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LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:49:11 GMT

Long day in court? Or taking a break from your entrance exam prep? Either way, LiveLaw Daily has you covered; a quick, clutter-free rundown of today's biggest legal stories.

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Supreme Court Closes 2015 Suo Motu Case Taken Over Parents' Suicide After Child's Death Due To Dengue

Debby Jain — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:39:41 GMT

The Supreme Court today closed a suo motu case taken up in 2015 over the suicide of a parent-couple following the tragic death of their 7-year old child due to dengue.

Allegedly, the child passed away after some hospitals denied him admission citing shortage of beds.

A bench of CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana closed the matter, while recording a statement of the counsel for Delhi Cantonment Board that the direction for filing of an action taken plan had been complied with. It further recorded her undertaking that the authorities are conscious of their responsibility and will continue to take necessary preventive measures in future.

To recap, the 7-year old child was alleged to have been taken to Moolchand Hospital, Max Hospital, Akash Hospital and Irene Hospital, but he was denied admission.

The parents' suicide led to massive outrage, resulting in the Union and Delhi governments initiating separate enquiries. The Delhi government issued notice to all hospitals, while the named hospitals were asked to explain why their registration should not be cancelled.

While Max and Moolchand Hospitals denied having refused treatment to the child, Aakash and Irene Hospitals cited lack of proper ICU facilities as the reason behind denying treatment to him.

In November 2017, the Supreme Court observed that a major cause behind vector borne diseases (like dengue) was lack of proper solid waste management. It limited the scope of the matter to this issue. The last order, before today, was passed in February 2019, when the Court directed NDMC, MCD and the Delhi Cantonment to file an action plan.

Notably, the Supreme Court recently came upon a case where a 4-year old victim of rape and murder in Ghaziabad was allegedly denied treatment by 2 private hospitals while she was alive. A bench led by CJI Kant constituted a Special Investigation Team to probe the case and observed that the hospitals were "criminally negligent" and highly insensitive for denying treatment to the child perhaps because she belonged to a poor family.

After the Court's nudge, the hospitals agreed to pay a voluntary sum of Rs.12 lakhs to the victim's family. During the hearing of this case, the Court indicated that it will frame guidelines to ensure prompt medical care for victims of sexual assault and in other medical emergencies.

Case: IN RE: OUTRAGE AS PARENTS END LIFE AFTER CHILD'S DENGUE DEATH SMW(C) No. 1/2015

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846 | REHANA KHAN VS. RIZWAN SIDDHIQUEE

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:15:50 GMT

Advocate Cannot Disclose Client's Confidential Information Even If She Turns Adversary : Supreme Court Upholds Lawyers' Suspension

Supreme Court Imposes Rs 5 Lakh Costs On Actress & Her Advocate For Wasting Judicial Time

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Advocate Cannot Disclose Client's Confidential Information Even If She Turns Adversary : Supreme Court Upholds Lawyers' Suspension

Yash Mittal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:14:46 GMT

The Supreme Court on Friday (August 21) affirmed the two-year suspension of an advocate's license to practice, holding that the disclosure of a former client's confidential information could not be justified on the ground of responding to public allegations.

“An advocate's duty is not conditional upon the client's continued good behaviour towards the advocate. An advocate cannot use information received in confidence against his client, and the fact that she has since become his adversary makes no difference.”, observed a bench of Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vijay Bishnoi, while sustaining the Bar Council of India disciplinary committee order to suspend the bar license of the Respondent-advocate for two years.

The case arose from a complaint filed by the Appellant (actress Rehana Khana @ Rozlyn Khan) against her former advocate, i.e., Respondent(Rizwan Siddique), before the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The appellant had engaged the respondent as her counsel in 2013-2014 in connection with allegations of sexual assault against a senior police official.

The crux of the complaint was that on August 5, 2014, the respondent gave television interviews in which he disclosed confidential communications with the appellant, played recorded conversations between them, broadcast messaging exchanges, and publicly characterized her complaint as a "false case of rape" while accusing her of seeking publicity.

The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, by order dated August 11, 2025, found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and suspended his license for two years, imposed a fine of ₹3 lakh payable to the complainant, and directed ₹2 lakh to be deposited in the Bar Council of India's Welfare Fund.

Both the Appellant and Respondent filed appeals against the BCI's decision. The Appellant sought enhancement in the punishment, whereas the Respondent sought setting aside of the punishment.

Sustaining the BCI's bar license suspension order, the judgment authored by Justice Nath disapproved the Respondent's act of revealing the confidential information of her former client. The Court said that merely because of the termination of the client-attorney relationship between them, the Respondent cannot reveal the sensitive and confidential information of her former client to respond to the accusations made against him.

The respondent had challenged the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the order was passed ex parte without proper service of notice. The Court rejected this contention, noting:

"The respondent entered appearance and he filed a written statement refuting the allegations. He was represented by counsel, and he participated in the recording of evidence. It is clear that he knew, from the institution of the disciplinary case, down to the passing of the impugned order in August 2025, that proceedings were pending against him and what those proceedings alleged. A party who has been present throughout cannot be heard to say that he was absent, especially one who is himself an advocate. The ground is flimsy and is, in our view, an afterthought, taken because no better one was available."

The Court further rejected the appellant's prayer for enhancement of punishment, observing that she had not approached the Court with clean hands, having herself participated in a press briefing while the matter was pending.

"The material on record, including exchanges she has herself relied upon, shows that while the engagement subsisted she and the respondent were in discussion about the means by which the police official might be trapped, which is not the conduct of a client simply seeking legal advice. Nor is her account of what followed complete. She appeared before the electronic media on 28th July 2014 of her own volition and spoke of her case, though her grievance before us is that her case was made public. Further, the police official was discharged on 4th December 2015, and that order has never been challenged by her. Having been less than candid about each of these matters, she cannot ask us to enlarge a relief granted to her.", the Court observed.

The Court also dissaproved of the conduct of both the parties for suppressing material information.

Resultantly, the appeals were disposed of, imposing costs of ₹5 lakh each on the appellant and the respondent, to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.

Also from the judgment - Supreme Court Imposes Rs 5 Lakh Costs On Actress & Her Advocate For Wasting Judicial Time

Cause Title: REHANA KHAN VS. RIZWAN SIDDHIQUEE (with connected case)

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Ms. Rehana Khan Petitioner/appellant-in-person Mr. Adit Subramaniam Pujari, Adv. Ms. Karishma Maria, AOR Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, Adv. Mr. Harshwardhan Pushkin Sharma, Adv. Mr. Bhavesh Seth, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Caveator-in-person, AOR Mr. P V Yogeswaran, Adv. * M/S. Ram Sankar & Co, AOR Mr. Adit Subramaniam Pujari, Adv. Ms. Karishma Maria, AOR Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, Adv. Mr. Harshwardhan Pushkin Sharma, Adv. Mr. Bhavesh Seth, Adv.

Delhi High Court Declares August 27 As Holiday; Sitting Days In Lieu Announced

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:07:12 GMT

The Delhi High Court has declared August 27, Thursday, as a holiday for the High Court as well as the courts subordinate to it.

In lieu of the holiday, the High Court has declared September 19, as a Court sitting day for the High Court whereas September 12, will be a Court sitting day for the subordinate courts.

The notification, issued by the Registry today, further provides that cases fixed before the High Court on August 27 will be taken up on August 31, in addition to the cases already fixed for that date.

For the subordinate courts, cases fixed for August 27 will be taken up on August 29, along with the cases already fixed for that day.

For context, August 26 is a holiday for the Delhi High Court and subordinate courts on the occasion of Prophet Mohammad's birthday.

August 28 is also a holiday for all the courts on the occasion of Raksha Bandhan.

Click here to read notification

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After Supreme Court Intervention, President Approves Gallantry Medal For Former Cop Who Killed Two Dacoits In 2003

Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:34:07 GMT

The Supreme Court was informed on Friday that President Droupadi Murmu has approved the conferment of the President's Medal for Gallantry on former police officer Vivek Kumar Chouhan, who shot dead two dacoits during an anti-dacoity operation in Madhya Pradesh in 2003.

A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta was hearing a case related to contempt proceedings initiated by Chouhan in the High Court against Union Home Secretary Govind Mohan for non-compliance with a High Court direction to confer the gallantry award on him.

After the Court earlier expressed displeasure over the delay in complying with the High Court order, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta today informed the Court that the President had taken a decision on the matter.

“We are grateful for your lordships' indulgence and now the decision is taken. The President has passed the order,” Mehta said.

He read out the relevant portion of the communication, stating that the proposal had been examined in compliance with the High Court's order and as per the applicable guidelines.

He said the President had approved the Medal for Gallantry to Sri Vivek Kumar Chauhan, SI for the action dated June 24, 2003. The award will be notified in the Gazette of India by the President's Secretary shortly, he added.

Mehta also argued that the High Court's order should not be treated as a precedent, saying that such awards are ultimately decided by the President.

The Court noted that it was only dealing with the contempt proceedings, and this observation was not required in the order.

Senior Advocate Mrigendra Singh, appearing for Chouhan, said that Chouhan would withdraw the contempt petition in the High Court in light of this development.

In the order, the Court recorded that Mehta had placed before it a communication dated August 20, 2026, issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, whereby approval had been granted to confer the Medal of Gallantry on Chouhan, and the award would be notified in the Gazette of India in due course.

“In that view of the matter the present petition does not require any further consideration,” the Court opined.

The Court also recorded that Singh's statement that Chouhan would withdraw the contempt proceedings pending before the High Court.

Background

The dispute arose from Chouhan's long-pending claim for the President's Gallantry Medal. He was serving as SHO of Ghatigaon police station in Gwalior district in 2003 when he led an operation against dacoits. Two dacoits were killed and Chouhan sustained injuries.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court had directed in December 2024 that the gallantry award be conferred on Chouhan within one month. The order was subsequently upheld by a Division Bench.

The Centre had later submitted that the President had approved a Gallantry Medal for Chouhan. The High Court rejected this as inadequate, holding that the Gallantry Medal and President's Gallantry Medal were distinct honours and that the latter was a higher distinction. The High Court found that the Union had "clearly over reached the order", amounting to prima facie willful disobedience.

The Centre challenged the High Court order before the Supreme Court.

Case no. – MA 2056/2026 in SLP(C) No. 10821/2026, Diary No. 40866/2026

Case Title – Govind Mohan v. Vivek Singh Chouhan

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Minor Can't Be Denied Passport Merely Because Estranged Father Withholds Consent: Rajasthan High Court

Jayanti Pahwa — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:33:58 GMT

The Rajasthan High Court has directed the passport authority to issue a passport to a minor child, observing that merely because the father's consent was absent from the application, his constitutional right to go abroad cannot be violated.

The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand observed;

"The future and career of the petitioner cannot be allowed to remain dependent upon the wish, will and desire of one of his parents. The valuable constitutional right of the petitioner cannot be prejudiced and must not be allowed be taken away, merely because the consent of his father is not there on the application for getting passport. The petitioner cannot be compelled to approach his father to get his consent on the said application".

A minor filed a petition through his mother seeking issuance of appropriate directions to the passport authority for issuance of a passport to him. Per the petitioner, he has submitted an application for issuance of a passport, but the same was refused by the authorities on technical grounds that the consent of the father was missing from the application.

The counsel for the petitioner informed the court that the parents had obtained a divorce decree in 2022. The petitioner further submitted that the father is not interested in the domestic affairs of the petitioner, and thus it is not possible for him to obtain his father's consent. The petitioner wished to travel abroad to study for a better future.

The counsel appearing for the Passport authority submitted that, per Annexure C, it is mandatory to get the consent of either the mother or the father in case the parents are residing separately and the said parent has custody.

The counsel also argued that the said divorce decree was unclear regarding the custody of the petitioner, and therefore, the consent of both parents would be needed in such circumstances.

The court, examining the divorce proceedings, recorded that the petitioner was in the custody of his mother. The bench also noted that the father had not filed any application seeking his custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, and therefore the mother is the lawful guardian of the petitioner.

Examining the materials placed on record, the bench noted that the petitioner has passed the Secondary School Examinations with "flying colours", and therefore his application to study abroad cannot be declined.

The bench highlighted, "Now, for a better future and career, he wants to study abroad and for the purpose of going abroad, passport is required because passport is a singular document which enables a citizen to cross international boundaries and travel to other countries. In the absence of such singular document, i.e. passport, any incumbent is an alien to a foreign country".

The bench reiterated that the right to personal liberty conferred under Article 21 of the Constitution also includes the right to travel abroad. The right to travel abroad is an integral facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The bench clarified, "Therefore, even if one of the parents of a minor child refuses to give consent, then also the passport issuing authority can still issue a passport to a minor, provided Annexure-C is submitted".

Additionally, the court elucidated that travelling abroad to study further for the betterment of the future is not a "fanciful affair but has became an essential requirement of modern life".

The bench further noted that unless the present of the children is fine and taken care of, how would their future become bright? The bench also emphasized that a child's right to go abroad for the betterment of his future career cannot be allowed to be ruined merely in the absence of the father's consent.

The bench directed, "Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the instant writ petition is liable to be and is hereby allowed. The respondent-passport authority is directed to issue a passport to the Petitioner forthwith without any further delay".

Case Title: Riddham Deora v Union of India, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.17014/2026

For Petitioner: Advocate Rahul Soni

For Respondents: Advocate Navneet Singh Birkh

Click here to read/download the Order

Kerala High Court Issues Notice To Vigilance Director On Plea Challenging Refusal To Probe DGP S Sreejith

Anamika MJ — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:28:34 GMT

The Kerala High Court on Friday (August 21) issued notice to the Director of the State Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (VACB) on a petition challenging the Government's decision declining, at this stage, to initiate a vigilance investigation into corruption allegations against DGP S. Sreejith, IPS.

Justice A. Badharudeen issued notice on the petition moved by an Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector.

The petitioner has challenged the Government order dated August 19, which found that a vigilance investigation against Sreejith was not warranted “as of now”. The petition alleges that the order was passed without proper application of mind despite material requiring further inquiry.

The petitioner had earlier approached the High Court with allegations that Sreejith had visited Dubai while on casual leave without obtaining permission to travel abroad and participated in the inauguration of a private enterprise allegedly connected to him. Allegations concerning benami transactions and other irregularities were also raised.

The Court had earlier directed an enquiry into the complaint. However, the petitioner objected to a notice issued for a joint hearing in the presence of Sreejith, against whom the allegations had been made.

The High Court subsequently directed the Additional Chief Secretary to afford the petitioner an independent personal hearing in Sreejith's absence, observing that requiring a complainant to participate in a hearing in the presence of the person against whom allegations are made cannot be recognised as a fair procedure.

Following the hearing, the Additional Chief Secretary appeared before the Court on Thursday and submitted that the directions had been complied with. He informed the Court that an order had been passed finding that a vigilance investigation against Sreejith was not warranted at present.

Challenging the August 19 order, the petitioner has also raised allegations regarding Sreejith's tenure as Kerala Transport Commissioner between April 2022 and August 2024. It is alleged that an unofficial “Transport Commissioner's Squad” was formed during this period and was used to victimise subordinate personnel and facilitate illicit transactions.

The petitioner contends that his complaint concerning the alleged benami transaction and foreign business activity does not relate to a decision taken by Sreejith in the discharge of official functions and, therefore, the statutory requirement of prior approval does not bar an inquiry.

The petitioner has sought to quash the August 19 Government order and direct the Director of the VACB to conduct an inquiry into the allegations and submit a report to the Court expeditiously.

Case Title: Dipin Edavana v State of Kerala and Others

Case No: WP(Crl.) 1315/ 2026

Counsel for Petitioner: K.K. Dheerendrakrishnan, N.P. Asha

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Insurer Can't Deny Compensation For Fire Damage Citing Technical Interpretation Of Policy Without Adducing Evidence: Gujarat High Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:26:01 GMT

The Gujarat High Court has held that insurance company cannot refuse to pay compensation for loss due to fire merely based on technical interpretation of proposal form and insurance policy without adducing any evidence. [2026 LiveLaw (Guj) 226]

The respondent manufactures Polyester Textured Yarn, Draw Textured Yarn, and Partially Oriented Yarn paper tubes whose stock was insured by the Appellant Insurance Company from 12.08.1994 to 11.08.1995 against a premium of Rs.2,616. The Policy covered risks arising out of fire, theft, and short circuits.

On 14.04.1995, an electrical short circuit allegedly occurred within the respondent's factory premises, where a fire broke out and destroyed the stock stored in the godown. The Surveyor appointed by the Appellant inspected the site and submitted his assessment report, while the police drew up a panchnama during the course of their investigation. Since policy purchased by the respondent was in force on the date of incident, it claimed and demanded loss suffered due to destroy of stock by fire.

However the Insurance Company contested the claim contending that the fire broke out in the factory premises solely due to the negligence and fault of the respondent, thereby the insurer is not liable to pay damages.

The trial court framed issues and permitted both the parties to lead evidence. However on the respondent lead oral and documentary evidence and Insurance Company did not produce any documentary evidence not did it cross examine the respondent. Thus the trial court decreed the respondent's suit granting compensation of Rs.2 Lakhs with interest at rate of 8% from the date of suit till realization of the amount.

Justice JC Doshi observed that no counter-evidence was adduced by the Appellant - Insurance Company to rebut or dispel the evidence led by the respondent.

Perusing the surveyor's report placed, which covers risk of stock and stock in process, the court said that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation.

" The technical interpretation of proposal form as well as insurance policy without adducing evidence in that regards is not permissible. Nonetheless leaf of policy produce on record cover the risk of stock and stock in progress. This condition is sufficient to cover risk and liability of insurance company for risk purchased. In nutshell, learned Trial Court has rightly earmarked liability upon insurance company to pay loss suffered by plaintiff due to fire. Thus, I see no reason to interfere with impugned judgment. Consequently, the first appeal stands dismissed".

The appeal was dismissed.

Case title: THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED v/s POOJA PAPER TUBE INDUSTRIES

R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 5712 of 2019

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Guj) 226

Appearance:

MS KARUNA V RAHEVAR(3818) for the Appellant(s) No. 1

THAKKAR AND PAHWA ADVOCATES(1357) for the Defendant(s) No. 1

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 | SPO/CONSTABLE IRB SATPAL SINGH VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:19:17 GMT

Mere Pendency Of Criminal Case No Ground To Discharge Employee : Supreme Court

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Kerala High Court Impleads Breast Cancer Patient In Suo Motu Case On Exorbitant Pricing Of Patented Drugs

K. Salma Jennath — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:18:42 GMT

The Kerala High Court on Friday (August 21) allowed the petition filed by a breast cancer patient who sought to be impleaded as an additional respondent in a suo motu plea raising issue of exorbitant pricing of patented breast cancer drugs.

The plea was originally filed by a breast cancer patient, who was being treated with patented Ribociclib, seeking an intervention by the Central government invoking the provisions of the Patent Act, particularly Sections 83 and 92 or Section 100. After she passed during pendency of the case, the Court had decided to convert the case into a suo motu petition.

Section 92 provides for compulsory license. Section 83 deals with general principles applicable to working of patented inventions. Section 100 authorises the government to requisition life-saving medicines in cases of extreme necessity "for the purposes of the government".

Last month, after hearing the amicus curiae as well as the counsels for the Union and the drug-manufacturing companies, the Court had sought expert opinion on whether Palbociclib, a cheaper drug that is no longer under patent and is also locally manufactured, can be used as a substitute to patented Ribociclib and Abemaciclib, for treating breast cancer.

It had then suo motu impleaded the National Cancer Institute (Jhajjar), Chittaranjan National Cancer Institute (Kolkata), the Regional Cancer Centre (Thiruvananthapuram) and the Drugs Controller General of India as additional respondents in the plea.

Subsequently, an impleading petition was filed by a breast cancer patient, who is presently taking Ribociclib to treat her condition.

When the matter came up today, Justice Harisankar V. Menon allowed the impleadment and posted the case to September 3 for final hearing, taking note of the Apex Court's request to expeditiously hear the matter.

Since affidavit was filed only on behalf of the Drugs Controller General, the Court directed the Additional Solicitor General of India P. Sreekumar to liaison with the suo motu impleaded respondents to ensure that they place their affidavits on record by the next posting date.

"In view of the urgency pointed by amicus curiae Smt. Maitreyi as well as in view of the impleadment of an affected party...post the matter for final consideration on 03.09.2026...The ASGI Sri. P. Sreeekumar is directed to liaison with Additional respondents nos. 11, 12 and 13 and ensure that a statement/affidavit is placed on record positively by the next posting. This is especially so, in view of the orders passed by the Apex Court dated 17.7.2026 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 19 of 2026 as per which the Apex Court has requested this Court to dispose of the matter expeditiously," the Court recorded in the order passed.

The Court also orally said: "We will find a solution…The only question is whether this is a substitute or not. Suppose it is not a substitute, I may, perhaps, issue a direction to the central government."

The Court further recorded a point raised by the amicus curiae that even as per the affidavit filed on behalf by the Drugs Controller, it has not been stated conclusively as to whether "Palbociclib" was a substitute for "Ribociclib". In the affidavit, among other averments, it was stated that opinion on the therapeutical interchangeability of the two drugs for a particular patient is to be rendered by the treating doctor or oncologist.

Last month, the co-convenors of the Working Group on Access to Medicines and Treatment had written a letter to the Chief Justice seeking intervention for expeditious final hearing of the plea. A copy of the same was addressed to the Chief Justice of India as well.

Case Title: In Re Exorbitant Pricing of Life Saving Patented Medicines

Amicus curiae: Maitreyi Sachidananda Hegde

Counsel for the respondents: S. Sreekumar (Sr.), Joseph Kodianthra (Sr.), Hemant Singh (Sr.), P. Sreekumar - ASGI, O.M. Shalina - DSGI

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PC-PNDT Rules Don't Bar Doctor From Conducting Ultrasound At Clinics In Two Different Districts: Orissa High Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:14:32 GMT

The Orissa High Court has held that a qualified Radiologist cannot be barred from conducting ultrasonography at two different clinics/medical establishments situated in two different districts, especially when his superior authorities in his permanent employment have issued a 'no-objection certificate' for his practice beyond official working hours. [2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 97]

Clarifying the true purport of Rule 3(3) of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 (the 'PCPNDT Rules'), the Bench of Justice Bibhu Prasad Routray held–

“The plain interpretation of the provisions in Rule 3(3) read with the object of the Act does not contradict to such provisions of the Act or intention of the Legislature by permitting the medical practitioner to conduct ultrasonography in two different clinics in two districts. There cannot be any hindrance in view of the provisions of the PC & PNDT Act and Rules to debar the medical practitioner from conducting ultrasonography in two clinics situating in two different districts and such an interpretation would be not in consonance with the object of the Act.”

The petitioner, who is currently posted as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Radio-Diagnosis in the VIMSAR, Burla, Sambalpur, sought permission for rendering his service at a private clinic situated in Attabira in the district of Bargarh. The Superintendent of VIMSAR issued a 'No Objection Certificate' authorising the petitioner to attend the said hospital beyond his duty hours.

Subsequently, the Chief District Medical and Public Health Officer, Bargarh (CDMO) passed an order, under Rule 3(3) of the PCPNDT Rules, prohibiting the petitioner from working in private hospital. The said Rule states as follows–

“Each medical practitioner qualified under the Act to conduct ultrasonography in a genetic clinic/ultrasound clinic/imaging centre shall be permitted to be registered with a maximum of two such clinics/centres within a district. The Consulting hours for such medical practitioner, shall clinic/centre.”

Impugning such prohibition order, the petitioner approached the High Court through this writ petition. The petitioner argued that when the Superintendent of his Hospital has expressly permitted him to work at the private clinic beyond his duty hours, the CDMO, Bargarh had no authority to debar him.

On the other hand, the State submitted that when the petitioner is working as Assistant Professor in VIMSAR, Burla in the district of Sambalpur, he cannot be permitted to perform USG at a Clinic situated at Attabira in the district of Bargarh. It was further contended that even though the Rules allow doctors to conduct USG at two different clinics in a particular district, it does not permit working in two different districts.

Justice Routray was of the opinion that the PCPNDT Rules do not explicitly prohibit Radiologists from practising in two different clinics situated in two different districts. The terms “within a district” have been employed to keep the doctors under the disciplinary and administrative superintendence of a District Advisory Committee (DAC). Since each district has one DAC, it cannot authorise a doctor to work under it when he is admittedly working under another DAC.

The Court further acceded to the contention of the petitioner that when the Superintendent of the VIMSAR, Burla has no objection to the petitioner working in Bargarh beyond his duty hours, the Bargarh DAC lacks authority to debar him. It also took note of the fact that the distance between the two workplaces is merely 25 KMs.

“Though the Petitioner has been refused to conduct ultrasonography at Rajaram Health Care, Attabira with purported reasons under Rule 3(3) of the PC & PNDT Rules, but on analysis of the same no justification is seen on the part of the District Advisory Committee of Bargarh to apply the provisions of Rule 3(3) of the PC & PNDT Rules to reject the request of the Petitioner, particularly when the Petitioner is admittedly a qualified Radiologist.”

Accordingly, the impugned prohibition order was set aside and the petitioner was allowed to work in the said private clinic.

Case Title: Jagabandhu Barik v. State of Odisha & Ors.

Case No: W.P.(C) No. 14988 of 2026

Date of Judgment: August 06, 2026

Counsel for the Petitioner: Ms. P.S. Mohanty, Advocate

Counsel for the State: Mr. S.K. Jee, Addl. Government Advocate

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 97

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 844 | RAVI KUMAR SINGH MALHOTRA VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:12:01 GMT

'Child Witness Testimony Not Convincing' : Supreme Court Sets Aside Murder Conviction

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RPNLU Prayagraj Appoints 12 Assistant Professors, Expands Faculty Strength To 18

Law School Correspondent — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:53:25 GMT

Dr. Rajendra Prasad National Law University, Prayagraj (RPNLU) has strengthened its academic framework with the appointment of 12 Assistant Professors, taking the University's total faculty strength to 18 members. The expansion includes 14 faculty members from the discipline of Law and 4 from Social Sciences, reflecting the University's commitment to interdisciplinary legal education.

According to the University, the newly appointed faculty members bring diverse academic and professional experience from institutions such as the University of Delhi, University of Allahabad, Banaras Hindu University, University of Lucknow, Gautam Buddha University, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, National Law University Jodhpur, National Law University Delhi, National Law University Odisha, and the Indian Institutes of Technology Kharagpur, among others.

The University stated that the new appointments are expected to strengthen teaching and research in emerging areas of law, including human organ transplantation, consumer protection, data privacy, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, forensic evidence, medical jurisprudence, FinTech, and regulation of digital businesses and emerging technologies.

The newly appointed faculty members are Dr. Aakriti Sharma, Dr. Astha Misra, Dr. Garima Singh, Dr. Gaurav Kumar, Dr. Gaurav Singh Sachan, Dr. Keerty Dabbas, Dr. Nikita Chaudhary, Dr. Ravi Prakash Rahul, Dr. Swati Kumari Mawandiya, Dr. Vivek Trivedi, Ms. Tanya Sagar, and Mr. Yash Saxena. The University stated that they have already assumed teaching responsibilities and have begun contributing to various academic and administrative committees.

The academic session 2026–27 commenced on August 1, 2026, with a range of academic, co-curricular and student-focused activities. The University expects the enhanced faculty strength to improve teaching, research, mentoring and institutional engagement.

RPNLU currently offers the five-year integrated B.A. LL.B. programme, along with LL.M. and Ph.D. programmes. The University stated that it aims to emerge as a centre of excellence in legal education, research and scholarship while fostering competent, ethical and socially responsive legal professionals.

At present, the University is functioning from its transit campus, while construction of its permanent campus at Jhalwa is progressing. Speaking about the development, Registrar Varun Kumar Pandey said that the permanent campus project has received significant support from Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, who serves as the Chairperson of the University. He added that the transition to the permanent campus is expected to enhance the University's academic and infrastructural capabilities.

Highlighting the University's growth, Vice-Chancellor Senior Prof. (Dr.) Usha Tandon said that under the leadership of Justice Manoj Misra, Judge of the Supreme Court of India and Visitor of the University, and Justice Arun Bhansali, Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court and Chancellor of the University, RPNLU is emerging as a vibrant centre of legal education and academic excellence.

The University stated that with its growing faculty strength, interdisciplinary academic orientation and developing permanent campus, it aims to strengthen its position in the national legal education landscape.

