir Project.

A preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued on January 16, 2008. The Section 6 declaration was subsequently issued on March 21, 2008.

The petitioners contended that they were deprived of their statutory right to object and participate in a Section 5-A enquiry. The State maintained that the lands were required for a genuine public purpose and claimed that Section 5-A notices had been issued, but the petitioners either refused to receive them or failed to submit objections.

The High Court noted that although the Section 6 declaration was issued in March 2008, the State's own case referred to an award enquiry only in August 2009. This delay was inconsistent with a claim of urgency sufficient to deny the Section 5-A safeguard.

The Court did not quash the preliminary notification under Section 4(1), since the public purpose itself had not been found non-existent. Instead, it set aside the Section 6 declaration insofar as it concerned the petitioners' lands.

The Court also declined to hold that the acquisition had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act. Relying on Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, it held that the period covered by an interim status quo order obtained by the petitioners had to be excluded while calculating the five-year period. It clarified that this did not cure the independent defects in the acquisition under the 1894 Act.

If the lands are still required for the stated public purpose, the authorities were permitted to proceed afresh under the presently applicable statutory regime.

Case Title: Kusa Lachi Reddy & Ors. v. District Collector, Karimnagar District & Anr.

Case No.: W.P. No. 26095 of 2009

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 137

Appearance: V.V. Ramana Rao for the petitioners; Katta Radha Reddy, Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, for the respondents.

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The Patna High Court has observed that the Bihar State Teachers Transfer Rules, 2026 specifically provide for preference in transfer where both spouses are in government service, and directed consideration of two teachers' requests for posting in the Patna Sadar Urban Region where their husbands work.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Harish Kumar directed the District Establishment Committee to consider the petitioners' transfer requests under the 2026 Rules and take a decision preferably within four weeks.

The petitioners had initially approached the High Court seeking transfer within the Patna Sadar Urban Region as per the options exercised by them. They relied on the State Government's earlier transfer policy contained in a Resolution dated October 7, 2024 and had also raised their grievances through the e-Shikshakosh portal.

When the petitions were heard on March 18, 2026, the District Education Officer, Patna assured the Court that a final decision on their transfer applications would be taken in accordance with law. However, instead of deciding their transfer requests, the authorities subsequently placed both petitioners on deputation at K.B. Sahay High School, Sherullahpur, Sheikhpura, Patna, on the ground of the teacher-student ratio.

During the pendency of the matter, the State notified the Bihar State Teachers Transfer Rules, 2026. The Court noted that Rule 3(x) and Rule 4 provide that where both husband and wife are in government service or are teachers, preference should be given to posting them in the same district or place.

The State submitted that since the 2026 Rules had come into force from June 25, the petitioners' cases would now have to be considered under the new regime.

The High Court accepted this position and noted that the petitioners' husbands were working in the Patna High Court establishment. Their request for accommodation in schools within the Patna Sadar Urban Region therefore required consideration under the specific spouse-posting preference contained in the 2026 Rules. The Court observed:

“…This Court finds that there is a specific provision with regard to the preference to be given in favor of the husband and wife, if they are in government service. The very claim of the petitioners are specifically in limited bound that their husbands have been discharging duty in the institution of the Patna High Court, therefore, their cases must be considered in the light of the specific prescriptions of the Rules, 2026, and accommodate them nearby the school in the Patna Sadar Urban Region.”

Accordingly, the Court directed the authorities to place the petitioners' cases before the District Establishment Committee, which was asked to consider the matter and take an appropriate decision preferably within four weeks.

The Court further directed that the petitioners should not be disturbed from their present deputation at K.B. Sahay High School until the Committee takes a decision.

Both writ petitions were disposed of with these directions.

Case Title: Kanchan Kumari v. State of Bihar and Ors.

