Retiring Supreme Court Judge Justice Sanjay Karol on Friday said the strength of the judiciary lies in a strong Bar and urged young lawyers to attend court regularly, make the most of every opportunity and remain courteous to senior members of the Bar and the Bench.

Speaking at his farewell organised by the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA), Justice Karol said the Bar is the “custodian of the justice delivery system” because judges come and go, while the Bar remains.

“The stronger the Bar, the stronger the Bench,” he said.

Addressing young members of the Bar, Justice Karol said lawyers cannot learn the practical application and interpretation of law only by studying provisions in college.

“If you want to become a Vidwan, you will have to come to the court. You will have to come to the courtroom. Your real grooming will be there,” he said, adding, “No matter how much you read Article 21, Article 14 in college, you will never know how to apply the law. You will never know how to interpret the law.”

Justice Karol urged young lawyers to use every opportunity available to them, however small. “Whatever opportunity has come in your way, little bit that it may be, utilize it to the fullest. Never ever hesitate. But yet be courteous, both to the senior members and to the Bench,” he said.

Justice Karol also urged senior lawyers to support their juniors and “never ever let their juniors let down their dreams”. He said his practice of appointing young lawyers as amici was not an act of favour.

“I did not oblige you by appointing amicus. No. It was my constitutional duty,” he said.

Justice Karol said that apart from delivering judgments, he considered it his constitutional obligation to ensure that the Bar was nurtured and young lawyers got opportunities.

“The biggest obstacle in the life of a young member of the Bar is to stand on their legs and open up their mouth. That's the biggest hurdle. We have all undergone that process,” he noted.

He appreciated young lawyers who appeared before him, saying that they had made valuable submissions and given him insights into new dimensions of cases. “Each one of the younger members of the Bar have helped, assisted and given their submissions which are absolutely immaculate. They have given me a great insight to a totally new dimension,” he said.

Justice Karol also emphasised the role of the Bar in maintaining the independence and strength of the judiciary.

“Our strength, judges' strength lies from the Bar and nowhere else. If at all there is a custodian of the justice delivery system, it is the Bar at whatever level it may be..Judges come and judges go. It is the Bar only who is here,” he said.

He recalled an incident involving senior advocate Fali S Nariman to illustrate the role of a strong Bar. Justice Karol said a judge had once “almost ridiculed” a party-in-person, following which Nariman stood up and told the judge that the judge was wrong and that he would never again enter that courtroom.

Justice Karol said his judicial approach was guided by the principle of “broad substantial justice”. “Justice is very relative, you can't define justice. But one formula which at least I adopted is, right or wrong, I will share that with you. And that is broad substantial justice,” he said.

He said that judges should keep in mind the person behind every case. “Because behind the brief is a common man. A man who has great hopes from this institution, because this is the last and the final court where he can get his voice heard,” Justice Karol said.

On mediation, Justice Karol shared that he had requested that judges be trained as mediators and announced that he would be the first to undergo such training on August 23, 2026.

Referring to the Samadhan Samaroh initiative, he appreciated Justice PS Narasimha, observing that he had been working hard on it.

Justice Karol said that when a litigant is allowed to speak in their own language, they realise for the first time that they have been “seen” and “heard”.

“A lot of unlearning is required to be done. And I have practiced it in court. You just lend voice, lend your ears, to that litigant who comes to the court,” he said.

Justice Karol also spoke about his understanding of the Constitution, saying he had tried to distinguish between a Constitution that is “living” and the need to “live the Constitution”.

He said that judges must travel and understand the conditions of people to truly live the Constitution. “You have to feel the pain, the agony, the sorrow of people,” he said, stressing that behind every case is a common person who has placed his hopes in the justice system.

Justice Karol also urged judges and lawyers to remember their responsibility towards the Supreme Court as an institution.

Referring to the photographs of former Chief Justices displayed in the Supreme Court corridors, he stressed that judges must remember that they are stepping into the shoes of those who had held the office before them.

“Every moment of ours has to be such that whether inside court or outside court while we are in office or when we are out of office should be such that it brings majesty and dignity to this institution which is the Supreme Court of India,” he said.

Justice Karol thanked the Chief Justice of India, his judicial colleagues, members of the Bar, Registry officials, court staff, law clerks and his family for their support during his tenure.

He also sought the forgiveness of members of the Bar and his colleagues for any “excesses” he may have committed, knowingly or unknowingly.

Describing the relationship between the Bar and Bench as “a symphony”, Justice Karol emphasised that both sides must work as stakeholders in the justice delivery system.

He shared that he was leaving the Supreme Court with a deep sense of contentment and no regrets after three-and-a-half years on the Bench.

Chief Justice of India Surya Kant on Friday praised Justice Sanjay Karol for encouraging young lawyers appearing before him, saying that the judge often tells senior advocates when their juniors have argued a matter well before the bench and such words from a senior judge can mean far more to a young lawyer than any reassurance.

Speaking at the Supreme Court Bar Association farewell for Justice Karol, who will demit office tomorrow, CJI Kant said that Justice Karol had always been attentive to the growth and nurturing of the young members of the Bar.

“His concern for the way justice is delivered also extends to the way the legal profession itself grows. He has always been attentive to the growth and nurturing of the young members of the bar and who knows better than these youngsters, many of whom had the advantage of working as amicus in his court. Giving an opportunity to hundreds of young lawyers, members of the bar, is really a great opportunity to them to shape themselves as the future members of the Supreme Court Bar Association.  Many of you also appear regularly before him, know that he always makes it a point to tell a senior that their juniors have argued the matter very well before the Bench. To a young lawyer, such encouraging words from a senior judge can mean far more than any reassurance,” CJI Kant said.

CJI Kant also recalled his long association with Justice Karol, dating back to their days as young lawyers. Recalling what he had said about Justice Karol at the time of his farewell from the Himachal Pradesh High Court, CJI Kant described him as “an ideal judge who is always eager to do justice to the oppressed and deserving and has never allowed technicalities to overshadow the free flow of justice.”

“Almost 8 years later as I once again bid him farewell, I find that those words have not only stood the test of time but remain as true today as they were then,” he added.

CJI Kant described Justice Karol as an “amiable and remarkable down to earth person” who had maintained a deep regard for the values of judicial office, including impartiality, integrity, independence and humility.

He said these qualities were reflected not only in Justice Karol's personal conduct but also in the way he heard matters, spoke to lawyers and litigants and approached judicial reasoning.

CJI Kant highlighted that Justice Karol's courtroom was never an intimidating place and that he treated it as a space for dialogue rather than confrontation.

“Even when the disagreements were sharp between the parties, he ensured that every party leaves with the sense that they have been heard properly and that their disputes will be resolved with fairness,” he said.

The CJI also highlighted Justice Karol's encouragement of mediation and settlement in family, service and commercial disputes.

“For my brother Justice Karol, justice has never just meant that every dispute must have a winner and a loser. Instead, he has encouraged the parties before him to always try to settle and talk to one another to find common ground for mutual agreement,” he said.

CJI Kant also spoke about Justice Karol's judicial work, particularly his decisions in criminal law and motor accident compensation matters.

He said Justice Karol's criminal law decisions reflected a balance between the legitimate interests of society and the constitutional promise of fairness to an accused.

“His approach has recognized that the criminal justice system must be unyielding where the law demands firmness but equally vigilant in protecting the safeguards that stand between the individual and the coercive power of the state,” CJI Kant said.

He added that Justice Karol's opinions showed a judge who was “deeply compassionate and acutely aware of social realities”, particularly in his work concerning motor accident compensation cases.

CJI Kant also recalled an incident from Justice Karol's tenure in Himachal Pradesh when Shimla faced a drinking water shortage. He said Justice Karol took suo motu cognizance of the situation and personally visited the spot where water was being distributed.

“He walked extra miles, went to the spot where the water was being distributed to ensure that there was no favouritism or favour of high ups in society and water was distributed equally to all those who are in need,” he said.

CJI Kant said Justice Karol's retirement from judicial office was not necessarily the end of his contribution to the legal world.

Recalling former Attorney General Fali S Nariman's observation that every judge leaving the Supreme Court should satisfy himself that he had left “a little brick of his own making” in the edifice of the Supreme Court, CJI Kant said Justice Karol had left his own brick through his contribution to the Court's body of judicial scholarship.

“On behalf of my colleagues on the Bench, I thank you for your companionship and your institutional commitment. And above all, for reminding us that firmness and kindness are not opposites, but complementary in judging,” he added.

CJI Kant also congratulated the newly constituted Executive Committee of the SCBA and called it fitting that one of its first occasions brought the Bench and Bar together to honour Justice Karol.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta was hearing a case related to contempt proceedings initiated by Chouhan in the High Court against Union Home Secretary Govind Mohan for non-compliance with a High Court direction to confer the gallantry award on him.

After the Court earlier expressed displeasure over the delay in complying with the High Court order, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta today informed the Court that the President had taken a decision on the matter.

“We are grateful for your lordships' indulgence and now the decision is taken. The President has passed the order,” Mehta said.

He read out the relevant portion of the communication, stating that the proposal had been examined in compliance with the High Court's order and as per the applicable guidelines.

He said the President had approved the Medal for Gallantry to Sri Vivek Kumar Chauhan, SI for the action dated June 24, 2003. The award will be notified in the Gazette of India by the President's Secretary shortly, he added.

Mehta also argued that the High Court's order should not be treated as a precedent, saying that such awards are ultimately decided by the President.

The Court noted that it was only dealing with the contempt proceedings, and this observation was not required in the order.

Senior Advocate Mrigendra Singh, appearing for Chouhan, said that Chouhan would withdraw the contempt petition in the High Court in light of this development.

In the order, the Court recorded that Mehta had placed before it a communication dated August 20, 2026, issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, whereby approval had been granted to confer the Medal of Gallantry on Chouhan, and the award would be notified in the Gazette of India in due course.

“In that view of the matter the present petition does not require any further consideration,” the Court opined.

The Court also recorded that Singh's statement that Chouhan would withdraw the contempt proceedings pending before the High Court.

Background

The dispute arose from Chouhan's long-pending claim for the President's Gallantry Medal. He was serving as SHO of Ghatigaon police station in Gwalior district in 2003 when he led an operation against dacoits. Two dacoits were killed and Chouhan sustained injuries.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court had directed in December 2024 that the gallantry award be conferred on Chouhan within one month. The order was subsequently upheld by a Division Bench.

The Centre had later submitted that the President had approved a Gallantry Medal for Chouhan. The High Court rejected this as inadequate, holding that the Gallantry Medal and President's Gallantry Medal were distinct honours and that the latter was a higher distinction. The High Court found that the Union had "clearly over reached the order", amounting to prima facie willful disobedience.

The Centre challenged the High Court order before the Supreme Court.

Case no. – MA 2056/2026 in SLP(C) No. 10821/2026, Diary No. 40866/2026

Case Title – Govind Mohan v. Vivek Singh Chouhan

Constitution of India

Constitutional & Administrative Law — Correlative Public Duties of Local Authorities — Maintenance of Pedestrian Infrastructure – The Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths carries a corresponding, enforceable legal duty upon public authorities - Wherever a road exists, there is a strict public duty to ensure a footpath is demarcated, constructed, and safely maintained - The primary duty-bearers responsible for provisioning and safeguarding this pedestrian infrastructure are Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, and Panchayats. [Paras 7 - 10] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Constitution of India – Judicial Review of Employer's Decision on Suitability – Appointment to Disciplined Force – Criminal Antecedents and Acquittal via Compounding - Even after a truthful disclosure of past criminal cases ending in acquittal, an employer retains the discretion to assess a candidate's suitability for appointment - such a decision cannot be arbitrary - To survive judicial review, it must be supported by material on record demonstrating that an offence involving moral turpitude was indeed committed and that the candidate was linked to it, despite earning an acquittal on technical grounds, benefit of doubt, or due to witnesses turning hostile or being won over. [Para 14] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493

Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers & Judicial Review - Judiciary cannot create or expand criminal offences or prescribe punishments in the absence of legislative action - The Supreme Court held that the authority to enact binding general norms of conduct, formulate policy, and choose legislative responses falls squarely within the exclusive province of the Legislature - Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers embedded in the Indian Constitution, the functional demarcation between the organs is fundamental; one organ cannot usurp the essential functions of another - While Courts can fill interstitial gaps to protect fundamental rights when a absolute legislative vacuum or constitutional silence exists, they cannot supplant the legislative scheme or construct parallel regulatory regimes where the field is already fully occupied by substantive law. [Relied on SCWLA v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 680; Dr. Ashwini Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 585; Paras 25-98, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Constitutional Law – Writ of Continuing Mandamus - Continuing Mandamus cannot be issued in anticipation of future contingencies or to micro-manage executive functions - The device of "continuing mandamus" is a judicial innovation designed to secure compliance with a declared right against institutional inertia, rather than a substantive standalone writ remedy - It cannot be deployed to keep matters pending in anticipation of future contingencies or possible defaults that have not yet arisen - To assume executive failure in advance and maintain continuous judicial oversight would violate the principle of institutional comity, transgress the doctrine of separation of powers, and unconstitutionally reduce the Court's role to the "micro-management" of matters falling strictly within the executive domain. [Relied on Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 80 and National Federation of Indian Women v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 719 of 2023; Paras 65, 67, 69, 73, 75] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Article 12 - Definition of State

Article 12 – Definition of 'State' – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) - The Supreme Court held that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, writ petitions filed by its employees under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable - Key Determinants for Article 12 Status – Supreme Court observed that while no single test is exhaustive, the cumulative effect of the following factors established AFGIS as an instrumentality of the State - i. Deep and Pervasive Control - The Society was established with the sanction of the President of India, who also approved its deputation rules; ii. Administrative Dominance - The Board of Trustees and Managing Committee consist entirely of serving senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF); iii. Compulsory Nature - Membership and premium deductions are mandatory for all IAF personnel as an integral part of their service conditions, leaving no choice to the individual; iv. Public Function - The Society performs a public duty by providing insurance and welfare to armed forces personnel, which is a core government function linked to national sovereignty and security; v. Self-Representation - The Society had previously represented itself as 'Government' to seek exemptions from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111; Paras 15-19] Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2026 INSC 233

Article 12 and Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition against a Society – Fiduciary Duty of Government Officers in Governing Bodies – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a Society (HEWO) comprising government employees, especially when issues of lack of transparency, unfairness, and unreasonableness in the allotment of housing facilities are raised - Noted that ex-officio members of a Governing Body, who are responsible government officers, must act in a fiduciary capacity for the common good, ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability while eschewing favoritism, bias, and arbitrariness. [Para 5]. Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Article 14 – Equality before law

Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial Assistance, Not Compassionate Appointment - The plain, unambiguous language and text of Rule 23(1), as well as its marginal heading, confine its operation strictly to "compassionate financial assistance" - It contains no express or implicit reference to "compassionate appointment" - Extending a provision textually confined to financial assistance to cover compassionate appointment would amount to judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation - Purposive construction cannot be used to override unambiguous text or plug a perceived legislative gap - The Rules of 2019 maintain a meticulous and deliberate structural separation between the two forms of relief across all definitional, procedural, eligibility, and administrative domains - Rule 5(1)(a) defines financial assistance as a monthly monetary payment, whereas Rule 5(1)(b) defines compassionate appointment as public employment - The two are qualitatively distinct forms of relief - The omission of "compassionate appointment" from Rule 23(1) must be regarded as deliberate - Absence of Sequential Hierarchical Bar for Compassionate Appointment - Rule 5(1)(f) (defining family for financial assistance) utilizes a strict cascading sequencing mechanism using the word "failing" across multiple sub-clauses, creating a mandatory priority bar - Rule 5(1)(g) (defining family for compassionate appointment) merely lists eligible categories (widow/widower, children, dependent siblings) and completely omits any "failing" or conditional language - no absolute statutory bar prevents the consideration of a child's claim for compassionate appointment solely because the widow's claim has not been conclusively determined, particularly where the widow has explicitly renounced her claim - Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) Upheld within its Proper Domain - Rule 23(1) is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution - It is a temporary, regulatory, and preventive measure not a penal one aimed at preventing a person criminally culpable for an employee's death from accessing the welfare scheme - The classification has a rational nexus with its object - its validity does not extend its applicability to the field of compassionate appointment, which it does not govern – The Supreme Court noted a significant anomaly in the Rules of 2019: the lesser form of relief (financial assistance) is suspended during criminal trials for the murder of the employee, while the substantially greater form of relief (permanent public employment) lacks a corresponding safeguarding provision - While the Court cannot rewrite the rules to rectify this lacuna, it is strongly desirable for the State Government to introduce appropriate amendments to bridge this legislative gap. [Relied on Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 329; M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925; Paras 15-45] Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2026 INSC 640

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Section 3 – Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 – Clause 2(p) – Government Order No. 6 of 2019 dated 05.08.2019 – Paragraph IV(10) and Paragraph V – Compassionate Appointment / Allotment of Fair Price Shop – Exclusion of 'Married Daughter' from the definition of 'Family' – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 15(1) – Gender-based Stereotype - Key Issue - Whether the blanket exclusion of a 'married daughter' from the definition of 'family' for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent/compassionate quota is constitutionally sustainable – Supreme Court held – i. Gender Discrimination and Arbitrary Classification - The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of "family" under Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order and Paragraph IV(10) of the G.O. fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary - The distinction lacks any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the welfare-oriented object of the scheme, which is to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of a deceased dealer; ii. Impermissible Stereotypes - Supreme Court observed that while a married son continues to be considered a part of the family, a daughter is excluded solely because of her marriage - This distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter loses all ties with her natal family upon marriage which is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution; iii. Dependency as a Question of Fact - Dependency is a question of fact to be determined in each individual case and cannot be conclusively or speculatively presumed based entirely on marital status or assumptions regarding local residence; iv. Doctrine of Purposive Construction Applied - Applying the doctrine of purposive construction to avoid an unjust or arbitrary result, the Court read down the provision - The expression "daughter" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order must be interpreted to include a married daughter, provided she establishes factual dependency on the deceased dealer, submits a dependency certificate along with No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from other adult family members, and satisfies all other eligibility criteria, including local residence. [Relied on Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors. v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1954) 2 SCC 791; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619; Paras 18-27] Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2026 INSC 617

Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 – Equity and Social Justice – Held that long-serving employees who have rendered continuous, uninterrupted service spanning decades and have been functionally assimilated into the regular framework cannot be retained in a precarious status to deny them social security - The distinction between temporary and permanent employment becomes substantively illusory when the nature of duties performed is identical to regular employees - The State, as a model employer, is bound by constitutional mandates to ensure fair conditions of work and economic justice. [Paras 35-40] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Public Interest Litigation — Regularisation vs. Demolition — Doctrine of Proportionality and Irreversibility — Irregular allotment of land by City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited (CIDCO) to a private developer without a competitive tender process - The High Court declared the allotment illegal and ordered restoration/demolition but granted liberty to apply for regularisation – Held that demolition of a fully operational commercial complex (shopping mall and hotel) after 17 years, an investment of ₹450 crores, 8,000 livelihoods, and ₹100 crores of annual tax revenue would not vindicate public interest - The severity of a remedial measure must bear a rational and proportionate relationship to the nature and magnitude of the wrong - Financial prejudice to the public authority can be remedied through a rigorous financial recovery mechanism, whereas demolition causes catastrophic and irreparable socio-economic harm - Public law must distinguish between remedies that restore public welfare and those that merely punish at the cost of the public - Demolition order set aside. [Paras 22, 23, 24, 26] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Equal Pay for Equal Work / Regularization — Parity in Service benefits - The State Government framed a policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster Roll workers engaged prior to 01.04.1993, under which approximately 30,000 workers were regularized - The appellants, who were similarly situated, engaged prior to the cut-off date, and had rendered continuous service for decades, were excluded due to clerical errors and administrative lapses on the part of the State - Held, the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to a smaller group within the same identifiable class without demonstrating a valid distinction - Equality does not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy - Exclusion of the appellants is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Karnataka & Others v. M.L. Kesari & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66; Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99; Paras 60 - 78] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14 and 16 — Public Employment — Arbitrary Contractual Appointment against Regular Vacancy — Validity of Selection Process — Even by the most liberal approach to the primacy of selection committees in educational institutions, denying a regular appointment to a fully qualified candidate while appointing others on a regular basis through the same selection process is patently illegal and unconstitutional, especially when the selection record discloses no reasons for such differential treatment - If a candidate is deemed unsuitable for a regular appointment, they cannot be recommended even on a contractual basis. (Paras 12 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Public Employment — Doctrine of Estoppel/Acquiescence — Unemployed Candidate accepting Contractual Appointment under Economic Compulsion — The choices for the unemployed are few - Joining a post on a contractual basis and working for a considerable period does not estop the employee from challenging the patent illegality or arbitrariness in the selection procedure, nor does it wipe out the violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (Paras 6, 10 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 16, 226, 142 and 309 — Mandamus for Regularisation contrary to Statutory Rules — High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by contractual para-teachers seeking regularisation — Held that Courts exercising powers under Articles 226 or 142 cannot issue a mandamus to regularise services contrary to the statutory scheme or rules made under Article 309 - Adherence to statutory rules must be insisted upon to protect the rights of open-market candidates and preserve the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity in public employment. [Paras 11 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 – Equal Treatment and Arbitrary Classification – Pendency of litigation cannot be a valid basis for classification - Denying engagement orders to candidates simply because litigation was pending against them as on the date of the closure of a government scheme, while issuing engagement orders to similarly situated candidates with no pending litigation, fails the twin-test of reasonable classification - Mere pendency of litigation is an extraneous circumstance and bears no rational nexus with the objective of maintaining educational standards. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Relaxation – Arbitrariness and Discrimination – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench order that had upheld the Registrar's rejection of a promotion recommendation - held that when the Board of Directors—the competent authority validly exercises its discretion to grant relaxation in educational qualifications based on an employee's long service and competence, the Registrar cannot arbitrarily reject such a proposal - Denial of promotion to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated employees (Sushil Kumar Tripathi and Ram Swaroop Pandey) possessing the same qualifications constitutes a violation of the fundamental concept of equality. [Paras 6 - 9] Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353

Constitution of India – Key Principles and Reliance – i. Twin Tests of Article 14: For a classification to be valid, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those grouped together from others; and (2) that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved; ii. Arbitrariness as the Enemy of Equality: Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicitly unequal and violative of Article 14; iii. Financial Crunch vs. Discrimination: While a financial crunch may justify deferring benefits or setting implementation dates, it cannot justify providing discriminatory rates of enhancement for the same inflationary pressure once the decision to grant the benefit has been made. [Relied on D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors (2025) 1 SCC 1; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 72; Paras 20-28] State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352

Constitution of India – Article 14 and Article 32 – Public Procurement – Transparency and Accountability – Facts – Petitioners alleged systemic nepotism and corruption in Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that public works were awarded to firms related to the Chief Minister and other high officials without open tenders - CAG report identified missing vouchers worth crores and repeated execution of works without tenders - The State holds public resources as a trustee on behalf of the people - Award of public contracts and execution of works must be transparent, fair, and free from arbitrariness or undisclosed conflicts of interest – Extraordinary power under Article 32 to transfer investigation to the CBI must be exercised sparingly and in exceptional situations - Such transfer is justified where high officials are involved, where the investigation by State machinery lacks credibility, or to instil public confidence in the rule of law. Save Mon Region Federation v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2026 INSC 320

Constitution of India – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Reasonable Classification – Dearness Allowance (DA) vs. Dearness Relief (DR) – Whether the State/KSRTC can effect a classification between serving employees and pensioners by granting enhancement of DA/DR at differential rates – HELD: No, The object of both DA and DR is common: to mitigate the hardship of inflation - Inflation hits both serving and retired employees with equal force - Once a decision is taken to provide and increase these allowances based on inflation, fixing a higher rate for serving employees (14%) than for pensioners (11%) has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and is discriminatory and arbitrary. State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - The Supreme Court dismissed a batch of appeals filed by the Union of India against various High Court judgments which had ruled in favor of candidates from the OBC category - The central controversy was whether the salary of parents employed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private sectors could be the sole basis for "Creamy Layer" exclusion in the absence of established "equivalence" with government posts - held that treating PSU/private employees differently from Government servants (where salary is excluded from the income test) constitutes hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 – Unconstitutionality – Held: The impugned Act, which provides for the complete takeover of the management and assets of a private trust-run institution (Sinha Library) without a principled framework for compensation or a demonstration of mismanagement, is "manifestly arbitrary" - The State cannot use its legislative power to single out a specific institution for takeover without an intelligible basis or fair process - The Act fails the test of reasonableness and non-confiscatory nature required under Article 300A. Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness – Evolution and Application – Held: Manifest arbitrariness is a well-settled ground for striking down plenary legislation under Article 14. A law is manifestly arbitrary when it is "capricious, irrational, or not guided by any principle" or is "excessive and disproportionate" - A legislative enactment that targets a specific entity for total deprivation of management and property rights without following due process, providing adequate compensation, or establishing a clear public necessity (beyond mere "better management") is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 35-50] Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Articles 14 and 21 – Judicial Review of Executive Policy – Separation of Powers – While acknowledging the executive's competence in drafting health policies, Supreme Court maintained that the separation of powers cannot prevent judicial intervention when fundamental rights are violated due to the absence of a structured relief framework in exceptional circumstances. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Articles 14 and 21 – Environmental Law – Precautionary Principle – Sustainable Development – Validity of Industrial Reclassification – The Supreme Court quashed the Central Pollution Control Board's (CPCB) January 2025 revised industrial categorization which downgraded "stand-alone cement grinding units without Captive Power Plants (CPP)" from 'Red' to 'Orange' category - Held: A regulatory downgrade that weakens environmental protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of safeguarding life and health - In the absence of proportionate and scientifically substantiated justification, such dilution is arbitrary and infringes the right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21. [Paras 58, 65, 66] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Article 14 — Manifest Arbitrariness — Executive memoranda issued by the State that departed from the AICPI-linked formula stipulated in the ROPA Rules without an independent study or rational basis were held to be "manifestly arbitrary" - Noted that State action must be governed by reason and the "lacking in reasoned principle" prong of manifest arbitrariness applies when a State ignores its own statutory stipulations. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 14 — Substantive Equality — The principle of substantive equality requires the State to remedy structural, institutional, and systemic disadvantages - Mere equal treatment is insufficient when individuals are placed in unequal positions due to biological, social, or economic factors. Inaccessibility of MHM measures converts a biological reality into a structural exclusion, violating the right to participate in education on equal terms. [Paras 41- 65] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 15(3), 21, and 21A — Right to Education and Menstrual Health — The Supreme Court held that the right to education is a "multiplier right" that enables the exercise of other human rights and forms an integral part of the right to life and human dignity - Noted that inaccessibility to Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) measures including clean gender-segregated toilets, sanitary napkins, and safe disposal mechanisms constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of adolescent girl students. [Paras 20-40] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 21, and 41 – Directive Principles of State Policy – Article 142 of the Constitution – Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) are "two wheels of a chariot," where the principles of Article 39(a) (right to livelihood) and Article 41 (right to work in cases of disablement) must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights - The right to work is recognized as a precious liberty that enables a person to live with dignity beyond "mere animal existence." – Exercising its power to do complete justice, directed the creation of a supernumerary post for the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields CIL - The employer was directed to provide "reasonable accommodation" in the form of a suitable desk job with a computer and keyboard designed as per "universal design" under Section 2(ze) of the RPwD Act. [Relied on Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India; 2024 INSC 775; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 16 SCC 654; Paras 13- 24] Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Articles 14 and 21 - Classifying widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of their husband's death (before or after the father-in-law) is arbitrary and lacks a rational nexus with the Act's object of securing maintenance for vulnerable dependants - Denying maintenance on such technical grounds would expose them to destitution, violating the right to life with dignity under Article 21 - Section 19 casts a personal obligation on the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law during his lifetime - Section 22 creates an obligation on the heirs of the deceased to maintain dependants out of the estate - A claim under Section 22 arises only after the death of the father-in-law – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266; Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau (2023) 19 SCC 126; Paras 16-28] Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Articles 14 and 16 - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24

Article 14 — Admission to Medical Courses — Sports Quota — Change in Rules after commencement of process — Transparency and Fair Play — The Supreme Court quashed the Punjab Government's decision to expand the "zone of consideration" for sports achievements from Classes XI & XII to include Classes IX & X for MBBS/BDS admissions - Granted — To avoid unsettling admissions of third parties not before the Court, the relief was restricted to the appellants – directed that the appellants are to be accommodated in government medical college seats previously allotted to Respondents 4 and 5, while the respondents are to be moved to the seats vacated by the appellants in a private medical college. Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Article 16 – Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) – Validity of Income and Asset Certificates – Requirement of Specified Financial Year – Held: For claiming the benefit of EWS reservation, the Income and Asset Certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application as prescribed in the advertisement and relevant Government Orders - A certificate pertaining to a different financial year, or one issued prior to the closure of the relevant financial year, is invalid and goes to the root of a candidate's eligibility - Candidates must be in possession of the necessary certificate in the prescribed form on or before the cut-off date - Rejection of candidature due to non-conformity with these requirements is justified to ensure the expeditious completion of public recruitment processes. Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351 : AIR 2026 SC 1860

Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70

Article 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1)(c), and Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk and Access Demarcated Footpaths — Priority over Motorised Vehicles - The Supreme Court declared that the "Right to Walk" is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India - It is inextricably connected to life and is integral to the right to move freely throughout the territory of India - This right takes within its sweep the right to safe, comfortable, and well-demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads, which must be treated as primary and take priority over the movement of motorized vehicles - Walking also embodies expressional, congregational, and associational rights. [Paras 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Right to Education in Mother Tongue/Language of Choice - The guarantee of freedom of speech and expression necessarily encompasses the right to receive information in a form that is both meaningful and comprehensible - The true value of this freedom lies in the ability to understand, internalize, and process information - Education, as a primary vehicle for transmitting knowledge, must be imparted in a language that the child understands best - A child, or a parent/guardian on their behalf, has a fundamental right to freedom of choice regarding the medium of instruction at the primary school stage, and the State cannot artificially restrict this choice. [Paras 42, 43] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 - Right to Property and Burden of Proof – i. Burden of Proof - In cases alleging fundamental rights violations, the initial burden lies on the petitioner to establish the existence and invasion of such rights; ii. Title over Land - held that the petitioner failed to prove that Mizo Chiefs were absolute owners of the land under the British regime - Documents (boundary papers) suggested they functioned as administrative heads rather than proprietary owners; iii. Privy Purses - rejected the plea of discrimination comparing Mizo Chiefs to rulers of Princely States, noting that privy purses were outcomes of specific pre-constitutional contractual arrangements and not a legally enforceable fundamental right - the petitioner failed to establish a clear title to the lands or a specific breach of fundamental rights under the erstwhile Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the petition was dismissed. [Relied on Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 1; G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 329; Paras 27-64] Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Film Certification – Judicial Interference – Petition filed seeking to restrain the release of the film "Ghooskhor Pandat," alleging offensive stereotyping against the Brahmin community - The Respondent/Producer filed an affidavit unequivocally withdrawing the title and undertaking that any new title would not be evocative of the earlier one - Supreme Court disposed of the petition, noting that the grievances were suitably addressed by this undertaking. Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Standards for Judging Film Content – "The Ordinary Reasonable Man" – The effect of words or expressions in a movie must be judged by the standards of "reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men," and not by those of weak or hypersensitive minds – Noted that the "man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard - Freedom of expression cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people – Noted that if the rights of artists were subjected to popular notions of what is acceptable, the constitutional guarantee would be rendered illusory - Once a competent statutory Board grants a certificate, no individual or group can create disturbances in the exhibition of the film - Courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the freedom of speech and expression, even if Judges personally dislike the spoken or written words. [Para 19, 22-24, 32-34] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 19(1)(c) – Right to Form Associations – Regulatory Control over Sports Bodies –The Supreme Court reaffirmed that while the right to form an association includes its continued existence with its original voluntary composition, it does not extend to an uninhibited right to pursue goals free from regulatory control - So long as the initial voluntary composition remains unaffected, regulatory measures do not violate Article 19(1)(c). Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Article 20 - Protection in respect of conviction for offences

Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533

Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 25 & 26 – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357 : AIR 2026 SC 1907 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 133

Article 20(3) – Right Against Self-Incrimination – Anticipatory Bail – NDPS Act – Held that State cannot insist that an accused hand over his mobile phone as a condition for "cooperating with the investigation" if doing so forces the accused to incriminate himself - The Supreme Court held that while an appellant must join the investigation, the obligation to cooperate does not extend to a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Article 21 - Protection of life and personal liberty

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Travel Abroad vs. Right to Speedy Trial and Societal Interest — Interplay and Balancing of Rights — While Article 21 guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, including the right to travel abroad, such a right is not absolute and cannot be viewed in isolation - A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the accused on one hand, and the victim's right to a speedy trial along with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice on the other. [Para 10] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Right to Speedy Trial and Timely Investigation – Duty of Constitutional Courts - Inordinate Delay in Investigation – Appeal against High Court order dismissing a writ petition seeking directions to file a charge-sheet in a criminal complaint pending for nearly two decades – Constitutional courts cannot remain mute spectators to prolonged and endless investigations – Right to speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, which inherently includes the timely completion of investigations – If an investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to intervene instead of dismissing the plea on technical or alternative-remedy grounds. [Paras 10 - 13] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626

Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21 & 23 — Human Trafficking for Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE)— Right to Rehabilitation — Held, a combined reading of Articles 21 and 23 establishes that victims of trafficking for CSE possess a fundamental right to rehabilitation - The constitutional obligations owed to victims of exploitative structures extend beyond a prevention, rescue, and punishment paradigm to comprehensive rehabilitation - State's failure to provide a robust "Victim Protection Plan" and adequate rehabilitation infrastructures violates Articles 21 and 23 - Detailed guidelines issued under Articles 32 and 142 to govern pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation of victims until the enactment of comprehensive central legislation. [Paras 56, 277-281, 290 - 303] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Constitution of India – Article 21 [Right to Life and Personal Liberty] – Administrative Delay in Releasing Prisoner on Parole Post-Judicial Order – Inherent Power / Public Law Remedy – Grant of Monetary Compensation for Illegal Detention - Appeal seeking monetary compensation for 24 days of illegal detention resulting from administrative delay by State authorities in executing a judicial release order on permanent parole - The High Court had directed the release of the appellant-convict on parole, and despite compliance with the conditions and verification of sureties, the State delayed his actual release on the ground that it was considering filing an appeal against the parole order - The Supreme Court observed that the deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of constitutional provisions constitutes illegal detention - Supreme Court forcefully negated the State's justification, holding that a judicial order remains in operation unless stayed, modified, or set aside by a superior forum - The principle of "obey first, appeal later" must guide executive actions, and the State cannot subordinate an individual's fundamental right to personal liberty to its slow bureaucratic processes or administrative decisions regarding whether to prefer an appeal - Just because a person is a convict does not mean their constitutional rights weigh any less on the scales of justice - Held, the non-release of the prisoner after the satisfaction of judicial conditions amounts to illegal detention, for which monetary compensation is an established public law remedy to penalize the public wrong and make amends - The State was directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- directly to the appellant. [Paras 9 - 12] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — The right to trauma care of citizens is an integral part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - A robust, uniform, and swift mechanism for emergency trauma care is critical to recognizing and responding to road accident situations to save human lives - Bystanders often hesitate to act due to fear of legal proceedings or police harassment - Systemic interventions, uniform frameworks, and proper Good Samaritan laws are required to eliminate these barriers. Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — Interim Directions for Uniform Trauma Care System — The Supreme Court issued comprehensive time-bound interim directions to the Union and all States/UTs i. Full technical and operational integration of all emergency helplines (100, 101, 108, etc.) into the universal helpline 112 within three months; ii. Establishment of functional physical and digital Good Samaritan Grievance Redressal Systems within three months; iii. Notification of a medical rescue protocol by the Union within three months, to be operationalized by States/UTs within three months thereafter; iv. Mandatory Automotive Industry Standard 125 (AIS-125) compliance and GPS/Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD) fitment in all public and private ambulances, integrated with helpline 112 within three months; v. Adoption of the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professionals (NCAHP) notified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) curriculum within three months; vi. Establishment of State Trauma Registries within four months; vii. Grading and designation of all medical facilities across National/State Highways and urban areas within three months; viii. Full operationalization of the PM RAHAT cashless treatment scheme for road accident victims within three months, failing which it would amount to a violation of the Motor Vehicles Act; ix. Execution of multi-lingual mass-media campaigns within one month. [Relied on Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 194; Paras 5-12] Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545

Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Held, the fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21 encompasses the right of every citizen to move freely and access public spaces without living under constant apprehension of physical harm, attack, or exposure to life-threatening events like dog bites - While animal welfare and protection of sentient beings are of high constitutional and moral significance, they cannot eclipse or subordinate the paramount obligation of the State to safeguard human life, bodily integrity, and public safety - When human lives are weighed against the interests of sentient beings, the constitutional balance must unequivocally tilt in favor of the preservation and protection of human life. (Paras 31, 99, 101) In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Protection of Officials Acting in Good Faith - Held, all officers and officials of municipal authorities, local bodies, Panchayati Raj institutions, and autonomous bodies/schools/hospitals tasked with executing the Court's directions shall be entitled to due protection for acts performed in good faith - No FIR, criminal complaint, or coercive proceeding shall ordinarily be initiated against them unless a prima facie case of mala fides or gross abuse of authority is established. [Para 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Tortious Liability & Administrative Accountability - Stray Dog Management — Assumption of Responsibility by Animal Welfare Groups and Institutional Heads - Held, the assertion of rights or interests in favor of protecting and feeding stray dogs cannot operate in isolation from the corresponding responsibility to safeguard human safety - It is mandatory for animal welfare groups, associations, or student-led bodies operating within educational or institutional campuses to file an affidavit undertaking express tortious liability for any incident of dog bites or attacks occurring within the premises - If no such undertaking is filed, no activity of maintaining or feeding stray dogs shall be permitted within the campus - Failure to enforce this will entail suitable action against the Head of the Institution concerned. [Paras 71–74] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Engagement of NGOs — Due Diligence and Financial Accountability - While observing that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can play a constructive role in executing the Capture-Sterilize-Vaccinate-Release (CSVR) model to ease the burden on local bodies, judicial notice was taken of instances where fraudulent or repetitive bills were submitted for monetary gain - Held, municipal authorities must undertake rigorous background checks, verify credentials, and evaluate technical capability and financial integrity before awarding contracts to NGOs - Public funds must be protected through continuous supervision, periodic field inspections, and independent financial/performance audits. [Paras 65–67] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Criminal Procedure – Inherent Powers – Quashing of Proceedings – Right to Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant for 35 years arising out of a dispute over food in a police mess involving minor offences under Sections 147, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 120 of the Railways Act - Supreme Court emphasized that a quick trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Keeping a public servant in suspended animation for 35 years without any fault on his part runs completely contrary to the spirit of the "procedure established by law" - Right to speedy trial is not an abstract or illusory safeguard; it is a fundamental right and a human right that no civilized society can deny to an accused - If the continuation of proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 21, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Paras 30 - 42] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473

Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456

Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Sections 3(2)(b)(i), 3(3), and 5 — Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 — Rule 3B(c) — Constitution of India — Articles 21, 32, and 226 — Late-Term Pregnancy of Minor — Reproductive Autonomy and Decisional Autonomy as Fundamental Rights — Lack of Statutory Remedy No Bar to Constitutional Remedy - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and permitted the medical termination of the pregnancy - The Court laid down the following key propositions: i. Reproductive Autonomy under Article 21 - The right to make decisions concerning one's body and reproduction is an integral facet of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - No court ought to compel any woman, especially a minor child, to carry an unwanted pregnancy to full term against her express will - The choice of the pregnant woman must be prioritized over the interest of an unborn child or suggestions of giving the child up for adoption; ii. Statutory Limitations vs. Constitutional Remedy - A lack of remedy under a statute (such as the MTP Act) does not bar a constitutional remedy under Article 32 or 226 - The statute merely codifies a part of the constitutional remedy - When statutory limits are exhausted, Constitutional Courts must view the case through the lens of the pregnant woman's welfare and fundamental rights rather than adopting a prohibitory approach, which inadvertently drives women toward unsafe, illegal abortion centers; iii. Foetal Normalcy and Passage of Time - The invocation of foetal normalcy or the advanced duration of a pregnancy cannot be used to deny termination - Subordinating a woman's fundamental rights to the pathology of a fetus instrumentalizes her into a mere conduit - the passage of time does not extinguish reproductive choices, as delays often stem from systemic barriers, irregular cycles, lack of awareness, financial constraints, or fear; iv. Assessment of Mental Health and Distress - The absence of a clinically diagnosed psychiatric disorder in a Medical Board report does not negate the presence of severe emotional trauma, distress, or anguish - The minor's two suicide attempts demonstrated acute mental suffering that the law cannot ignore - Since the Medical Board found the minor physically fit for the procedure and she consented through her mother, the request could not be denied. [Relied on X v. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra & Others (Civil Appeal No. 827 of 2026); Paras 10-16] S v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437

Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411: AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130

Road Safety Directions – Parking and Encroachment – i. Prohibition on Unauthorized Parking: Heavy/commercial vehicles prohibited from parking on any National Highway carriageway or paved shoulder except at designated bays - Enforcement mandated via Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS), GPS-timestamped evidence, and eChallans; ii. Encroachment Removal: Construction of new commercial structures within the Right of Way (ROW) prohibited with immediate effect - District Magistrates directed to remove existing unauthorized structures within 60 days; iii. Land Use Restrictions: State Governments to notify prohibition of land use change within 40 metres (residential) and 75 metres (commercial) from the highway mid-point; iv. Emergency Services: Deployment of BLS ambulances and recovery cranes at intervals not exceeding 75 km within 60 days; v. Wayside Amenities: Construction of truck lay-byes every 75 km, prioritized on the Amritsar-Jamnagar Highway - Amenities must include rest areas, food services, and first-aid; vi. Blackspots: Identification and publication of accident blackspots within 45 days, followed by installation of high-intensity LED lighting and speed cameras; vii. District Highway Safety Task Force: Constitution of task forces in every district within 15 days to conduct fortnightly reviews; viii. Monitoring: NHAI to conduct drone-based aerial surveys at least twice annually - MoRTH to report on the constitution of an Inter-State Highway Safety Coordination Committee within 60 days. [Relied on Gyan Prakash vs. Union of India and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1189; Paras 4-8] In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388

Constitution of India – Article 21 and Article 142 – Right to Life and Safe Passage – Road Safety and Infrastructure Failures – Supreme Court took suo-motu cognizance of systemic negligence following fatal accidents in Phalodi (Rajasthan) and Rangareddy (Telangana) - Held: The 'Right to Life' under Article 21 is a positive mandate for the State to ensure a safe environment - Safety of commuters is an integral facet of the right to live with dignity - Recognizing that National Highways account for nearly 30% of road fatalities despite being only 2% of total road length, the Court issued comprehensive interim directions under Article 142 to address administrative lethargy and infrastructural gaps. In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21 and Article 142 — Environmental Law — Illegal Sand Mining — National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary — The Supreme Court took proactive measures against rampant illegal sand mining in the National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary, spanning the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh - Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of fragile ecosystems is a constitutional imperative and an integral facet of the Right to Life under Article 21 - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Court issued mandatory interim directions to curb environmental degradation and protect enforcement personnel from organized "sand mafias". In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380

Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Article 21 – Right to Die with Dignity – Passive Euthanasia – Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, specifically CANH administered through a PEG tube, for a patient in an irreversible Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) for over 12 years - Held: The right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity - In cases where medical treatment is futile and serves no therapeutic purpose other than artificially prolonging a mindless biological existence, its withdrawal is constitutionally permissible. [Paras 29, 52, 72, 91] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Article 21 – Right to Life and Health – COVID-19 Vaccination – Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI) – Compensation Policy – The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to formulate a "no-fault" compensation framework for serious adverse events or deaths resulting from COVID-19 vaccinations - held that while the state-led vaccination program was a vital public health intervention, the State bears a positive obligation under Article 21 to ensure that families suffering grave harm are not left without an accessible mechanism for redress. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Article 21 – Right to Life and Dignity – The guarantee of life and personal dignity extends beyond prison gates; incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity - Convicts are not denuded of all fundamental rights by mere reason of conviction. OCIs, based on trust and self-discipline, align with the constitutional vision of viewing prisons as institutions of correction and social reintegration - Exclusion of women prisoners from OCIs in several states (e.g., Assam, Gujarat, UP, West Bengal) or failing to transfer eligible women constitutes blatant gender discrimination - States directed to develop gender-sensitive protocols to ensure women have equal access to reformative facilities. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Article 21 – Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an inseparable part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 – Held that the State has an affirmative duty to protect the environment to ensure the well-being of all citizens, noting that the time is ripe for the rigorous implementation of this constitutional guarantee. Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Article 21 — Right to Dignity, Privacy, and Health — The right to life includes the right to a dignified existence and the right to menstrual health - Dignity is undermined when girl children are subjected to stigma or compelled to adopt unsafe practices due to a lack of facilities - Privacy is a concomitant of dignity, imposing a positive obligation on the State to facilitate a private space for menstrual management. [Paras 70 -80, 85 – 96] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12

Article 21A - Right to Education

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23(2) Provisos & Right to Quality Education — Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) is a mandatory eligibility requirement and a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21-A of the Constitution of India - The statutory framework of Section 23 does not operate retrospectively to invalidate past appointments; instead, it provides a prospective, time-bound mechanism for in-service teachers to secure the minimum qualifications necessary to maintain elementary education standards - The services of teachers cannot be protected at the cost of the educational future of children. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Constitution of India - Article 21-A & Article 142 – Right to Education vs. Complete Justice – The constitutional guarantee to provide education includes within its ambit the right to quality education - While invoking plenary powers under Article 142 to balance equities and accommodate merit-holders , the mandate of Article 21-A cannot be compromised - the state is at liberty to dispense with the services of teachers who fail to acquire mandatory minimum statutory qualifications within the prescribed grace period. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Article 21A and Article 23 – Right to Education and Prohibition of Forced Labour – Contractual Teachers – Honorarium Revision – The Supreme Court held that part-time contractual instructors appointed under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now Samagra Shiksha Scheme) in Upper Primary Schools are entitled to periodic revision of their honorarium – Noted that keeping such teachers on a stagnant, meager honorarium (initially ₹7,000/-) for over a decade, while prohibiting them from taking other employment, amounts to "economic coercion" and "forced labour" (Begar) prohibited under Article 23. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Article 22 - Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.

Illegal Detention - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court - Definition of Illegal Detention - i. The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is illegal detention - It includes instances where the detention lacks a valid legal basis or where a lawful power is exercised arbitrarily, in bad faith, or through a procedure that fails to observe essential safeguards; ii. Binding Nature of Judicial Orders ("Obey First, Appeal Later") - Once a competent court issues a direction, it must be obeyed and implemented without reservation - The mere filing or anticipation of an appeal does not automatically keep a judicial order in abeyance or operate as a stay - Flouting or ignoring such directions on a specious plea that the order is erroneous undermines the rule of law and invites chaos; iii. [Relied on Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 141; Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347; Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Paras 7-9] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599

Article 22(1) and Article 21 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Section 8 – Section 22 – Grounds of Arrest – Constitutional Mandate – Article 22(1) and Article 21 – The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of bail by the High Court and ordered the immediate release of the appellants due to the failure of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to provide written grounds of arrest - The appellants, medical professionals at a corporate hospital, were arrested following the recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets - While the NCB claimed the grounds of arrest were orally explained and noted in a template-style arrest memo, the Court found this insufficient under established legal mandates - Supreme Court emphasized that providing written grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the arrestee. Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Article 23 - Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Rights-Based Re-framing of Trafficking - The Supreme Court observed that human trafficking cannot be viewed solely through the prism of a criminal justice or crime-control response - Secure convictions do not address the multi-layered material, physical, and psychological trauma suffered by victims - Under a human rights framework grounded in Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution, victims must be recognized as rights-holders at the centre of the state's response - Rehabilitation is a constitutional guarantee, equal to or more important than rescue, since returning a victim to a site of vulnerability without material or psychological protection risks immediate re-trafficking. [Paras 254-256, 278-281] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Article 32 – Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

Constitution of India – Article 32 vs. Statutory Remedies - Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 32 cannot be routinely invoked to bypass efficacious statutory mechanisms - The Supreme Court clarified that while constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 remain available as vital safeguards against the failure of statutory authorities, this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature - It ought not to be invoked in a routine manner to bypass the comprehensive, multi-tiered remedies provided under the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 56, 61, 98] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – Maintainability of PIL based on media reports – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers - Public Interest Litigation – Requirements of Credible Material – Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for the constitution of a National Task Force and a nationwide food safety audit based on various instances of food contamination and regulatory failure - Held: PILs must be founded on credible, cogent, and research-based material - Newspaper reports and media publications highlighting sporadic incidents do not constitute reliable or legally admissible evidence to establish a systemic failure of fundamental rights under Article 32. [Paras 5, 6] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Article 32 and Article 14 – Declaration of Public Holidays – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions – Writ petition seeking directions to the Union and State governments to frame uniform guidelines for declaring public/gazetted holidays and to declare Guru Gobind Singh's 'Prakash Parv' as a nationwide gazetted holiday - Held: Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the declaration of public holidays is a policy decision involving administrative efficiency, economic implications, and the balancing of diverse socio-cultural practices – Noted that i. Executive Domain: Matters of policy determination regarding governance and administrative exigencies lie within the exclusive domain of the executive. Any judicial mandate to increase non-working days involves a line-drawing exercise that is inherently policy-driven and not amenable to judicial determination; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The absence of a uniform policy does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. Absolute uniformity is not mandated where differentiation is founded on rational considerations, such as regional socio-cultural needs in a federal structure; iii. Article 25 (Religious Freedom): Freedom of religion does not extend to a right to seek State recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday; iv. Administrative Impact: Expanding the list of gazetted holidays would adversely impact governance and public productivity - In a developing nation, the focus must remain on the dignity of labor and continuity of work; v. Floodgates Argument: Granting such relief would open the floodgates to similar claims from diverse sections of society, leading to an impractical expansion of holidays; vi. Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji: Supreme Court recorded deep reverence for the Tenth Guru, noting that his teachings of 'Kirat Karo' (honest living) and 'Vand Chakko' (sharing) emphasize active engagement with responsibilities - His legacy is best honored through the dedicated performance of duties rather than a symbolic show of respect by demanding a holiday. [Paras 11-18] All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : 2026 INSC 289

Article 32 – Writ Petition seeking directions regarding alleged violations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Import of animals by private facilities – Legality of CITES permits – Held: The subject matter was previously examined by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in W.P. (C) No. 783 of 2025, which found no violation of domestic or international law - The CITES Secretarial Document relied upon by the petitioner explicitly records that no evidence was found regarding imports without requisite documentation or for commercial purposes - Once an import is effected under valid permission, it cannot be subsequently treated as prohibited merely because objections are raised later - Disturbing the settled environment, custody, and care of living animals (including rescued animals) after lawful import may itself result in cruelty. [Relied on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs. The Collector of Customs, 1962 AIR 1893; Paras 2-5] Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Delay and Laches – Right to Property – Writ petition filed by Mizo Chief Council seeking compensation for lands allegedly acquired without due process in 1954-55 - Respondents raised preliminary objection regarding inordinate delay of nearly six decades - The Supreme Court reiterated that while Article 32 is a fundamental right, it is not immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure - Petitions agitating stale claims ought not to be entertained to prevent disturbing settled positions and causing prejudice to third parties - Supreme Court clarified that the operative test is not "unreasonable delay" but "unexplained delay. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction vs. High Court Administration – While the Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a supervisory forum over the day-to-day administration or rosters of High Courts, it may intervene in "rare and exceptional situations" where continuing inaction results in a demonstrable infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 – Supreme Court noted that pending revisions must be decided by giving full effect to the legal and constitutional observations of the Supreme Court - The failure to implement specific directions regarding the re-evaluation of withdrawal of prosecution (Section 321 CrPC) implicated the credibility of the criminal process. [Paras 3-9] Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 32 – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Criminal Process – Successive FIRs – The Supreme Court allowed a Writ Petition where the State registered multiple FIRs in quick succession to ensure the petitioner remained in custody despite being granted bail in earlier matters – Noted that such conduct by the prosecution established a conscious effort to keep the petitioner incarcerated, amounting to a violation of personal liberty. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Powers of the Supreme Court – Article 32 is the "heart and soul" of the Constitution as it empowers citizens to directly approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights – Noted that it will not readily refuse to hear a petition under Article 32 if a violation of a fundamental right is prima facie established. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Domestic Workers' Rights – Minimum Wages – Separation of Powers – Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring that domestic workers have a fundamental right to minimum wages under Articles 21 and 23 and challenging their exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act and Code of Wages, 2019 - Held: Supreme Court declined to issue a positive mandamus for the enactment of law, emphasizing the doctrine of separation of powers - While acknowledging the vulnerable status of domestic workers and the lack of legislative protection, noted that an enforceable decree cannot be passed if it requires the legislature to enact a specific law - Supreme Court impressed upon State Governments to consider the grievances highlighted by the petitioners and urged the development of suitable mechanisms to prevent exploitation and ensure minimum wages. [Relied on Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand and another [(2025) INSC 118]; Paras 2-8] Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101

Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Article 39 - Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.

Article 39(b) – Public Trust Doctrine – Spectrum as a Natural Resource – Spectrum is a finite, scarce, and renewable natural resource - The State holds spectrum in trust for the people and is constitutionally obligated to ensure its distribution subserves the common good and generates adequate compensation for the public - The grant of a license is a "State largesse" and does not result in the transfer of proprietary interest or ownership to private entities. [Paras 15, 16, 33] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Article 48A - Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life

Environmental Law & Constitution of India – Protection of Ecological Hotspots, Wildlife Sanctuaries, and Tiger Reserves – Removal of Forest Encroachments vs. Humanitarian Grounds for Rehabilitation – Constitutional Imperatives - The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) flagged massive, multi-decade encroachments across the Agasthyamalai Ecological Landscape, specifically within the Srivilliputhur-Megamalai Tiger Reserve (SMTR), Kalakad- Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve (KMTR), and Kanyakumari Wildlife Sanctuary (KWS) - The report highlighted slow eviction progress by State authorities, the active extension of public utilities/welfare amenities to illegal occupants, and the presence of 118 serving or retired government employees among the encroachers - The State of Tamil Nadu sought a phased, humanitarian approach to eviction owing to the long duration of settlements and complex socio-economic ties – Held that environmental preservation cannot stand indefinitely deferred under the guise of procedural or humanitarian challenges - While the Court is fully alive to the necessity of structured human rehabilitation, complex resettlement issues cannot operate as a perpetual justification for postponing legally mandated eviction and ecological restoration - Protection of forests and fragile ecosystems is a non-negotiable constitutional imperative under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India - The approach to conservation must be strictly eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, recognizing the intrinsic value of non-human species – Supreme Court issued exhaustive, time-bound mandamus directions, including a division-wise encroachment eviction plan, a blanket moratorium on welfare schemes/infrastructure in encroached pockets, stringent disciplinary action and environmental restitution charges against government employee encroachers, and the total removal of commercial/governmental structures from protected tiger habitats. [Relied on T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2025) 2 SCC 641; 46-65] A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : 2026 INSC 605

Articles 48A, 51A(g), 226, and 32 – Environmental Law – Protection of Reserved Forests – Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants – Due Process – Rule of Law – The Supreme Court addressed the State's obligation to protect reserved forests while balancing the rights of long-standing human habitations - Noted that while forests are vital ecological systems and carbon sinks, and the State has a constitutional mandate to safeguard them, such protection must be pursued through lawful, non-arbitrary means. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Article 50 - Separation of judiciary from executive.

Judicial Review - Separation of Powers - Constitutional Courts cannot step into the shoes of administrative/executive authorities or assume the role of framing and implementing specific infrastructural solutions. Neither a High Court under Article 226 nor the Supreme Court under Article 136 should devise remedial measures for civic problems such as waterlogging and inadequate drainage. While Courts can monitor and direct authorities to perform their duties, they cannot themselves prescribe detailed engineering or administrative solutions (such as directing the laying of a specific sewer line across AIIMS premises). All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. Shailendra Bhatnagar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 511

Judicial Independence and Public Confidence – Judicial independence is a foundational feature of the Constitution - The strength of the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed in it by the public - Reckless aspersions and unfounded allegations of lack of impartiality or improper motives against a sitting Judge strike at the foundation of judicial independence and diminish the credibility of the justice delivery system. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Article 51A - Fundamental duties of every citizen of India

Article 51A(k) of the Constitution – Positive Right to Elementary Education and Co-relative Duty Bearers - The identification of the right to elementary education as a positive right recognizes co-relative duties and identifies five distinct duty bearers responsible for its realization, reiterated the following: i. Appropriate Government: Obligated to establish and ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, with financial responsibilities shared between Central and State Governments (Sections 6, 7, and 8); ii. Local Authority: Obligated to ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, maintain records of children up to 14 years, and monitor admission, attendance, and completion of elementary education (Section 9); iii. Neighbourhood Schools: Obligated to provide free and compulsory education and admit children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups to the extent of at least 25% of the class strength (Section 12); iv. Parents/Guardians: Constitutionally recognized obligation to provide education opportunities to their child under Article 51A(k); v. Elementary School Teachers: Play the most crucial role in nation-building through the development of a student's mind and character. [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2026 INSC 56); Paras 10-14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422

Articles 51A and 51A(e) – Fraternity and Constitutional Duty – Supreme Court noted that fraternity is a guiding philosophy of the Constitution - It is the fundamental duty of every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Vilifying or denigrating any community based on religion, language, caste, or region is constitutionally impermissible. [Para 11-14] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 91 - Power of the Deputy Chairman or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Chairman.