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NLU Jodhpur's Centre For Family Law Announces Inter-College Essay Writing Competition 2026

Law School Correspondent — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:47:17 GMT

The Centre for Family Law (CFL), National Law University, Jodhpur, has announced the First Edition of the CFL–NLUJ Inter-College Essay Writing Competition, 2026, centred on the theme “Reproductive Rights and Bodily Autonomy.”

The competition seeks to provide students with a platform to engage critically with contemporary legal, social, and ethical questions surrounding reproductive choice, bodily integrity, and the evolving contours of family law. By encouraging rigorous and original scholarship, the Centre aims to foster meaningful discourse on issues that continue to shape legal and policy debates both in India and globally.

About the Centre for Family Law

The Centre for Family Law, National Law University, Jodhpur, is dedicated to promoting scholarship, dialogue, and research in the field of family law and allied disciplines. Through lectures, discussions, publications, competitions, and other academic initiatives, the Centre seeks to foster critical engagement with contemporary legal and social issues affecting families and individuals.

About the Competition

The relationship between family law and questions of reproductive autonomy has become increasingly significant in contemporary legal discourse. Issues such as abortion rights, assisted reproductive technologies, maternal healthcare, child marriage, and bodily integrity raise complex questions concerning individual autonomy, state regulation, gender justice, and access to healthcare.

Recognising the need for sustained academic engagement with these issues, the Centre for Family Law has launched this essay competition to encourage students to explore the intersections between law, family, society, and individual rights through analytical and research-driven writing.

Theme: Reproductive Rights and Bodily Autonomy

Participants are invited to critically examine the legal, constitutional, social, and policy dimensions of reproductive rights and bodily autonomy through an interdisciplinary lens. The following sub-themes are merely indicative and not exhaustive:

Abortion: Reproductive Choice and State Control
Female Genital Mutilation and the Right to Bodily Integrity
Surrogacy and Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021
Maternal Health and Post-Birth Care
Child Marriage and Reproductive Autonomy

Participants are free to explore any topic that falls within the broader theme of the competition.

Awards and Recognition

The competition offers:

Cash prizes up to the tune of Rs. 10,000;
One-year CaseMine AI Pro subscriptions for the authors of the top three winning entries;
Publication opportunities in the Family Law Chronicle for selected submissions;
Certificates of Achievement, Merit, and Participation, as applicable.

Registration form and Fee payment portal

To facilitate the administration of the competition and ensure committed participation, the following registration fee shall be applicable:

Single-Author Submission: ₹300
Co-Authored Submission: ₹600

Please find the registration link attached: https://forms.gle/bYsK76wwn2GynfSJA

Please note that the link to the payment portal is attached in the description of the google form. Participants are required to upload proof of payment while completing the registration process.

Important Dates

Registration Deadline: 24 August 2026 [this has been extended to 13 August, 2026]
Submission Deadline: 10 September 2026

For detailed information regarding eligibility, formatting requirements, registration, and submission procedures, participants are advised to refer to the official competition brochure.

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CCCPL, RGNUL Invites Blogs On Competition Law & Consumer Protection

Law School Correspondent — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:25:02 GMT

Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab, was established by the State Legislature of Punjab by passing the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law Punjab Act, (Punjab Act No. 12 of 2006). In May 2015, RGNUL was the first and only NLU to have been accredited by National Assessment and Accreditation Council ("NAAC") with an 'A' grade. In March 2018, RGNUL was amongst the four NLUs including NLU Delhi, NALSAR and NLUO to have been granted autonomy by the University Grants Commission.

ABOUT CCCPL

The Centre for Competition and Consumer Protection Law (CCCPL) is a research centre dedicated to advancing understanding and promoting awareness of competition and consumer protection laws. Driven by a committed academic and research community, the Centre seeks to ensure a fair and competitive marketplace through rigorous scholarship and informed policy engagement. Through research, advocacy, and outreach initiatives, it contributes to the development of sound legal frameworks that safeguard the interests of both consumers and businesses.

ABOUT CALL FOR BLOGS

CCCPL is presently organising a Call for Blogs, inviting submissions on contemporary and emerging issues in competition law and consumer protection, with the aim of fostering meaningful academic discourse and policy-oriented analysis. The initiative seeks to provide a platform for students, researchers, practitioners, academicians, and other stakeholders to engage critically with evolving legal, economic, and regulatory developments in these fields.

ELIGIBILITY

Submissions are invited from:

• Academicians and Researchers

• Legal Practitioners and Policy Professionals

• Ph.D. Scholars

• Postgraduate and Undergraduate Students

THEME

The authors may send submissions centered around contemporary and relevant issues of competition law and consumer protection. An illustrative and non-exhaustive list of themes is provided in the brochure for reference. Authors are encouraged to interpret the themes creatively and explore any interdisciplinary angles.

SUBMISSION & FORMATTING GUIDELINES

· Submissions should be in the range of 1000 to 1500 words, with an abstract no longer than 70 words included in the 1500 words.

· Co-authorship of up to 2 authors is allowed.

· Use Times New Roman Font Size 12, with Line Spacing of 1.5.

· The manuscript should not contain the name of the author(s), institutional affiliation, or any other identification mark.

· Submissions should be the original work of the author(s). All manuscripts will be checked for plagiarism by the Editorial Board, and offensive, abusive, derogatory, or potentially defamatory submissions will be rejected. A similarity index of 12% will be strictly adhered to for all submissions.

· Submissions must only be made by filling out this Google Form. Submissions made through any other medium will be rejected.

· Once the Editorial Board receives the article, it will go through a rigorous review, and the decision about its acceptance or rejection shall be communicated to the author(s) within 24 days. It might, in unforeseen circumstances, extend to 30 days; the same would be communicated to the author(s) by the Board.

· Adhering to all the submission guidelines is mandatory.

The authors may kindly refer to the Brochure for additional submission guidelines.

SUBMISSION DEADLINES

The blog invites rolling submissions.

SUBMISSION PROCEDURE

Submissions made only in a .doc/.docx format are accepted.

The file name must be “Title_CCCPL Manuscript”. The Title of the manuscript should not be more than 12 words. Submissions must only be made by filling out this Google form. Submissions made through any other medium will be rejected.

CONTACT INFORMATION

You can reach us at cccplsubmissions@gmail.com

Click here for Brochure

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Supreme Court Dismisses Ex-Punjab Dy CM Sukhbir Singh Badal's Plea To Quash Defamation Complaint By AKJ Leader

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:24:21 GMT

The Supreme Court today(August 21) refused to quash a defamation case against Shirmani Akali Dali president and former Punjab Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal, filed by Rajinder Pal Singh, spokesperson of the religious organisation Akhand Kirtani Jatha.

A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu dismissed his special leave petition. Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal appeared for Badal.

It may be recalled that Pal Singh in 2017 filed a complaint against Badal under Section 499(defamation) of the Indian Penal Code. He alleged that Badal, when he was the Deputy CM, made certain defamatory statements in several newspapers alleging that the complainant and the AKJ were a "political front" of the largest terrorist outfit, Babbar Khalsa International.

This, the complainant said, was made because the then Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal had come to meet him. The Magistrate on March 4, 2020, prima facie concluded that the petitioner had made defamatory statements and summoned him under Sections 500 and 501 of the IPC.

Badal approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the complaint as well as the summoning order by the Judicial Magistrate. However, the High Court dismissed his petition.

Case Details: SUKHBIR SINGH BADAL v RAJINDER PAL SINGH|Diary No. 35327-2026

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Call For Blog Submissions | CJLT Blog, NLIU Bhopal

Law School Correspondent — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:15:52 GMT

The Centre for Jurisprudence and Legal Theory (CJLT) at NLIU, Bhopal, seeks to ignite rigorous scholarship in Jurisprudence and Legal Theory. The Centre aims to cultivate sustained interest in foundational legal thought, challenge the misplaced perception of jurisprudence as inherently abstruse, and push the boundaries of existing knowledge. Rooted in the belief that everything which is a human construct is ultimately intelligible to human beings, CJLT endeavours to simplify, amplify, and meaningfully signify the objectives and scope of jurisprudence. It further seeks to disseminate philosophical and scientific theories that shape the methods of answering questions seeking truth about law, while also addressing its interstices and silences.

About NLIU

National Law Institute University, Bhopal, ranks among the oldest and most esteemed National Law Universities in India. NLIU has led in providing quality legal education and has cultivated a global alumni network that has excelled in traditional legal fields as well as in public administration, academia, and policy-making. NLIU promotes and incentivizes a culture of academic rigor. The university fosters research in advanced legal fields, consistently organizing interdisciplinary and industry-wide workshops, seminars, and training programs on topics of current legal significance. The university serves as the alma mater for numerous esteemed journals that accept submissions from students, professionals, regulators, and academicians throughout the legal field, fostering a culture of academic research and facilitating multi-directional discourse.

About CJLT-Blog

The Blog serves as a platform for rigorous, analytical, and conceptually grounded engagement with jurisprudence, legal theory, and allied philosophical and interdisciplinary inquiries into law. We particularly encourage submissions that critically examine foundational questions concerning the nature, methods, values, and limits of law, while remaining clear, accessible and theoretically robust.

Eligibility

Contributions are welcome from students, researchers, practitioners, and academicians. Submissions should reflect strong legal reasoning, clarity of thought, and relevance to the field of Jurisprudence and Legal Theory.

Submission Details

Submission details can be referred through the centre's official website: cjlt.nliu.ac.in

For any queries regarding the blog, please reach out to blog.cjlt@nliu.ac.in. For any queries regarding the centre, please reach out to cjlt@nliu.ac.in.

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NFSU–TSUL Invite Applications For Dual Degree LL.M In Cyber Crime Law & Digital Forensics (2026–27)

Law School Correspondent — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:10:46 GMT

The National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) was established in 2009 as Gujarat Forensic Sciences University under the visionary leadership of the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi, who was then the Chief Minister of Gujarat. In 2020, the University was elevated to the status of a Central University through an Act of Parliament and designated as an Institution of National Importance under the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.

NFSU is the world's first and only university dedicated to education, training, research and innovation in forensic sciences and allied disciplines, including behavioural sciences, cybersecurity, digital forensics and criminology. Headquartered in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, the University presently operates through 16 campuses, including its first international campus in Jinja, Uganda. The University is at the forefront of advancing forensic applications in law, criminal justice administration, homeland security, governance and human rights. Through its interdisciplinary academic programmes, specialised training, research and policy engagement, NFSU develops highly skilled professionals capable of addressing contemporary challenges faced by national and international justice systems. Its broader vision is to integrate forensic science into justice delivery, governance and public policy.

About The School Of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies

The School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies (SLFJPS) at NFSU was established to provide interdisciplinary and professionally oriented legal education, with particular emphasis on the application of forensic science, technology and policy across diverse areas of law and justice administration. The School aspires to become a leading centre for education, research and professional training in forensic justice. It seeks to prepare legal professionals, policymakers, researchers and public officials to respond effectively to emerging challenges in criminal justice, cybercrime, digital evidence, forensic investigation, governance and technology regulation.

SLFJPS addresses the evolving requirements of the legal profession through intellectually rigorous, technologically informed and practically relevant academic programmes. Through its teaching, research, practical training and policy engagement, the School is committed to developing technology-proficient lawyers and justice-sector professionals capable of contributing meaningful, innovative and practically viable solutions to contemporary legal and policy challenges.

About Tashkent State University of Law (TSUL)

Tashkent State University of Law (TSUL) is a leading higher-education and scientific-methodological institution in Uzbekistan for the education, training and professional development of legal specialists. Rooted in Uzbekistan's national tradition of legal education, TSUL combines established academic foundations with modern pedagogical approaches. The University undertakes fundamental and applied research on contemporary questions of legislation and legal practice and contributes to legal awareness, legal culture and international academic cooperation.

About the Programme

NFSU, India, in collaboration with TSUL, Uzbekistan, invites applications for the Dual Degree LL.M. in Cyber Crime Law & Digital Forensics for the academic year 2026–27. Designed for the rapidly evolving field of digital justice, the programme integrates law, technology and forensic sciences and provides academic and cultural exposure in India and Uzbekistan. It enables learners to examine the legal, investigative, evidentiary and policy dimensions of cybercrime and emerging technologies through a comparative and interdisciplinary framework.

Programme Focus

The programme focuses on Cyber Crime Law, Digital Forensics, Cybercrime Investigation, Digital Evidence, Emerging Technologies and Comparative Legal Systems. Its interdisciplinary approach is intended to help learners understand how legal principles, forensic methods and technological tools interact in contemporary investigations, adjudication, regulation and policy development.

Programme Overview

Duration: Two semesters (one year)

Course Type: Regular, full-time

Credits: 60 credits

Semester I: National Forensic Sciences University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India

Semester II: Tashkent State University of Law, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Degrees Awarded: Two Master's degrees: LL.M. in Cyber Crime Law & Digital Forensics by NFSU and the corresponding Master's degree in Cyber Law by TSUL (programme code 70420127)

Total Intake: 30 students

Tuition Fee: USD 1,725 per semester

Eligibility and Selection Process

• A Bachelor's or Master's degree (Law) from a recognised or accredited institution

• Proficiency in English

• Participation in the prescribed interview process

Admission will be subject to verification of academic credentials and fulfilment of the applicable requirements prescribed by NFSU and TSUL.

Key Highlights

• Two Master's degrees awarded through two collaborating universities

• Academic and cultural exposure in India and Uzbekistan

• Interdisciplinary learning across law, technology and forensic sciences

• Engagement with global faculty and research opportunities

• Industry-oriented and policy-driven learning

• Career pathways in law firms, cybersecurity, digital investigations, government agencies and international organisations

Application Details

Last date to apply: 30 August 2026

Application form: https://forms.gle/s5whEQNBysqsMHyd7

NFSU admissions and information: https://nfsu.ac.in/news | https://nfsu.ac.in/CSAS

For any query, please write to us: admission_law@nfsu.ac.in

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“Courtroom Most Profound Classroom”: Justice Vinod Chandran Dissents On Relaxing 3 Year Practice Rule For Judicial Service

Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 12:59:06 GMT

Justice K Vinod Chandran has dissented from the Supreme Court judgment modifying the three-year practice requirement and reducing it to one year for recruitment as Civil Judge (Junior Division), holding that there was no ground to review the earlier judgment restoring the requirement.

Describing the courtroom as “the most profound of all classrooms”, Justice Chandran disagreed with the decision to replace the three-year practice requirement with a transitional arrangement of one year of deemed practice followed by one year each of training and law clerkship.

“The forensic and analytical skills of an adjudicator are better learnt in the profession by observing what happens in the Courts; not necessarily as a Presiding Officer controlling it, but as a keen and eager student of law; the Court room being the most profound of all classrooms. A Presiding Officer's mistake puts to peril a litigant, and her remedy is only by way of an appeal. A lawyer's mistake can be remedied by an experienced Presiding Officer, a seasoned Senior or an astute colleague, or even by a ministerial staff of the Court with first-hand experience of the proceedings. The requirement of experience is the need of the hour and essential in the immediate future, otherwise we would be accused of creating a cadre of careerists rather than of jurists capable of enriching a robust system, alive to the needs of the nation, society and its people”, the observed.

Justice Chandran also rejected the argument that the practice rule is futile as three years of practice did not equip young lawyers for judicial service because fledgling lawyers may not initially be entrusted with briefs or have opportunities to argue in court.

He pointed out that this contention raises a question on suitability of fresh lawyers being given decision-making responsibilities. “The question that arises immediately is that when a senior lawyer or litigant would not entrust a case to a lawyer who is fresh out of college, will it be safe to entrust such persons with the decision-making process in a case; when even legal services require an amount of experience to ensure; not mere representation, but quality assistance”, he highlighted.

Supporting the 3-year practice requirement, he emphasised that the initial years of practice involved much more than conducting trials or making arguments. A young lawyer learns by working with seniors, handling files, interacting with other lawyers and observing court proceedings, he observed, adding that drafting, research, cross-examination and formulating arguments were among the skills acquired through such experience.

Justice Chandran further disagreed with equating judicial service with other public services such as the IAS, IPS and IFS. He highlighted that judicial officers exercise adjudicatory powers without supervisory interference in their judicial acts, with errors being corrected through appeals, revisions or the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. For this reason, he said judicial service could not be equated with other public services in the context of recruitment requirements.

He also questioned the two-year training arrangement prescribed by the majority. He noted that requiring new recruits to undergo two years of training would mean that they would continue for two years on half the pay of a Civil Judge (Junior Division), while the period would not be reckoned as service. He opined that this would prejudice new recruits and place a strain on the exchequer, while vacancies in the judiciary would remain unfilled during the training period.

He further objected to making regular appointment dependent on the satisfaction of the High Court judge supervising the law clerkship, observing that this could create another hurdle in the transition from training to active service. He also pointed to the possibility of two classes of candidates emerging from the same recruitment process, with some having one year of practice and others having two, three or more years.

Justice Chandran agreed with the majority that some prior experience of court functioning was desirable for judicial recruits but said he could not agree with the structured two-year training program adopted by the majority. He observed that the 2025 judgment had been based on the views of a vast majority of High Courts and States, which had supported prior experience at the Bar.

He stressed that experience at the Bar was essential for law graduates “steeped in academics” to understand the affairs of people and the difficulties faced by litigants before deciding their cases. He also rejected criticism that the High Courts' views were based on anecdotal observations, prejudices and subjective reviews, pointing out that High Courts exercise administrative control over the District Judiciary and regularly assess the performance of judicial officers.

The three-year practice requirement had been removed by a three-judge bench in the 2002 All India Judges Association judgment and restored by another three-judge bench in 2025. Justice Chandran rejected the argument that the subsequent decision could not have altered the earlier judgment because it was a Coordinate Bench holding that this argument was “outrightly fallacious”.

“Quite attractive, in the normal circumstances, but outrightly fallacious in the scenario of a 'continuing mandamus'. The 1st All India Judges' Association v. Union of India case [(1992) 1 SCC 119] also decided by a three-judge bench; issued directions to improve the conditions of service of the judicial officers, found necessary to maintain independence of the judiciary”, he said.

He concluded that there was no scope for review of the earlier judgment and dismissed the review petitions.

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110 / 2025 and connected cases

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

Regular Appointment Can't Be Terminated Without Due Process: Jharkhand High Court While Staying Cancellation Of Recruitments Via JPSC Exams

Malavika Prasad — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:04:21 GMT

While staying Jharkhand government's orders cancelling recruitments made through 11th to 13th Jharkhand Public Service Commission Exams, the High Court High Court prima facie observed that regular appointments cannot be disturbed or terminated without following the principles of natural justice.

The Court made the observation while staying a notification cancelling the recruitment of Food Safety Officers pursuant to a 2023 Advertisement. It noted that there was no material before the State to show which candidates were involved in the alleged corruption and the investigation was still underway.

The petitioners contended that they were duly appointed pursuant to Advertisement No. 18 of 2023; however, all of a sudden, due to notification dated 18.08.2026, the entire examination/recruitment process has been cancelled and resultantly their services have been disengaged.

Petitioners' counsel said that without following natural justice, but "rather due to some pressure" as per his instruction, this action has been taken by the concerned respondent.

Senior Additional Advocate General submitted that though the counter-affidavit has not been filed, but as per his instructions, upon various allegations made by different citizens of the State, the State has already started in-depth enquiry by the Investigating Agency i.e. Crime Investigation Department (CID) and few arrests have also been made.

On principles of natural justice, he said that there was a mass bungling in the entire recruitment process and only due to that reason the Government has rightly cancelled the entire appointment pursuant to the Advertisement No. 18 of 2023.

Justice Deepak Roshan in his interim order observed:

"Having regard to the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is prima facie of the view that a regular appointment cannot be disturbed/terminated without following principles of natural justice. Till now, there is no material with the respondents to show as to which candidates are involved in corruption or else; inasmuch as, the Investigating Agency is already in action.

Further, so far as the issue of interim protection is concerned; this Court feels that interest of justice is paramount and in the instant case the interest of justice demands stay of the Notification dated 18.08.2026 (Annexure-4); inasmuch as, in effect they have been terminated without following any due process of law. Accordingly, learned counsel for the respondents are directed to file counter-affidavit giving in detail about the investigation and/or any further development. List this case on 15.09.2026 at 2:30 P.M. In the meantime, the operation, implementation and execution of the Notification No. 06/LO.S.A.-01-07/ 5404 of 2026 (Annexure-4) dated 18.08.2026 with regard to Advertisement No. 18 of 2023 shall remain stayed till further orders"

The court directed the Sr. AAG to inform the concerned department to allow the petitioners and other similar situated persons who are affected by the notification, to continue their work till disposal of the writ petition.

"However, looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, all the petitioners are directed to file an affidavit/undertaking to the effect that the final order passed by the trial court in connected criminal case shall be binding on them and the Government would be free to take appropriate action in accordance with law," the high court added.

The matter is listed on September 15.

Case title: Saurav Singh & Ors. v/s State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand & Ors.

W.P.(S) No. 6450 of 2026

Appearance:

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Adv Mr. Amritansh Vats, Adv Mr. Arpan Mishra, Adv Mr. Ankit Vishal, Adv Ms. Prerna Jhunjhunwala, Adv Mr. Kumar Abhishek, Adv Mr. Arpan. M. Ekka, Adv Mr. Ashish Choudhary, Adv Mr. Rahul Ranjan, Adv Mr. Akhouri Sankalp, Adv Mr. Sudhanshu Shekhar, Adv Mr. Suman Roy, Adv

For the Respondent (s) : Mr. Achyut Keshav, Sr. AAG Mr. J.F.Toppo, G.A.V Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Adv

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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Jharkhand High Court Extends Continuation Benefit Under SC Orders To Consumer Commission Members Who Retired Before May 21, 2025

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:00:36 GMT

The Jharkhand High Court has modified a State Government notification which restricted the benefit of continuation in office under the Supreme Court's Manendra Bhaskar Limaye ruling to Presidents and Members of Consumer Commissions who retired on or after May 21, 2025.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Deepak Roshan held that the Supreme Court's directions did not restrict the benefit to office-holders who retired on or after the date of its judgment. The Court said May 21, 2025 was merely the date on which the judgment was pronounced and not a qualifying date for entitlement.

The Court was hearing writ petitions filed by former Presidents and Members of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions at Latehar, Jamtara, Simdega and Dumka. The petitioners had been appointed in 2021 for a tenure of four years or until attaining the age of 65 years, whichever was earlier. They retired between September 2024 and February 2025.

The dispute arose after the State Government issued a notification dated October 10, 2025 pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Manendra Bhaskar Limaye (Limaye-II). The notification allowed Presidents and Members who had retired on or after May 21, 2025 to continue until completion of the fresh appointment process.

Since the petitioners had retired before May 21, 2025, they were excluded from its benefit. The State argued that the Supreme Court's directions protected only those Presidents and Members who were still serving when Limaye-II was pronounced on May 21, 2025. It therefore contended that the petitioners, having already retired, could not seek reinstatement.

The High Court disagreed. It said the relevant directions in Limaye-II did not create such a cut-off. The Court observed:

“As a matter of fact, Paragraph 102(4) of Limaye-II nowhere confines the benefit of continuation to Office-holders who retired on or after the date of the judgment itself. Paragraph 102(3) of the directions which governs Presidents and Members appointed and serving prior to Limaye-I entitles such persons to complete their tenure in entirety and, where tenure ends before completion of new recruitment process, to continue in office until that process is completed.”

The Bench noted that all the petitioners had been appointed in October-November 2021, before the Supreme Court's Limaye-I judgment of March 3, 2023. Their tenure subsequently ended before the recruitment process under the new rules was completed.

It therefore held that they fell within the category of Presidents and Members “appointed and serving prior to Limaye-I”. Their entitlement to continue until completion of the fresh recruitment process did not depend upon whether their original tenure ended before or after May 21, 2025.

The Court accordingly modified the October 10 notification to the extent it restricted the benefit to persons retiring on or after May 21, 2025. It directed that Presidents and Members appointed and serving prior to Limaye-I be allowed to complete their tenure and, where that tenure ended before completion of the fresh recruitment process, to continue until the process was completed.

The petitioners were directed to be re-employed in their respective District Consumer Commissions. Their service was also directed to be treated as uninterrupted from their respective dates of retirement until fresh recruitment is made or the Rules are suitably amended.

The writ petitions were accordingly allowed.

Case Title: Umesh Singh v. Union of India and Ors.

Case Number: W.P.(S) No. 7373 of 2025

Appearance: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Mr. Arpan Mishra and Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel for the Petitioners; Mr. M.K. Roy, G.A.-I, Mr. O.P. Tiwary, G.P.-III, Mr. Manish Kumar, G.P.-V and Ms. Bakshi Vibha for the Respondents.

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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Demarcate Forest Land In Bhopal, Remove Illegal Encroachments Within 3 Months: NGT Directs MP Govt

Malavika Prasad — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 11:02:02 GMT

National Green Tribunal, Central Zone Bench directed systemic removal of encroachments on central verges of roads in Bhopal using wire fencing, afforestation and geo-tagging and has further prohibited concretization in the green belt area.

The tribunal further directed Bhopal's Collector and the Divisional Forest Officer to undertake a joint survey and demarcate entire recorded forest land within the district preferably through GIS(Geographic Information System)/GPS and satellite imagery, submit the consolidated report and wherever illegal encroachment is found and there is no lawful impediment, the authorities have been directed to remove the same as per law within three months.

A bench of judicial member Justice Sheo Kumar Singh and expert member Sudhir Kumar Chaturvedi issued a slew of directions after noting that Percentage of district area under forest cover is less than 12% in Bhopal as per Indian State Forest Report (ISFR) 2023 and as compared to 2021 to 2023, there is a decline of approximately 0.54 sq.km. in Bhopal District only. The tribunal also remarked this was national data from ISFR which shows that the enhanced area of forest was "wrongly calculated" by the Forest Department.

It thus directed:

Encroachments on the site and central verges of the roads in Bhopal should be removed in a systematic way and year-wise followed by wire fencing, afforestation and geo-tagging in a phased manner. This exercise should be carried out in the other areas in coordination and cooperation with Ward Level Green Committee to be constituted by the Collector and the Bhopal Municipal Corporation.
A high resolution satellite imagery such as – bird's eye view or pic bird or high resolution drone survey should have been used followed by ground truthing for calculating the green belt and its encroachment.
The Respondents are directed to ensure that long lasting multi-purpose native species are to be selected for carrying out plantation to restore the area such as - Vad, Pipal, Khati Amli, Jamun, Desi Mango, Neem, Sesam, Kadam, Saj and Arjun to be given priority while carrying out plantation, considering their ecological importance for side verge and block plantation. For central verge of ornamental species of local origin of lower and middle canopy should be preferred for plantation for beautification and enhancement of greenery.
Similarly, for gaps in the forest area in the city, the Forest Department shall take up the plantation using saplings of local native forestry species as per working plan of the area from their own funds.
The order of Supreme Court with regard to removal of encroachments, must be strictly complied with within a time frame as directed by the Supreme Court and the Commissioner and Collector, Bhopal, shall monitor it through the committee and submit the compliance report to the Registrar of this Bench within three months. In case violations are found, the Registrar may place the matter for necessary orders.
No concretization allowed in green belt area which should be maintained as green belt only to act as lungs for the local residents.
The Principal Secretary, Forest Department, and PCCF & HoFF, are directed to monitor the efforts made by the Forest Department for removal of encroachments on quarterly basis. Details of the forest review be submitted to Registrar of this Bench for consideration.
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, is directed to call and collect the report from the District Headquarter and to submit the report within three months with regard to the encroachments and total area of the forest in a following proforma – “Sl. No./Name of the District/Total Forest Cover/Details of Encroachment/Protected Forest/Reserve Forest/ Deemed Forest/Sanctuaries and Protected Areas/ Any other Forest/Total Encroachments Upto June, 2026/ Action Taken For Removal of Encroachment Year-wise/ Actual Area Removed From Encroachment/ and Percentage Loss of Forest As On Date”.
The Collector, Bhopal, and the Divisional Forest Officer, Bhopal, are directed to undertake a joint survey and demarcation of entire recorded forest land within the district preferably through GIS/GPS and satellite imagery and submit the consolidate report and time bound action proceeding and where encroachment is found to be illegal and there is no lawful impediment, the concerned authorities shall take action for removal in accordance with law within three months.
The area should not only be removed from encroachers but it should be demarcated and protected by permanent boundary pillars, fencing wherever appropriate, entered correctly in the revenue records. Area freed from the encroachments should not be left open to invite future encroachment and, therefore, entire area is to be restored ecologically by taking up plantation by the Divisional Forest Officer. The Forest Department to carry out plantation in entire area to be converted into green cover within 12 months. The PCCF is directed to monitor the progress for the same.
The Committee duly constituted by the Collector will periodically monitor the encroachments and prepare a list on quarterly basis with regard to the name of the area, khasra khatoni number, if any, total area under encroachments, action taken for removal of encroachment alongwith date and remark column. This data should be collected and placed before the Collector for taking necessary actions. After submission of the data and compiling it, the District Magistrate/Collector concerned shall send a copy of this to the Registrar of the NGT Bench for taking further action.