Case Numbers: Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case Nos. 3516 and 3517 of 2026

Appearance: Mr. Alok Kumar, Mr. Pranav Kumar and Ms. Ruchi Acharya for the Petitioner in CWJC No. 3516 of 2026; Mr. Lokesh Kumar, AC to AG, for the Respondents. Mr. Shakti Suman Kumar for the Petitioner in CWJC No. 3517 of 2026; Mr. R.P.N. Tiwari, AC to SC-25, for the Respondents.

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Criticising the Board, the Division Bench of Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V. and Justice K.V. Jayakumar observed:

“We are shocked and dismayed to note that the Board has incurred an expenditure to the tune of Rs.28,44,313/- from the Devaswom funds within a short period for the repairs of the residential quarter, purchase of vehicle and purchase of household articles for an Officer, who was appointed on a deputation basis for a limited period, that too, violating the Rules and Regulations…. We strongly disapprove and deprecate the actions of the Board and its top officials for incurring expenditure for luxuries and comforts of the officers, violating the norms, Rules and Regulations. The Board shall take utmost care and restraint, while expending the funds of the Devaswom, in future.”

The Court was considering pleas raising the allegation that the Devaswom Commissioner misappropriated Devaswom funds. The petitioners alleged that the Devaswom Board and the Commissioner spent huge amounts to renovate the 100-year-old quarter allotted to the latter. Additional expenses were also incurred for buying household items and an amount of Rs. 17 lakhs was spent on a new car, it is alleged.

The petitioners argued that there was no justification for the Board or its officers to spend such a huge amount on luxuries when it is finding it difficult to manage the 409 temples under it. It was pointed out that public money collected by devotees must be spent more diligently, especially since most of the temples are in a dilapidated condition and in need of serious repair.

The Board's stand was that the Commissioner had incurred the expenses after getting necessary orders and there was no illegality or irregularity on the actions of the Board or the Commissioner.

The amicus curie suggested that the expenditure incurred must be subjected to audit by the Audit department.

In the affidavit submitted by the Audit department, it was stated that S.R. Udayakumar was appointed as Devaswom Commissioner on a deputation basis and his tenure was extended by the Board thereafter. Further, it was stated that though there is provision for residence, there is no provision for furnishing the same.

Reference was made to a 2019 government order, whereby it is stated that a new vehicle can be purchased only if the old one completed 3 lakh km or 10 years of service. However, in the present case, though it is stated that the vehicle was replaced due to braking issues, it had only covered around 86,000 km and registered around 4 years back only. Moreover, considerable amount was spent on the car's accessories also.

The Court, after hearing the parties, noted that the car and household articles were purchased in violation of norms and the 2019 GO. It then perused Section 73A of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 that lays down the Board's duties, including ensuring proper facilities in the temples.

It also took note of the fact that the Audit department noted irregularities in the transactions in DBAR No. 5/2025. Therefore, it directed the Board to finalise the audit objections in the afore petition within 3 months.

Further, the Board's Secretary was directed to file an affidavit of compliance after finalizing the audit objections.

Case No: WP(C) No.39814/2025 & DBP No.13/2026

Case Title: K.B. Sumod v. State of Kerala and Ors. & Narayanankutty K. and Ors. v. The Cochin Devaswom Board and Ors.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 461

Counsel for the petitioners: Anupama Subramanian, Resmi A.

Counsel for the respondents: K.R. Sunil – Special Government Pleader, K.P. Sudheer – Standing Counsel

Amicus Curiae: P. Ramachandran

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The Telangana High Court has dismissed two appeals by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) against an order setting aside its revocation of Layout Regularisation Scheme (LRS) permissions for two plots, after refusing to condone delays of 820 and 794 days in filing the appeals. [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 136]

The Court also found little prima facie merit in GHMC's allegation that the plot owners' vendor had committed fraud, noting that the Corporation had regularised the plots with full knowledge that they were situated in the open space of an unapproved layout.

A Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Renuka Yara held that GHMC had itself collected penal and pro-rata charges for the shortfall in open space before granting LRS permissions and subsequent building permissions. It therefore could not claim that it had been kept in the dark about the reduction of open space.