Article 91 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(1) – Competence of Deputy Chairman – Held that the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant, the Deputy Chairman is constitutionally mandated under Article 91(1) to perform all duties of the office - The statutory powers vested in the "Chairman" under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act are inseparable from the office of the Presiding Officer and must be read in harmony with the Constitutional scheme - the Deputy Chairman is competent to consider a notice of motion and exercise discretion to admit or refuse it under Section 3(1) of the Act. [Paras 17 - 22] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Article 136 – Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136 – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Layout Sanction and Plot Incorporation – Title Disputes - The High Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot unnecessarily delve into or adjudicate upon the issue of title when it was never under dispute and the writ petition was filed for the limited purpose of seeking a direction to incorporate a plot into a colony's layout plan - A mere entry in the list of properties maintained by a Municipal Corporation cannot, by itself, constitute a valid proof of title over the subject land. Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389

Constitution of India - Article 136 – Equitable Relief – Supreme Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, observing that the appellant's conduct was "callous, laconic, and in clear violation of applicable rules -" Supreme Court emphasized that it would be loath to substitute its own discretion for that of the State Government regarding commercial decisions like the allotment of industrial plots at concessional rates. [Para 73, 77, 78] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321

Article 136 – Concurrent Findings of Fact – The Supreme Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised sparingly, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of fact from the courts below - Interference is only warranted if such findings are "manifestly perverse" - In this case, the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court in favor of the Respondents were found to be legally sound and based on a careful appreciation of the factual matrix – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 24] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 139A - Transfer of certain cases.

Article 139A(1) – Withdrawal of cases from High Court – Substantial questions of general importance – Stagnation of Trial – Failure to pronounce judgment after reserving it – The Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary power under Article 139A(1) to withdraw three criminal revision petitions pending before the Allahabad High Court to itself – Noted that the revisions had been heard and judgment reserved on 05.02.2020, but no judgment had been pronounced for several years - The continuing stay on trial proceedings arising from a 1994 incident resulted in a "standstill" of the criminal process for decades, infringing upon the right to speedy justice. Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 141 – Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts.

Precedent – Nature of Orders – Article 141 – that the High Court relied on Ram Naresh Singh v. Bokaro Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as a binding precedent to direct the release of gratuity with only nominal rent deductions - Held: The order in Ram Naresh Singh was passed on grounds of equity in specific facts and did not purport to lay down a binding precedent - An order passed on facts cannot be elevated to the status of a precedent by operation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 17] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Article 142 – Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Complete Justice – Enhancement of Compensation – Permanent Disability – Paraplegia - Even though the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was not strictly appropriate as the vehicle was not the proximate cause of the accident, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to prevent a person with life-altering, grievous injuries (total paraplegia with bladder and bowel incontinence) from being left in the lurch by another round of litigation - Finding the High Court's assessment technically restrictive and insufficient, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹25,00,000/- with interest from the date of the claim petition, keeping the original apportionment of liability undisturbed to serve the ends of justice. [Paras 12-15] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637

Article 142 of the Constitution - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Differentiated Threshold for Neutral Officers / Liquidators - Serial Indulgence Impermissible – Noted that the fact that the appellant is a neutral officer (Liquidator) acting for the benefit of stakeholders does not permit the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes of the IBC - The statute does not carve out a separate threshold or relaxation for such officers - A litigant who has previously secured a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and condonation of re-filing delay at an earlier appellate stage (e.g., under Section 61 before the NCLAT) cannot claim a similar exercise of judicial discretion automatically at successive appellate stages - The discipline of limitation under the IBC does not countenance serial condonations of delay, as it would defeat the legislative objective of expedition and finality. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (2021) 10 SCC 401; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484); Distinguished from CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406); Paras 19-24] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Constitution of India – Article 142(1) – Dissolution of Marriage on Irretrievable Breakdown - The Supreme Court possesses the inherent, discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142(1) to dissolve a marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown to do "complete justice," even if the facts do not strictly satisfy a statutory ground under the prevailing personal law - This power is exercised with great care and caution when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvation, and that the continuation of a formal legal tie on paper is unjustified and merely perpetuates frustration - Given that the parties were living separately for over 15 years, mediation had failed, and both were financially independent doctors with no children from the wedlock, it was deemed a fit case to sever the ties and put an end to a stale, frozen relationship. [Relied on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2798; Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, (2025) 3 SCC 748; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, (2019) 9 SCC 409; Paras 29-37] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Administration of Justice – Undue delay in pronouncing reserved judgements by High Courts – Frame of Uniform Guidelines – The Supreme Court observed that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution extends to every stage of a proceeding and is violated by delayed delivery of reserved judgements, particularly impacting those in custody - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive and binding guidelines for all High Courts to ensure timely pronouncement and uploading of judgements. Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 — Power to do complete justice — Taking a pragmatic approach to avoid the sudden displacement of a substantial number of in-service teachers and consequent disruption to school-going children, the timeline to qualify the TET is modified - The timeline originally granted in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra is extended from 2 (two) years to 3 (three) years - In-service teachers must acquire the TET qualification by August 31, 2028, instead of August 31, 2027 - States are directed to conduct the TET periodically, preferably twice a year. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Constitution of India - Article 142 — Plenary Power to Do Complete Justice — Scope and Limits: Reaffirmed, the jurisdiction under Article 142 is expansive but tempered by self-imposed restraints founded on fundamental public policy - It cannot be invoked to "supplant" substantive law or disregard express statutory provisions rooted in fundamental public policy considerations - it retains wide discretion to mould relief, bridge gaps, and address situations in nebulous areas where the law is silent or inadequate, provided it does not contravene a core, non-derogable principle of a statute - issuing directions to protect sensitive institutional areas from stray dogs does not override or contravene the statutory scheme, but supplements, clarifies, and operationalizes it. [Relied on: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; and Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Paras 50–54, 62 - 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Article 142 – Recovery of Outstanding Fees of Relocated Medical Students – Sudden closing/denial of recognition to a medical college due to deficiencies creates an extraordinary situation putting the academic future of students in jeopardy - When students are relocated to other private medical colleges under judicial intervention via a State-supervised counselling mechanism, the resultant financial burden must be equitably apportioned. [Paras 4 – 6] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Modification of Penalty – Although the appellant committed a lapse through a brazen mis-declaration regarding his faculty appearances in the same academic year, the incident dated back to 2016 - Considering that a decade had passed, the appellant was now 76 years old, and the operation of the penalty had remained stayed throughout the litigation, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do complete justice - Supreme Court directed the National Medical Commission (NMC) to reduce the punishment from a three-month removal of the appellant's name from the Indian Medical Register to the issuance of a censure/warning. [Paras 13-16] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453

Service Law — Regularisation — Validity of State Notifications — Group 'B', 'C', and 'D' employees — Distinction between "Irregular" and "Illegal" appointments — The Supreme Court examined the validity of Haryana Government Notifications dated 16.06.2014, 18.06.2014, and 07.07.2014, which sought to regularise contractual/ad hoc employees – i. Validity of Notifications dated 16.06.2014 and 18.06.2014: Supreme Court held these notifications valid as they were intended to grant benefits to employees who were eligible under the 1996 policy but were left out due to its administrative withdrawal - Since these employees occupied sanctioned posts and met prescribed qualifications at the time of initial engagement, their appointments were "irregular" but not "illegal"- The High Court's quashing of these two notifications was set aside; ii. Invalidity of Notifications dated 07.07.2014: Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the 07.07.2014 notifications - These policies were found arbitrary as they sought to regularise employees engaged without any public advertisement or interview, and utilized a future cut-off date (31.12.2018), which bypassed regular recruitment processes. (Paragraph 21); iii. Protection under Article 142: Despite striking down the 07.07.2014 notifications, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to protect the services of those ad hoc employees who have already secured benefits and remain in service - to balance equity, such employees are to be placed at the lowest pay scale admissible to their posts. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) INSC 216; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) INSC 993; State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) INSC 469; Paras 18 – 25] Madan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2026 INSC 379

Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Scope of Extraordinary Powers – Condonation of Illegalities – Extraordinary powers under Article 142 cannot be invoked to condone significant illegalities committed by a party, such as the unauthorized sale of assets of a sick company and its subsidiary during the pendency of litigation - held it was not a case for "ironing of creases" but one involving multiple illegalities that could not be regularized. [Paras 166–176] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Mediated Settlement – Appellant-Husband and Respondent-Wife entered into a mediated Settlement Agreement to dissolve marriage by mutual consent - Appellant-Husband performed substantial obligations, including payment of ₹89,00,000 and return of jewellery - Respondent-Wife resiled from the settlement before the Second Motion, alleging oral promises of additional jewellery worth ₹120 crores and gold biscuits worth ₹50 crore - Held: Withdrawal of consent without proving fraud, force, or undue influence, specifically based on terms not included in a signed mediated settlement, indicates an irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 to grant a decree of divorce to do complete justice. [Paras 36 - 55] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Matrimonial Dispute – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Dissolution of Marriage and Quashing of Multiplicity of Proceedings – The parties were embroiled in a decade-long "vicious spate of litigation" including over 80 legal proceedings initiated by the respondent-husband against the appellant-wife, her family, and her legal counsels – Held that the marriage "dead for all practical purposes" and a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Constitution of India - Exercise of Powers under Article 142 – Termination of Vexatious Litigation – Supreme Court observed the respondent-husband, a practicing advocate, had misused his legal knowledge to file vindictive and oppressive complaints before various forums, including the State Bar Council and criminal courts - To provide a "quietus" to the dispute, the Supreme Court quashed all pending civil, criminal, and miscellaneous proceedings inter se, including FIRs and disciplinary complaints against advocates. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Modification of Relief – Finding the High Court's direction to grant admission justified, the Supreme Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 to modify the timing of the relief - Due to the pendency of litigation for over three years, the Court directed the respondent to be admitted for the academic year 2026-2027 instead of 2023-2024. [Relied on S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others (2020) 17 SCC 465; Paras 15-19] Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Article 142 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Article 142 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Exercise of Extraordinary Jurisdiction despite opposition by one spouse - The Supreme Court dissolved a marriage that had lasted only 65 days of cohabitation followed by over a decade of separation and excessive litigation - held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond salvage, maintaining a formal legal relationship is unjustified and the Court can exercise its power under Article 142 to do "complete justice," even if one spouse opposes the divorce. Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Article 142 – Restoration of Withdrawn Petitions – National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – The Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to set aside an order of the Trial Court, which had allowed land owners to withdraw their Section 34 petitions following a High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act unconstitutional - noted that since the High Court's judgment was subsequently stayed, the land owners were left "remediless" as fresh petitions would be barred by limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act - Supreme Court has raised concerns over the deep structural flaws in determining the land acquisition compensation acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court said that land owners whose lands were acquired under the 1956 Act faces significant disadvantage when compared to land owners whose lands were acquired under different laws. [Para 1-3] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62

Article 145 - Rules of Court, etc.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 145(4) – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order XII Rules 1 and 3 – Practice and Procedure – Status of Order Dictated in Open Court vs. Signed Order – Variance – Modification before Signing – Miscellaneous application filed seeking a clarification that a draft order dictated in open court is final and binding, and that the subsequent signed order uploaded later lacks the force of law due to the omission of an ancillary direction for status quo and the modification of a direction disposing of a Writ Petition – Held - Displaced the applicants' contention. A distinction must be drawn between the dictation of a draft order to a Court-master and the formal pronouncement of a judgment - The dictation of an order in open court serves as a skeletal framework to put facts on record, which remains subject to correction, refinement, and enhancement in chambers prior to signing - The digitally signed and uploaded order is the sole final expository of the Court's unalterable opinion - Judges retain a locus poenitentiae to change their mind or correct an error in law (such as the erroneous grant of an ancillary status quo order) before the judgment crystallizes through signing - Unless a material change is made to the core outcome behind the back of the parties without a re-hearing, refinements made in chambers do not invalidate the signed order. [Paras 15, 19 - 23, 25 - 28] Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 490 : 2026 INSC 483

Article 215 - High Courts to be courts of record.