The tribunal was hearing a plea seeking a direction to the Bhopal Municipal Corporation, Collector, Divisional Forest Officer and others to remove all types of encroachments (permanent or temporary) carried out on Central verges, side verges of all roads and parks in Bhopal and to carry out a time bound afforestation of local (indigenous) shrubs and trees on the areas designated for it to maintain minimum forestry and ecology of the city.

The tribunal further directed the respondent authorities to comply with the Madhya Pradesh Vrakshon Ka Parirakshan Nagriya Kshetra Adhiniyam (Tree Preservation (Urban Areas) Act) 2001 and if the number of trees for any development projects are required to be felled are more than the prescribed in the notification issued by the State Government then the matter may be referred to the High Level Centrally Empowered Committee constituted by the State.

It has also directed that Rules with regard to the compensatory plantation, compulsory afforestation, maintenance, green policy, plantation, transplantation, beautification and maintenance policy, 2015, must be complied with ensuring the survival of the trees according to the existing rules of the Forest Department and the Department shall monitor it.

Further, compensatory plantation within the municipal area will be monitored for 15 years by the committee comprising of the members of the Forest Department, Municipal Corporation, Horticulture Department and State PCB for ensuring better survival and establishment of the plantation.

The tribunal has also called for GIS mapping of the Bhopal Municipal Corporation area including central and side verges of roads inside the city as well as a tree census of the area. Bhopal Municipal Corporation is directed to prepare a futuristic planned afforestation strategy for conservation of trees and greenery in the area with identification of indigenous and endangered tree species to be planted with a minimum height of two meters.

With respect to wastewater, the Tribunal directed the Corporation to identify Sewage Treatment Plants in close proximity to plantation areas so that treated water could be effectively utilised to support plant growth. It also directed ward-wise mapping of the entire BMC area.

Further ward-wise public participation is of utmost importance to make the entire project successful for conservation and protection of local forestry and greenery and the BMC may organise the annual function for distributing the prize to those persons who maintain the greenery. This may promote the interest of the citizens and the units residing around the green belt.

The Corporation is directed to reconsider suitably amending the following relevant rules on certain aspects:

(a) All vacant land parcels over 200 sq. meters owned by BMC, Smart City Bhopal, or BDA must allocate at least 25% of their footprint to Miyawaki plots.

(b) The Bhopal Metro Rail Corporation Limited (BMRCL) is mandated to engineer vertical modular green facades across all concrete pillars along elevated lines.

(c) All active metro rail stations, depots, and public BRTS bus terminals must construct a 5-meter deep perimeter green buffer to capture vehicular emissions and reduce localized heat build-up.

(d) All new commercial, educational, and multi-family residential structures (Plot Area > 500 sq. meters) must cover at least 40% of unshaded roof space with living green roofs.

(e) Residential plots below 500 sq. meters must coat all exposed roof spaces with high-albedo, solar-reflective cooling paints exhibiting an initial Solar Reflectance Index (SRI).

The plea was disposed of.

Case title: Dr. Subhash C. Pandey v/s Bhopal Municipal Corporation & Others

Original Application No.17/2023(CZ)

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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Madras High Court Quashes FIR Against Students Who Peacefully Protested Conference On Eradication Of Sanatana Dharma

Upasana Sajeev — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 10:51:55 GMT

Building Rules Do Not Permit Conversion Of Residential Building Into A Prayer Hall: Madras High Court Rejects Plea Of Man To Convert Residence To Prayer Hall

The Madras High Court has quashed a criminal case registered against a law student and others for protesting against the conduct of a conference for the eradication of Sanatana Dharma. [2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 404]

Justice R Vijayakumar noted that the student and others had raised their agitation in a peaceful and democratic manner and there was no allegation of any damage to public property. Thus, the court held that continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process of law.

“ The petitioner and others, who belong to a Student Association had conducted a protest in front of a Conference Hall, where a meeting was conducted for eradication of Sanatana Dharma, The petitioner and others have raised their agitation in a peaceful and democratic manner and further, there is no allegation of any damage to any public property. In such circumstances, continuation of the criminal proceedings would only be an abuse of process of law,” the court observed.

The court was hearing a petition filed by Senthoorvelan. Senthoorvelan, along with seven others, had protested against the conduct of a conference for eradication of Sanatana Dharma. The prosecution alleged that despite warnings by police officials, the petitioners and others blocked the road and caused inconvenience to the general public.

The petitioner argued that he had raised his objection with regard to the conduct of the meeting and had peacefully conducted the protest in front of the Conference Hall. The petitioner argued that the same could not be considered an offence. The petitioner also pointed out that the chargesheet had not been filed for the past three years.

The prosecution argued that though the chargesheet was ready, it had not been filed yet.

Noting that the petitioners had conducted their protest peacefully and no public property had been damaged, the court was inclined to quash the case. Thus, the court quashed the FIR not only against the petitioner student but against all other accused also.

Counsel for Petitioner: Mr. PR. Malan

Counsel for Respondent: Mr. G. Ganesh Kumar Government Advocate (Crl.Side)

Case Title: M Senthoorvelan v State of Tamil Nadu and Another

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 404

Case No: Crl OP (MD) No 16688 of 2026

Click Here To Read/Download The Judgment

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Supreme Court Imposes Rs 5 Lakh Costs On Actress & Her Advocate For Wasting Judicial Time

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:14:29 GMT

The Supreme Court today (August 21) strongly disapproved of the conduct of Mumbai-based Advocate Rizwan Siddiquee and actress Rehana Khan, alias Rozlyn Khan, for wasting more than 11 years of the judiciary just for the sake of their reputation.

In view of the conduct of both sides, the Court also imposed costs. The appellant and the respondent were each directed to pay ₹5 lakh to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks, with the Court directing that the amount would be recovered in accordance with law in the event of non-payment.

To briefly state, the issue arose after Khan accused Siddiquee of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, alleging that he breached the fiduciary relationship by disclosing confidential client information to the media, issuing a public notice without consent, and making derogatory remarks about his client public. Khan made a complaint to the Bar Council of India, which initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the advocate.

The committee found Siddiquee guilty of professional misconduct and suspended his license for 2 years, and he was ordered to pay Rs. 3 lakhs to the complainant and Rs. 2 lakh to the BCI. Both challenged the BCI's order before the High Court and then before the Supreme Court.

Neither party approached the Court with clean hands'

A bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed that both parties suppressed materials and didn't approach the Court with clean hands.

The Supreme Court took a critical view of the manner in which both sides had conducted the litigation. The Bench noted that the parties had withheld relevant material and that the record disclosed instances of suppression, embellishment and claims developed after the fact.

The Court emphasised that judicial proceedings cannot be used as a means for parties to settle personal scores, repair reputations damaged by their own conduct, or obtain an advantage from disputes in which they themselves had played a substantial role.

'Eleven years' of judicial time consumed

The Bench expressed particular concern over the length of the litigation. It noted that the dispute had occupied the attention of the Bar Council of India, the High Court and the Supreme Court for approximately 11 years.

The Court stressed that judicial time is a limited public resource and that the time consumed by this dispute could otherwise have been devoted to litigants whose cases required genuine and timely judicial intervention.

The Bench consequently recorded its strong disapproval of the conduct of both parties, holding that each had contributed substantially to the controversy and its prolonged litigation.

Court's observations

It observed: "It is sometimes said that in a trial the parties already know the truth and it is the judge on the trial. The observation is a sobering one and the present case illustrates why. Before us are two litigants, each of who have approached the court in the confident expectation of vindication, and neither of whom has been candid with it. Every fact of consequence has had to be prised out of a record in which suppression, embellishment and afterthought are the common currency of both sides. The machinery of justice is not a facility placed at the disposal of parties to settle scores, to salvage reputations they themselves imperilled, or to extract advantage from a controversy of their own making. We say at the outset, giving our reasons in what follows, that neither the appellant nor the respondents leave this court with credit.

We are left with the observations with which we began: each of these parties has come to us complaining of a wrong, and each has been the author of a good part of it. Between them, they have occupied the time of the Bar Council of India, a High Court and this Court for eleven years. That time belonged to other litigants waiting for release they genuinely need. We record our strong disapproval of the conduct of both. In view of the above observations, the impugned order dated 11th August 2025 is upheld. civil appeal no. 12256/ 2025, civil appeal no. 7959/2026 and transfer case no. 30/ 2026 are all dismissed.

In view of the conduct of each party, we deem it fit to impose costs. The appellant and the respondent shall each pay Rs. 5 lac to be deposited to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks, failing which it shall be recovered in accordance with law. The pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."

After the judgment was pronounced, one counsel requested that the names of the parties may be redacted. However, Justice Nath refused and orally remarked that when advocates have been fighting all over on social media, there is no need for their names to be redacted in a Court's order. "Both of you have been putting everything on social media, you gave that interview."

Also from the judgment - Advocate Cannot Disclose Client's Confidential Information Even If She Turns Adversary : Supreme Court Upholds Lawyers' Suspension

Case Details: REHANA KHAN v RIZWAN SIDDHIQUEE|C.A. No. 12256/2025 & RIZWAN SIDDIQUEE v REHANA KHAN|C.A. No. 7959/2026

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 846

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

Calcutta High Court Declines Urgent Hearing In Plea Flagging Violence At Jadavpur University Between ABVP & FETSU Students

Srinjoy Das — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 10:25:19 GMT

The Calcutta High Court has declined an urgent hearing on a plea seeking immediate judicial intervention to restore law and order at Jadavpur University amid the ongoing unrest on the campus.

The development comes amid clashes at Jadavpur University between members of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) and students belonging to the Faculty of Engineering and Technology Students' Union (FETSU) during its ongoing annual general meeting. The rival groups have levelled allegations against each other in connection with the unrest on campus.

The plea was mentioned before a Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Atarup Banerjee, with the lawyer seeking the Court's urgent intervention in view of the prevailing situation at the University.

The lawyer also sought to tag the matter with an existing case concerning Jadavpur University pending before the High Court.

The Court, however, declined to hear the matter urgently and also refused the request to tag the issue with the pending proceedings. The Bench instead asked the lawyer to file a separate case concerning the latest developments at the University.

During the hearing, the lawyer also showed the Court video clips purportedly depicting a fire on the University campus and submitted that the situation required immediate judicial intervention.

The latest developments come against the backdrop of earlier proceedings before the Calcutta High Court concerning law and order and security at Jadavpur University, after a first-year student had earlier committed suicide amid allegations of ragging.

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CJP's Saurav Das Moves Delhi High Court Against Abhijit Iyer Mitra, Jaipur Dialogues Etc For Revealing Personal Info

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 10:31:02 GMT

Cockroach Janta Party's Saurav Das has filed a suit before the Delhi High Court against commentator Abhijit Iyer Mitra, and certain web portals over allegations of revealing his residential address and personal information on social media.

The suit seeks mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendants, which also include portals such Sunday Guardian, Jaipur Dialogues, Pamphlet and Lawbeat. The suit also names Google LLC and X Corp (formerly Twitter) as defendants.

The suit claims violation of Das' right to privacy, dignity and security. Das has also sought damages against the Defendants for intrusion into and publication of his private life.

Das has claimed that the defendants have unlawfully discovered, recorded, published and repeatedly disseminated his residential address and other deeply personal and sensitive information concerning his background, particulars of parents and his sexuality.

Relying on various videos posted on social media, Das claims that by reason of his journalistic work, disclosures made in the public interest and political engagement, he has been subjected to violent threats and targeted hostility even in the past.

He has said that repeated disclosure and amplification of his precise residential address creates a real and foreseeable risk of his being subjected to violence at and around his home.

As per him, such a disclosure also places other occupants of the premises at risk and has caused him a grave and continuing apprehension for their safety and security.

He has also alleged that the Pamphlet's representatives have trespassed the shared residential premises where he lives and that videos have been recorded of the portions of his house, including the interiors, and have been published on X.

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Supreme Court Orders Premature Release Of 105-Year Old Life Convict In 1988 Murder Case

Debby Jain — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:56:49 GMT

The Supreme Court today ordered premature release of a 105-year old life convict, Rasik Chandra Mondal, after confirming his interim bail/parole in a 1988 murder case.

A bench of CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana passed the order.

Mondal was booked by West Bengal police in 1988 for the offenses under Sections 143, 448, 302 and 324 of IPC. On December 12, 1994, he was convicted under Section 302. In 2018, the Calcutta High Court dismissed his appeal against conviction. He approached the Supreme Court as well, but the plea was dismissed.

Mondal approached the Supreme Court for premature release in 2020 when he was 99 years old. In 2024, the Court granted him interim bail/parole during the pendency of the petition (on terms and conditions to be fixed by the trial court).

Today, having regard to Mondal's age, the Supreme Court found no justification for not releasing him prematurely even if he had not completed his entire sentence.

Case :RASIK CHANDRA MONDAL v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL, W.P.(Crl.) No. 313/2020

Bihar Court Sentences 85-Year-Old Man To 3 Yrs In Jail In 1992 Attempt To Murder Case; Granted Provisional Bail

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Madras High Court Issues Notice On Plea By Arun IPS Seeking To Restrain Savukku Shankar From Posting Defamatory Videos Against Him

Upasana Sajeev — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:45:48 GMT

The Madras High Court has issued notice on a plea filed by IPS officer and former Tamil Nadu DVAC Chief Arun seeking to restrain YouTuber Shankar @ Savukku Shankar from making defamatory content against him. The IPS officer has also claimed damages to the tune of Rs 1 Crore from Shankar.

Justice K Govindarajan Thilakavadi has issued notice to Shankar, Google, YouTube and X Corp (previously Twitter).

Arun has moved the court seeking to restrain Shankar, his agents, followers, or any other person acting on their behalf, from publishing, republishing, broadcasting, uploading, circulating, sharing, transmitting, posting, reposting, or disseminating any content containing defamatory allegations, insinuations, or imputations concerning Arun, whether by name, photograph, designation or otherwise.

The officer also claimed Rs 1,00,05,000 as damages from Shankar for the loss of reputation, emotional distress, mental agony, professional harm caused to Arun and the violation of his dignity and privacy. As an interim measure, Arun has also sought directions to YouTube and X Corp (previously Twitter) to take down the infringing content that was posted by Shankar against Arun.

It may be noted that earlier this year, Shankar had approached the court seeking a CBI probe based on the recent remarks made by a division bench of the High Court, where the bench had censured the IPS officer for passing a detention order for extraneous considerations.

In his plea, Shankar submitted that despite such a grave observation by the High Court, the State had not taken any action against the officer. He added that the continued inaction of the State, despite clear judicial censure, has given rise to a reasonable apprehension that no impartial enquiry or investigation would be undertaken by the State authorities.

The court had, however, rejected the plea, observing that public interest litigation is a tool intended to reach marginalised and vulnerable segments of society and not a tool for vindicating personal animosity. The court also noted that the personal allegations made by Shankar against Arun would show that the intent behind the PIL was not purely public-spirited.

Shankar had also made allegations against Arun through videos on his YouTube channel. This has prompted the officer to approach the court seeking to restrain Shankar and for damages.

Case Title: A Arun IPS v A Shankar @ Savukku Shankar and Others

Case No: CS 195 of 2026

ICC Decision That Complaint Lacks 'Sexual Element' Can Be Challenged Under POSH Act: Bombay High Court

Narsi Benwal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:45:28 GMT

A decision of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) rejecting a complaint under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) (POSH) Act, 2013 at the threshold with a finding that 'no sexual element' is involved in the plaint, without conducting an enquiry, would still amount to a 'recommendation' under the Act and the said decision can be 'appealed' before an Industrial Court, held the Bombay High Court on Wednesday (August 19).

Single-judge Justice Sandeep Marne therefore, held that if such a decision of the ICC is not construed as a 'recommendation' it would leave an aggrieved woman 'remediless.'

The judge turned down the argument that the decision of the ICC to reject the complaint at the threshold cannot be construed to be a recommendation as no enquiry as mandated under section 11 of the POSH Act, is conducted.

"If the Internal Committee does not conduct inquiry in the manner prescribed under Section 11, the same may vitiate its decision/recommendation. However, mere non-conduct of inquiry in respect of complaint of sexual harassment by the Internal Committee would not save its decision from the ambit of the expression 'recommendation' under Section 13 of the POSH Act. Even if Internal Committee does not conduct an inquiry but still makes a decision on a complaint of sexual harassment, such decision would be a 'recommendation' within the meaning of Section 13(2) or (3) of the POSH Act," the bench held.

To illustrate, the judge explained, that upon receipt of a complaint of sexual harassment, the ICC writes to the employer to terminate the services of the Respondent-employee without holding inquiry, such course of action of the committee would assume characteristic of a 'recommendation' and the mere vice of non-holding of inquiry would not save such action from the ambit of the expression 'recommendation' used under Section 13(3) of the POSH Act.

On the same analogy, the judge added, "If the Internal Committee, upon receipt of complaint of sexual harassment, rules that the complaint does not constitute sexual harassment of the complainant, such ruling by the Internal Committee would also assume characteristic of a recommendation made under Section 13(2) of the POSH Act. This is because the employer acts on such decision of the Internal Committee and does not take any further action in the manner as per Section 13(2) of the POSH Act. Therefore, a ruling by the Internal Committee that the complaint does not constitute sexual harassment, which is arrived at without holding any inquiry, would still be a 'recommendation' within the meaning of Section 13(2) of the POSH Act."

Further, the judge pointed out that the legislative object is not to reward the Internal Committee which violates mandate of Section 11(1) (conducting enquiry) for making its decision challenge free and thus, when the Internal Committee violates mandate of Section 11(1) and makes a decision without holding inquiry, which may result in adverse action against the Respondent-employee, some remedy has to be provided to the affected employee by treating such decision of the Internal Committee as a recommendation within Section 13(3) of the POSH Act.

"In my view therefore, provisions of POSH Act must not only be interpreted liberally but in the event of any difficulty, the same must be interpreted in favour of class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. Therefore, a plain and strict interpretation of Sections 13 and 18 of the POSH Act would result in a situation where an aggrieved woman is rendered remediless against a decision of the ICC, essentially on account of ICC's failure to conduct an inquiry. In such circumstances, the Courts ought to adopt a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the POSH Act so as to give the character of a 'recommendation' to a decision of the ICC holding that the complaint does not disclose any sexual element," the bench emphasised.

In the instant case, the bench noted, that the employer has taken cognisance of the complaint and the same has been forwarded to the ICC. The reference was in fact made by the employer to an external ICC member since there was a conflict involved qua one of the members of ICC and accordingly, the ICC headed by an external member, took cognisance of the complaint and has rendered its decision on the same.

"Its conclusion is a recommendation as held and the same would accordingly be appealable. In the Appeal, the Industrial Court would decide whether the ICC is right in concluding that the complaint does not involve an element of sexual harassment," the judge made it clear.

The High Court's verdict arises from an petition filed by some of the employees of Maple Infra, an infrastructure investment trust, who challenged the decision of an Industrial Court pronounced in May 2026, wherein the Industrial Court held the decision of an ICC on a complaint of one of the female employees, to be appealable under section 18 of the POSH Act.

The employees contended that the female employee's complaint was rightly dismissed or rejected by the ICC at the threshold as there was no 'sexual element' in her plaint against one of the senior employees of the company. However, the Industrial Court while deciding the applications on maintainability of the female employee's appeal challenging the ICC's October 2025 decision communicated through an email, held that the complainant was indeed working in an 'uncomfortable' environment and ordered the ICC to reconsider the complaint afresh.

By the detailed 64-page judgment, Justice Marne held that the ICC's October 2025 decision via email can be held to be a 'recommendation' and thus is appealable before the Industrial Court. The judge, however, held that the Industrial Court while deciding the issue of maintainability of the appeal could have avoided entering into the merits of the appeal. He therefore, ordered the Industrial Court to again consider afresh the complainant woman's appeal against the ICC Decision.

With these observations, the bench disposed of the petitions.

Appearance:

Senior Advocates Sharan Jagtiani and Ashish Kamat along with Advoctes Madhavi Nalluri, Shraddha Achliya, Ankoosh Mehta, Mansi Chheda, Arunima Phadke and Ankita Singhania instructed by Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas appeared for the Petitioner Employees.

Advocates Karl Tamboly, Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, Aseem Naphade, Vilasini Balasubramanian and Victoria Gonsalves instructed by Jayakar & Partners represented the Complainant.

Assistant Government Pleaders VR Raje and AA Nadkarni represented the State.

Case Title: Anup Vikal vs State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition 7430 of 2026)

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Bom) 396

Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

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Supreme Court Closes 2023 Pleas Against 'The Kerala Story'; Allows To File Fresh Plea For Guidelines On Films Promoting Hate

Debby Jain — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:35:11 GMT

Supreme Court Expresses Disinclination To Entertain Plea To Stop Release Of 'The Kerala Story' Movie

The Supreme Court today disposed of 3 petitions pertaining to the movie 'The Kerala Story' which attracted widespread controversy in 2023.

A bench of CJI Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana heard the matter. While one of the petitions (by producer-Sunshine Pictures) was withdrawn, Advocate Nizam Pasha, for petitioners (Qurban Ali and BR Aravindakshan) in two other cases, stressed that despite the release of the movie, issues survive.

Pasha urged that the High Court had disposed of the petitioner's writ petition on similar issue, observing that a writ petition is not maintainable against the grant of certificate to a movie by CBFC. He said that while statutory remedy is available only to the producer, other persons aggrieved by a movie have to take recourse to a writ petition.

While Justice Mohana noted that the movie ended up being released, Justice Bagchi remarked that the question of law could be left open. "The litigation has to await another movie...another movie that is controversial, we will go into that question", J Bagchi said.

Pasha then highlighted that the petitioner had approached the Court seeking cancellation of the movie's certificate, and that the movie is still accessible on OTT platforms. He pressed for hearing of the matter by further pointing out that the petitioner had approached against an interim order of the High Court, but later the High Court disposed of the writ petition noting that the Supreme Court was seized of the issue.

"Guidelines have to be laid down for films that promote hate speech", he urged. "Alright, file a comprehensive writ petition seeking general guidelines", replied CJI. The bench recorded in the order that the question of law would remain open and parties would have liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings.

One of the petitions, which the Court closed today, was filed by the producers Sunshine Pictures Pvt Ltd and Vipul Amritlal Shah challenging the West Bengal Government's ban on the film. In May 2023, the Supreme Court had stayed the West Bengal Government's ban.

To recap, the movie 'Kerala Story', directed by Sudipto Sen and produced by Vipul Amrutlal Shah, attracted controversy for making claims that nearly 32,000 women from Kerala were converted through deceit into Islam and forced to join ISIS. The then Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan, the ruling party of the state CPI(M) and the opposition Congress came out against the movie, saying that it was peddling false propaganda to create communal hatred and to portray the state in a bad light.

Following the Supreme Court's refusal to interfere, the aggrieved parties approached the Kerala High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court however refused to stay exhibition of the movie, while recording the submission of the producer that the movie's teaser (which claimed that over 32000 women from Kerala were recruited by ISIS) would be removed from their social media accounts.

A sequel of the movie by the name of 'The Kerala Story 2' was released this year in February. Initially, a single Bench of the High Court stayed its release noting that the CBFC failed to properly assess whether the film threatened communal disharmony. However later, in a special sitting, a Division Bench of the Court lifted the stay.

Case: QURBAN ALI v. CENTRAL BOARD OF FILM CERTIFICATION AND ANR., SLP(C) No. 10166/2023 (and connected cases)

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Mere Credit Of Fraud Proceeds Into Bank Account Doesn't Establish Involvement In Crime: MP High Court

Jayanti Pahwa — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:33:59 GMT

Madhya Pradesh High Court- Principal Seat at Jabalpur

‘Such Appointments Purely Professional In Nature, Cannot Be Categorized As Public Employment’: MP High Court Denies Reservations In Appointment Of Law Officers At Office Of Advocate General

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has granted anticipatory bail to 78 year old reitered IFS and ex-serviceman accused in a cheating and forgery case, observing that merely because an amount was credited into his bank account, by itself, is insufficient to conclude that he was knowingly involved. [2026 LiveLaw (MP) 336]

The bench of Justice Ajay Kumar Nirankari noted that the petitioner has provided an explanation regarding the amount credited and no evidence was shown that he was likely to abscond, tamper with evidence, or influence the witness.

Thus, the bench directed:

"Having considered the rival submissions and the material available on record, this Court is of the considered view that, at this stage, the mere fact that an amount was credited into the bank account of the applicant, by itself, would not be sufficient to conclude that the applicant was knowingly involved in the commission of the alleged offences. The applicant has furnished a specific explanation that his bank and debit-card details had been obtained by an unknown person on the pretext of assisting him in obtaining an insurance amount and the subsequent transactions were carried out without his knowledge".

An application seeking anticipatory bail was filed by the petitioner, a retired IFS officer and ex-serviceman, for offences including cheating (Section 420) and forgery (Section 467) of the IPC.

Per the prosecution, a complaint was lodged on July 13, 2024, alleging that various persons posing as representatives of SBI Life, Bharti AXA, Kotak Life and other institutions obtained a total amount of ₹26.11 lakhs from him through various bank accounts and electronic modes by making false representations, using forged documents, and giving misleading assurances in the name of insurance.

Investigation revealed that a total of ₹15.15 lakhs was transferred by the complainant into the applicant's bank account between July 6 and December 26, 2023, which prima facie appeared to be proceeds of the alleged crime.

The counsel for the petitioner argued that he retired from service in 2008. In 2023, he received unknown messages and calls from a person who introduced himself as a helper in obtaining an insurance amount. The said person obtained the petitioner's bank account details.

It was argued that owing to the petitioner's old age and belief that he was required to receive an insurance amount, he placed faith in said caller and disclosed details of his debit card.

Thereafter, the police called the petitioner on June 24, 2026, regarding the said deposit in his account. The petitioner discovered that he was shown as accused 9 in the crime.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that he had no knowledge regarding the withdrawal or utilization of the disputed amount and merely because certain transactions happened through his bank account, the same does not establish his involvement in the offence.

The counsel further informed the court that the petitioner only used a basic keypad phone and was a permanent resident of Karnataka. He had sought interim protection from the Karnataka High Court to approach this High Court for relief.

The counsel for the State argued that the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature and related to an economic offence. The counsel argued that the petitioner's bank account was directly used to receive the alleged proceeds of crime, and therefore his involvement cannot be ruled out at this stage.

The State argued that custodial interrogation may be necessary to ascertain the circumstances in which his bank account was used and by whom.

The court noted that the petitioner had frnished specific explaination that his bank and debit card details were obtained by an unknown person on the pretext of helping him obtain the insurance amount.

The bench also noted, "the material allegations primarily relate to banking and electronic transactions which can be investigated through documentary and electronic evidence, this Court is of the view that custodial detention of the applicant is not shown to be indispensable at this stage".

The bench also took note of the applicant's advanced age, his status as a retired IFS officer and ex-serviceman, and the absence of criminal antecedents. Therefore, the court deemed it appropriate to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner.