The Bench observed:

"It is the petitioners who with full knowledge about shortfall of open area granted LRS proceedings and also granted building permissions. This fact pattern shows that even in case the case of petitioners to condone delay is considered on the basis of merits, there is little scope for prima facie case of fraud or misrepresentation."

The Bench particularly rejected GHMC's reliance on election duties to explain the subsequent delay. It observed:

"Even assuming that all the aforementioned sequence of events are sufficient cause for delay, the time period thereafter allegedly was taken up on account of entrustment of Special Election Duties for the State Telangana Assembly Elections followed by Parliament Elections. This reason seems far-fetched, as the staff of petitioner-corporation may be engaged in election duties, but the Zonal Commissioner can always take a decision about filing the Writ Appeal. The City Planner also could have sought necessary instructions for filing Writ Appeal or not.

The staff being busy with election duty does not seem a convincing reason for the simple reason that while the staff are busy with election duties, the decision makers could have always decided whether or not to file a Writ Appeal and inform the same to the Standing Counsel, who were appointed by proceedings in G.O.Ms.No.517 dated 10.10.2022. Even in case the staff are busy, the Standing Counsel would not be engaged with election duties and therefore they could have always prepared the grounds of Writ Appeal. Further, the petitioners waiting to seek legal opinion from the Standing Counsel till the culmination of elections does not seem convincing"

The appeals arose from two writ petitions filed by Siri Constructions and Darshinee Infra Projects against GHMC's July 23, 2018 revocation notices concerning Plot Nos. 22/A and 19/A respectively. A Single Judge had, by a common order dated April 25, 2022, allowed the writ petitions and set aside the revocation notices. GHMC filed appeals against this order after delays of 820 and 794 days.

Explaining the delay, GHMC said that the zonal official dealing with the matter, M. Narsimha Ramulu, had been apprehended by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on April 21, 2022 in a disproportionate assets case. Another City Planner was thereafter placed in additional charge, followed by the appointment of a regular City Planner in August 2022. GHMC's Standing Counsel were also changed in October 2022.

GHMC further submitted that when the respondents subsequently sought restoration of their building permissions, the file was put up in November 2023. However, officials were then occupied with the Telangana Assembly elections and subsequently the Parliamentary elections, delaying the process of obtaining legal advice on whether an appeal should be filed.

The developers opposed condonation. They pointed out that they had submitted representations on May 24, 2022 and March 7, 2023, along with copies of the Single Judge's order, seeking restoration of their building permissions and grant of occupancy certificates. They argued that GHMC therefore had full knowledge of the judgment but failed to challenge it within time.

The Division Bench agreed that the reasons offered by GHMC did not explain the entire delay. It said that even if the ACB case against the concerned official justified some initial delay, a regular City Planner had been appointed by August 2022 and a decision on filing an appeal ought to have been taken within a reasonable period thereafter.

Similarly, while a change of Standing Counsel could require some time for the new counsel to take over, the Court noted that no action was taken for more than a year. It found that GHMC "did not take up any initiative to file the Writ Appeals" until the developers sought implementation of the earlier judgment.

The Court also considered GHMC's argument that the merits should not be shut out merely on limitation because public interest was involved in preserving open spaces. However, it found that the Corporation had complete knowledge of the location of the plots when it granted regularisation.

Since GHMC had collected penal and pro-rata charges for the shortfall in open space, the Court held that there could be no question of the vendors having concealed this fact from it. It therefore found "little scope for prima facie case of fraud or misrepresentation" even if the merits were considered while deciding the applications for condonation.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed GHMC's applications seeking condonation of delays of 820 and 794 days. Consequently, both writ appeals were also dismissed.

Case Title: Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v. Siri Constructions; Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. v. Darshinee Infra Projects

Case Nos.: I.A. No. 1 of 2024 in/and W.A. No. 1028 of 2024; I.A. No. 1 of 2024 in/and W.A. No. 1033 of 2024

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 136

Appearance: A. Sudarshan Reddy, Advocate General, for GHMC and the other appellants; K. Durga Prasad for the respondents.

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