Succession Act, 1925 - Inherent and Plenary Powers of Constitutional Court — Testamentary Jurisdiction — Protection of Estate in medio — held that a High Court, while sitting in its testamentary jurisdiction, does not cease to be a Constitutional Court of Record or a Court of Equity - When an estate is brought under the protective umbrella of the Court through the appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it is in custodia legis – If the Supreme Court discovers glaring irregularities, deceit, suppression of bank accounts, or siphoning of funds by a self-styled executor using shell or dormant trusts, it cannot remain a silent spectator - It is entirely within the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to direct a police investigation to unearth the fraud, safeguard the property, and protect the process of the Court from abuse - Key Takeaways & Statutory Interpretations – i. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 211, 247 & 307 — Authority of Executor vs. Administrator pendente lite - While an executor derives authority from the Will, such authority is not a license to plunder cash assets when rival Wills are propounded and the matter is fiercely contested - The appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 suspends the powers of the executor, making the Administrator the "hand of the court" to preserve and maintain the estate; ii. The Succession Act is Not a Bar to Criminal Investigation - The Indian Succession Act governs the administration of estates but does not grant immunity to individuals committing criminal breach of trust, forgery, or conspiracy; iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 340 - Directing a criminal investigation into a larger conspiracy of siphoning funds through fraudulent banking transactions does not strictly fall under Section 340 of the CrPC (which deals with offences affecting the administration of justice) - broader inherent powers can be exercised without being strictly shackled by the procedural bars or appellate restrictions under Section 341 of the CrPC – iv. No Prejudice Caused by Investigation - Mere initiation of an investigation to uncover the truth and assist the Testamentary Court in tracing siphoned assets does not infringe upon personal liberty or cause actual or substantive prejudice. [Relied on Paras M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433; Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal Krishnan, (1996) 11 SCC 376; Pandurang Shamrao Laud v. Dwarkadas Kalliandas, 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 154; Paras 28-43] Bai Avabai Hormusji Tata Trust v. Shernaz Faroukh Lawyer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 542 : 2026 INSC 540

Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Article 226 - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

Criminal courts cannot, by judicial directions, introduce a new procedural stage not contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for the conduct of trials. The procedure for criminal trials, including prosecutions under the PC Act, must be strictly followed as laid down in the CrPC/BNSS read with the provisions of the PC Act. Courts cannot create an additional pre-charge stage for examining sanctioning authorities. Section 311 CrPC, being a general provision relating to inquiries and trials, cannot be interpreted to override or bypass the specific stages of trial prescribed in the Code, particularly the stage of framing of charges. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot rewrite the procedural law or issue directions that require all Sessions Courts/Special Courts to examine sanctioning authorities before framing of charge or commencement of trial. The Supreme Court emphasised that while the validity of sanction can be challenged at appropriate stages as per law (including under Section 19(4) of the PC Act), it does not warrant creation of a mandatory pre-trial examination procedure through judicial fiat. Directions issued by the High Court were accordingly set aside. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : 2026 INSC 650

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) — Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court — Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) / Border Security Force (BSF) — Dismissal from Service — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens - Key Legal Principles Summarized by Supreme Court – i. Territorial Jurisdiction based on Situs of Office: Even if the entire cause of action arises outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court (e.g., the misconduct occurred and the dismissal order was issued elsewhere), a member of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), including the BSF, can maintain a writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) of the Constitution - This is because the overall command, administration, and superintendence vest in authorities whose offices are situated in New Delhi (the Union of India and the Director General, BSF); ii. Inapplicability of Forum Non Conveniens to Article 226(1) Writs - The doctrine of forum non conveniens is misapplied when used by a High Court to refuse to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction invoked under Article 226(1) based on the situs of the respondent's office - When a suitor chooses a forum that is highly convenient to the respondents themselves, and where the official records are readily available or can be summoned, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens becomes self-defeating and denies access to justice. [Relied on Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977) 1 SCC 484; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff (2001) 9 SCC 525; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Paragraph 21-40] Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2026 INSC 630

Constitution of India, Articles 226/227 – Challenge to order passed by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Held, the scheme of the Act envisages minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings – Except in cases where the order is so perverse that a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction stares one in the face, the High Court should not entertain a challenge to a Section 16 order under Article 226/227 – The party must wait for the passing of the final award and avail the remedy under Section 34. Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Suppression of Facts — Relief Moulding vs. State Inaction — Suppression of a fact by a litigant must be of a material fact that has the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory on merits to disentitle them from relief - Even in cases of non-disclosure of connected litigation, the Court cannot permit the State to deny the appellants the benefit of a judicial order passed in their favour which has attained finality and was never challenged - Allowing the State to escape its obligation on the ground of delay in seeking implementation would tantamount to permitting it to take advantage of its own wrong (Ex injuria sua nemo habere debet) - The State, being a model employer under Article 12, is estopped from espousing such a contention, especially when the failure to make monthly payments gives rise to a fresh cause of action every month - The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the litigants and their counsel to place all connected facts on record, and it is for the Court to decide what constitutes a "material fact." - Pick-and-choose disclosures are impermissible - reiterated that the principle of suppression is a safeguard against the abuse of judicial process and not a weapon of technicality, noting that the withheld fact must be of such critical import that its absence renders a decision unjust. [Relied on SJS Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166; Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, (2025) 7 SCC 450; Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, (2024) 18 SCC 643; Paras 6 – 8] B. Yerraji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2026 INSC 495

Constitutional Law – Article 226 vs Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Distinguishing the scope of jurisdiction, the Court observed that so long as cognizance of an offence is not taken, a writ to quash an FIR/charge-sheet can be issued under Article 226 - once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 is not available, though the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482

Forest Act, 1326 (Hyderabad) - Fasli (1916 AD) & 1355 Fasli (1945 AD) – Revenue Entries – Evidentiary value on title – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Writ of Certiorari – Revenue records or Jamabandi entries serve only a fiscal purpose to enable the person whose name is mutated to pay land revenue - A revenue record is not a document of title and does not create or extinguish ownership, nor does it possess presumptive value regarding title - Stray or solitary entries for a single year cannot be relied upon against long, consistent revenue entries - Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning complex questions of fact and property title - The proper function of investigating these claims lies with a civil court in a regularly constituted suit, rather than a court exercising writ jurisdiction - A Writ of Certiorari lies only on limited grounds, namely: (i) want of jurisdiction, (ii) excess of jurisdiction, (iii) violation of principles of natural justice, and (iv) an error of law apparent on the face of the record. [Relied on Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (1957) 1 SCC 439; Paras 16 - 19] Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 469 : 2026 INSC 450

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Exhaustion of Alternative Statutory Remedies — Registration of FIR — Held - The extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and subject to self-imposed restrictions - It ought not to be invoked for the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) or proper investigation when alternative, equally efficacious sequential statutory remedies are available under the criminal procedure framework, unless justified by exceptional urgency or imminent danger to life or liberty - Entertaining such a writ petition in the first instance effectively results in the High Court acting as a forum of first instance, thereby completely bypassing the structured statutory scheme, which is impermissible. Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition against Co-operative Societies — The Supreme Court held that disputes pertaining purely to the internal management, governance, or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not ordinarily attract writ jurisdiction – Noted that District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies and not "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" under Article 12, even if they are subject to statutory regulation or oversight by the Registrar - A writ lies against a non-State entity only when it performs public duties or acts in breach of statutory obligations of a public character, which was not the case here. [Relied on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733; Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 8] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing impleadment application in a writ petition challenging the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Appellant sought impleadment as municipal authorities relied on an interim stay in said writ petition to reject Appellant's building plans and initiate demolition – Held: A person directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order cannot be shut out of proceedings merely because they were not an original party to the principal challenge - The Appellant is at least a "proper party" whose presence enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the consequences of its own interim order. Procedural exclusion of a party facing immediate civil consequences (demolition and refusal of statutory benefits) is unsustainable - High Court's order set aside; Appellant impleaded as a party respondent. Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction against Show Cause Notice – Reiterated that while courts ordinarily do not interfere at the SCN stage, it is not an "inviolable rule" - Interference is permissible in exceptional circumstances, including patent lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process of law, or where the notice reflects a pre-determined approach. [Relied on Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270; Paras 30-40] J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309

Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court reiterated that once a High Court declines to entertain a writ petition on the ground of an available efficacious alternative remedy, it cannot pass interim orders (such as a stay or status quo) to operate until the petitioner approaches the alternative forum - Order – Interim relief can only be granted in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief available upon the final determination of rights - It is impermissible for a High Court to grant interim relief as the "only and final relief" while simultaneously declining to decide on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Rejection of Writ Petition at the threshold on technical office objections – Sustainability of – High Court rejected a writ petition arising under the SARFAESI Act based on Registry objections regarding prayer revision, multiple reliefs in a single prayer, and joinder of parties – Held that the High Court erred in sustaining these technical objections to "nip a proceeding in the bud" - When fraud and collusion are alleged specifically regarding the conduct of a Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; the court must remember the maxim "fraus omnia corrumpit" (fraud unravels everything) - Allegations of fraud should not be buried without an examination of merits due to mere technicalities. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact and Delay – Held that High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition filed in 2015 challenging construction activities that commenced in 2002 and were completed by 2007-2008 - Held: Gross delay in approaching the Court disentitles a petitioner to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Noted that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to specifically plead and substantiate facts with cogent material; mere abstract points of law without evidence are insufficient. [Paras 66 - 70] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Article 226(3) – Vacation of Interim Orders – Mandatory Timeline for Disposal – Special Leave Petition filed against an interim order of status quo – Petitioner submitted that an application for vacating the interim order had been pending since January 2025 – Held, Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India mandates that upon an application for vacating an interim order being filed, the High Court is required to dispose of the same within a period of two weeks – In light of this provision, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to take up and dispose of the pending application on its own merits. [Paras 3, 4] Giriraj v. Mohd. Amir, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Article 227 - Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 227 — Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction — Capacity as an Appellate Court Impermissible - The High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh evidence/facts under Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction is a correctional jurisdiction meant to be exercised sparingly to set right grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse, or patent errors of law - It cannot be used to substitute a plausible and reasonable view taken by a subordinate court with an alternative interpretation merely because another view is possible. [Paras 31 - 36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court — Interference with discretionary order of amendment — Held: In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal - It is not open to the High Court to review or reassess the evidence or material upon which the inferior court or tribunal passed the order - The supervisory jurisdiction is strictly confined to seeing whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction - The High Court transgresses its limitations if it enters upon the merits of the case set up in the amendment. [Paras 15, 16] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 vs. Article 227 of the Constitution of India / Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Remedy for Legal Representatives – Held that the appropriate statutory relief for a legal representative aggrieved by and seeking to challenge an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not via a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the CPC. V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393 : AIR 2026 SC 2041

Article 227 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121

Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise and does not permit the reappreciation of evidence – Held that the High Court was not justified in dislodging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court to refer a dispute to arbitration when the existence of the agreement was under serious doubt. [Relied on: Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited v. Sanjay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1604; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713; Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386; Paras 16- 23] Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Interference with Interlocutory Orders – Held: While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and it should generally not intervene in interlocutory orders like impleadment, the Supreme Court will not restore an incorrect Trial Court order if the High Court has rightly interfered to prevent an illegality – Held that an impleadment application filed nearly nine years after acquiring knowledge of the suit (as evidenced by the applicant's seal on the original summons) is liable to be rejected on the ground of silence and delay. [Relied on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384; Paras 33-44] Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Article 233 - Appointment of district judges

Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Article 235 - Control over subordinate courts.

Constitution of India - Article 235 - The Registrar General of a High Court has no independent or suo motu authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer. The power of disciplinary control over judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested collectively in the High Court, comprising the Chief Justice and the companion Judges. The Registrar General can act only as a delegate on behalf of the Chief Justice or a committee of Judges duly constituted by the Chief Justice. Any disciplinary action initiated without the approval or authorisation of the Chief Justice or such a committee suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and is void ab initio. High Court of Uttarakhand v. Deepali Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 623

Article 246A - Special provision with respect to goods and services tax (GST)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Sections 2(31), 2(52), 7, 9, And 15 — Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 — Rule 31a, Rule 31b, And Rule 31c — Constitution of India — Article 246a Read With Entry 34 of List II — Online Gaming, Fantasy Sports, And Casinos — Taxability Of Stakes As Betting And Gambling - Key Issues Decided – i. Characterization of Games of Skill played with Stakes - Whether placing monetary stakes on games predominantly involving skill (such as Rummy or Fantasy Sports) alters the nature of the transaction to fall within the ambit of "Betting and Gambling" under the GST/Constitutional framework; ii. Relevance of Skill vs. Chance in Taxing Framework - Whether the distinction between games of skill and games of chance pales into insignificance once the element of betting or staking money on an uncertain outcome enters the activity - Held by the Supreme Court – a. Staking Transforms Activity into Betting and Gambling - Once money or money's worth is risked or staked upon an uncertain outcome, the activity inherently acquires the character of betting and gambling - This holds true irrespective of whether the underlying game is categorized as a game of skill, a game of chance, or a combination of both, as the intrinsic nature of the underlying game loses significance for regulatory and fiscal purposes once a staking arrangement is introduced; b. Betting and Gambling as Interchangeable Cognate Expressions - The expressions "betting" and "gambling" are interchangeable and cognate terms that cannot be artificially split or rewritten as "betting on gambling" - Both terms fundamentally encompass the act of staking money on an unknown and uncertain future victory or outcome; c. Online Rummy and Fantasy Sports with Stakes constitute Betting - While the underlying formats of games like online Rummy or Fantasy Sports may involve elements of expertise or skill, playing or organizing them with real money stakes open to the general public constitutes a betting enterprise - The participants are effectively forecasting an unknown future event (victory) to win a pool directly linked to the staked amounts; d. Definition of Gaming Includes Skill and Chance for Money - Relying on established jurisprudence, "gaming" is judicially defined as playing any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money's worth - The act does not cease to be gaming merely because the underlying game requires a substantial degree of skill. [Relied on M.J. Sivani and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (1995) 6 SCC 289; Clarified State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I) 1957 SCR 870; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II) 1957 SCR 930; Distinguished from K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 66-86] Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence Hqs v. Gameskraft Technologies, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 572 : 2026 INSC 595

Article 282 - Expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out of its revenues.

Article 282 of the Constitution - Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Article 300A – Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.

Constitutional Law – Right to Pension – Nature of Pension – Plea of Financial Burden – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 300A – Held that Pension is not a bounty, grace, or a matter of financial convenience dependent on the employer - It is a deferred wage and a hard-earned benefit amassed by virtue of long and continuous service, constituting "property" within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution - A constitutional right cannot be rendered illusory or defeated on account of administrative inaction or the plea of financial burden. [Paras 41-74] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Constitution of India – Article 300A – Right to Property – Fair Compensation - The right to receive fair statutory compensation upon the compulsory deprivation of property is an intrinsic sub-right encapsulated within the sacrosanct constitutional and human right under Article 300A - Statutes that are expropriatory must be strictly construed, and the State cannot abdicate its responsibility or deprive a person of property without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory compensation mechanism. [Paras 41 - 62] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517

Constitution of India – Article 300A – Constitutional Right to Property – The right of redemption is a valuable right embedded in the SARFAESI Act to protect the borrower's ownership, which is a constitutional right - This right survives until the completion of the sale by a registered deed following a legally valid process - Since the borrowers discharged the entire outstanding liability during the pendency of the proceedings and the sale process was legally infirm due to timeline violations, the borrowers are entitled to redeem the property. [Relied on Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar (2014) 5 SCC 610; Paras 18-30] E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303

Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Article 309 – Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.

Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India – Whether a railway servant ceases to be a member of the civil service of the Union merely because separate service rules govern their recruitment, conduct, control, and pension – Held that No, A railway servant remains a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Central Government - The delegation of powers to the Railway Board does not separate the status of a railway servant from that of a Central Government employee, as the Railway Board functions as the Government of India itself for railway administration - Service under the Railway Board is service under the Central Government. [Paras 42, 43] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562

Service Law – Promotion vs. Selection Post – Restructuring of Cadre and Framing of Rules under Article 309 – Vested Right to Promotion – Supercession of Executive Instructions: The respondents, serving as Assistant Section Officers, sought directions for the curation of a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) to consider their promotion to the post of Assistant Regional Transport Officer (ARTO) based on Executive Instructions dated 17.11.1981 - the State restructured the cadre, making the Government the appointing authority, and subsequently framed the Odisha Transport Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution - The 2021 Rules mandated filling the ARTO posts through a competitive examination conducted by the OPSC - The High Court directed the State to convene the DPC under the old Executive Instructions, holding that the vacancies arose prior to the new rules and that the pending recommendation for a DPC was saved from supersession - Allowing the appeals of the State, the Supreme Court held – i. An employee does not possess a vested right or a legitimate expectation to be promoted - The limited right available is only for the consideration of candidacy in accordance with the "rule in force" as on the date the consideration takes place; ii. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of the law/rules that existed on the date when they arose - The Government is fully entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up existing vacancies prior to the amendment or framing of new rules, especially when a restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient administration; iii. Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India strictly supersede any prior departmental executive instructions, circulars, or memoranda; iv. The savings clause in the 2021 Rules exempting "things done or omitted to be done" cannot save a mere inter-departmental letter or recommendation to convene a DPC, as it does not constitute a completed or concluded act under the old instructions; v. Furthermore, the post of ARTO was a selection post and not a promotional post - Ranking or position in a gradation list does not confer an automatic right to promotion to a selection post where merit and policy-driven selection methods govern - The method of selection is a matter of policy vesting entirely with the Government. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 773; Union of India v. Somasundaram Viswanath, (1989) 1 SCC 175; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910; Paras 13-28] State of Odisha v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2026 INSC 505

Public Employment — Regularisation of Para-Teachers / Contractual Employees — Scheme-based appointments vs. Cadre posts — Para-teachers engaged on a contractual basis under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan ("SSA") sought blanket regularisation as permanent Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas bypassing the statutory recruitment rules — Held that a prayer for regularisation from a scheme post to a State cadre post changes the character of the appointment - A scheme post under the SSA is jointly funded and continues until the scheme ceases, whereas a cadre post is governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India creating public employment via constitutionally aligned recruitment processes - A direct leap from one to the other, bypassing statutory rules, creates an unsanctioned mode of recruitment which is prohibited - Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the statutory rules, but do not possess an absolute right to blanket regularisation. [Paras 19 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Article 311 - Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of civil servants.

Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Scope of Protection — Employees of Statutory Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings - The protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India providing that a member of a civil service or a holder of a civil post shall not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority applies strictly to persons holding civil posts under the Union or a State - Employees of a public sector company or corporation (such as MSEDCL) having a distinct legal personality independent of the Government do not hold a civil post merely because of government ownership or control - Their disciplinary competence is governed entirely by the internal Service Regulations of the Corporation and not by Article 311. [Relied on S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177; Paras 80-110] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 311(2) – ICAR functions as an autonomous Society whose recruitment and service conditions are governed by its own rules and bye-laws—hence, Article 311 is not attracted – A transfer, reversion, or repatriation is ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot per se be considered punitive - Judicial review of administrative discretion is narrowly confined to evaluating the decision-making process rather than the merits or fairness of the conclusion itself - It must strictly assess whether the action was arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, particularly regarding whether it imposes penal or stigmatic consequences without due procedure - Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent, and concrete material, and cannot be entertained merely on conjectures or the sequence of events. [Paras 9, 10, 11-16] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Article 311(2)(b) – Dismissal from service without departmental inquiry – Scope of "Reasonably Practicable" – Requirement of Objective Satisfaction – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable, holding that the power to dispense with a regular departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be exercised based on mere "assumptions and conjectures" - Supreme Court noted that the disciplinary authority must record satisfaction based on independent material showing that holding an inquiry is not "reasonably practicable" - Key Observations held – i. Judicial Review and Satisfaction - The finality given to the disciplinary authority's decision under Article 311(3) is not binding on the Courts - The scope of judicial review is open to strike down orders dispensing with an inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or lack a factual basis – Held that court must consider whether a "reasonable man acting in a reasonable way" would have reached the same conclusion in the prevailing situation; ii. Absence of Material Evidence: In the present case, the Preliminary Inquiry (PE) report failed to record any specific instances of the appellant who was in custody at the time—threatening or intimidating witnesses - The Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) relied on the ACP's "presumption" of potential witness tampering without any supporting material, which the Court deemed a failure of application of mind; iii. Custody as a Factor: It was incumbent upon the authority to demonstrate how the appellant, while in jail, posed a threat that made an inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; iv. Adherence to Circulars: noted that the Delhi Police's own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007) mandate that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a "short cut" and requires "cogent and legally tenable reasons". [Relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 36; Paras 23-40] Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2026 INSC 234

Article 324 - Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be vested in an Election Commission.

Constitution of India – Article 324 & Article 327 – Interplay between Constitutional Powers and Parliamentary Legislation – The legislative competence of Parliament under Article 327 and the ECI's mandate under Article 324 are complementary, not competing - Parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish or paralyse the core constitutional functions of the Commission - The Commission retains plenary authority to issue regulatory directions and fill vacuums where the law is silent, though it must act consistently with express statutory prohibitions. [Relied on: Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664; All Party Hill Leaders' Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161; Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628; In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237; Para 175-186] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Section 21(3) – Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Constitution of India – Articles 324, 325, 326 & 327 – Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls – Power of the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct state-wide Special Intensive Revision – The expression "for any constituency or part of a constituency" in Section 21(3) of the RP Act includes "many" or "all" constituencies if state-wide reasons like rapid urbanization, migration, and duplication pollute the rolls - The non-obstante clause in Section 21(3) frees the Commission from the ordinary procedural limitations of Section 21(2), allowing it to shape the course of revision as it thinks fit, provided it records cogent reasons. [Paras 35 – 50] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Article 329 - Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters

Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer during an election process is not maintainable in view of the constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b). The proper and exclusive remedy for challenging the improper rejection of a nomination lies in an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after the declaration of results. The Supreme Court cannot carve out exceptions based on the alleged “glaring”, “manifest”, or “arbitrary” nature of the rejection of nomination, as doing so would amount to rewriting Article 329 and creating an impermissible parallel jurisdiction between writ courts and election tribunals. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the challenge regarding the non-disclosure of a private criminal complaint in Form 26 affidavit. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643

Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The petitioner's nomination for Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that she failed to disclose a pending private complaint filed against her in a Court, despite receiving summons. The petitioner contended that disclosure was not required under Section 33A of the RP Act as no cognizance had been taken and no charge had been framed. She argued that the rejection was arbitrary and prevented a contested election. Article 329 imposes a clear constitutional embargo on judicial interference in electoral matters except through the mechanism provided by law (election petition). The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner to justify pre-result interference, holding that the cited observations do not dilute the bar under Article 329. Allowing writ jurisdiction in “glaring” cases while relegating others to election petitions would lead to splitting of jurisdiction and judicial overreach. The right to contest an election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right, reinforcing the inapplicability of Article 32. Writ petition dismissed as non-maintainable with liberty to the petitioner to file an election petition. No order as to costs. The Court clarified that it has not made any observation on the merits of the case. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643

Article 366 - Definitions

Customary Law & Succession – Princely States – Rule of Lineal Male Primogeniture vs. Personal Law – Merger Covenant and Private Properties – Dispute over the character and devolution of the properties belonging to the erstwhile royal family of Kapurthala - The appellants contended that the properties declared as "private properties" by the former ruler under the merger agreement are subject to Hindu Mitakshara Law and liable for partition, while the contesting respondent claimed absolute ownership under the rule of primogeniture - Held, upon signing the merger covenant on May 5, 1948, the Maharaja ceased to be an absolute sovereign and assumed the status of an ordinary citizen - The recognition of the Maharaja as a "Ruler" under Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India was a political/executive act for ceremonial purposes and was not an indicium of property ownership – While Article XIV of the covenant guaranteed succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi (throne), it did not extend that protection or the rule of primogeniture to the private personal properties earmarked under Article XII. [Paras 47, 48] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571

Seventh Schedule

National Highway - Toll on National Highways covered by Union List; States can levy toll only on other roads - Held, the levy and collection of toll/fee on National Highways by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) falls squarely within the legislative competence of the Union under Entry 23 read with Entry 96 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Toll collected for the use of National Highways is a fee traceable to Entry 23 (highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national highways) read with Entry 96 (fees in respect of any of the matters in the Union List) of List I. The expression “tolls” under Entry 59 of List II (State List) must be confined to charges levied by States on roads/highways other than National Highways. Once a road is declared a National Highway, legislative competence shifts exclusively to the Union. Rule 8 of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rate and Collection) Rules, 2008 is intra vires the Constitution and the National Highways Act, 1956. There is no lack of legislative competence or excessive delegation. The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court judgment which had upheld the constitutional validity of toll collection on National Highways, including through concessionaires. T.S.R. Venkatramana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 326

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43

Seventh Schedule

Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 34 – Betting and Gambling – Online Gaming – Games of Skill vs. Games of Chance – Scope of legislative competence of States – Interpretation of the conjunction "and" – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Article 19(1)(g) – Res Extra Commercium – List II, Entry 1 – Public Order - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court which held that Entry 34 of List II is restricted to games of chance - The expression "betting and gambling" cannot be split disjunctively or interpreted narrowly as "betting on gambling" to provide immunity to games of skill played for stakes - Entry 34 of List II empowers the State Legislatures to regulate or prohibit betting activities on both games of chance and games of skill when played for stakes. [Relied on: State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029; Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Paras 217-228, 267 – 273] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Eighth Schedule

Eighth Schedule Technicality vs. Constitutional Imperative - The State cannot justify its continued inaction or lackadaisical approach on the technical premise that a regional language (such as Rajasthani) is not formally recognized in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution - The absence of an administrative policy is an executive shortcoming warranting prompt rectification, not a valid ground to defend institutional inertia. [Para 46] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Ninth Schedule

Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran  rejected the contention while deciding review petitions challenging the Court's May 20, 2025 judgment restoring the requirement of prior legal practice for entry-level judicial service.

The Chief Justice, while pronouncing the judgment, said: “The contention that post-graduation should be treated equivalent to practice, that we have not been able to accept.”

The Court, however, by 2:1 (Justice Chandran dissenting),modified the manner in which the practice requirement would operate. For recruitment notifications issued between May 20, 2025 and March 31, 2027, all law graduates will be eligible to apply notwithstanding the three-year practice requirement.

Candidates selected through these recruitments will undergo one year of training at the State Judicial Academy followed by one year of structured law clerkship, with the two years treated as equivalent to practice for the purpose of the requirement.

For recruitment notifications issued on or after April 1, 2027, candidates will be required to have at least one year of actual practice before appearing for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination.

The review petitions challenged the May 2025 judgment which had restored the three-year practice requirement for candidates seeking direct entry into the judicial service. The Court had held that prior exposure to the functioning of courts was desirable for a person entering judicial service.

In the present judgment, the Court maintained that conclusion but held that practical experience could be acquired through a structured combination of institutional training and supervised law clerkship. It also noted that the sudden restoration of the three-year requirement had caused hardship to law graduates who had prepared for judicial examinations under the regime prevailing for more than two decades.

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110/2025

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

The Supreme Court has waived the three-year practice requirement for candidates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) examinations pursuant to recruitment notifications issued between May 20, 2025 and March 31, 2027.

A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran (dissenting) said all law graduates would be eligible to apply during this transitional period, notwithstanding the three-year practice requirement.

The Court said such candidates would be deemed to have completed one year of active practice for the purposes of their applications. They will not be required to furnish a separate certificate of practice for the deemed period.

“In light of the above discussions, we consider it appropriate to issue the following directions which would apply to all recruitment notifications, advertisements issued through the post of Civil Judge Junior Division in the transitional period, namely from the date the judgment was in May 25 pronounced and up to 31st March 2027. The directions are – all law graduates shall be eligible to apply notwithstanding the 3-year practice requirement. Having regard to the fact that more than one year has elapsed since the judgment under review was pronounced, such candidates shall, for the purposes of their applications, be deemed to have completed one year of active practice. There shall not be required to furnish a separate certificate of practice in report of the said deemed period”, the Court held.

Candidates selected pursuant to these recruitments will, however, be appointed initially as Trainee Judicial Officers. They will undergo one year of intensive training at the concerned State Judicial Academy, followed by one year of structured law clerkship. The clerkship will include six months under the supervision of the Principal District Judge, District and Sessions Judge or a member of the Higher Judicial Service, and six months under a sitting judge of the concerned High Court.

The Court said the training and clerkship periods will be treated as equivalent to two years of practice at the Bar for the purposes of the three-year requirement.

The direction has been issued as a transitional arrangement after the Court restored the three-year practice requirement in its May 20, 2025 judgment. The Court held that the sudden restoration of the requirement without a transitional arrangement had caused hardship to law graduates when had prepared for judicial examinations under the earlier regime.

“The sudden restoration of the requirements without any transitional arrangement has visited hardship upon law graduates who had prepared their professional lives on the basis of the regime that prevailed for over two decades”, the Court observed.

The Court has otherwise retained the requirement of prior practical exposure, but reduced the requirement to one year for recruitments after the transitional period. For recruitment notifications issued on or after April 1, 2027, candidates will have to possess at least one year of actual practice before appearing for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination. The selected candidates will have to undergo training for one year and clerkship for one year thereafter ( 6 months under District Judge and 6 months under High Court judge).

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110/2025

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

On 20 August 2026, the Department of Justice notified nine advocates who will take the oath as Additional Judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. On 4 May, the Supreme Court Collegium had approved ten, on a list that began in the High Court collegium and carried the endorsement of every constitutional functionary consulted along the way. The nine who have taken oath deserve every good wish, and nothing here reflects on them. The tenth name, that of Major Navdeep Singh, Senior Advocate, has been dropped without a word. I write this not as an academic observer of the appointments process but as a practising advocate who has watched, at close range, how lawyers quietly alter their professional choices in response to what that process rewards and punishes.

Three distinct arguments run through this piece, and it is best to state them at the outset. The first is procedural: a candidate cleared through the constitutional selection process should not disappear into unexplained executive silence. The second is constitutional: even without reservation, which nobody is demanding, the composition of the judiciary is not a matter to which a constitutional democracy can be indifferent. The third is institutional: the opacity of the present process makes it impossible to distinguish legitimate selection from arbitrary exclusion, and that inability is itself the injury. Put shortly, the question is not whether Navdeep Singh is entitled to a judgeship because he is a Sikh. It is whether a candidate who has cleared the constitutional selection process can be silently excluded without explanation, and whether a judiciary that already suffers from a demonstrable diversity deficit can afford to treat representation as irrelevant.