Case Title: Govindappa Jayaramaiah v State of Madhya Pradesh, MCRC-38769-2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (MP) 336

For Petitioner: Advocate Sandeep Kumar Sen

For Complainant: Advocates Bhanu Pratap Yadav and Shivani Raikwar

For State: Government Advocate Amit Pandey

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LiveLaw Supreme Court Half-Yearly Digest 2026 - Constitution Of India

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:30:59 GMT

Constitution of India

Constitutional & Administrative Law — Correlative Public Duties of Local Authorities — Maintenance of Pedestrian Infrastructure – The Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths carries a corresponding, enforceable legal duty upon public authorities - Wherever a road exists, there is a strict public duty to ensure a footpath is demarcated, constructed, and safely maintained - The primary duty-bearers responsible for provisioning and safeguarding this pedestrian infrastructure are Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, and Panchayats. [Paras 7 - 10] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Constitution of India – Judicial Review of Employer's Decision on Suitability – Appointment to Disciplined Force – Criminal Antecedents and Acquittal via Compounding - Even after a truthful disclosure of past criminal cases ending in acquittal, an employer retains the discretion to assess a candidate's suitability for appointment - such a decision cannot be arbitrary - To survive judicial review, it must be supported by material on record demonstrating that an offence involving moral turpitude was indeed committed and that the candidate was linked to it, despite earning an acquittal on technical grounds, benefit of doubt, or due to witnesses turning hostile or being won over. [Para 14] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493

Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers & Judicial Review - Judiciary cannot create or expand criminal offences or prescribe punishments in the absence of legislative action - The Supreme Court held that the authority to enact binding general norms of conduct, formulate policy, and choose legislative responses falls squarely within the exclusive province of the Legislature - Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers embedded in the Indian Constitution, the functional demarcation between the organs is fundamental; one organ cannot usurp the essential functions of another - While Courts can fill interstitial gaps to protect fundamental rights when a absolute legislative vacuum or constitutional silence exists, they cannot supplant the legislative scheme or construct parallel regulatory regimes where the field is already fully occupied by substantive law. [Relied on SCWLA v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 680; Dr. Ashwini Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 585; Paras 25-98, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Constitutional Law – Writ of Continuing Mandamus - Continuing Mandamus cannot be issued in anticipation of future contingencies or to micro-manage executive functions - The device of "continuing mandamus" is a judicial innovation designed to secure compliance with a declared right against institutional inertia, rather than a substantive standalone writ remedy - It cannot be deployed to keep matters pending in anticipation of future contingencies or possible defaults that have not yet arisen - To assume executive failure in advance and maintain continuous judicial oversight would violate the principle of institutional comity, transgress the doctrine of separation of powers, and unconstitutionally reduce the Court's role to the "micro-management" of matters falling strictly within the executive domain. [Relied on Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 80 and National Federation of Indian Women v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 719 of 2023; Paras 65, 67, 69, 73, 75] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Article 12 - Definition of State

Article 12 – Definition of 'State' – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) - The Supreme Court held that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, writ petitions filed by its employees under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable - Key Determinants for Article 12 Status – Supreme Court observed that while no single test is exhaustive, the cumulative effect of the following factors established AFGIS as an instrumentality of the State - i. Deep and Pervasive Control - The Society was established with the sanction of the President of India, who also approved its deputation rules; ii. Administrative Dominance - The Board of Trustees and Managing Committee consist entirely of serving senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF); iii. Compulsory Nature - Membership and premium deductions are mandatory for all IAF personnel as an integral part of their service conditions, leaving no choice to the individual; iv. Public Function - The Society performs a public duty by providing insurance and welfare to armed forces personnel, which is a core government function linked to national sovereignty and security; v. Self-Representation - The Society had previously represented itself as 'Government' to seek exemptions from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111; Paras 15-19] Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2026 INSC 233

Article 12 and Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition against a Society – Fiduciary Duty of Government Officers in Governing Bodies – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a Society (HEWO) comprising government employees, especially when issues of lack of transparency, unfairness, and unreasonableness in the allotment of housing facilities are raised - Noted that ex-officio members of a Governing Body, who are responsible government officers, must act in a fiduciary capacity for the common good, ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability while eschewing favoritism, bias, and arbitrariness. [Para 5]. Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Article 14 – Equality before law

Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial Assistance, Not Compassionate Appointment - The plain, unambiguous language and text of Rule 23(1), as well as its marginal heading, confine its operation strictly to "compassionate financial assistance" - It contains no express or implicit reference to "compassionate appointment" - Extending a provision textually confined to financial assistance to cover compassionate appointment would amount to judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation - Purposive construction cannot be used to override unambiguous text or plug a perceived legislative gap - The Rules of 2019 maintain a meticulous and deliberate structural separation between the two forms of relief across all definitional, procedural, eligibility, and administrative domains - Rule 5(1)(a) defines financial assistance as a monthly monetary payment, whereas Rule 5(1)(b) defines compassionate appointment as public employment - The two are qualitatively distinct forms of relief - The omission of "compassionate appointment" from Rule 23(1) must be regarded as deliberate - Absence of Sequential Hierarchical Bar for Compassionate Appointment - Rule 5(1)(f) (defining family for financial assistance) utilizes a strict cascading sequencing mechanism using the word "failing" across multiple sub-clauses, creating a mandatory priority bar - Rule 5(1)(g) (defining family for compassionate appointment) merely lists eligible categories (widow/widower, children, dependent siblings) and completely omits any "failing" or conditional language - no absolute statutory bar prevents the consideration of a child's claim for compassionate appointment solely because the widow's claim has not been conclusively determined, particularly where the widow has explicitly renounced her claim - Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) Upheld within its Proper Domain - Rule 23(1) is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution - It is a temporary, regulatory, and preventive measure not a penal one aimed at preventing a person criminally culpable for an employee's death from accessing the welfare scheme - The classification has a rational nexus with its object - its validity does not extend its applicability to the field of compassionate appointment, which it does not govern – The Supreme Court noted a significant anomaly in the Rules of 2019: the lesser form of relief (financial assistance) is suspended during criminal trials for the murder of the employee, while the substantially greater form of relief (permanent public employment) lacks a corresponding safeguarding provision - While the Court cannot rewrite the rules to rectify this lacuna, it is strongly desirable for the State Government to introduce appropriate amendments to bridge this legislative gap. [Relied on Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 329; M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925; Paras 15-45] Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2026 INSC 640

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Section 3 – Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 – Clause 2(p) – Government Order No. 6 of 2019 dated 05.08.2019 – Paragraph IV(10) and Paragraph V – Compassionate Appointment / Allotment of Fair Price Shop – Exclusion of 'Married Daughter' from the definition of 'Family' – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 15(1) – Gender-based Stereotype - Key Issue - Whether the blanket exclusion of a 'married daughter' from the definition of 'family' for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent/compassionate quota is constitutionally sustainable – Supreme Court held – i. Gender Discrimination and Arbitrary Classification - The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of "family" under Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order and Paragraph IV(10) of the G.O. fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary - The distinction lacks any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the welfare-oriented object of the scheme, which is to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of a deceased dealer; ii. Impermissible Stereotypes - Supreme Court observed that while a married son continues to be considered a part of the family, a daughter is excluded solely because of her marriage - This distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter loses all ties with her natal family upon marriage which is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution; iii. Dependency as a Question of Fact - Dependency is a question of fact to be determined in each individual case and cannot be conclusively or speculatively presumed based entirely on marital status or assumptions regarding local residence; iv. Doctrine of Purposive Construction Applied - Applying the doctrine of purposive construction to avoid an unjust or arbitrary result, the Court read down the provision - The expression "daughter" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order must be interpreted to include a married daughter, provided she establishes factual dependency on the deceased dealer, submits a dependency certificate along with No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from other adult family members, and satisfies all other eligibility criteria, including local residence. [Relied on Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors. v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1954) 2 SCC 791; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619; Paras 18-27] Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2026 INSC 617

Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 – Equity and Social Justice – Held that long-serving employees who have rendered continuous, uninterrupted service spanning decades and have been functionally assimilated into the regular framework cannot be retained in a precarious status to deny them social security - The distinction between temporary and permanent employment becomes substantively illusory when the nature of duties performed is identical to regular employees - The State, as a model employer, is bound by constitutional mandates to ensure fair conditions of work and economic justice. [Paras 35-40] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Public Interest Litigation — Regularisation vs. Demolition — Doctrine of Proportionality and Irreversibility — Irregular allotment of land by City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited (CIDCO) to a private developer without a competitive tender process - The High Court declared the allotment illegal and ordered restoration/demolition but granted liberty to apply for regularisation – Held that demolition of a fully operational commercial complex (shopping mall and hotel) after 17 years, an investment of ₹450 crores, 8,000 livelihoods, and ₹100 crores of annual tax revenue would not vindicate public interest - The severity of a remedial measure must bear a rational and proportionate relationship to the nature and magnitude of the wrong - Financial prejudice to the public authority can be remedied through a rigorous financial recovery mechanism, whereas demolition causes catastrophic and irreparable socio-economic harm - Public law must distinguish between remedies that restore public welfare and those that merely punish at the cost of the public - Demolition order set aside. [Paras 22, 23, 24, 26] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Equal Pay for Equal Work / Regularization — Parity in Service benefits - The State Government framed a policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster Roll workers engaged prior to 01.04.1993, under which approximately 30,000 workers were regularized - The appellants, who were similarly situated, engaged prior to the cut-off date, and had rendered continuous service for decades, were excluded due to clerical errors and administrative lapses on the part of the State - Held, the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to a smaller group within the same identifiable class without demonstrating a valid distinction - Equality does not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy - Exclusion of the appellants is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Karnataka & Others v. M.L. Kesari & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66; Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99; Paras 60 - 78] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14 and 16 — Public Employment — Arbitrary Contractual Appointment against Regular Vacancy — Validity of Selection Process — Even by the most liberal approach to the primacy of selection committees in educational institutions, denying a regular appointment to a fully qualified candidate while appointing others on a regular basis through the same selection process is patently illegal and unconstitutional, especially when the selection record discloses no reasons for such differential treatment - If a candidate is deemed unsuitable for a regular appointment, they cannot be recommended even on a contractual basis. (Paras 12 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Public Employment — Doctrine of Estoppel/Acquiescence — Unemployed Candidate accepting Contractual Appointment under Economic Compulsion — The choices for the unemployed are few - Joining a post on a contractual basis and working for a considerable period does not estop the employee from challenging the patent illegality or arbitrariness in the selection procedure, nor does it wipe out the violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (Paras 6, 10 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 16, 226, 142 and 309 — Mandamus for Regularisation contrary to Statutory Rules — High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by contractual para-teachers seeking regularisation — Held that Courts exercising powers under Articles 226 or 142 cannot issue a mandamus to regularise services contrary to the statutory scheme or rules made under Article 309 - Adherence to statutory rules must be insisted upon to protect the rights of open-market candidates and preserve the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity in public employment. [Paras 11 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 – Equal Treatment and Arbitrary Classification – Pendency of litigation cannot be a valid basis for classification - Denying engagement orders to candidates simply because litigation was pending against them as on the date of the closure of a government scheme, while issuing engagement orders to similarly situated candidates with no pending litigation, fails the twin-test of reasonable classification - Mere pendency of litigation is an extraneous circumstance and bears no rational nexus with the objective of maintaining educational standards. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Relaxation – Arbitrariness and Discrimination – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench order that had upheld the Registrar's rejection of a promotion recommendation - held that when the Board of Directors—the competent authority validly exercises its discretion to grant relaxation in educational qualifications based on an employee's long service and competence, the Registrar cannot arbitrarily reject such a proposal - Denial of promotion to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated employees (Sushil Kumar Tripathi and Ram Swaroop Pandey) possessing the same qualifications constitutes a violation of the fundamental concept of equality. [Paras 6 - 9] Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353

Constitution of India – Key Principles and Reliance – i. Twin Tests of Article 14: For a classification to be valid, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those grouped together from others; and (2) that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved; ii. Arbitrariness as the Enemy of Equality: Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicitly unequal and violative of Article 14; iii. Financial Crunch vs. Discrimination: While a financial crunch may justify deferring benefits or setting implementation dates, it cannot justify providing discriminatory rates of enhancement for the same inflationary pressure once the decision to grant the benefit has been made. [Relied on D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors (2025) 1 SCC 1; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 72; Paras 20-28] State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352

Constitution of India – Article 14 and Article 32 – Public Procurement – Transparency and Accountability – Facts – Petitioners alleged systemic nepotism and corruption in Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that public works were awarded to firms related to the Chief Minister and other high officials without open tenders - CAG report identified missing vouchers worth crores and repeated execution of works without tenders - The State holds public resources as a trustee on behalf of the people - Award of public contracts and execution of works must be transparent, fair, and free from arbitrariness or undisclosed conflicts of interest – Extraordinary power under Article 32 to transfer investigation to the CBI must be exercised sparingly and in exceptional situations - Such transfer is justified where high officials are involved, where the investigation by State machinery lacks credibility, or to instil public confidence in the rule of law. Save Mon Region Federation v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2026 INSC 320

Constitution of India – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Reasonable Classification – Dearness Allowance (DA) vs. Dearness Relief (DR) – Whether the State/KSRTC can effect a classification between serving employees and pensioners by granting enhancement of DA/DR at differential rates – HELD: No, The object of both DA and DR is common: to mitigate the hardship of inflation - Inflation hits both serving and retired employees with equal force - Once a decision is taken to provide and increase these allowances based on inflation, fixing a higher rate for serving employees (14%) than for pensioners (11%) has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and is discriminatory and arbitrary. State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - The Supreme Court dismissed a batch of appeals filed by the Union of India against various High Court judgments which had ruled in favor of candidates from the OBC category - The central controversy was whether the salary of parents employed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private sectors could be the sole basis for "Creamy Layer" exclusion in the absence of established "equivalence" with government posts - held that treating PSU/private employees differently from Government servants (where salary is excluded from the income test) constitutes hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 – Unconstitutionality – Held: The impugned Act, which provides for the complete takeover of the management and assets of a private trust-run institution (Sinha Library) without a principled framework for compensation or a demonstration of mismanagement, is "manifestly arbitrary" - The State cannot use its legislative power to single out a specific institution for takeover without an intelligible basis or fair process - The Act fails the test of reasonableness and non-confiscatory nature required under Article 300A. Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness – Evolution and Application – Held: Manifest arbitrariness is a well-settled ground for striking down plenary legislation under Article 14. A law is manifestly arbitrary when it is "capricious, irrational, or not guided by any principle" or is "excessive and disproportionate" - A legislative enactment that targets a specific entity for total deprivation of management and property rights without following due process, providing adequate compensation, or establishing a clear public necessity (beyond mere "better management") is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 35-50] Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Articles 14 and 21 – Judicial Review of Executive Policy – Separation of Powers – While acknowledging the executive's competence in drafting health policies, Supreme Court maintained that the separation of powers cannot prevent judicial intervention when fundamental rights are violated due to the absence of a structured relief framework in exceptional circumstances. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Articles 14 and 21 – Environmental Law – Precautionary Principle – Sustainable Development – Validity of Industrial Reclassification – The Supreme Court quashed the Central Pollution Control Board's (CPCB) January 2025 revised industrial categorization which downgraded "stand-alone cement grinding units without Captive Power Plants (CPP)" from 'Red' to 'Orange' category - Held: A regulatory downgrade that weakens environmental protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of safeguarding life and health - In the absence of proportionate and scientifically substantiated justification, such dilution is arbitrary and infringes the right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21. [Paras 58, 65, 66] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Article 14 — Manifest Arbitrariness — Executive memoranda issued by the State that departed from the AICPI-linked formula stipulated in the ROPA Rules without an independent study or rational basis were held to be "manifestly arbitrary" - Noted that State action must be governed by reason and the "lacking in reasoned principle" prong of manifest arbitrariness applies when a State ignores its own statutory stipulations. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 14 — Substantive Equality — The principle of substantive equality requires the State to remedy structural, institutional, and systemic disadvantages - Mere equal treatment is insufficient when individuals are placed in unequal positions due to biological, social, or economic factors. Inaccessibility of MHM measures converts a biological reality into a structural exclusion, violating the right to participate in education on equal terms. [Paras 41- 65] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 15(3), 21, and 21A — Right to Education and Menstrual Health — The Supreme Court held that the right to education is a "multiplier right" that enables the exercise of other human rights and forms an integral part of the right to life and human dignity - Noted that inaccessibility to Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) measures including clean gender-segregated toilets, sanitary napkins, and safe disposal mechanisms constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of adolescent girl students. [Paras 20-40] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 21, and 41 – Directive Principles of State Policy – Article 142 of the Constitution – Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) are "two wheels of a chariot," where the principles of Article 39(a) (right to livelihood) and Article 41 (right to work in cases of disablement) must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights - The right to work is recognized as a precious liberty that enables a person to live with dignity beyond "mere animal existence." – Exercising its power to do complete justice, directed the creation of a supernumerary post for the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields CIL - The employer was directed to provide "reasonable accommodation" in the form of a suitable desk job with a computer and keyboard designed as per "universal design" under Section 2(ze) of the RPwD Act. [Relied on Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India; 2024 INSC 775; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 16 SCC 654; Paras 13- 24] Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Articles 14 and 21 - Classifying widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of their husband's death (before or after the father-in-law) is arbitrary and lacks a rational nexus with the Act's object of securing maintenance for vulnerable dependants - Denying maintenance on such technical grounds would expose them to destitution, violating the right to life with dignity under Article 21 - Section 19 casts a personal obligation on the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law during his lifetime - Section 22 creates an obligation on the heirs of the deceased to maintain dependants out of the estate - A claim under Section 22 arises only after the death of the father-in-law – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266; Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau (2023) 19 SCC 126; Paras 16-28] Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Articles 14 and 16 - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24

Article 14 — Admission to Medical Courses — Sports Quota — Change in Rules after commencement of process — Transparency and Fair Play — The Supreme Court quashed the Punjab Government's decision to expand the "zone of consideration" for sports achievements from Classes XI & XII to include Classes IX & X for MBBS/BDS admissions - Granted — To avoid unsettling admissions of third parties not before the Court, the relief was restricted to the appellants – directed that the appellants are to be accommodated in government medical college seats previously allotted to Respondents 4 and 5, while the respondents are to be moved to the seats vacated by the appellants in a private medical college. Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Article 16 – Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) – Validity of Income and Asset Certificates – Requirement of Specified Financial Year – Held: For claiming the benefit of EWS reservation, the Income and Asset Certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application as prescribed in the advertisement and relevant Government Orders - A certificate pertaining to a different financial year, or one issued prior to the closure of the relevant financial year, is invalid and goes to the root of a candidate's eligibility - Candidates must be in possession of the necessary certificate in the prescribed form on or before the cut-off date - Rejection of candidature due to non-conformity with these requirements is justified to ensure the expeditious completion of public recruitment processes. Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351 : AIR 2026 SC 1860

Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70

Article 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1)(c), and Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk and Access Demarcated Footpaths — Priority over Motorised Vehicles - The Supreme Court declared that the "Right to Walk" is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India - It is inextricably connected to life and is integral to the right to move freely throughout the territory of India - This right takes within its sweep the right to safe, comfortable, and well-demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads, which must be treated as primary and take priority over the movement of motorized vehicles - Walking also embodies expressional, congregational, and associational rights. [Paras 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Right to Education in Mother Tongue/Language of Choice - The guarantee of freedom of speech and expression necessarily encompasses the right to receive information in a form that is both meaningful and comprehensible - The true value of this freedom lies in the ability to understand, internalize, and process information - Education, as a primary vehicle for transmitting knowledge, must be imparted in a language that the child understands best - A child, or a parent/guardian on their behalf, has a fundamental right to freedom of choice regarding the medium of instruction at the primary school stage, and the State cannot artificially restrict this choice. [Paras 42, 43] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 - Right to Property and Burden of Proof – i. Burden of Proof - In cases alleging fundamental rights violations, the initial burden lies on the petitioner to establish the existence and invasion of such rights; ii. Title over Land - held that the petitioner failed to prove that Mizo Chiefs were absolute owners of the land under the British regime - Documents (boundary papers) suggested they functioned as administrative heads rather than proprietary owners; iii. Privy Purses - rejected the plea of discrimination comparing Mizo Chiefs to rulers of Princely States, noting that privy purses were outcomes of specific pre-constitutional contractual arrangements and not a legally enforceable fundamental right - the petitioner failed to establish a clear title to the lands or a specific breach of fundamental rights under the erstwhile Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the petition was dismissed. [Relied on Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 1; G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 329; Paras 27-64] Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Film Certification – Judicial Interference – Petition filed seeking to restrain the release of the film "Ghooskhor Pandat," alleging offensive stereotyping against the Brahmin community - The Respondent/Producer filed an affidavit unequivocally withdrawing the title and undertaking that any new title would not be evocative of the earlier one - Supreme Court disposed of the petition, noting that the grievances were suitably addressed by this undertaking. Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Standards for Judging Film Content – "The Ordinary Reasonable Man" – The effect of words or expressions in a movie must be judged by the standards of "reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men," and not by those of weak or hypersensitive minds – Noted that the "man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard - Freedom of expression cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people – Noted that if the rights of artists were subjected to popular notions of what is acceptable, the constitutional guarantee would be rendered illusory - Once a competent statutory Board grants a certificate, no individual or group can create disturbances in the exhibition of the film - Courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the freedom of speech and expression, even if Judges personally dislike the spoken or written words. [Para 19, 22-24, 32-34] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 19(1)(c) – Right to Form Associations – Regulatory Control over Sports Bodies –The Supreme Court reaffirmed that while the right to form an association includes its continued existence with its original voluntary composition, it does not extend to an uninhibited right to pursue goals free from regulatory control - So long as the initial voluntary composition remains unaffected, regulatory measures do not violate Article 19(1)(c). Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Article 20 - Protection in respect of conviction for offences

Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533

Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 25 & 26 – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Constitution of India, Article 20(2) – Double Jeopardy – Adjudication and confiscation under Chapter IV of the Benami Act are civil actions directed against the property itself to remedy a statutory violation, whereas personal criminal prosecution is governed by Chapter VII - Confiscation is a civil consequence tested on the principle of preponderance of probabilities and does not amount to prosecution or criminal punishment - Simultaneous or successive initiation of both civil confiscation and criminal prosecution does not attract the bar of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution - Once a competent judicial determination declaring a transaction to be benami attains finality in a civil suit, the property is liable to absolute confiscation by the Central Government, and it is unnecessary to relegate the matter to the statutory Adjudicating Authority under the Act. Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357 : AIR 2026 SC 1907 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 133

Article 20(3) – Right Against Self-Incrimination – Anticipatory Bail – NDPS Act – Held that State cannot insist that an accused hand over his mobile phone as a condition for "cooperating with the investigation" if doing so forces the accused to incriminate himself - The Supreme Court held that while an appellant must join the investigation, the obligation to cooperate does not extend to a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Article 21 - Protection of life and personal liberty

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Travel Abroad vs. Right to Speedy Trial and Societal Interest — Interplay and Balancing of Rights — While Article 21 guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, including the right to travel abroad, such a right is not absolute and cannot be viewed in isolation - A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the accused on one hand, and the victim's right to a speedy trial along with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice on the other. [Para 10] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Right to Speedy Trial and Timely Investigation – Duty of Constitutional Courts - Inordinate Delay in Investigation – Appeal against High Court order dismissing a writ petition seeking directions to file a charge-sheet in a criminal complaint pending for nearly two decades – Constitutional courts cannot remain mute spectators to prolonged and endless investigations – Right to speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, which inherently includes the timely completion of investigations – If an investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to intervene instead of dismissing the plea on technical or alternative-remedy grounds. [Paras 10 - 13] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626

Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 254

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21 & 23 — Human Trafficking for Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE)— Right to Rehabilitation — Held, a combined reading of Articles 21 and 23 establishes that victims of trafficking for CSE possess a fundamental right to rehabilitation - The constitutional obligations owed to victims of exploitative structures extend beyond a prevention, rescue, and punishment paradigm to comprehensive rehabilitation - State's failure to provide a robust "Victim Protection Plan" and adequate rehabilitation infrastructures violates Articles 21 and 23 - Detailed guidelines issued under Articles 32 and 142 to govern pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation of victims until the enactment of comprehensive central legislation. [Paras 56, 277-281, 290 - 303] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Constitution of India – Article 21 [Right to Life and Personal Liberty] – Administrative Delay in Releasing Prisoner on Parole Post-Judicial Order – Inherent Power / Public Law Remedy – Grant of Monetary Compensation for Illegal Detention - Appeal seeking monetary compensation for 24 days of illegal detention resulting from administrative delay by State authorities in executing a judicial release order on permanent parole - The High Court had directed the release of the appellant-convict on parole, and despite compliance with the conditions and verification of sureties, the State delayed his actual release on the ground that it was considering filing an appeal against the parole order - The Supreme Court observed that the deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of constitutional provisions constitutes illegal detention - Supreme Court forcefully negated the State's justification, holding that a judicial order remains in operation unless stayed, modified, or set aside by a superior forum - The principle of "obey first, appeal later" must guide executive actions, and the State cannot subordinate an individual's fundamental right to personal liberty to its slow bureaucratic processes or administrative decisions regarding whether to prefer an appeal - Just because a person is a convict does not mean their constitutional rights weigh any less on the scales of justice - Held, the non-release of the prisoner after the satisfaction of judicial conditions amounts to illegal detention, for which monetary compensation is an established public law remedy to penalize the public wrong and make amends - The State was directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- directly to the appellant. [Paras 9 - 12] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — The right to trauma care of citizens is an integral part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - A robust, uniform, and swift mechanism for emergency trauma care is critical to recognizing and responding to road accident situations to save human lives - Bystanders often hesitate to act due to fear of legal proceedings or police harassment - Systemic interventions, uniform frameworks, and proper Good Samaritan laws are required to eliminate these barriers. Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — Interim Directions for Uniform Trauma Care System — The Supreme Court issued comprehensive time-bound interim directions to the Union and all States/UTs i. Full technical and operational integration of all emergency helplines (100, 101, 108, etc.) into the universal helpline 112 within three months; ii. Establishment of functional physical and digital Good Samaritan Grievance Redressal Systems within three months; iii. Notification of a medical rescue protocol by the Union within three months, to be operationalized by States/UTs within three months thereafter; iv. Mandatory Automotive Industry Standard 125 (AIS-125) compliance and GPS/Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD) fitment in all public and private ambulances, integrated with helpline 112 within three months; v. Adoption of the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professionals (NCAHP) notified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) curriculum within three months; vi. Establishment of State Trauma Registries within four months; vii. Grading and designation of all medical facilities across National/State Highways and urban areas within three months; viii. Full operationalization of the PM RAHAT cashless treatment scheme for road accident victims within three months, failing which it would amount to a violation of the Motor Vehicles Act; ix. Execution of multi-lingual mass-media campaigns within one month. [Relied on Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 194; Paras 5-12] Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545

Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Held, the fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21 encompasses the right of every citizen to move freely and access public spaces without living under constant apprehension of physical harm, attack, or exposure to life-threatening events like dog bites - While animal welfare and protection of sentient beings are of high constitutional and moral significance, they cannot eclipse or subordinate the paramount obligation of the State to safeguard human life, bodily integrity, and public safety - When human lives are weighed against the interests of sentient beings, the constitutional balance must unequivocally tilt in favor of the preservation and protection of human life. (Paras 31, 99, 101) In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Protection of Officials Acting in Good Faith - Held, all officers and officials of municipal authorities, local bodies, Panchayati Raj institutions, and autonomous bodies/schools/hospitals tasked with executing the Court's directions shall be entitled to due protection for acts performed in good faith - No FIR, criminal complaint, or coercive proceeding shall ordinarily be initiated against them unless a prima facie case of mala fides or gross abuse of authority is established. [Para 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Tortious Liability & Administrative Accountability - Stray Dog Management — Assumption of Responsibility by Animal Welfare Groups and Institutional Heads - Held, the assertion of rights or interests in favor of protecting and feeding stray dogs cannot operate in isolation from the corresponding responsibility to safeguard human safety - It is mandatory for animal welfare groups, associations, or student-led bodies operating within educational or institutional campuses to file an affidavit undertaking express tortious liability for any incident of dog bites or attacks occurring within the premises - If no such undertaking is filed, no activity of maintaining or feeding stray dogs shall be permitted within the campus - Failure to enforce this will entail suitable action against the Head of the Institution concerned. [Paras 71–74] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Engagement of NGOs — Due Diligence and Financial Accountability - While observing that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can play a constructive role in executing the Capture-Sterilize-Vaccinate-Release (CSVR) model to ease the burden on local bodies, judicial notice was taken of instances where fraudulent or repetitive bills were submitted for monetary gain - Held, municipal authorities must undertake rigorous background checks, verify credentials, and evaluate technical capability and financial integrity before awarding contracts to NGOs - Public funds must be protected through continuous supervision, periodic field inspections, and independent financial/performance audits. [Paras 65–67] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India — Article 21 — Bail — Prolonged Incarceration — Judicial Discipline — Binding Nature of Precedents — Grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner facing charges under the UAPA and the NDPS Act on the ground of prolonged incarceration and gross delay in the trial - The appellant was in custody for over 5 years and 11 months with more than 350 prosecution witnesses remaining to be examined - Restrictive statutory provisions under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA do not oust the jurisdiction of constitutional courts to grant bail where an undertrial's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 has been infringed - The rigors of statutory bail restrictions "melt down" when there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone is substantial - The legislative intent cannot invert the core constitutional relationship between personal liberty and detention - Even under stringent special statutes like the UAPA, "bail is the rule and jail is the exception". Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512 : 2026 INSC 503: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 298

Criminal Procedure – Inherent Powers – Quashing of Proceedings – Right to Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant for 35 years arising out of a dispute over food in a police mess involving minor offences under Sections 147, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 120 of the Railways Act - Supreme Court emphasized that a quick trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Keeping a public servant in suspended animation for 35 years without any fault on his part runs completely contrary to the spirit of the "procedure established by law" - Right to speedy trial is not an abstract or illusory safeguard; it is a fundamental right and a human right that no civilized society can deny to an accused - If the continuation of proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 21, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Paras 30 - 42] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473

Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456

Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Sections 3(2)(b)(i), 3(3), and 5 — Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 — Rule 3B(c) — Constitution of India — Articles 21, 32, and 226 — Late-Term Pregnancy of Minor — Reproductive Autonomy and Decisional Autonomy as Fundamental Rights — Lack of Statutory Remedy No Bar to Constitutional Remedy - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and permitted the medical termination of the pregnancy - The Court laid down the following key propositions: i. Reproductive Autonomy under Article 21 - The right to make decisions concerning one's body and reproduction is an integral facet of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - No court ought to compel any woman, especially a minor child, to carry an unwanted pregnancy to full term against her express will - The choice of the pregnant woman must be prioritized over the interest of an unborn child or suggestions of giving the child up for adoption; ii. Statutory Limitations vs. Constitutional Remedy - A lack of remedy under a statute (such as the MTP Act) does not bar a constitutional remedy under Article 32 or 226 - The statute merely codifies a part of the constitutional remedy - When statutory limits are exhausted, Constitutional Courts must view the case through the lens of the pregnant woman's welfare and fundamental rights rather than adopting a prohibitory approach, which inadvertently drives women toward unsafe, illegal abortion centers; iii. Foetal Normalcy and Passage of Time - The invocation of foetal normalcy or the advanced duration of a pregnancy cannot be used to deny termination - Subordinating a woman's fundamental rights to the pathology of a fetus instrumentalizes her into a mere conduit - the passage of time does not extinguish reproductive choices, as delays often stem from systemic barriers, irregular cycles, lack of awareness, financial constraints, or fear; iv. Assessment of Mental Health and Distress - The absence of a clinically diagnosed psychiatric disorder in a Medical Board report does not negate the presence of severe emotional trauma, distress, or anguish - The minor's two suicide attempts demonstrated acute mental suffering that the law cannot ignore - Since the Medical Board found the minor physically fit for the procedure and she consented through her mother, the request could not be denied. [Relied on X v. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra & Others (Civil Appeal No. 827 of 2026); Paras 10-16] S v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437

Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37(1)(b)(ii) — Grant of Bail — Commercial Quantity — Twin Conditions Mandatory — Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 cannot blindly dilute statutory rigors - The recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section is a mandatory jurisdictional pre-condition and a sine qua non for granting bail in offences involving a commercial quantity - The right to a speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a precious constitutional right, but it must be read harmoniously alongside, and not in displacement or opposition to, the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act - Prolonged incarceration during the pendency of a trial does not automatically entail relaxation or mechanical dilution of these statutory twin conditions - Orders granting bail without recording such explicit satisfaction stand completely vitiated and cannot be sustained. [Paras 9,10] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411: AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130

Road Safety Directions – Parking and Encroachment – i. Prohibition on Unauthorized Parking: Heavy/commercial vehicles prohibited from parking on any National Highway carriageway or paved shoulder except at designated bays - Enforcement mandated via Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS), GPS-timestamped evidence, and eChallans; ii. Encroachment Removal: Construction of new commercial structures within the Right of Way (ROW) prohibited with immediate effect - District Magistrates directed to remove existing unauthorized structures within 60 days; iii. Land Use Restrictions: State Governments to notify prohibition of land use change within 40 metres (residential) and 75 metres (commercial) from the highway mid-point; iv. Emergency Services: Deployment of BLS ambulances and recovery cranes at intervals not exceeding 75 km within 60 days; v. Wayside Amenities: Construction of truck lay-byes every 75 km, prioritized on the Amritsar-Jamnagar Highway - Amenities must include rest areas, food services, and first-aid; vi. Blackspots: Identification and publication of accident blackspots within 45 days, followed by installation of high-intensity LED lighting and speed cameras; vii. District Highway Safety Task Force: Constitution of task forces in every district within 15 days to conduct fortnightly reviews; viii. Monitoring: NHAI to conduct drone-based aerial surveys at least twice annually - MoRTH to report on the constitution of an Inter-State Highway Safety Coordination Committee within 60 days. [Relied on Gyan Prakash vs. Union of India and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1189; Paras 4-8] In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388

Constitution of India – Article 21 and Article 142 – Right to Life and Safe Passage – Road Safety and Infrastructure Failures – Supreme Court took suo-motu cognizance of systemic negligence following fatal accidents in Phalodi (Rajasthan) and Rangareddy (Telangana) - Held: The 'Right to Life' under Article 21 is a positive mandate for the State to ensure a safe environment - Safety of commuters is an integral facet of the right to live with dignity - Recognizing that National Highways account for nearly 30% of road fatalities despite being only 2% of total road length, the Court issued comprehensive interim directions under Article 142 to address administrative lethargy and infrastructural gaps. In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21 and Article 142 — Environmental Law — Illegal Sand Mining — National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary — The Supreme Court took proactive measures against rampant illegal sand mining in the National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary, spanning the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh - Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of fragile ecosystems is a constitutional imperative and an integral facet of the Right to Life under Article 21 - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Court issued mandatory interim directions to curb environmental degradation and protect enforcement personnel from organized "sand mafias". In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380

Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Article 21 – Right to Die with Dignity – Passive Euthanasia – Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, specifically CANH administered through a PEG tube, for a patient in an irreversible Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) for over 12 years - Held: The right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity - In cases where medical treatment is futile and serves no therapeutic purpose other than artificially prolonging a mindless biological existence, its withdrawal is constitutionally permissible. [Paras 29, 52, 72, 91] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Article 21 – Right to Life and Health – COVID-19 Vaccination – Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI) – Compensation Policy – The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to formulate a "no-fault" compensation framework for serious adverse events or deaths resulting from COVID-19 vaccinations - held that while the state-led vaccination program was a vital public health intervention, the State bears a positive obligation under Article 21 to ensure that families suffering grave harm are not left without an accessible mechanism for redress. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Article 21 – Right to Life and Dignity – The guarantee of life and personal dignity extends beyond prison gates; incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity - Convicts are not denuded of all fundamental rights by mere reason of conviction. OCIs, based on trust and self-discipline, align with the constitutional vision of viewing prisons as institutions of correction and social reintegration - Exclusion of women prisoners from OCIs in several states (e.g., Assam, Gujarat, UP, West Bengal) or failing to transfer eligible women constitutes blatant gender discrimination - States directed to develop gender-sensitive protocols to ensure women have equal access to reformative facilities. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Article 21 – Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an inseparable part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 – Held that the State has an affirmative duty to protect the environment to ensure the well-being of all citizens, noting that the time is ripe for the rigorous implementation of this constitutional guarantee. Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Article 21 — Right to Dignity, Privacy, and Health — The right to life includes the right to a dignified existence and the right to menstrual health - Dignity is undermined when girl children are subjected to stigma or compelled to adopt unsafe practices due to a lack of facilities - Privacy is a concomitant of dignity, imposing a positive obligation on the State to facilitate a private space for menstrual management. [Paras 70 -80, 85 – 96] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12

Article 21A - Right to Education

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 - Section 23(2) Provisos & Right to Quality Education — Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) is a mandatory eligibility requirement and a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21-A of the Constitution of India - The statutory framework of Section 23 does not operate retrospectively to invalidate past appointments; instead, it provides a prospective, time-bound mechanism for in-service teachers to secure the minimum qualifications necessary to maintain elementary education standards - The services of teachers cannot be protected at the cost of the educational future of children. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Constitution of India - Article 21-A & Article 142 – Right to Education vs. Complete Justice – The constitutional guarantee to provide education includes within its ambit the right to quality education - While invoking plenary powers under Article 142 to balance equities and accommodate merit-holders , the mandate of Article 21-A cannot be compromised - the state is at liberty to dispense with the services of teachers who fail to acquire mandatory minimum statutory qualifications within the prescribed grace period. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Article 21A and Article 23 – Right to Education and Prohibition of Forced Labour – Contractual Teachers – Honorarium Revision – The Supreme Court held that part-time contractual instructors appointed under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now Samagra Shiksha Scheme) in Upper Primary Schools are entitled to periodic revision of their honorarium – Noted that keeping such teachers on a stagnant, meager honorarium (initially ₹7,000/-) for over a decade, while prohibiting them from taking other employment, amounts to "economic coercion" and "forced labour" (Begar) prohibited under Article 23. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Article 22 - Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.

Illegal Detention - Key Legal Observations & Guidelines by Supreme Court - Definition of Illegal Detention - i. The deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of provisions of the Constitution is illegal detention - It includes instances where the detention lacks a valid legal basis or where a lawful power is exercised arbitrarily, in bad faith, or through a procedure that fails to observe essential safeguards; ii. Binding Nature of Judicial Orders ("Obey First, Appeal Later") - Once a competent court issues a direction, it must be obeyed and implemented without reservation - The mere filing or anticipation of an appeal does not automatically keep a judicial order in abeyance or operate as a stay - Flouting or ignoring such directions on a specious plea that the order is erroneous undermines the rule of law and invites chaos; iii. [Relied on Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 141; Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347; Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Kanu Sanyal vs. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674; Paras 7-9] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599

Article 22(1) and Article 21 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Section 67 – Section 8 – Section 22 – Grounds of Arrest – Constitutional Mandate – Article 22(1) and Article 21 – The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of bail by the High Court and ordered the immediate release of the appellants due to the failure of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to provide written grounds of arrest - The appellants, medical professionals at a corporate hospital, were arrested following the recovery of 2000 Tramadol tablets - While the NCB claimed the grounds of arrest were orally explained and noted in a template-style arrest memo, the Court found this insufficient under established legal mandates - Supreme Court emphasized that providing written grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement to protect the fundamental rights of the arrestee. Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Article 23 - Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) — Rights-Based Re-framing of Trafficking - The Supreme Court observed that human trafficking cannot be viewed solely through the prism of a criminal justice or crime-control response - Secure convictions do not address the multi-layered material, physical, and psychological trauma suffered by victims - Under a human rights framework grounded in Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution, victims must be recognized as rights-holders at the centre of the state's response - Rehabilitation is a constitutional guarantee, equal to or more important than rescue, since returning a victim to a site of vulnerability without material or psychological protection risks immediate re-trafficking. [Paras 254-256, 278-281] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Article 32 – Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

Constitution of India – Article 32 vs. Statutory Remedies - Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 32 cannot be routinely invoked to bypass efficacious statutory mechanisms - The Supreme Court clarified that while constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 remain available as vital safeguards against the failure of statutory authorities, this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature - It ought not to be invoked in a routine manner to bypass the comprehensive, multi-tiered remedies provided under the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 56, 61, 98] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – Maintainability of PIL based on media reports – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers - Public Interest Litigation – Requirements of Credible Material – Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for the constitution of a National Task Force and a nationwide food safety audit based on various instances of food contamination and regulatory failure - Held: PILs must be founded on credible, cogent, and research-based material - Newspaper reports and media publications highlighting sporadic incidents do not constitute reliable or legally admissible evidence to establish a systemic failure of fundamental rights under Article 32. [Paras 5, 6] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Article 32 and Article 14 – Declaration of Public Holidays – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions – Writ petition seeking directions to the Union and State governments to frame uniform guidelines for declaring public/gazetted holidays and to declare Guru Gobind Singh's 'Prakash Parv' as a nationwide gazetted holiday - Held: Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the declaration of public holidays is a policy decision involving administrative efficiency, economic implications, and the balancing of diverse socio-cultural practices – Noted that i. Executive Domain: Matters of policy determination regarding governance and administrative exigencies lie within the exclusive domain of the executive. Any judicial mandate to increase non-working days involves a line-drawing exercise that is inherently policy-driven and not amenable to judicial determination; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The absence of a uniform policy does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. Absolute uniformity is not mandated where differentiation is founded on rational considerations, such as regional socio-cultural needs in a federal structure; iii. Article 25 (Religious Freedom): Freedom of religion does not extend to a right to seek State recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday; iv. Administrative Impact: Expanding the list of gazetted holidays would adversely impact governance and public productivity - In a developing nation, the focus must remain on the dignity of labor and continuity of work; v. Floodgates Argument: Granting such relief would open the floodgates to similar claims from diverse sections of society, leading to an impractical expansion of holidays; vi. Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji: Supreme Court recorded deep reverence for the Tenth Guru, noting that his teachings of 'Kirat Karo' (honest living) and 'Vand Chakko' (sharing) emphasize active engagement with responsibilities - His legacy is best honored through the dedicated performance of duties rather than a symbolic show of respect by demanding a holiday. [Paras 11-18] All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : 2026 INSC 289

Article 32 – Writ Petition seeking directions regarding alleged violations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Import of animals by private facilities – Legality of CITES permits – Held: The subject matter was previously examined by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in W.P. (C) No. 783 of 2025, which found no violation of domestic or international law - The CITES Secretarial Document relied upon by the petitioner explicitly records that no evidence was found regarding imports without requisite documentation or for commercial purposes - Once an import is effected under valid permission, it cannot be subsequently treated as prohibited merely because objections are raised later - Disturbing the settled environment, custody, and care of living animals (including rescued animals) after lawful import may itself result in cruelty. [Relied on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs. The Collector of Customs, 1962 AIR 1893; Paras 2-5] Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Delay and Laches – Right to Property – Writ petition filed by Mizo Chief Council seeking compensation for lands allegedly acquired without due process in 1954-55 - Respondents raised preliminary objection regarding inordinate delay of nearly six decades - The Supreme Court reiterated that while Article 32 is a fundamental right, it is not immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure - Petitions agitating stale claims ought not to be entertained to prevent disturbing settled positions and causing prejudice to third parties - Supreme Court clarified that the operative test is not "unreasonable delay" but "unexplained delay. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction vs. High Court Administration – While the Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a supervisory forum over the day-to-day administration or rosters of High Courts, it may intervene in "rare and exceptional situations" where continuing inaction results in a demonstrable infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 – Supreme Court noted that pending revisions must be decided by giving full effect to the legal and constitutional observations of the Supreme Court - The failure to implement specific directions regarding the re-evaluation of withdrawal of prosecution (Section 321 CrPC) implicated the credibility of the criminal process. [Paras 3-9] Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 32 – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Criminal Process – Successive FIRs – The Supreme Court allowed a Writ Petition where the State registered multiple FIRs in quick succession to ensure the petitioner remained in custody despite being granted bail in earlier matters – Noted that such conduct by the prosecution established a conscious effort to keep the petitioner incarcerated, amounting to a violation of personal liberty. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Powers of the Supreme Court – Article 32 is the "heart and soul" of the Constitution as it empowers citizens to directly approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights – Noted that it will not readily refuse to hear a petition under Article 32 if a violation of a fundamental right is prima facie established. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Domestic Workers' Rights – Minimum Wages – Separation of Powers – Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring that domestic workers have a fundamental right to minimum wages under Articles 21 and 23 and challenging their exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act and Code of Wages, 2019 - Held: Supreme Court declined to issue a positive mandamus for the enactment of law, emphasizing the doctrine of separation of powers - While acknowledging the vulnerable status of domestic workers and the lack of legislative protection, noted that an enforceable decree cannot be passed if it requires the legislature to enact a specific law - Supreme Court impressed upon State Governments to consider the grievances highlighted by the petitioners and urged the development of suitable mechanisms to prevent exploitation and ensure minimum wages. [Relied on Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand and another [(2025) INSC 118]; Paras 2-8] Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101

Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Article 39 - Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.

Article 39(b) – Public Trust Doctrine – Spectrum as a Natural Resource – Spectrum is a finite, scarce, and renewable natural resource - The State holds spectrum in trust for the people and is constitutionally obligated to ensure its distribution subserves the common good and generates adequate compensation for the public - The grant of a license is a "State largesse" and does not result in the transfer of proprietary interest or ownership to private entities. [Paras 15, 16, 33] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Article 48A - Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life

Environmental Law & Constitution of India – Protection of Ecological Hotspots, Wildlife Sanctuaries, and Tiger Reserves – Removal of Forest Encroachments vs. Humanitarian Grounds for Rehabilitation – Constitutional Imperatives - The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) flagged massive, multi-decade encroachments across the Agasthyamalai Ecological Landscape, specifically within the Srivilliputhur-Megamalai Tiger Reserve (SMTR), Kalakad- Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve (KMTR), and Kanyakumari Wildlife Sanctuary (KWS) - The report highlighted slow eviction progress by State authorities, the active extension of public utilities/welfare amenities to illegal occupants, and the presence of 118 serving or retired government employees among the encroachers - The State of Tamil Nadu sought a phased, humanitarian approach to eviction owing to the long duration of settlements and complex socio-economic ties – Held that environmental preservation cannot stand indefinitely deferred under the guise of procedural or humanitarian challenges - While the Court is fully alive to the necessity of structured human rehabilitation, complex resettlement issues cannot operate as a perpetual justification for postponing legally mandated eviction and ecological restoration - Protection of forests and fragile ecosystems is a non-negotiable constitutional imperative under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India - The approach to conservation must be strictly eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, recognizing the intrinsic value of non-human species – Supreme Court issued exhaustive, time-bound mandamus directions, including a division-wise encroachment eviction plan, a blanket moratorium on welfare schemes/infrastructure in encroached pockets, stringent disciplinary action and environmental restitution charges against government employee encroachers, and the total removal of commercial/governmental structures from protected tiger habitats. [Relied on T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2025) 2 SCC 641; 46-65] A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : 2026 INSC 605

Articles 48A, 51A(g), 226, and 32 – Environmental Law – Protection of Reserved Forests – Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants – Due Process – Rule of Law – The Supreme Court addressed the State's obligation to protect reserved forests while balancing the rights of long-standing human habitations - Noted that while forests are vital ecological systems and carbon sinks, and the State has a constitutional mandate to safeguard them, such protection must be pursued through lawful, non-arbitrary means. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Article 50 - Separation of judiciary from executive.

Judicial Review - Separation of Powers - Constitutional Courts cannot step into the shoes of administrative/executive authorities or assume the role of framing and implementing specific infrastructural solutions. Neither a High Court under Article 226 nor the Supreme Court under Article 136 should devise remedial measures for civic problems such as waterlogging and inadequate drainage. While Courts can monitor and direct authorities to perform their duties, they cannot themselves prescribe detailed engineering or administrative solutions (such as directing the laying of a specific sewer line across AIIMS premises). All India Institute of Medical Sciences v. Shailendra Bhatnagar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 511

Judicial Independence and Public Confidence – Judicial independence is a foundational feature of the Constitution - The strength of the judiciary lies in the confidence and trust reposed in it by the public - Reckless aspersions and unfounded allegations of lack of impartiality or improper motives against a sitting Judge strike at the foundation of judicial independence and diminish the credibility of the justice delivery system. Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Article 51A - Fundamental duties of every citizen of India

Article 51A(k) of the Constitution – Positive Right to Elementary Education and Co-relative Duty Bearers - The identification of the right to elementary education as a positive right recognizes co-relative duties and identifies five distinct duty bearers responsible for its realization, reiterated the following: i. Appropriate Government: Obligated to establish and ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, with financial responsibilities shared between Central and State Governments (Sections 6, 7, and 8); ii. Local Authority: Obligated to ensure the availability of neighbourhood schools, maintain records of children up to 14 years, and monitor admission, attendance, and completion of elementary education (Section 9); iii. Neighbourhood Schools: Obligated to provide free and compulsory education and admit children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups to the extent of at least 25% of the class strength (Section 12); iv. Parents/Guardians: Constitutionally recognized obligation to provide education opportunities to their child under Article 51A(k); v. Elementary School Teachers: Play the most crucial role in nation-building through the development of a student's mind and character. [Relied on Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2026 INSC 56); Paras 10-14] Lucknow Public School v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2026 INSC 422

Articles 51A and 51A(e) – Fraternity and Constitutional Duty – Supreme Court noted that fraternity is a guiding philosophy of the Constitution - It is the fundamental duty of every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Vilifying or denigrating any community based on religion, language, caste, or region is constitutionally impermissible. [Para 11-14] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 91 - Power of the Deputy Chairman or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Chairman.

Article 91 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(1) – Competence of Deputy Chairman – Held that the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant, the Deputy Chairman is constitutionally mandated under Article 91(1) to perform all duties of the office - The statutory powers vested in the "Chairman" under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act are inseparable from the office of the Presiding Officer and must be read in harmony with the Constitutional scheme - the Deputy Chairman is competent to consider a notice of motion and exercise discretion to admit or refuse it under Section 3(1) of the Act. [Paras 17 - 22] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Article 136 – Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136 – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Layout Sanction and Plot Incorporation – Title Disputes - The High Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot unnecessarily delve into or adjudicate upon the issue of title when it was never under dispute and the writ petition was filed for the limited purpose of seeking a direction to incorporate a plot into a colony's layout plan - A mere entry in the list of properties maintained by a Municipal Corporation cannot, by itself, constitute a valid proof of title over the subject land. Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389

Constitution of India - Article 136 – Equitable Relief – Supreme Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, observing that the appellant's conduct was "callous, laconic, and in clear violation of applicable rules -" Supreme Court emphasized that it would be loath to substitute its own discretion for that of the State Government regarding commercial decisions like the allotment of industrial plots at concessional rates. [Para 73, 77, 78] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321

Article 136 – Concurrent Findings of Fact – The Supreme Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised sparingly, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of fact from the courts below - Interference is only warranted if such findings are "manifestly perverse" - In this case, the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court in favor of the Respondents were found to be legally sound and based on a careful appreciation of the factual matrix – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 24] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 139A - Transfer of certain cases.

Article 139A(1) – Withdrawal of cases from High Court – Substantial questions of general importance – Stagnation of Trial – Failure to pronounce judgment after reserving it – The Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary power under Article 139A(1) to withdraw three criminal revision petitions pending before the Allahabad High Court to itself – Noted that the revisions had been heard and judgment reserved on 05.02.2020, but no judgment had been pronounced for several years - The continuing stay on trial proceedings arising from a 1994 incident resulted in a "standstill" of the criminal process for decades, infringing upon the right to speedy justice. Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 141 – Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts.

Precedent – Nature of Orders – Article 141 – that the High Court relied on Ram Naresh Singh v. Bokaro Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as a binding precedent to direct the release of gratuity with only nominal rent deductions - Held: The order in Ram Naresh Singh was passed on grounds of equity in specific facts and did not purport to lay down a binding precedent - An order passed on facts cannot be elevated to the status of a precedent by operation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 17] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Article 142 – Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Complete Justice – Enhancement of Compensation – Permanent Disability – Paraplegia - Even though the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was not strictly appropriate as the vehicle was not the proximate cause of the accident, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to prevent a person with life-altering, grievous injuries (total paraplegia with bladder and bowel incontinence) from being left in the lurch by another round of litigation - Finding the High Court's assessment technically restrictive and insufficient, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹25,00,000/- with interest from the date of the claim petition, keeping the original apportionment of liability undisturbed to serve the ends of justice. [Paras 12-15] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637

Article 142 of the Constitution - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Differentiated Threshold for Neutral Officers / Liquidators - Serial Indulgence Impermissible – Noted that the fact that the appellant is a neutral officer (Liquidator) acting for the benefit of stakeholders does not permit the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes of the IBC - The statute does not carve out a separate threshold or relaxation for such officers - A litigant who has previously secured a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and condonation of re-filing delay at an earlier appellate stage (e.g., under Section 61 before the NCLAT) cannot claim a similar exercise of judicial discretion automatically at successive appellate stages - The discipline of limitation under the IBC does not countenance serial condonations of delay, as it would defeat the legislative objective of expedition and finality. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (2021) 10 SCC 401; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484); Distinguished from CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406); Paras 19-24] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629

Constitution of India – Article 142(1) – Dissolution of Marriage on Irretrievable Breakdown - The Supreme Court possesses the inherent, discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142(1) to dissolve a marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown to do "complete justice," even if the facts do not strictly satisfy a statutory ground under the prevailing personal law - This power is exercised with great care and caution when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvation, and that the continuation of a formal legal tie on paper is unjustified and merely perpetuates frustration - Given that the parties were living separately for over 15 years, mediation had failed, and both were financially independent doctors with no children from the wedlock, it was deemed a fit case to sever the ties and put an end to a stale, frozen relationship. [Relied on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2798; Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, (2025) 3 SCC 748; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, (2019) 9 SCC 409; Paras 29-37] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Administration of Justice – Undue delay in pronouncing reserved judgements by High Courts – Frame of Uniform Guidelines – The Supreme Court observed that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution extends to every stage of a proceeding and is violated by delayed delivery of reserved judgements, particularly impacting those in custody - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive and binding guidelines for all High Courts to ensure timely pronouncement and uploading of judgements. Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 — Power to do complete justice — Taking a pragmatic approach to avoid the sudden displacement of a substantial number of in-service teachers and consequent disruption to school-going children, the timeline to qualify the TET is modified - The timeline originally granted in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra is extended from 2 (two) years to 3 (three) years - In-service teachers must acquire the TET qualification by August 31, 2028, instead of August 31, 2027 - States are directed to conduct the TET periodically, preferably twice a year. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Constitution of India - Article 142 — Plenary Power to Do Complete Justice — Scope and Limits: Reaffirmed, the jurisdiction under Article 142 is expansive but tempered by self-imposed restraints founded on fundamental public policy - It cannot be invoked to "supplant" substantive law or disregard express statutory provisions rooted in fundamental public policy considerations - it retains wide discretion to mould relief, bridge gaps, and address situations in nebulous areas where the law is silent or inadequate, provided it does not contravene a core, non-derogable principle of a statute - issuing directions to protect sensitive institutional areas from stray dogs does not override or contravene the statutory scheme, but supplements, clarifies, and operationalizes it. [Relied on: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; and Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Paras 50–54, 62 - 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Article 142 – Recovery of Outstanding Fees of Relocated Medical Students – Sudden closing/denial of recognition to a medical college due to deficiencies creates an extraordinary situation putting the academic future of students in jeopardy - When students are relocated to other private medical colleges under judicial intervention via a State-supervised counselling mechanism, the resultant financial burden must be equitably apportioned. [Paras 4 – 6] Soumya Ranjan Panda v. Subhalaxmi Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2026 INSC 488

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Modification of Penalty – Although the appellant committed a lapse through a brazen mis-declaration regarding his faculty appearances in the same academic year, the incident dated back to 2016 - Considering that a decade had passed, the appellant was now 76 years old, and the operation of the penalty had remained stayed throughout the litigation, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do complete justice - Supreme Court directed the National Medical Commission (NMC) to reduce the punishment from a three-month removal of the appellant's name from the Indian Medical Register to the issuance of a censure/warning. [Paras 13-16] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453

Service Law — Regularisation — Validity of State Notifications — Group 'B', 'C', and 'D' employees — Distinction between "Irregular" and "Illegal" appointments — The Supreme Court examined the validity of Haryana Government Notifications dated 16.06.2014, 18.06.2014, and 07.07.2014, which sought to regularise contractual/ad hoc employees – i. Validity of Notifications dated 16.06.2014 and 18.06.2014: Supreme Court held these notifications valid as they were intended to grant benefits to employees who were eligible under the 1996 policy but were left out due to its administrative withdrawal - Since these employees occupied sanctioned posts and met prescribed qualifications at the time of initial engagement, their appointments were "irregular" but not "illegal"- The High Court's quashing of these two notifications was set aside; ii. Invalidity of Notifications dated 07.07.2014: Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the 07.07.2014 notifications - These policies were found arbitrary as they sought to regularise employees engaged without any public advertisement or interview, and utilized a future cut-off date (31.12.2018), which bypassed regular recruitment processes. (Paragraph 21); iii. Protection under Article 142: Despite striking down the 07.07.2014 notifications, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to protect the services of those ad hoc employees who have already secured benefits and remain in service - to balance equity, such employees are to be placed at the lowest pay scale admissible to their posts. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) INSC 216; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) INSC 993; State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) INSC 469; Paras 18 – 25] Madan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2026 INSC 379

Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Scope of Extraordinary Powers – Condonation of Illegalities – Extraordinary powers under Article 142 cannot be invoked to condone significant illegalities committed by a party, such as the unauthorized sale of assets of a sick company and its subsidiary during the pendency of litigation - held it was not a case for "ironing of creases" but one involving multiple illegalities that could not be regularized. [Paras 166–176] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Mediated Settlement – Appellant-Husband and Respondent-Wife entered into a mediated Settlement Agreement to dissolve marriage by mutual consent - Appellant-Husband performed substantial obligations, including payment of ₹89,00,000 and return of jewellery - Respondent-Wife resiled from the settlement before the Second Motion, alleging oral promises of additional jewellery worth ₹120 crores and gold biscuits worth ₹50 crore - Held: Withdrawal of consent without proving fraud, force, or undue influence, specifically based on terms not included in a signed mediated settlement, indicates an irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 to grant a decree of divorce to do complete justice. [Paras 36 - 55] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Matrimonial Dispute – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Dissolution of Marriage and Quashing of Multiplicity of Proceedings – The parties were embroiled in a decade-long "vicious spate of litigation" including over 80 legal proceedings initiated by the respondent-husband against the appellant-wife, her family, and her legal counsels – Held that the marriage "dead for all practical purposes" and a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Constitution of India - Exercise of Powers under Article 142 – Termination of Vexatious Litigation – Supreme Court observed the respondent-husband, a practicing advocate, had misused his legal knowledge to file vindictive and oppressive complaints before various forums, including the State Bar Council and criminal courts - To provide a "quietus" to the dispute, the Supreme Court quashed all pending civil, criminal, and miscellaneous proceedings inter se, including FIRs and disciplinary complaints against advocates. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Modification of Relief – Finding the High Court's direction to grant admission justified, the Supreme Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 to modify the timing of the relief - Due to the pendency of litigation for over three years, the Court directed the respondent to be admitted for the academic year 2026-2027 instead of 2023-2024. [Relied on S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others (2020) 17 SCC 465; Paras 15-19] Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Article 142 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Article 142 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Exercise of Extraordinary Jurisdiction despite opposition by one spouse - The Supreme Court dissolved a marriage that had lasted only 65 days of cohabitation followed by over a decade of separation and excessive litigation - held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond salvage, maintaining a formal legal relationship is unjustified and the Court can exercise its power under Article 142 to do "complete justice," even if one spouse opposes the divorce. Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Article 142 – Restoration of Withdrawn Petitions – National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – The Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to set aside an order of the Trial Court, which had allowed land owners to withdraw their Section 34 petitions following a High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act unconstitutional - noted that since the High Court's judgment was subsequently stayed, the land owners were left "remediless" as fresh petitions would be barred by limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act - Supreme Court has raised concerns over the deep structural flaws in determining the land acquisition compensation acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court said that land owners whose lands were acquired under the 1956 Act faces significant disadvantage when compared to land owners whose lands were acquired under different laws. [Para 1-3] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62

Article 145 - Rules of Court, etc.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 145(4) – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order XII Rules 1 and 3 – Practice and Procedure – Status of Order Dictated in Open Court vs. Signed Order – Variance – Modification before Signing – Miscellaneous application filed seeking a clarification that a draft order dictated in open court is final and binding, and that the subsequent signed order uploaded later lacks the force of law due to the omission of an ancillary direction for status quo and the modification of a direction disposing of a Writ Petition – Held - Displaced the applicants' contention. A distinction must be drawn between the dictation of a draft order to a Court-master and the formal pronouncement of a judgment - The dictation of an order in open court serves as a skeletal framework to put facts on record, which remains subject to correction, refinement, and enhancement in chambers prior to signing - The digitally signed and uploaded order is the sole final expository of the Court's unalterable opinion - Judges retain a locus poenitentiae to change their mind or correct an error in law (such as the erroneous grant of an ancillary status quo order) before the judgment crystallizes through signing - Unless a material change is made to the core outcome behind the back of the parties without a re-hearing, refinements made in chambers do not invalidate the signed order. [Paras 15, 19 - 23, 25 - 28] Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 490 : 2026 INSC 483

Article 215 - High Courts to be courts of record.