The Man And The Silence

Navdeep Singh's record is public. A constitutional and service law practitioner at Chandigarh, he is the most decorated officer in the history of the Territorial Army, with eleven commendations earned largely while serving in counter insurgency areas during court vacations. He founded the Armed Forces Tribunal Bar Association, served on the Government's own Committee of Experts constituted in 2015 under the late Manohar Parrikar to curb litigation against soldiers, helped shape international military justice instruments at Yale and Stellenbosch, and has written or edited several books and over two hundred articles. He was the only military veteran among the ten recommended, and the only turbaned Sikh.

I do not claim to know why he was excluded. That is precisely the point. No reason has been recorded, disclosed or even hinted at, to him, to the Collegium or to the public. What I am asking is why the country is not entitled to know.

This Has Happened Before

The silence is harder to accept because it is not new. In October 2023, the Collegium recommended five advocates for this very court; the Centre appointed three and withheld the two turbaned Sikhs in the batch, Harmeet Singh Grewal and Deepinder Singh Nalwa. A bench headed by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul asked in open court: "Two of the candidates not cleared are both Sikhs. Why should this arise?" The Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee called it discrimination. No answer ever came. The two were appointed only in February 2025, nearly sixteen months after they were first cleared, their seniority permanently damaged.

Nor is unexplained withholding reserved for any one community. Senior Advocate Aditya Sondhi withdrew his consent to a Karnataka High Court judgeship in 2022 after a year of silence while his batchmates were appointed. Shwetasree Majumdar, one of the country's finest intellectual property lawyers, withdrew in 2025 after the Government appointed the two advocates recommended alongside her and never acted on her file. In no case was a reason stated. A lawyer who consents to judgeship winds down a practice built over decades; to leave such a person in limbo indefinitely is a quiet cruelty, and the Bench loses its best candidates to it.

The Numbers Tell A Larger Story

Set these episodes against the composition of the courts, with one honest caveat: the Government does not formally record the religion of judges, so counts of community rest on publicly known identity. By my count from the public record, of the roughly fifty five judges serving in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on the eve of these appointments, eleven are Sikhs, in a court whose jurisdiction includes the one Indian state where Sikhs are a majority, and only five of those eleven came from the Bar; the rest rose from the judicial services, as a matter of right, as per their seniority, at the close of long careers, with little time left to shape the court's jurisprudence. Representation that arrives late and leaves early is representation in name.

Higher up, the Supreme Court has had no Sikh judge since Chief Justice J.S. Khehar retired in August 2017. Justice Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Chief Justice of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, is by all India seniority the third senior most High Court judge in the country and the senior most sitting Sikh Chief Justice, with an unblemished record; lawyers of the region, concerned by he being marginalised , have formally petitioned for his elevation. Yet when the Collegium recommended five appointments to the Supreme Court this May, he was passed over, and among those elevated was a judge junior to him from his own parent High Court.

The picture is no better elsewhere. The Department of Justice's list of judges as on 1 February 2026 shows the Delhi High Court, in the capital of a country of, with a sizable Muslim population, with forty four judges serving against a sanctioned strength of sixty and not one publicly identifiable Muslim among them. So far as community is publicly known, the Supreme Court today has one Muslim judge and one Christian judge against a sanctioned strength of thirty eight now. And the caste picture comes from the Government's own mouth: in March 2025 the Law Ministry informed the Rajya Sabha that of 715 High Court judges appointed since 2018, only 22 were from the Scheduled Castes, 16 from the Scheduled Tribes, 89 from the Other Backward Classes and 37 from the minorities, which leaves roughly seventy seven per cent drawn from the upper castes, and, as anyone who practises in our constitutional courts knows, disproportionately from a narrow, urban, English speaking elite, from established legal families and a handful of storied chambers, a phenomenon entrenched enough that the Law Commission's 230th Report and Parliament's own records discuss it as the "uncle judges" syndrome. In seventy six years, only two Dalits have held the office of Chief Justice of India. Whole states can go unseen too: Jharkhand waited a decade for a judge of its High Court to sit on the Supreme Court, until this year's round of appointments. Parliament's Standing Committee on Law and Justice, in its 133rd Report of August 2023, called this a "diversity deficit", recorded a declining trend, and recommended that the collegiums recommend adequate numbers from the marginalised sections, a duty it wanted written into the Memorandum of Procedure. Nothing of the kind has happened. We cannot even measure the pipeline, because no body, governmental or professional, publishes data on the social composition of the lakhs of lawyers who enrol each year.

This Is Not An Argument For Quotas

There is no reservation in the higher judiciary, and no one is asking for any. But the absence of a quota is not the absence of a constitutional concern. Four ideas must be kept apart: reservation, which is a legally prescribed allocation; representation, which asks whether an institution broadly reflects the society it governs; merit, which is the threshold of competence every candidate must cross; and selection, which is the choice among the many who cross it. The argument here is not that anyone should be appointed because of community. It is that when several candidates are professionally qualified, the institutions choosing among them cannot be indifferent to a pattern in which entire sections of society are systematically absent from the outcome.

And this matters for justice itself, not merely for appearances, because judging is not a mechanical act. Every judge who takes the oath applies open textured phrases, equality, due process, dignity, reasonableness, to the facts of other people's lives, and what strikes a judge as reasonable or fair depends, inescapably, on the range of lives that judge is able to imagine. The judicial power of a constitutional court is an exercise of constitutional morality and of equity as much as of technical law; between two legally available outcomes, it is a judge's tempered sense of what justice requires that decides the case, and that sense is formed by experience. In a country of this size and diversity, where the same statute falls upon a tribal forest dweller, an urban startup founder and a landless labourer, a bench drawn from a single narrow stratum will, with the best will in the world, see some litigants clearly and others only dimly. Diversity on the Bench is therefore not a concession to identity politics; it is an epistemic necessity for a fairer and more equitable system of justice, one in which litigants of every description can be understood, and can believe they will be understood. South Africa's framers went further and constitutionalised the concern: Section 174(2) of that country's Constitution directs that "the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed." India chose a different model, leaving composition to the discretion of the appointing institutions under Articles 124 and 217. But a discretion left unstructured by text is structured by constitutional morality, and the equality code of our Constitution is not suspended at the door of the appointments process. Where there is no quota, diversity can come only from conscious choice. That is a duty, not a favour.

What If There Is A Reason?

The fair minded reader will ask the obvious question: perhaps there is something about this candidature the public does not know. I accept that possibility without reservation. There may be considerations of suitability known to the Government and not to us; I do not claim otherwise. But the Constitution's own machinery answers this. The Memorandum of Procedure permits the Government to return a recommendation, with reasons, for the Collegium's reconsideration, and the Collegium can then weigh the material and respond. What the Government has done instead is neither to appoint nor to return, but to sit silent while notifying everyone else. If there is a reason, the process exists to state it. If there is none, the appointment must issue. A constitutional system should not operate through unexplained exclusion, because unexplained exclusion is indistinguishable, from the outside, from arbitrary or discriminatory exclusion, and the reputational cost of that ambiguity is borne by the candidate and by the institution, never by the officials who maintain the silence.

Why The Stakes Are So High

These are not ordinary personnel decisions. Whatever the merits of individual candidates, appointments to the constitutional courts are exercises of public power with profound and near permanent consequences. Not a single judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court has been removed through the constitutional process in the seventy nine years since Independence. A judge once appointed will interpret the Constitution and decide questions of life, liberty and property for decades, answerable in that time to conscience alone. And each such judge carries an extraordinary share of the Republic. The Punjab and Haryana High Court serves upward of six crore people through a working bench in the sixties, roughly one judge for every ten lakh citizens; nationally, the Department of Justice's court wise statement as on 1 May 2026 records 797 working judges against a sanctioned 1,122, nearly one in three seats vacant. In a system this stretched, every name added or withheld matters enormously, and every unexplained withholding is a decision of constitutional consequence taken invisibly.

The Lawyer Watching From The Back Of The Court

Think, finally, of what all this teaches the young lawyer watching. A first generation lawyer, a Dalit or Adivasi lawyer, a Muslim or Sikh lawyer, a woman without a judge for a father, a scholar, an independent mind: each learns, episode by episode, that the system will not reliably reward merit, integrity, scholarship, courage or the diversity they embody, and that it may answer those qualities with silence and limbo. Many of the best will simply stop thinking of judgeship at all. I confess I am one of them. That loss appears in no government table, but the institution will pay it for a generation.

So, who gets to judge in India? Today the honest answer is: whoever survives a process in which the Collegium chooses behind closed doors and the Government vetoes behind closed lips. Neither should be able to decide invisibly. If there is material against Major Navdeep Singh, let it be returned to the Collegium with reasons, as the process commands. If there is none, let the warrant issue. And in either event, let both institutions begin doing openly what the Constitution's promise of equality demands: seeking out able candidates from every section of this country, appointing them, and telling us why when they do not. Until then, every list of ten that arrives as a list of nine will ask a question the system refuses to answer, and the silence will go on doing its quiet damage. The independence of opinion, commitment to principles of preamble to constitution should never be a disqualification to become a judge in India, a constitutional democracy.

Author is an Advocate practicing at Punjab and Haryana High Court. Views are personal.

The Supreme Court on August 19 issued notice on a plea challenging the inclusion of the District Police Chief in the State of Kerala's procedure for appointing Public Prosecutors under Section 18 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

The petitioner contends that Section 18(4) requires the District Magistrate to consult the Sessions Judge and does not permit the Police Chief, who heads the investigating agency, to be part of the consultative process.

The petitioner has also challenged the State's procedure of allowing the District Collector to prepare an initial list of eligible advocates before consulting the Sessions Judge.

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta issued notice returnable in 4 weeks on a petition filed by advocate Vishnuprasad Nair against the judgment of the Kerala High Court approving the mechanism for appointment of Public Prosecutors in Kerala.

During the hearing, Senior Advocate PB Suresh Kumar for Nair submitted that Section 18(4) of the BNSS provides only for consultation between the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge in preparing the panel of Public Prosecutors.

Justice Vikram Nath questioned how the additional consultation would affect the process if it was only consultative. He asked, “The Rule or the provision says that the District Judge and the District Magistrate, correct? So if they want to have some further inputs, what is wrong in that?”

Kumar contended that the Supreme Court had held that where a statute requires an authority to make an appointment in consultation with a particular person, the prescribed procedure cannot be expanded by consulting an additional person. He also stressed that the District Police Chief heads the investigating agency and argued that the office of the prosecutor has to remain independent of the investigating agency.

He referred to Clause 2 of the circular, which provides that after preparation of a list containing the names of eligible persons, the District Collector shall convene a joint meeting with the District Judge and District Police Chief. He argued that the District Police Chief should not be part of this consultation because of the requirement that the Public Prosecutor's office remain independent of the investigating agency.

The Court ultimately issued notice. Justice Nath indicated that there was no need to expressly record that appointments made during the pendency of the case would be subject to the outcome of the proceedings, observing that any such appointments would automatically be subject to the final outcome.

Background

The Kerala High Court initiated a suo motu writ petition in 2021 after it noting serious lapses in the conduct of criminal trials by prosecutors. In its April 9, 2025 judgment, the High Court held that the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 did not govern the appointment of Public Prosecutors.

It held that such appointments were governed by Section 18 of the BNSS and directed the State Government to frame internal administrative guidelines in conformity with the provision, while giving primacy to the opinion of the District Judge.

The State Government subsequently issued a circular on September 3, 2025 authorising the District Collector to invite applications and prepare a preliminary panel of eligible advocates after examining their qualifications, experience, integrity, reputation and antecedents.

On December 3, 2025, the State Government issued a circular laying down guidelines for preparation of panels for appointment of Public Prosecutors. The petition challenges the circular on the ground that it permits the District Collector to prepare a panel before consultation with the Sessions Judge under Section 18(4) of the BNSS.

Nair approached the High Court challenging the circular as being contrary to Section 18 of the BNSS and the directions issued in the April 2025 judgment.

During the proceedings, the State produced a revised draft circular on July 6, 2026. Nair objected to three aspects of the draft. First, it provided for consultation by the District Collector with both the Sessions Judge and the District Police Chief, although Section 18(4) contemplates consultation with the Sessions Judge. Second, it retained the provision allowing the District Collector to prepare an initial panel before consultation. Third, it used the expression "due regard" instead of "primacy" in relation to the opinion of the District Judge.

The Kerala High Court approved the draft circular with one modification. It replaced the expression "due regard" with "due primacy". It rejected the challenge to the participation of the District Police Chief, holding that the Police Chief's inputs could assist in understanding the antecedents of candidates and that the opinion of the Police Chief was not conclusive. The High Court also did not accept the petitioner's objection to preparation of the preliminary panel by the District Collector before judicial consultation.

Thus, Nair filed the present SLP challenging the HC judgment. The petition contends that Section 18(4) of the BNSS provides for consultation between the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge while preparing the panel of Public Prosecutors. According to the petitioner, permitting the District Police Chief to participate introduces an authority that is not contemplated by the statute.

The petition relies on the Supreme Court's judgment in Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh to contend that when a statute requires an appointment to be made in consultation with a specified authority, the prescribed process cannot be expanded by adding another authority.

The petition also argues that participation of the District Police Chief affects the independence of the prosecutorial system because the Police Chief heads the investigating agency. It relies on S.B. Shahane v. State of Maharashtra, in which the Supreme Court stressed the need for prosecutors to remain independent of the police department and officers responsible for investigation.

“By permitting an executive functionary heading the investigating agency to participate in the selection of Public Prosecutors, the Impugned Judgment compromises the institutional independence of the prosecutorial system and dilutes the statutory consultative mechanism contemplated by Parliament. The inclusion of the District Police Chief in the process of appointing the public prosecutor is contrary to the settled position that the prosecutor office should be independent of the police department as categorically held by this Hon'ble Court in S,B. Shahane and Ors. v5. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (AIR 1995 SC 1628)”, the plea contends.

The petition further argues that allowing the District Collector to prepare the initial panel before consultation with the Sessions Judge makes the judicial consultation ineffective. According to the petitioner, the Sessions Judge is reduced to commenting on candidates already shortlisted by the executive instead of participating in the identification of candidates at the initial stage.

The petition contends that the statutory consultative mechanism must be followed and that appointment of Public Prosecutors must involve meaningful judicial participation and remain insulated from executive interference.

Appearance –

For Petitioner: Mr. P.B Suresh Kumar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Pranav Krishna, AOR Mr. Akhil Suresh, Adv. Mr. S. K Adithyan, Adv. Mr. Asher Revi Job, Adv. Mr. Pattathil Pranav Menon, Adv. Mr. Naduvilaparambil Sebastian, Adv

Case no. – Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 28482/2026

Case Title – Vishnuprasad Nair v. State of Kerala & Ors.

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