Succession Act, 1925 - Inherent and Plenary Powers of Constitutional Court — Testamentary Jurisdiction — Protection of Estate in medio — held that a High Court, while sitting in its testamentary jurisdiction, does not cease to be a Constitutional Court of Record or a Court of Equity - When an estate is brought under the protective umbrella of the Court through the appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it is in custodia legis – If the Supreme Court discovers glaring irregularities, deceit, suppression of bank accounts, or siphoning of funds by a self-styled executor using shell or dormant trusts, it cannot remain a silent spectator - It is entirely within the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to direct a police investigation to unearth the fraud, safeguard the property, and protect the process of the Court from abuse - Key Takeaways & Statutory Interpretations – i. Indian Succession Act, 1925 — Sections 211, 247 & 307 — Authority of Executor vs. Administrator pendente lite - While an executor derives authority from the Will, such authority is not a license to plunder cash assets when rival Wills are propounded and the matter is fiercely contested - The appointment of an Administrator pendente lite under Section 247 suspends the powers of the executor, making the Administrator the "hand of the court" to preserve and maintain the estate; ii. The Succession Act is Not a Bar to Criminal Investigation - The Indian Succession Act governs the administration of estates but does not grant immunity to individuals committing criminal breach of trust, forgery, or conspiracy; iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 340 - Directing a criminal investigation into a larger conspiracy of siphoning funds through fraudulent banking transactions does not strictly fall under Section 340 of the CrPC (which deals with offences affecting the administration of justice) - broader inherent powers can be exercised without being strictly shackled by the procedural bars or appellate restrictions under Section 341 of the CrPC – iv. No Prejudice Caused by Investigation - Mere initiation of an investigation to uncover the truth and assist the Testamentary Court in tracing siphoned assets does not infringe upon personal liberty or cause actual or substantive prejudice. [Relied on Paras M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433; Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal Krishnan, (1996) 11 SCC 376; Pandurang Shamrao Laud v. Dwarkadas Kalliandas, 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 154; Paras 28-43] Bai Avabai Hormusji Tata Trust v. Shernaz Faroukh Lawyer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 542 : 2026 INSC 540

Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Article 226 - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

Criminal courts cannot, by judicial directions, introduce a new procedural stage not contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for the conduct of trials. The procedure for criminal trials, including prosecutions under the PC Act, must be strictly followed as laid down in the CrPC/BNSS read with the provisions of the PC Act. Courts cannot create an additional pre-charge stage for examining sanctioning authorities. Section 311 CrPC, being a general provision relating to inquiries and trials, cannot be interpreted to override or bypass the specific stages of trial prescribed in the Code, particularly the stage of framing of charges. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot rewrite the procedural law or issue directions that require all Sessions Courts/Special Courts to examine sanctioning authorities before framing of charge or commencement of trial. The Supreme Court emphasised that while the validity of sanction can be challenged at appropriate stages as per law (including under Section 19(4) of the PC Act), it does not warrant creation of a mandatory pre-trial examination procedure through judicial fiat. Directions issued by the High Court were accordingly set aside. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : 2026 INSC 650

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) — Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court — Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) / Border Security Force (BSF) — Dismissal from Service — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens - Key Legal Principles Summarized by Supreme Court – i. Territorial Jurisdiction based on Situs of Office: Even if the entire cause of action arises outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court (e.g., the misconduct occurred and the dismissal order was issued elsewhere), a member of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), including the BSF, can maintain a writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) of the Constitution - This is because the overall command, administration, and superintendence vest in authorities whose offices are situated in New Delhi (the Union of India and the Director General, BSF); ii. Inapplicability of Forum Non Conveniens to Article 226(1) Writs - The doctrine of forum non conveniens is misapplied when used by a High Court to refuse to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction invoked under Article 226(1) based on the situs of the respondent's office - When a suitor chooses a forum that is highly convenient to the respondents themselves, and where the official records are readily available or can be summoned, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens becomes self-defeating and denies access to justice. [Relied on Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977) 1 SCC 484; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff (2001) 9 SCC 525; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Paragraph 21-40] Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2026 INSC 630

Constitution of India, Articles 226/227 – Challenge to order passed by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Held, the scheme of the Act envisages minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings – Except in cases where the order is so perverse that a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction stares one in the face, the High Court should not entertain a challenge to a Section 16 order under Article 226/227 – The party must wait for the passing of the final award and avail the remedy under Section 34. Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Suppression of Facts — Relief Moulding vs. State Inaction — Suppression of a fact by a litigant must be of a material fact that has the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory on merits to disentitle them from relief - Even in cases of non-disclosure of connected litigation, the Court cannot permit the State to deny the appellants the benefit of a judicial order passed in their favour which has attained finality and was never challenged - Allowing the State to escape its obligation on the ground of delay in seeking implementation would tantamount to permitting it to take advantage of its own wrong (Ex injuria sua nemo habere debet) - The State, being a model employer under Article 12, is estopped from espousing such a contention, especially when the failure to make monthly payments gives rise to a fresh cause of action every month - The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the litigants and their counsel to place all connected facts on record, and it is for the Court to decide what constitutes a "material fact." - Pick-and-choose disclosures are impermissible - reiterated that the principle of suppression is a safeguard against the abuse of judicial process and not a weapon of technicality, noting that the withheld fact must be of such critical import that its absence renders a decision unjust. [Relied on SJS Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166; Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, (2025) 7 SCC 450; Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, (2024) 18 SCC 643; Paras 6 – 8] B. Yerraji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2026 INSC 495

Constitutional Law – Article 226 vs Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Distinguishing the scope of jurisdiction, the Court observed that so long as cognizance of an offence is not taken, a writ to quash an FIR/charge-sheet can be issued under Article 226 - once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 is not available, though the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482

Forest Act, 1326 (Hyderabad) - Fasli (1916 AD) & 1355 Fasli (1945 AD) – Revenue Entries – Evidentiary value on title – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Writ of Certiorari – Revenue records or Jamabandi entries serve only a fiscal purpose to enable the person whose name is mutated to pay land revenue - A revenue record is not a document of title and does not create or extinguish ownership, nor does it possess presumptive value regarding title - Stray or solitary entries for a single year cannot be relied upon against long, consistent revenue entries - Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not the appropriate forum for resolving serious disputes concerning complex questions of fact and property title - The proper function of investigating these claims lies with a civil court in a regularly constituted suit, rather than a court exercising writ jurisdiction - A Writ of Certiorari lies only on limited grounds, namely: (i) want of jurisdiction, (ii) excess of jurisdiction, (iii) violation of principles of natural justice, and (iv) an error of law apparent on the face of the record. [Relied on Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (1957) 1 SCC 439; Paras 16 - 19] Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 469 : 2026 INSC 450

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Exhaustion of Alternative Statutory Remedies — Registration of FIR — Held - The extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and subject to self-imposed restrictions - It ought not to be invoked for the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) or proper investigation when alternative, equally efficacious sequential statutory remedies are available under the criminal procedure framework, unless justified by exceptional urgency or imminent danger to life or liberty - Entertaining such a writ petition in the first instance effectively results in the High Court acting as a forum of first instance, thereby completely bypassing the structured statutory scheme, which is impermissible. Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition against Co-operative Societies — The Supreme Court held that disputes pertaining purely to the internal management, governance, or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not ordinarily attract writ jurisdiction – Noted that District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies and not "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" under Article 12, even if they are subject to statutory regulation or oversight by the Registrar - A writ lies against a non-State entity only when it performs public duties or acts in breach of statutory obligations of a public character, which was not the case here. [Relied on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733; Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 8] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing impleadment application in a writ petition challenging the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Appellant sought impleadment as municipal authorities relied on an interim stay in said writ petition to reject Appellant's building plans and initiate demolition – Held: A person directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order cannot be shut out of proceedings merely because they were not an original party to the principal challenge - The Appellant is at least a "proper party" whose presence enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the consequences of its own interim order. Procedural exclusion of a party facing immediate civil consequences (demolition and refusal of statutory benefits) is unsustainable - High Court's order set aside; Appellant impleaded as a party respondent. Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction against Show Cause Notice – Reiterated that while courts ordinarily do not interfere at the SCN stage, it is not an "inviolable rule" - Interference is permissible in exceptional circumstances, including patent lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process of law, or where the notice reflects a pre-determined approach. [Relied on Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270; Paras 30-40] J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309

Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court reiterated that once a High Court declines to entertain a writ petition on the ground of an available efficacious alternative remedy, it cannot pass interim orders (such as a stay or status quo) to operate until the petitioner approaches the alternative forum - Order – Interim relief can only be granted in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief available upon the final determination of rights - It is impermissible for a High Court to grant interim relief as the "only and final relief" while simultaneously declining to decide on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Rejection of Writ Petition at the threshold on technical office objections – Sustainability of – High Court rejected a writ petition arising under the SARFAESI Act based on Registry objections regarding prayer revision, multiple reliefs in a single prayer, and joinder of parties – Held that the High Court erred in sustaining these technical objections to "nip a proceeding in the bud" - When fraud and collusion are alleged specifically regarding the conduct of a Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; the court must remember the maxim "fraus omnia corrumpit" (fraud unravels everything) - Allegations of fraud should not be buried without an examination of merits due to mere technicalities. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact and Delay – Held that High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition filed in 2015 challenging construction activities that commenced in 2002 and were completed by 2007-2008 - Held: Gross delay in approaching the Court disentitles a petitioner to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Noted that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to specifically plead and substantiate facts with cogent material; mere abstract points of law without evidence are insufficient. [Paras 66 - 70] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Article 226(3) – Vacation of Interim Orders – Mandatory Timeline for Disposal – Special Leave Petition filed against an interim order of status quo – Petitioner submitted that an application for vacating the interim order had been pending since January 2025 – Held, Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India mandates that upon an application for vacating an interim order being filed, the High Court is required to dispose of the same within a period of two weeks – In light of this provision, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to take up and dispose of the pending application on its own merits. [Paras 3, 4] Giriraj v. Mohd. Amir, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Article 227 - Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 227 — Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction — Capacity as an Appellate Court Impermissible - The High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh evidence/facts under Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction is a correctional jurisdiction meant to be exercised sparingly to set right grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse, or patent errors of law - It cannot be used to substitute a plausible and reasonable view taken by a subordinate court with an alternative interpretation merely because another view is possible. [Paras 31 - 36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court — Interference with discretionary order of amendment — Held: In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal - It is not open to the High Court to review or reassess the evidence or material upon which the inferior court or tribunal passed the order - The supervisory jurisdiction is strictly confined to seeing whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction - The High Court transgresses its limitations if it enters upon the merits of the case set up in the amendment. [Paras 15, 16] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 vs. Article 227 of the Constitution of India / Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Remedy for Legal Representatives – Held that the appropriate statutory relief for a legal representative aggrieved by and seeking to challenge an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not via a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the CPC. V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393 : AIR 2026 SC 2041

Article 227 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121

Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise and does not permit the reappreciation of evidence – Held that the High Court was not justified in dislodging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court to refer a dispute to arbitration when the existence of the agreement was under serious doubt. [Relied on: Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited v. Sanjay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1604; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713; Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386; Paras 16- 23] Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Interference with Interlocutory Orders – Held: While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and it should generally not intervene in interlocutory orders like impleadment, the Supreme Court will not restore an incorrect Trial Court order if the High Court has rightly interfered to prevent an illegality – Held that an impleadment application filed nearly nine years after acquiring knowledge of the suit (as evidenced by the applicant's seal on the original summons) is liable to be rejected on the ground of silence and delay. [Relied on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384; Paras 33-44] Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Article 233 - Appointment of district judges

Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Article 235 - Control over subordinate courts.

Constitution of India - Article 235 - The Registrar General of a High Court has no independent or suo motu authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer. The power of disciplinary control over judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested collectively in the High Court, comprising the Chief Justice and the companion Judges. The Registrar General can act only as a delegate on behalf of the Chief Justice or a committee of Judges duly constituted by the Chief Justice. Any disciplinary action initiated without the approval or authorisation of the Chief Justice or such a committee suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and is void ab initio. High Court of Uttarakhand v. Deepali Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 623

Article 246A - Special provision with respect to goods and services tax (GST)

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Sections 2(31), 2(52), 7, 9, And 15 — Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 — Rule 31a, Rule 31b, And Rule 31c — Constitution of India — Article 246a Read With Entry 34 of List II — Online Gaming, Fantasy Sports, And Casinos — Taxability Of Stakes As Betting And Gambling - Key Issues Decided – i. Characterization of Games of Skill played with Stakes - Whether placing monetary stakes on games predominantly involving skill (such as Rummy or Fantasy Sports) alters the nature of the transaction to fall within the ambit of "Betting and Gambling" under the GST/Constitutional framework; ii. Relevance of Skill vs. Chance in Taxing Framework - Whether the distinction between games of skill and games of chance pales into insignificance once the element of betting or staking money on an uncertain outcome enters the activity - Held by the Supreme Court – a. Staking Transforms Activity into Betting and Gambling - Once money or money's worth is risked or staked upon an uncertain outcome, the activity inherently acquires the character of betting and gambling - This holds true irrespective of whether the underlying game is categorized as a game of skill, a game of chance, or a combination of both, as the intrinsic nature of the underlying game loses significance for regulatory and fiscal purposes once a staking arrangement is introduced; b. Betting and Gambling as Interchangeable Cognate Expressions - The expressions "betting" and "gambling" are interchangeable and cognate terms that cannot be artificially split or rewritten as "betting on gambling" - Both terms fundamentally encompass the act of staking money on an unknown and uncertain future victory or outcome; c. Online Rummy and Fantasy Sports with Stakes constitute Betting - While the underlying formats of games like online Rummy or Fantasy Sports may involve elements of expertise or skill, playing or organizing them with real money stakes open to the general public constitutes a betting enterprise - The participants are effectively forecasting an unknown future event (victory) to win a pool directly linked to the staked amounts; d. Definition of Gaming Includes Skill and Chance for Money - Relying on established jurisprudence, "gaming" is judicially defined as playing any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money's worth - The act does not cease to be gaming merely because the underlying game requires a substantial degree of skill. [Relied on M.J. Sivani and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (1995) 6 SCC 289; Clarified State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I) 1957 SCR 870; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II) 1957 SCR 930; Distinguished from K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 66-86] Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence Hqs v. Gameskraft Technologies, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 572 : 2026 INSC 595

Article 282 - Expenditure defrayable by the Union or a State out of its revenues.

Article 282 of the Constitution - Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Article 300A – Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.

Constitutional Law – Right to Pension – Nature of Pension – Plea of Financial Burden – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 300A – Held that Pension is not a bounty, grace, or a matter of financial convenience dependent on the employer - It is a deferred wage and a hard-earned benefit amassed by virtue of long and continuous service, constituting "property" within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution - A constitutional right cannot be rendered illusory or defeated on account of administrative inaction or the plea of financial burden. [Paras 41-74] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Constitution of India – Article 300A – Right to Property – Fair Compensation - The right to receive fair statutory compensation upon the compulsory deprivation of property is an intrinsic sub-right encapsulated within the sacrosanct constitutional and human right under Article 300A - Statutes that are expropriatory must be strictly construed, and the State cannot abdicate its responsibility or deprive a person of property without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory compensation mechanism. [Paras 41 - 62] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517

Constitution of India – Article 300A – Constitutional Right to Property – The right of redemption is a valuable right embedded in the SARFAESI Act to protect the borrower's ownership, which is a constitutional right - This right survives until the completion of the sale by a registered deed following a legally valid process - Since the borrowers discharged the entire outstanding liability during the pendency of the proceedings and the sale process was legally infirm due to timeline violations, the borrowers are entitled to redeem the property. [Relied on Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar (2014) 5 SCC 610; Paras 18-30] E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303

Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Article 309 – Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.

Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India – Whether a railway servant ceases to be a member of the civil service of the Union merely because separate service rules govern their recruitment, conduct, control, and pension – Held that No, A railway servant remains a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Central Government - The delegation of powers to the Railway Board does not separate the status of a railway servant from that of a Central Government employee, as the Railway Board functions as the Government of India itself for railway administration - Service under the Railway Board is service under the Central Government. [Paras 42, 43] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562

Service Law – Promotion vs. Selection Post – Restructuring of Cadre and Framing of Rules under Article 309 – Vested Right to Promotion – Supercession of Executive Instructions: The respondents, serving as Assistant Section Officers, sought directions for the curation of a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) to consider their promotion to the post of Assistant Regional Transport Officer (ARTO) based on Executive Instructions dated 17.11.1981 - the State restructured the cadre, making the Government the appointing authority, and subsequently framed the Odisha Transport Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution - The 2021 Rules mandated filling the ARTO posts through a competitive examination conducted by the OPSC - The High Court directed the State to convene the DPC under the old Executive Instructions, holding that the vacancies arose prior to the new rules and that the pending recommendation for a DPC was saved from supersession - Allowing the appeals of the State, the Supreme Court held – i. An employee does not possess a vested right or a legitimate expectation to be promoted - The limited right available is only for the consideration of candidacy in accordance with the "rule in force" as on the date the consideration takes place; ii. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must necessarily be filled on the basis of the law/rules that existed on the date when they arose - The Government is fully entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up existing vacancies prior to the amendment or framing of new rules, especially when a restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient administration; iii. Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India strictly supersede any prior departmental executive instructions, circulars, or memoranda; iv. The savings clause in the 2021 Rules exempting "things done or omitted to be done" cannot save a mere inter-departmental letter or recommendation to convene a DPC, as it does not constitute a completed or concluded act under the old instructions; v. Furthermore, the post of ARTO was a selection post and not a promotional post - Ranking or position in a gradation list does not confer an automatic right to promotion to a selection post where merit and policy-driven selection methods govern - The method of selection is a matter of policy vesting entirely with the Government. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 773; Union of India v. Somasundaram Viswanath, (1989) 1 SCC 175; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910; Paras 13-28] State of Odisha v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2026 INSC 505

Public Employment — Regularisation of Para-Teachers / Contractual Employees — Scheme-based appointments vs. Cadre posts — Para-teachers engaged on a contractual basis under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan ("SSA") sought blanket regularisation as permanent Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas bypassing the statutory recruitment rules — Held that a prayer for regularisation from a scheme post to a State cadre post changes the character of the appointment - A scheme post under the SSA is jointly funded and continues until the scheme ceases, whereas a cadre post is governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India creating public employment via constitutionally aligned recruitment processes - A direct leap from one to the other, bypassing statutory rules, creates an unsanctioned mode of recruitment which is prohibited - Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the statutory rules, but do not possess an absolute right to blanket regularisation. [Paras 19 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Article 311 - Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of civil servants.

Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Scope of Protection — Employees of Statutory Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings - The protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India providing that a member of a civil service or a holder of a civil post shall not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority applies strictly to persons holding civil posts under the Union or a State - Employees of a public sector company or corporation (such as MSEDCL) having a distinct legal personality independent of the Government do not hold a civil post merely because of government ownership or control - Their disciplinary competence is governed entirely by the internal Service Regulations of the Corporation and not by Article 311. [Relied on S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177; Paras 80-110] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 311(2) – ICAR functions as an autonomous Society whose recruitment and service conditions are governed by its own rules and bye-laws—hence, Article 311 is not attracted – A transfer, reversion, or repatriation is ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot per se be considered punitive - Judicial review of administrative discretion is narrowly confined to evaluating the decision-making process rather than the merits or fairness of the conclusion itself - It must strictly assess whether the action was arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, particularly regarding whether it imposes penal or stigmatic consequences without due procedure - Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent, and concrete material, and cannot be entertained merely on conjectures or the sequence of events. [Paras 9, 10, 11-16] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Article 311(2)(b) – Dismissal from service without departmental inquiry – Scope of "Reasonably Practicable" – Requirement of Objective Satisfaction – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable, holding that the power to dispense with a regular departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be exercised based on mere "assumptions and conjectures" - Supreme Court noted that the disciplinary authority must record satisfaction based on independent material showing that holding an inquiry is not "reasonably practicable" - Key Observations held – i. Judicial Review and Satisfaction - The finality given to the disciplinary authority's decision under Article 311(3) is not binding on the Courts - The scope of judicial review is open to strike down orders dispensing with an inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or lack a factual basis – Held that court must consider whether a "reasonable man acting in a reasonable way" would have reached the same conclusion in the prevailing situation; ii. Absence of Material Evidence: In the present case, the Preliminary Inquiry (PE) report failed to record any specific instances of the appellant who was in custody at the time—threatening or intimidating witnesses - The Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) relied on the ACP's "presumption" of potential witness tampering without any supporting material, which the Court deemed a failure of application of mind; iii. Custody as a Factor: It was incumbent upon the authority to demonstrate how the appellant, while in jail, posed a threat that made an inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; iv. Adherence to Circulars: noted that the Delhi Police's own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007) mandate that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a "short cut" and requires "cogent and legally tenable reasons". [Relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 36; Paras 23-40] Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2026 INSC 234

Article 324 - Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be vested in an Election Commission.

Constitution of India – Article 324 & Article 327 – Interplay between Constitutional Powers and Parliamentary Legislation – The legislative competence of Parliament under Article 327 and the ECI's mandate under Article 324 are complementary, not competing - Parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish or paralyse the core constitutional functions of the Commission - The Commission retains plenary authority to issue regulatory directions and fill vacuums where the law is silent, though it must act consistently with express statutory prohibitions. [Relied on: Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664; All Party Hill Leaders' Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161; Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628; In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237; Para 175-186] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Representation of the People Act, 1950 – Section 21(3) – Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 – Rule 21A – Constitution of India – Articles 324, 325, 326 & 327 – Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Electoral Rolls – Power of the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct state-wide Special Intensive Revision – The expression "for any constituency or part of a constituency" in Section 21(3) of the RP Act includes "many" or "all" constituencies if state-wide reasons like rapid urbanization, migration, and duplication pollute the rolls - The non-obstante clause in Section 21(3) frees the Commission from the ordinary procedural limitations of Section 21(2), allowing it to shape the course of revision as it thinks fit, provided it records cogent reasons. [Paras 35 – 50] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Article 329 - Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters

Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer during an election process is not maintainable in view of the constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b). The proper and exclusive remedy for challenging the improper rejection of a nomination lies in an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after the declaration of results. The Supreme Court cannot carve out exceptions based on the alleged “glaring”, “manifest”, or “arbitrary” nature of the rejection of nomination, as doing so would amount to rewriting Article 329 and creating an impermissible parallel jurisdiction between writ courts and election tribunals. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the challenge regarding the non-disclosure of a private criminal complaint in Form 26 affidavit. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643

Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The petitioner's nomination for Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that she failed to disclose a pending private complaint filed against her in a Court, despite receiving summons. The petitioner contended that disclosure was not required under Section 33A of the RP Act as no cognizance had been taken and no charge had been framed. She argued that the rejection was arbitrary and prevented a contested election. Article 329 imposes a clear constitutional embargo on judicial interference in electoral matters except through the mechanism provided by law (election petition). The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner to justify pre-result interference, holding that the cited observations do not dilute the bar under Article 329. Allowing writ jurisdiction in “glaring” cases while relegating others to election petitions would lead to splitting of jurisdiction and judicial overreach. The right to contest an election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right, reinforcing the inapplicability of Article 32. Writ petition dismissed as non-maintainable with liberty to the petitioner to file an election petition. No order as to costs. The Court clarified that it has not made any observation on the merits of the case. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643

Article 366 - Definitions

Customary Law & Succession – Princely States – Rule of Lineal Male Primogeniture vs. Personal Law – Merger Covenant and Private Properties – Dispute over the character and devolution of the properties belonging to the erstwhile royal family of Kapurthala - The appellants contended that the properties declared as "private properties" by the former ruler under the merger agreement are subject to Hindu Mitakshara Law and liable for partition, while the contesting respondent claimed absolute ownership under the rule of primogeniture - Held, upon signing the merger covenant on May 5, 1948, the Maharaja ceased to be an absolute sovereign and assumed the status of an ordinary citizen - The recognition of the Maharaja as a "Ruler" under Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India was a political/executive act for ceremonial purposes and was not an indicium of property ownership – While Article XIV of the covenant guaranteed succession according to law and custom to the Gaddi (throne), it did not extend that protection or the rule of primogeniture to the private personal properties earmarked under Article XII. [Paras 47, 48] Tikka Shatrujit Singh v. Sukjit Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2026 INSC 571

Seventh Schedule

National Highway - Toll on National Highways covered by Union List; States can levy toll only on other roads - Held, the levy and collection of toll/fee on National Highways by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) falls squarely within the legislative competence of the Union under Entry 23 read with Entry 96 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Toll collected for the use of National Highways is a fee traceable to Entry 23 (highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national highways) read with Entry 96 (fees in respect of any of the matters in the Union List) of List I. The expression “tolls” under Entry 59 of List II (State List) must be confined to charges levied by States on roads/highways other than National Highways. Once a road is declared a National Highway, legislative competence shifts exclusively to the Union. Rule 8 of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rate and Collection) Rules, 2008 is intra vires the Constitution and the National Highways Act, 1956. There is no lack of legislative competence or excessive delegation. The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court judgment which had upheld the constitutional validity of toll collection on National Highways, including through concessionaires. T.S.R. Venkatramana v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 326

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43

Seventh Schedule

Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 34 – Betting and Gambling – Online Gaming – Games of Skill vs. Games of Chance – Scope of legislative competence of States – Interpretation of the conjunction "and" – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Article 19(1)(g) – Res Extra Commercium – List II, Entry 1 – Public Order - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court which held that Entry 34 of List II is restricted to games of chance - The expression "betting and gambling" cannot be split disjunctively or interpreted narrowly as "betting on gambling" to provide immunity to games of skill played for stakes - Entry 34 of List II empowers the State Legislatures to regulate or prohibit betting activities on both games of chance and games of skill when played for stakes. [Relied on: State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029; Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Paras 217-228, 267 – 273] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Eighth Schedule

Eighth Schedule Technicality vs. Constitutional Imperative - The State cannot justify its continued inaction or lackadaisical approach on the technical premise that a regional language (such as Rajasthani) is not formally recognized in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution - The absence of an administrative policy is an executive shortcoming warranting prompt rectification, not a valid ground to defend institutional inertia. [Para 46] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Ninth Schedule

Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

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Architecture Of Restraint: EU Labour Enforcement And Worker Mobility In India

Abhimanyu Vyas & Snigdha Ghose — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 10:26:49 GMT

Historically, the Indian labour market has been regulated by labour and employment laws, which primarily focus on aspects such as wages, working conditions, and collective bargaining. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees every citizen the freedom to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business. Although the State can impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6), the broader constitutional vision clearly supports occupational mobility and guards against unfair restraints on the freedom to work. However, in today's labour markets, certain contractual practices have begun to restrict employee mobility in subtle yet powerful ways, often slipping past the boundaries of traditional labour law scrutiny.

No-poach agreements, also known as non-solicitation agreements, are arrangements under which firms agree not to recruit or hire each other's employees. These agreements may be written or informal and are often justified by firms as necessary for maintaining stability or protecting business interests. However, when such agreements are entered into between competitors without a legitimate justification, they effectively limit workers' employment options and weaken their bargaining power. Over time, this may lead to a reduction in wages, worker mobility, and an inefficient allocation of skills. However, these agreements have largely escaped antitrust scrutiny.

A significant shift in this approach occurred in June 2025, when the European Commission (“EC”) imposed fines totalling €329 million on Delivery Hero and Glovo for entering into no-poach agreements and exchanging sensitive information relating to employee hiring and compensation. Rather than focusing on price effects in downstream markets, the Commission examined how the conduct restricted competition in the labour market itself. In doing so, it recognised workers as participants in a market that is capable of being distorted through collusive conduct.

This raises a significant question: Should the Competition Commission of India draw inspiration from the Commission's approach? The CCI has historically focused on investigating price-fixing cartels, with labour market distortions rarely being examined as a competition law issue. While the labour discourse has traditionally centred on collective bargaining, wage protection, and industrial disputes, less focus has been placed on inter-employer arrangements that indirectly restrict mobility. With existing labour laws ill-equipped to address the issue, this blog aims to make a case for their scrutiny under competition law.

Labour-Market Cartelisation in India

From an economic perspective, the labour market is similar in nature to other markets. Workers offer their labour as service-providers, while organisations act as their buyers or recipients. In a competitive setting, organisations are expected to compete by offering higher wages and better working conditions to attract and retain labour. This competition ensures that wages reflect the value of labour and that human resources are allocated efficiently across firms and sectors. No-poach agreements disrupt this process by removing competitive pressure from the hiring market. When firms agree not to hire each other's employees, they effectively eliminate wage bidding between themselves. As a result, workers have fewer outside options, which weakens their bargaining power and allows firms to keep wages artificially low. Over time, this can lead to wage stagnation, reduced labour mobility, and inefficiencies in the allocation of skilled workers, particularly in sectors where a limited number of firms dominate employment opportunities. A study conducted by Matthew Gibson, titled 'How Major Tech Firms Used Illegal “No-Poach” Agreements to Control Workers' Salaries', analysed the effects of no-poach agreements on employee salaries, stock-based compensation, and job satisfaction in the context of a United States Department of Justice investigation. The investigation concerned no-poach arrangements among several technology companies, including Adobe, Apple, eBay, Google, Intel, Intuit, Lucasfilm, and Pixar. The study compared salary levels between firms that were part of these arrangements and those that were not. It found that employees at the colluding firms earned, on average, around 6% less than employees at non-colluding firms. Importantly, once the no-poach agreements were discontinued, salary levels at the colluding firms began to align with those offered by non-colluding firms. Based on these findings, the study concluded that the no-poach agreements in Silicon Valley had a significant negative effect on worker compensation. These effects closely resemble those caused by traditional cartels in product markets.

When competing firms coordinate their hiring practices to avoid competing for labour, they engage in behaviour that is functionally equivalent to market allocation or price-fixing. Basically, in a price-fixing cartel, firms agree not to compete on price, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer welfare. Similarly, in a labour-market cartel, firms agree not to compete for workers, leading to suppressed wages and reduced worker welfare. The core feature in both cases is the suppression of competition through coordination between competitors. The fact that the harm is suffered by workers rather than consumers does not alter the anti-competitive nature of the conduct.

To demonstrate this, we curated data from the financial statements of businesses involved in the food delivery industry in India. The dominant players in the industry are Zomato and Swiggy. Despite posting an approximately 714% increase in the consolidated adjusted revenue over a span of 5 financial years from FY 2020-21 to FY 2024-25 as derived from Zomato's annual financial statements, the employment benefit expense did not show a similar increase. A similar situation was seen at Swiggy, with the company's annual financial statements showing a 444% increase in profits from FY 2020-21 to FY 2024-25. However, the employee benefit expense during the same period registered a mere 73.33% increase.

The public data available for both the companies showcases a growing plateauing of the employment benefits expense curve. This showcases a growing standardization in the expense, indicating the possible existence of a no-poach agreement, which, as we shall demonstrate, have the effect of suppressing wages. However, the existing labour law architecture in India, especially the Code, does not effectively address this problem. The Code does not contemplate a scenario involving structural collusion among employers to bring down production costs. Instead, it focuses on employer-employee relations, regulating trade unions, grievance redressal mechanisms, strikes, lock-outs, etc. This lacuna in the existing architecture ignores the detrimental impact of such agreements on worker mobility and wage progression, necessitating the use of competition law to capture employer coordination in the labour market.

The absence of immediate consumer price effects has often been used to justify regulatory inaction in cases involving labour-market restraints. However, this approach fails to take into account the broader policy objectives of competition policy, which also include the promotion of efficiency, the prevention of the concentration of economic power, and the maintenance of the competitive process. Labour is an important factor of production in a number of sectors, and limiting the flow of labour as well as its price can have a variety of effects. Moreover, as evidenced from traditional competition law analysis, it struggles to address no-poach agreements because the harm they cause does not easily fit within a price-centric framework. Unlike classic cartels, these arrangements do not directly involve fixing prices or limiting output. Instead, they restrict competition over labour, which is reflected in stagnant wages and limited job switching rather than higher consumer prices. This has made it difficult for regulators to detect and penalise such conduct using conventional antitrust tools.

Given this context, no-poach agreements should be recognised as a form of labour-market cartelisation. They involve coordination between competing firms, restrict independent decision-making, and produce outcomes that would not arise in a competitive market. By focusing on the nature of the conduct rather than the identity of the affected market, competition law can more effectively address anti-competitive practices that undermine both worker welfare and market efficiency.

Recommendations

The authors have the following recommendations to bolster the CCI and other regulators' ability to address labour market collusion:

1. The Second Schedule of the Code, which deals with Unfair Labour Practices, should be amended to include the following clause:

“Entering into, or enforcing, any agreement, arrangement, or understanding with another employer, associations of employers, or entity, that, directly or indirectly, restricts, limits, or suppresses the mobility, recruitment, wage negotiation, hiring or employment terms of workers, including no-poach or wage-fixing arrangements across establishments.”

1. CCI should conduct and release its own market study identifying practices which constitute labour market collusion and provide a guidance note and/or policy brief addressing such conduct under section 3(3)(c).

2. The role of recognised trade unions may also be expanded to address coordinated practices across establishments. Currently, unions primarily raise disputes against individual employers. However, the legal framework could be strengthened to permit unions to challenge collective employer practices that negatively affect workers across a sector.

3. Labour Ministry should take active steps to spread awareness. It can organise workshops and issue advisories for HR departments, employer associations, and industry bodies explaining how informal no-poach agreements or wage coordination can negatively affect workers and encourage the adoption of alternative means such as non-disclosure agreements, minimum service periods, etc. to protect legitimate business interests.

4. Further, the burden can be shifted to such companies by calling upon the employers to disclose, in annual compliance filings under labour laws, whether they have entered into any inter-employer hiring restrictions or coordination arrangements.

Labour laws have always been concerned with managing the interface between employers and employees, e.g., with regard to salaries, working conditions, dispute resolution, and job security. Yet, as demonstrated in the blog, in a contemporary labour-intensive economic system, this is no longer sufficient. Labour markets cannot be seen as operating in a vacuum, independent of other market forces. They are intricately connected with the manner in which firms compete with one another for workers. Labourers are not only consumers whose welfare is improved by a fall in prices. They are also suppliers of a critical resource – human capital. When a labour market is distorted, it is a severe and enduring problem. To overlook it is a large blind spot in enforcement. No-poach agreements are an obvious candidate for the blind spot. No-poach agreements may be seen as a business practice, aimed at maintaining stability and protecting proprietary knowledge. However, when firms enter into an understanding with their competitors not to hire each other's workers, it is similar to a violation of the labour market. This is because it lessens wage competition and hampers workers' flexibility, which in turn hurts workers' bargaining power. The damage that such practices cause is real, especially in sectors that have a high concentration of skilled labour in a handful of firms. The blog has established that the economic damage caused by such agreements is neither theoretical nor speculative.

Authors are fifth year B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) students at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. Views are personal.

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'Gruesome': Delhi High Court Denies Bail To Man Accused Of Chopping Wife's Body, Dumping It In Septic Tank

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:15:02 GMT

The Delhi High Court has denied bail to a man accused of murdering his wife, chopping her body into pieces and dumping the remains in a septic tank. [2026 LiveLaw (Del) 775]

Justice Girish Kathpalia observed that the “gruesome manner” in which the crime was committed cannot be ignored while considering bail.

The Court dismissed the bail application filed by one Ashu Pal in relation to an FIR registered at Police Station Prem Nagar for the offences under Sections 302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The Delhi Police alleged that on February 22, 2019, Pal went to the police station and stated that he had killed his wife, chopped her body into pieces and dumped the remains in a septic tank.

While he was being interrogated, a PCR call was received from the deceased's brother stating that she had been killed and that her body had been recovered from the septic tank.

The deceased's brother had alleged in his complaint that since she had given birth to three daughters, Pal and his family members used to torture her and demand dowry.

The prosecution further alleged that Pal called the deceased's mother and told her that he had murdered his wife. When the deceased's brother visited the accused's house, he allegedly found blood stains and the woman's body in the septic tank.

Seeking bail, Pal's counsel argued that there were material contradictions in the testimonies of the deceased's mother and brother. It was also argued that the accused had never visited the police station to confess to the crime and that the trial was proceeding at a slow pace.

On the other hand, the prosecution submitted that the trial was not at all slow in pace and the allegations against the accused disentitled him of bail.

It was also submitted that the blood-stained weapon allegedly used in chopping off the dead body of the deceased and her clothes and jewellery, etc. were recovered and were examined forensically.

Dismissing the bail plea, the Court said that while delay in trial is a ground for grant of bail but it is not the only ground.

Justice Kathpalia said that while considering grant or denial of bail, the court cannot shut its eyes to the gruesome manner in which a lady was killed followed by chopping off of her body and throwing her in the septic tank.

“Considering the above circumstances, I do not find it a fit case to grant bail to the accused/applicant. Therefore, the bail application is dismissed,” the Court said.

Title: ASHU PAL v. THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 775

Click Here To Read Order

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Lawyer Accused Of Colluding With Judge's Secretary For TMC Leader's Case Records Opposes Claims, Requests Calcutta HC To Preserve CCTV

Srinjoy Das — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:29:09 GMT

Calcutta High Court judge, Justice Suvra Ghosh had yesterday recused from hearing former TMC minister Sujit Bose's bail plea, after alleging that an advocate for the petitioner had made contact with her private secretary to access the case records in her chambers.

Advocate Mousumi Bhowal, who was appearing as the Advocate-on-Record for Sujit Bose in the bail proceedings before the Calcutta High Court, has placed on record her opposition to the version of events surrounding the controversy that arose after the matter had been reserved for judgment.

She has sought an enquiry to prove her innocence and requested for the CCTV footage of the front room of the judge's chamber to be preserved.

In an affidavit filed before the High Court, Bhowal has categorically denied that she had connived with the Court Officer or made any attempt to obtain access to the case records with an oblique motive.

Bhowal stated that she was engaged as the Advocate-on-Record for Bose in CRM(R) No. 58 of 2026. According to her, after hearing the parties, Justice Suvra Ghosh had reserved the matter for pronouncement of judgment on August 17, 2026. She submits that she was called by the court officer to supply judgments relied on during arguments.

According to the advocate, on August 18, 2026, at around 2.25 PM, she received a telephone call and WhatsApp message from Advocate Nahid Ahmed, the junior of Senior Advocate Sabyasachi Banerjee, who was also appearing for the petitioner.

Bhowal stated that Ahmed informed her that Shikha Mukherjee, the Court Officer posted in Court Room No. 15 and Personal Secretary to Justice Ghosh, had called her to the courtroom for supplying copies of judgments.

She thereafter went to Court Room No. 15 at around 2.35 PM and met the Court Officer.

Bhowal stated that the Court Officer requested her to accompany her to the Sesquicentenary Building so that she could identify the judgments which were required to be supplied.

The advocate's affidavit states that the Court Officer then took her to the Judges' corridor and the front room of Justice Ghosh's chamber between approximately 2.40 PM and 2.42 PM, where two court staff members were present.

According to Bhowal, the Court Officer asked her to sit on a chair and thereafter asked a court staff member sitting outside the chamber to show the records of the case. "I have not uttered any word," Bhowal stated.

She further stated that the court staff member informed the Court Officer that the case file was with Justice Ghosh and, therefore, could not be shown to her.

"I have immediately left the said place without saying anything," the advocate stated.

Bhowal has specifically rejected any suggestion that she had attempted to enter the chamber of Justice Ghosh or had acted in concert with the Court Officer to access the case file.

"I have never connived with the learned Court Officer to bring out the record of the case with an oblique motive," the affidavit states.

She further asserted, "I have never tried to enter the chamber of Her Ladyship the Hon'ble Justice Suvra Ghosh" during the relevant period.

Bhowal stated that after leaving the area outside the chamber, the Court Officer requested her in the corridor of the Sesquicentenary Building to hand over copies of the judgments which had been referred to by Senior Advocate Sabyasachi Banerjee during the hearing.

She stated that she subsequently supplied two judgments to the Court Officer at Court Room No. 15 at around 3.10 PM.

The judgments, according to the affidavit, were orders delivered by Justice Ghosh in CRM(SB) No. 84 of 2024 on December 16, 2024 and CRM(SB) No. 29 of 2025 on December 19, 2025.

The advocate has also stated that she subsequently learnt from Nahid Ahmed that the Court Officer had called the registered clerk of Senior Advocate Sabyasachi Banerjee on August 18 for the purpose of obtaining copies of the judgments.

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Para-Veterinarian From Legally Established University Cannot Be Denied Registration Over Absence Of State Recognition: HP High Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:25:56 GMT

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that a para-veterinary qualification obtained from a university established by law cannot be denied recognition merely because the university is not separately recognised by the State Government or registered with the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council.

The Court further held that Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council Rules, 2011, to the extent it imposed such additional requirements, was in conflict with the parent Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council Act, 2010 and was therefore liable to be struck down.

A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Justice Ranjan Sharma remarked that: “Rule 14 of the HPPVC Rules, 2011, to the extent it provides that institutions/Universities imparting training shall have to be registered with the State Council, as well as providing that only Universities recognized by the State Government shall be eligible for registration in the State Council, is in direct conflict with the provisions of the HPPVC Act, 2010.”

Background:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Himachal Pradesh, had completed a Diploma in Veterinary Science and Animal Health Technology from the College of Veterinary Science, Rampura Phul, Punjab, a constituent college of Guru Angad Dev Veterinary and Animal Sciences University (GADVAS University), Ludhiana.

After completing the diploma, she applied for registration with the Himachal Pradesh Para Veterinary Council. Her application was rejected on the ground that the diploma was not recognised by the Himachal Pradesh Government and that the institution was not registered with the State Council, as required under Rule 14 of the HPPVC Rules, 2011.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court held that GADVAS University, being a university established by law, falls within the definition of a recognised institution under Section 2(j) of the HPPVC Act, 2010. Therefore, its para-veterinary qualification did not require separate recognition by the Himachal Pradesh Government.

The Court rejected the respondents' contention that the university was required to be recognised by the State Government or registered with the State Council. It held that Rule 14 could not impose conditions beyond those prescribed by the parent Act.

The Court held that the portion of Rule 14 requiring universities imparting para-veterinary training to be registered with the State Council and recognised by the State Government was in direct conflict with the HPPVC Act, 2010 and was therefore ultra vires.

Consequently, the Court quashed the impugned portion of Rule 14 and the rejection communication dated July 28, 2025, and directed the State Council to register the petitioner within one week, subject to completion of other formalities.

Case Name: Riya Sharma v/s State of H.P. & Ors.

Case No.: CWP No.14874 of 2026

Date of Decision: 15.07.2026

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Govt Can't Alter Merit List Recommended By Selection Committee, Appoint Consumer Commission President Of Its Choice: AP High Court

Amruta Gangajaliwale — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:14:58 GMT

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has set aside an order appointing President of Vijayawada's District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, holding that the State Government cannot independently alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by overlooking the recommendations of the Selection Committee. [2026 LiveLaw (AP) 198]

The case arose from a government order appointing the second-ranked candidate, arrayed as the fifth respondent, as President of the Commission, instead of the petitioner, who had topped the merit list.

Justice Balaji Medamalli held that under Rule 6(11) of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure of Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020, the State Government's role is confined to verifying the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee, and does not extend to altering the order of merit.

“If the State Government finds some material against the candidate recommended in the order of merit, the only option left with it, is to bring the aforesaid material to the notice of the Selection Committee for taking appropriate action, instead of the State Government changing the list by itself,” the Court observed.

Referring to the provisions governing the roles of the Selection Committee and the State Government under the Rules, the Court said that the committee is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the suitability of the candidates and examining the relevant eligibility criteria.

“ Once the Selection Committee has conducted such an assessment and forwarded the panel in the order of merit, the State Government cannot independently reassess the suitability of the candidates or make an appointment contrary to the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court noted.

The Court placed reliance on a Division Bench ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Tadikonda Suneetha v. Dr. Vajrala V.L. Narsimha Rao & Others, which dealt with a similar appointment dispute. The judgment was subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court, which declined to interfere with the High Court order.

“The legal position is well settled that the scope of interference by the State Government with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee is limited to the extent provided under Rule 6(11) of the Rules. In terms of Rule 6(11) of the Rules, the State Government is required to verify the credentials and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee,” the Court said.

It noted that if any adverse material is found against the candidate during the verification process, then it has to be placed before the Selection Committee.

“In the event any adverse material is found during such verification, the State Government is required to place the same, along with its opinion, before the Selection Committee for reconsideration of its recommendation,” the Court observed.

The Court said that after such reconsideration, if the Select Committee reiterates its recommendation, the State Government has no option except to act upon the said recommendation and issue the appointment order.

“The State Government cannot independently alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by overlooking the recommendations of the Selection Committee,” the Court said, holding that the government had deviated from the merit-based recommendations of the Selection Committee.

“Consequently, the appointment of respondent No.5 as President, District Commission, Vijayawada, cannot be sustained,” the Court held.

The Court set aside the appointment order, and directed the State Government to place its opinion, the antecedent verification report and other relevant material before the Selection Committee within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, enabling the Selection Committee to reconsider the matter and take action in accordance with law.

Background

The petitioner, Rayala Kiran Kumar, a practising advocate, had applied for the post of President of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, as per the January 2022 notification. He was found eligible and was called for interview before the Selection Committee.

Later, the fifth respondent was appointed to the post vide G.O.Rt.No.39, dated 28.07.2022.

The petitioner subsequently learnt, through information obtained under the Right to Information Act, that he had secured 21 out of 30 marks and was placed first in the order of merit, whereas the fifth respondent had secured 18 marks and was placed second. The State Government overlooked the recommendations of the Select Committee and the petitioner's superior merit while making the appointment, the petitioner alleged.

The petitioner submitted that the Selection Committee is empowered to determine its procedure for making recommendations under Rule 6(9) and recommend a panel of candidates in order of merit for appointment by the State Government under Rule 6(10). On the other hand, the State Government is only required to verify or cause verification of the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates under Rule 6(11), and cannot alter the recommendations of the committee unless adverse remarks are found against the candidates, particularly during the verification process, the petitioner submitted.

The petitioners alleged that the Government had failed to follow the prescribed procedure and had proceeded with the selection process in violation of the Consumer Protection Recruitment Rules, 2020.

The State Government, on the other hand, requested the dismissal of the writ petition, arguing that mere inclusion of a candidate in the selection list does not confer any vested right to appointment.

Case: Rayala Kiran Kumar vs Union of India & others,

W.P.NO. 30995 OF 2024

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 198

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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Court Can't Prescribe Methodology For Fixing Property Tax In Writ Jurisdiction: Delhi High Court

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:14:34 GMT

The Delhi High Court has held that court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot direct formulation of a particular methodology to determine rateable value and assess property tax as such matters fall within the statutory and administrative domain of the competent authority. [2026 LiveLaw (Del) 774]

A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Khetarpal and Justice Shail Jain dismissed a plea filed by the Khan Market Welfare Association seeking directions to the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) to formulate and implement a uniform methodology for fixing rateable values of properties.

The Court observed that a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is issued to enforce a legal right corresponding to a statutory or public duty, and cannot be used by the Court to assume the function of a statutory authority or prescribe the manner in which that authority should discharge its administrative functions.

The Association, comprising shopkeepers and property owners of Khan Market, had alleged disparities in the manner in which NDMC determines rateable values and assesses property tax for similarly situated properties.

It thus sought a direction to NDMC to adopt a uniform method for fixing rateable values until implementation of the Unit Area Method.

Dismissing the plea, the Court, at the outset, noted that what was sought was a direction to be issued as to the manner in which the statutory authority should formulate and administer the methodology for determination of rateable values.

The Court held that such a direction cannot ordinarily be issued in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. It added that determination of the methodology to be adopted for assessment of rateable values, so long as the authority acts within the statutory framework, involves the exercise of statutory and administrative functions entrusted to the authority by the legislature.

“The Court cannot, under the guise of issuing a mandamus, substitute its own formulation for that of the competent statutory authority. The principle is not that the exercise of statutory power is immune from judicial review, rather, it is that judicial review is directed towards the legality of the exercise of power and not towards the Court itself undertaking the function entrusted to the statutory authority,” it added.

Further, it was observed that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot ordinarily be invoked for creation of an institutional mechanism merely because the Petitioner Association alleges irregularities in the functioning of a statutory authority being the NDMC.

However, it said that writ jurisdiction can certainly be invoked where a taxing or revenue authority seeks to levy or collect a tax which is unconstitutional, ultra vires the statute, or which the authority has no jurisdiction to levy.

It said that the Court may, in an appropriate case, issue a mandamus restraining such unlawful levy or direct consequential relief where the law so warrants.

“This does not mean that the Respondents are free to act arbitrarily. The statutory discretion vested in them remains subject to the requirements of the NDMC Act and to the constitutional limitations governing State action,” the Court said.

“An assessment or levy which is shown, in an appropriate proceeding, to be contrary to the statute, without jurisdiction, discriminatory in a legally cognisable sense, or otherwise vitiated by an impermissible exercise of power, can certainly be subjected to judicial review. But that is materially different from asking the Court to prescribe a uniform assessment methodology for the Respondents or to establish an expert mechanism for overseeing their statutory functions,” it added.

Title: KHAN MARKET WELFARE ASSOCIATION (REGD.) v. UOI & ORS

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 774

Click here to read order

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 | JAMNABAI AND OTHERS VERSUS VASUDEV AND OTHERS

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 08:47:27 GMT

Mere Mutation In Revenue Records Cannot Extinguish One's Title In Property: Supreme Court

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Mere Threats Don't Constitute Criminal Intimidation Without Intent To Cause Alarm: Gujarat High Court Quashes FIR

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:14:20 GMT

The Gujarat High Court has held that merely threatening without an intention to cause alarm to the complainant would not constitute offence of criminal intimidation. [2026 LiveLaw (Guj) 225]

In doing so the court held that to invoke this offence the complainant must establish that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to him.

The petitioners had sought quashing of an FIR under IPC Sections 409(Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent), 504(Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace), 506(2) (criminal intimidation) read with 114(Abettor present when offence is committed).

It was alleged that the complainant had rented his shop to one Harshadkumar Prabhudas for carrying Optical business. A rent note was executed and the business in the name of Diamond Optical shop was operated by Harshadkumar. When Harshadbhai was not found, the complainant went to the shop and found one Jagdish sitting there. When the complainant asked him about the whereabouts of Harshad, the latter stated that his brother-in-law Arvind had possession of the shop and started using abusive words.

The complainant thereafter alleged that on 10.03.2016 one Bharat Pala came to the complainant's office informed that the shop was taken over from Harshadbhai by Bharatbhai and Arvindbhai and requested the complainant to transfer the rent note in their favour, failing which, he threatened the complainant with serious consequences. After a day or two, Afzalbhai informed the complainant that the key of the shop and the possession is with him, and the complainant was threatened not to make any inquiry about the shop.

Justice PM Raval in his order said:

" before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, the complainant must establish that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant and mere threats given by the accused not with an intention to cause alarm to the complainant but with a view to see that he does not come to his office or place for inquiring would not amount to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. In the entire FIR, there is no whisper of any allegation by the complainant that the threats which were administered actually caused any alarm to the first informant and that he felt actually threatened...Be that as it may, the fact remains that the entire FIR is silent with regards to the allegations of threats which were administered and actually causing any alarm to the first informant and that he actually well threatened is conspicuously missing, under the circumstances, no case is made out"

The court thus quashed the FIR finding that none of the allegations were proved.

Case title: HARSHADBHAI PRABHUDAS SHETH & ANR. v/s STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR

R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 7935 of 2016

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Guj) 225

Appearance:

MR MAHESH POOJARA FOR MR ASHISH M DAGLI(2203) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2

MS BHAVIKA H KOTECHA(2942) for the Respondent(s) No. 2

MR ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1

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Rajasthan High Court Raps Jodhpur Municipal Corporation For Failure To Hand Over Auctioned Plots Due To Encroachments

Nupur Agrawal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 08:30:19 GMT

Rajasthan High Court took serious note of Municipal Corporation's inaction against encroachers that led to its inability to hand over possession of auctioned plots to the successful bidders, and opined that the body being part of the government was not supposed to function in a manner that led to litigations.

The bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand was hearing a bunch of petitions that alleged non-handing over of possession of auctioned plots by the government, as well as impleadment applications by other people alleging right over the said plots on account of having possession, who were being treated as encroachers by the Municipal Corporation.

“By its conduct and performance, the State must create a sense of security in the mind of the citizens and citizens while dealing with the State must be in a position to rely upon the representations made by it. A special sanctity attaches to its acts; a presumption of correctness is available in respect of them and a sense of security is assumed in relation thereto.”

In the background of disputed questions of rights and titles over the subject properties, the Court directed constitution of a committee comprising of Higher Officials of Department of Local Self Government and Commissioner of Jodhpur Municipal Corporation, to decide the representations of the petitioners as well as the applicants.

For context, the matter pertained to 4 plots at Kabir Marg, Jodhpur, who were alleged to have been allocated to the petitioners in an auction. However, their possession was not handed over to the petitioners. On the other hand, certain other people, who had filed applications for impleadment, were contending their rights over the plots based on possession.

The latter set of people (applicants) were treated as encroachers by the Municipal Corporation based on a report by a Joint Commission, and the Court highlighted that it was based on their encroachment that the Corporation was unable to hand over possession to the petitioners.

In this background, the Court referred to Surendra Prasad Mishra Vs. O.N.G.C. (1987) where the Calcutta High Court held that where Govt. or Governmental agency makes a promise knowing or intending that it could be acted upon by the promisee and if the promise acting in accordance therewith and thereby alters his position, the Govt. or the Governmental agency would be held to be bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. or the Governmental agency at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise or that the promise has not been reduced to writing…

The Court observed that since the possession could not be handed over owing to encroachment, there was no fault of the petitioners and they could not be allowed to suffer due to “negligence, callousness and non-maintenance of the essential record” by the Corporation.

While highlighting inaction on part of the Corporation against the encroachers, it was held the Corporation could not be allowed to sit over the matter, and take any excuse regarding handing over the possession. They were duty bound to do so.

At the same time, while underscoring Article 21 and the Magna Carta, the Court highlighted the requirement of following due process of law before taking any action against any individual or establishment.

Hence, the State was directed to constitute the aforementioned committee to adjudicate upon the representations of the petitioners as well as the applicants to close the allotment process, within a period of 3 months.

Accordingly, the petitions were disposed of.

Title: Smt. Kiran v Municipal Corporation & Anr., and other connected petitions

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 344

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MP High Court Denies Anticipatory Bail To Woman Accused Of Embezzling Railways Ticket Sale Proceeds

Jayanti Pahwa — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 08:23:06 GMT

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has rejected the anticipatory bail application of a woman serving as Chief Booking Supervisor in the Railways, who was accused of embezzling ₹4.47 lakhs from Ticket Sale Proceeds along with other employees. [2026 LiveLaw (MP) 335]

The bench of Justice Ajay Kumar Nirankari observed that the investigation was still underway and that custodial interrogation could not be ruled out at this stage, particularly as the investigating agency was required to ascertain the applicant's precise role.

"In the considered opinion of this Court, the seriousness of the alleged offence, the amount of Railway cash involved, the allegation of preplanned conspiracy and the fact that the precise role of the applicant is yet to be completely ascertained during investigation weigh against the grant of anticipatory bail at this stage. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to extend the extraordinary discretionary relief of anticipatory bail to the applicant".

The case arose from a complaint concerning an alleged shortage of ₹4.47 lakhs from the sale proceeds of railway tickets at a booking office. The allegations were made against the Assistant Chief Booking Supervisor, Chief Booking Supervisor, and Station Manager.

The counsel for the applicant contended that she was implicated merely based on suspicion and conjecture, and there was no credible material establishing direct involvement in the alleged embezzlement.

It was submitted that the alleged shortage related to December 4-5, 2024, whereas the FIR was registered only on January 15, 2026. According to the applicant, the prosecution had offered no satisfactory explanation for the delay of more than one year, she argued, casting doubt on the prosecution's case.

The applicant further submitted that she was on sanctioned leave on the relevant dates and was neither posted at the concerned booking counter nor handling the railway cash. She also relied on a departmental enquiry, in which responsibility was allegedly fixed upon a different employee, who was actually posted at the counter and handling cash.

The counsel for the applicant further argued that she is a permanent Railway employee with a clean service record, with no criminal antecedents.

Opposing the application, the counsel for the State argued that the allegations involve a substantial amount of public money and were not limited to physical handling of cash by the employee posted at the booking counter.

Per the prosecution, the alleged offence was the result of a preplanned conspiracy involving Railway Employees. The State opposed the applicant's claim that she was on leave, submitting that her not handling physical cash does not conclusively rule out her involvement in the alleged conspiracy at the stage of anticipatory bail.

It was submitted that the investigating agency needed to ascertain the role of each accused, examine relevant documents and records, and confront the accused with statements of persons connected with transactions.

The court noted that at the stage of considering anticipatory bail, it could not delve into a detailed appreciation of evidence. The bench noted that the allegations concern misappropriation of Railway cash amounting to ₹4.47 lakhs.

The bench held, "The prosecution case is not confined merely to the physical handling of the cash by the employee posted at the booking counter; rather, an allegation of a preplanned conspiracy involving Railway employees has been levelled. Therefore, the fact that the applicant was allegedly on sanctioned leave on the relevant date or was not physically handling the cash cannot, at this stage, conclusively rule out her alleged involvement in the larger conspiracy".

Regarding the applicant's contention that another employee was held liable in the findings of the departmental enquiry, the court held,

"The finding recorded in a departmental inquiry may be a relevant circumstance, but it does not by itself conclusively determine the criminal liability of another person against whom an allegation of conspiracy is under investigation".

The bench, rejecting the contention of delay in filing the FIR, held that mere delay in lodging the FIR by itself cannot at this stage prove the prosecution case to be false or motivated.

The bench noted that investigating agency is investigating the complete role of the accused person and the manner in which the alleged shortage of tickets occurred. The bench held that the requirement of custodial interrogation cannot be ruled out.

Accordingly, the bench was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail and rejected the application.

Case TItle: Smt Bhawna Rai v State of Madhya Pradesh, MCRC-38002-2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (MP) 335

For Applicant: Advocate Sandeep Dubey

For State: Government Advocate BK Upadhyay

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AP High Court Fines Mother ₹50,000 For Suppressing Grant Of Custody To Father Pursuant To Mutual Settlement

Ritika Verma — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:13:42 GMT

Courts Should Allow Parties To Let In Oral And Documentary Evidence In Matters Relating To Guardianship: Madras High Court

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a habeas corpus petition seeking custody of minor children is not maintainable where the children are in the custody of their father pursuant to a mutually agreed settlement between the parents.[2026 LiveLaw (AP) 197]

A Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Purushottam Kumar Chintalapudi dismissed with costs the mother's petition seeking production and restoration of custody of her two minor children. The Court found that the parents had agreed under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the children would remain in the father's custody.

The Court observed:

“Once it was agreed mutually between the petitioner and the R5 that the custody of the children shall remain solely with the husband, the children cannot be said to be in any illegal custody of the R5-father.

The representation was made without disclosing the aforesaid settlement; Memorandum of Understanding and the order dated 18.09.2025 passed in Crl.P.No.9564 of 2025 by the High Court for the State of Telangana, in which the Memorandum of Understanding was made as part of the order. The Habeas Corpus petition is not maintainable. The petitioner has misused the process of this Court by suppression of the material facts.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court by way of a habeas corpus petition seeking issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution.

She alleged that her husband had forcibly removed their two minor children from her care and custody and that their whereabouts were unknown. She sought directions to trace and produce the children before the Court and restore their custody to her as their mother and natural guardian.

The State informed the High Court about a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) entered into between the petitioner and her husband to resolve their matrimonial disputes. Under the settlement, the husband agreed to a financial settlement, while “the custody and care of the children” were to remain solely with him.

The Court noted that the same MoU had also been referred to in an earlier order of the Telangana High Court in criminal proceedings against the petitioner's husband and another accused. In those proceedings, the Telangana High Court had quashed the criminal case against them after taking the settlement between the parties into account.

The present petitioner had been impleaded as a respondent in those proceedings. Although notice was issued to her, it was returned with the endorsement “unclaimed” and was consequently treated as duly served.

The Court further noted that, although the petitioner was provided Legal Aid Counsel after stating that she did not understand English, her counsel stated that she knew English. The petitioner had herself provided counsel with the MoU and the Telangana High Court order, and also read the MoU fluently in English before the Court. When asked why these documents were not disclosed in her earlier representation, she stated that she did not consider them relevant.

The Court observed that the petitioner had set the Court's machinery in motion without disclosing the material facts, resulting in the appearance of her husband, mother-in-law and two children before it.

Holding that the petition was not maintainable and involved suppression of material facts, the Bench dismissed it and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- on the mother.

The amount was directed to be invested in fixed deposits in the names of the two children, with Rs. 25,000/- each payable upon attaining majority. The Court also declined to accept her apology.

Case Title: In Re v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

Case No.: W.P. No. 18034 of 2026

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AP) 197

Counsel for the Petitioner: Smt. Santhi Sree Vallabhaneni

Counsel for Respondent(s): Sri J. Krishna Praneeth, AGP

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Insistence On Prior Complaint Or Documentary Proof Of Injury To Establish Matrimonial Cruelty “Absurd”: Jharkhand High Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 08:00:45 GMT

The Jharkhand High Court has observed that insisting on a prior police complaint regarding assault and torture, or documentary proof of injuries, to establish matrimonial cruelty is “absolutely absurd and unwarranted”.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava made the observation while setting aside an appellate court's decision acquitting a husband of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court restored his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court.

The complainant, Sushma Devi, married Sanjay Kumar alias Rajesh Kumar in March 2007. She alleged that at the time of their engagement, her father gave ₹2.5 lakh to the accused persons pursuant to their demand. Jewellery, household articles and electronic items worth around ₹3 lakh were also allegedly given.

According to the complainant, after the marriage, her husband and his family expressed dissatisfaction with the cash and gifts and demanded another ₹2 lakh as dowry. She alleged that when the demand was not fulfilled, she was subjected to physical and mental cruelty and was denied sufficient food and other necessities. She further alleged that on April 15, 2007, she was assaulted by her husband, sister-in-law and brother-in-law and driven out of the matrimonial home, following which she took shelter at her parental home in Jamshedpur.

The trial court convicted the husband and the other accused under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It sentenced them to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000 under Section 498A and two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 under the Dowry Prohibition Act.

In appeal, the Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the husband of the Section 498A offence, while maintaining his conviction and sentence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The other co-convicts were acquitted of both charges. The husband thereafter approached the High Court against his conviction under the Dowry Prohibition Act. The complainant also filed a revision challenging the acquittal of the accused.

On examining the evidence, the High Court found that the complainant had given a chronological account of the events and the circumstances in which she was allegedly ill-treated and tortured by her husband. Disagreeing with the approach adopted by the appellate court, the High Court observed:

“It further appears that insistence of the learned appellate court upon lodging any case in respect of assault and torture earlier meted with the complainant or any documentary evidence of injury, is absolutely absurd and unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.The complainant is a highly educated lady and she has stated with date of all the chronological events and the circumstances, wherein she was ill-treated and tortured at the hands of her husband.”

The Court held that the appellate court's findings were against the weight of the evidence and that its insistence on the complainant having lodged an earlier case with the police was unwarranted.

It accordingly set aside the appellate court's judgment insofar as it had acquitted Sanjay Kumar alias Rajesh Kumar of the offence under Section 498A IPC and restored the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court.

Case Title: Sanjay Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand and Anr.

Case Number: Cr. Revision No. 1465 of 2016

Appearance: Mr. Salona Mittal, Amicus Curiae, for the Petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 1465 of 2016; Mr. J.N. Upadhyay for the Petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 23 of 2017; Mr. Rajneesh Vardhan, A.P.P. and Mr. Arup Dey, A.P.P. for the State; Mr. J.N. Upadhyay and Mr. Mayank Kumar for O.P. No. 2.

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2026 LiveLaw(SC) 842 | THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Vs BRIJ PAL SINGH

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:52:49 GMT

Police Cannot Register FIR And Conduct Investigation For PC-PNDT Act Offences : Supreme Court

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Manager (Data Privacy) Vacancy At Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India LLP

Manav Malhotra — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:52:07 GMT

Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India LLP invites online application for the post of Manager (Data Privacy).

Name of the Post: Manager (Data Privacy)

Location: Pune

Essential Qualification and Experience

Minimum of 5+ years of experience in data protection or privacy compliance.
CIPT/CIPM/CIPPE or any other related certifications preferred.
In-depth knowledge of data protection laws and regulations, particularly the Personal. Data Protection Bill in India.
Strong analytical and problem-solving skills.
Bachelor's/master's degree in law, information technology, or a related field.

Roles & Responsibilities

As a Manager in Deloitte's Cyber Team, you'll build and nurture positive working relationships with teams and clients with the intention to exceed client expectations.
Develop data protection policies and procedures in accordance with privacy laws and regulations for clients.
Conduct assessments to identify potential data privacy and protection risks and develop mitigation strategies for clients as per their requirements.
Monitor and evaluate data processing activities to ensure compliance with data protection laws and company policies as per client requirement.
Provide guidance and support to the clients on conducting data protection impact assessments (DPIAs), conducting risk assessments, data governance, application, privacy impact assessments.
Design and build security / privacy framework, design/re-design processes and privacy controls to ensure framework development for clients.

How to apply?

To apply online, click here

To Access Official Notification, click here

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 | Bhumika Trust v. Union of India

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:05:53 GMT

Supreme Court Reduces Practice Requirement For Judicial Service To 1 Year; Selected Candidates To Undergo 1 Year Training & 1 Year Clerkship

Supreme Court Waives Prior Practice Requirement For Civil Judge (Junior Division) Exams Till March 2027

“Courtroom Most Profound Classroom”: Justice Vinod Chandran Dissents On Relaxing 3 Year Practice Rule For Judicial Service

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Holding Ambedkar Jayanti Meeting In School Was Not Attempt To Unduly Influence Lok Sabha Polls: Jharkhand High Court Quashes Case

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:50:44 GMT

The Jharkhand High Court has held that merely organising a meeting in a school hall to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti does not amount to undue influence at an election under Section 171F of the IPC.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary quashed criminal proceedings against two persons who were booked over a meeting held during the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

The first petitioner was the principal of Saraswati Shishu Vidya Mandir. The allegation was that he organised a meeting in the school hall on April 14, 2024 without obtaining permission from the competent authority and in violation of the Model Code of Conduct. The second petitioner had posted about the meeting on his social media account.

An FIR was registered on the written report of an Assistant Engineer-cum-Flying Squad Officer. After investigation, the police filed a chargesheet and the Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 171F, 171H and 188 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioners' application for discharge was later rejected.

Before the High Court, the question was whether the allegations, even if accepted as true, made out the offences for which the petitioners were being prosecuted.

On Section 171F, the Court noted that undue influence at an election is defined under Section 171C IPC. It found no allegation that either petitioner had interfered or attempted to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. The Court observed:

“There is no allegation against either of the petitioners of interfering or attempting to interfere with free exercise of any electoral right. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, the mere fact of organizing of meeting in the hall of a school to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti cannot constitute the offence punishable under Section 171F of the Indian Penal Code.”

The Court separately found that Section 188 IPC was also not attracted. It noted that there was no reference to any order promulgated by a public servant which had been disobeyed by the petitioners. The FIR had proceeded on the allegation that the meeting was held without permission.

It further noted that there was no allegation that the petitioners knew of any promulgated order which they had violated. The Assistant Engineer-cum-Flying Squad Officer who lodged the FIR was also not alleged to have promulgated any such order.

As regards Section 171H IPC, the Court found that there was “absolutely no allegation” concerning any of the ingredients of the offence.

The High Court held that none of the offences for which the Magistrate had taken cognizance were made out against the petitioners. It accordingly quashed the criminal proceedings, including the chargesheet, cognizance order and the order rejecting their discharge plea.

Case Title: Parmanand Singh and Anr v. State of Jharkhand

Case Number: Cr.M.P. No. 2482 of 2026

Appearance: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Thakur, Advocate, for the Petitioners; Mr. Shiv Shankar Kumar, Addl. P.P., for the State.

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Supreme Court Rejects Plea To Treat Post-Graduation As Equivalent To Practice At Bar For Civil Judge Recruitment

Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:03:27 GMT

The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that post-graduation in law should be treated as equivalent to practice at the Bar for the purpose of eligibility for recruitment as Civil Judge (Junior Division).

A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran rejected the contention while deciding review petitions challenging the Court's May 20, 2025 judgment restoring the requirement of prior legal practice for entry-level judicial service.

The Chief Justice, while pronouncing the judgment, said: “The contention that post-graduation should be treated equivalent to practice, that we have not been able to accept.”

The Court, however, by 2:1 (Justice Chandran dissenting),modified the manner in which the practice requirement would operate. For recruitment notifications issued between May 20, 2025 and March 31, 2027, all law graduates will be eligible to apply notwithstanding the three-year practice requirement.

Candidates selected through these recruitments will undergo one year of training at the State Judicial Academy followed by one year of structured law clerkship, with the two years treated as equivalent to practice for the purpose of the requirement.

For recruitment notifications issued on or after April 1, 2027, candidates will be required to have at least one year of actual practice before appearing for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination.

The review petitions challenged the May 2025 judgment which had restored the three-year practice requirement for candidates seeking direct entry into the judicial service. The Court had held that prior exposure to the functioning of courts was desirable for a person entering judicial service.

In the present judgment, the Court maintained that conclusion but held that practical experience could be acquired through a structured combination of institutional training and supervised law clerkship. It also noted that the sudden restoration of the three-year requirement had caused hardship to law graduates who had prepared for judicial examinations under the regime prevailing for more than two decades.

Case no. – W.P.(C) No. 001110/2025

Case Title – Bhumika Trust v. Union of India and connected cases

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₹1 Lakh Compensation For Illegal Termination Of Teacher 'Shockingly Disproportionate': Rajasthan High Court Enhances It To ₹20 Lakh

Nupur Agrawal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:30:40 GMT

The Rajasthan High Court enhanced the compensation payable to a teacher terminated illegally, from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 20 lakh, observing that the amount awarded by the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal was “shockingly disproportionate”.

The Court was dealing with a plea by a Hindi teacher who had served the respondent-school for around 20 years before her services were terminated in 2015 on the ground that there were no students for the subject of Hindi. The Tribunal had held the termination to be bad in law but, as the teacher had subsequently attained the age of superannuation, awarded her lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1 lakh in lieu of reinstatement.

The bench of Justice Anuroop Singhi took note of the fact that the teacher was a permanent employee, had rendered unblemished service for around 20 years, was not terminated for any misconduct and was not gainfully employed between the date of her termination and superannuation. The finding that her termination was bad in law had also attained finality, as the school had not challenged it.

“…keeping in view the mathematical calculation of the minimum emoluments which the petitioner would have earned during the interregnum period, this Court is of the considered view that the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- awarded by the Tribunal is shockingly disproportionate, and it would be just and proper to direct the respondent-School to make a lump-sum payment of Rs.20,00,000/- to the petitioner, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.”

For context, the petitioner was appointed in 1995, and after around 20 years of services, was terminated by the school in 2015 on the ground that there were no students for her subject i.e. Hindi. This was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal ruled the termination to be bad in law and awarded compensation of Rs. 1 Lakh to the petitioner.

The present petition was filed by the petitioner challenging the quantum of the compensation. It was argued that she should have been awarded her entire salary and benefits which she would have been entitled to had the termination not taken place.

It was submitted that not granting such benefits allowed the respondent to take advantage of their wrong and legitimized an illegal act.

After hearing the contentions, the Court affirmed the finding of the Tribunal about petitioner's termination being bad in law. However, the Court observed that no one could be allowed to benefit from their own fault

“…it was equally incumbent upon the Tribunal to determine the dues payable to the petitioner, which would have met the minimum respectable yard-stick, not only in monetary terms, but also to pay back the respect and honor which the petitioner would have earned, if she would have rendered the services for the entire period…the quantification of amount to be paid to the petitioner could have been such which would have kept the respondents in a win-win position and left the petitioner high and dry and is shockingly disproportionate.”

The Court observed that the petitioner's monthly salary was Rs. 50,000/- and there was a period of more than 67 months between her termination and date of superannuation. This resulted in a figure of around Rs. 33,50,000/-.

However, the Court held that this figure itself could not be treated as determinative basis for awarding compensation. In this background, the Court took into account other factors, as elaborated above.

The Court also took into account several principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases in this regard, and taking guidance from the same, enhanced petitioner's compensation from Rs. 1 Lakh to Rs. 20 Lakhs, payable within 2 months.

Accordingly, the petition was disposed of.

Title: Rani Gupta v Management Committee, Maheshwari Public School and Anr.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 343

For Petitioners: Mr. Sunil Samdaria with Mr. Arihant Samdaria

For Respondents: Mr. Vinod Goyal; Mr. Bhavya Kala for Mr. Devansh Sharma, Dy.GC

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Supreme Court Sets Aside Madras HC Order Allowing Dayanidhi Maran To Summon Telecom Secretary As Court Witness

Gursimran Kaur Bakshi & Amisha Shrivastava — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:18:41 GMT

The Supreme Court today(August 21) set aside the Madras High Court's order directing the Trial Court to summon the Union Telecom Secretary as a court witness in a criminal case against DMK MP and former Union Telecom Minister Dayanidhi Maran concerning alleged misuse of BSNL telecom facilities. However, the Court has reserved the right of Maran to summon the Secretary as a defence witness.

This comes after the CBI, through Additional Solicitor General SV Raju, approached the Supreme Court challenging the order. When the matter was first taken up on August 10, a bench comprising Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli asked whether the CBI would have any objection if the Telecom Secretary is summoned as a defence witness.

Based on ASG Raju's instructions, the Court directed that the Telecom Secretary may be examined as a defence witness. However, Senior Advocates Siddharth Luthra and Nalin Kohli objected to the Telecom Secretary being considered as a defence witness. Luthra said the secretary is not a defence witness and urged that the High Court's order be not stayed. He said: "He is a court's witness, which would be appropriate, as the court can put to him what is the procedure and what is the norm and come to a determination. It would be very onerous on me."

But the Court refused to hear any objections, and asked Luthra: "Are you taking this option [of considering the secretary as defence witness] or not?"

After brief arguments, the Court ordered: "Heard Mr Shri Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General for petitioner, Shri Siddharth Luthra, senior advocate for the sole respondent. In the special leave petition, we are only concerned with the direction of the High Court directing Secretary Telecom as a court witness. The trial court by its order dated 10 October 2025 rejected the prayer of the respondent to summon the Secretary, Telecom, as the court witness; the High Court reserved the said order. Having heard learned counsels, we are of the opinion that there is justification given for overruling the considered order of the Trial Court declining to summon the Secretary, Telecom, as a court witness. When the matter came up on August 10, we passed the following order. ..

The primary submission is that so far as the Secretary Telecom, being summoned as a court witness, shall be sustained or alternatively, in the event court not accept the said stand, they would examine Secretary, Telecom as defence witness. Now that we are inclined to restore the order of the Trial Court, we permit the respondent to summon the Secretary Telecom as a defence witness as indicated in our August 10 order. We set aside the High Court's order and restore the Trial Court's order. We permit the respondent to have the option to summon the Secretary, Telecom, as a defence witness if he so desires."

The challenge concerns the Madras High Court's order directing the trial court to examine the Telecom Secretary under Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), corresponding to Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The High Court held that the Secretary's evidence was relevant to determining whether Maran, who was Minister of Communications and Information Technology between 2004 and 2007, was entitled to service-category telecom connections during the relevant period.

The High Court noted that prosecution witness Rita Achary had spoken about the general policy applicable to Union Ministers but had not specifically addressed the administrative privileges applicable to the Minister heading the concerned department. It held that the Telecom Secretary, as the senior-most executive authority in the Department of Communications, was best placed to clarify the applicable administrative framework.

It also noted that statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and replies issued pursuant to them had been approved by the Telecom Secretary. It referred to his communication dated October 3, 2007, in which he had referred to the existence of an inordinately high number of telecom connections.

The High Court held that Section 348 BNSS is not intended to allow either party to fill lacunae in its case. At the same time, it held that the provision enables the court to summon a person as a court witness where the person's evidence may have a bearing on the issues arising for determination and may be necessary to arrive at the truth.

The CBI chargesheet alleges that Maran, in conspiracy with senior BSNL officials and persons associated with Sun TV Network, dishonestly procured and continued to use a large number of telecom facilities at his residences in Chennai and New Delhi under the BSNL “Service Category”.

The prosecution alleges that the facilities included hundreds of telephone lines, ISDN-PRA/BRA connections, broadband and internet leased circuits, mobile connections, optical fibre connectivity, leased lines and video conferencing systems. It further alleges that BSNL officials manipulated records by showing BSNL authorities as subscribers while installing connections at private premises, converted private connections into service-category connections and failed to raise bills or maintain records of subsequently cancelled bills. The alleged conduct resulted in a wrongful loss estimated at about Rs.1.78 crore to public sector telecom entities, including BSNL and MTNL, with corresponding wrongful gain to private beneficiaries, particularly Sun TV Network, according to the chargesheet.

The chargesheet alleges offences under Sections 120B, 409, 467, 471 and 477A of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The High Court also allowed Maran's plea seeking examination of Rakesh Kumar Somani, AGM (Vigilance), BSNL, and T. Sathyamurthy, then an Inspector of Police, CBI, as court witnesses. It found their evidence relevant and necessary for the just decision of the case. It rejected, however, Maran's request to summon A. Mahalingam and Mohan Lal Sindhi as court witnesses. The High Court held that they could instead be examined as defence witnesses.

The High Court's order noted that the prosecution had examined 98 witnesses and marked 418 exhibits but had not examined Somani or marked four Vigilance reports. Maran had argued that the reports were relevant to his defence as they indicated that there was no irregularity in the installation of excess telephone lines and other consequential installations at his residence or camp office.

The High Court ultimately directed the Trial Court to make every endeavour to expedite the trial, noting that the allegations relate to 2004-2007 and that the trial had already progressed substantially.

Case Details: THE STATE Vs DAYANIDHI MARAN|SLP(Crl) No. 13933/2026 Diary No. 40341 / 2026

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Delhi High Court Restrains FIITJEE Directors From Travelling Abroad, Orders Attachment Of ₹66 Lakh Over Unpaid Rent Dues

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:13:54 GMT

The Delhi High Court has restrained the directors of test-prep coaching institute FIITJEE Limited from travelling outside the country without its permission in a case involving unpaid rent dues. [2026 LiveLaw (Del) 773]

Justice Sachin Datta also ordered attachment of Rs. 66.31 lakh lying in the bank account of the company's sister concern towards alleged unpaid rent dues.

The Court also ordered the Directors to deposit their original passports within four weeks.

Justice Datta passed the order while dealing with two petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, by landlords seeking urgent interim protection against FIITJEE.

The petitioners claimed that FIITJEE, which was a tenant in their premises, had left behind substantial arrears of rent.

It was submitted that although the petitioners had subsequently recovered possession of the premises after filing the petitions, the rent dues remained unpaid.

According to the petitioners, the arrears amounted to Rs. 33,15,957.50 in each of the two petitions, taking the total amount to Rs. 66,31,915.

During the hearing on August 20, the petitioners referred to an earlier order passed by a coordinate bench in August 2025 in a similar matter involving FIITJEE. It was pointed out that, in that case, payments were made from a bank account belonging to the company's sister concern namely FIITJEE ESchool Private Limited.

FIITJEE's counsel submitted that the company was unable to make any payment as its bank account was stated to have been attached by the police in connection with certain criminal proceedings. However, the counsel was unable to provide details of the alleged attachment.

On this, the Court noted that FIITJEE's counsel was unable to refute that, in the earlier proceedings involving the company in question, its liability had been discharged through the bank account of its sister concern.

Considering the circumstances, the Court directed:

“The amount lying in the aforesaid bank account in ICICI Bank bearing Account no. 629405047349 shall stand attached to the extent of Rs. 66,31,915 (aggregate amount payable in both the petitions). The same shall be subject to further orders in the present petitions.”

It further directed the directors of FIITJEE to remain personally present on January 27, 2017.

“The said Directors shall also deposit their original passports in this Court within four weeks and are restrained from travelling out of the country, without permission of this Court,” it ordered further.

Title: CDR. INDER JIT SINGH AND ANR v. FIITJEE LIMITED & other connected matter

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 773

Click here to read order

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'Malicious' Prosecution: Why Allahabad High Court Quashed Judicial Officer's FIR Alleging Doctor-Wife Demanded ₹1 Crore For Divorce

Sparsh Upadhyay — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:24:08 GMT

The Allahabad High Court recently quashed an FIR lodged by a Judicial Official of the State against his doctor-wife and two others after finding that the criminal proceedings were "not bona fide but malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court".

A Bench of Justice Rajeev Misra and Justice Dr. Ajay Kumar-II allowed a writ petition filed by the wife and two others while setting aside the FIR lodged by a Judicial Officer in January this year.

The Court took into account two circumstances: the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and, more significantly, the contradiction between the FIR's allegation that the wife was refusing to cooperate in the divorce proceedings unless paid ₹1 crore and the admitted fact that the divorce decree had already been passed several months before the FIR was lodged.

" …impugned criminal proceedings have been engineered by first informant respondent-4 on account of an ulterior motive and for an extraneous consideration. As such, criminal prosecution of petitioners is not bona fide but malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court", the bench observed in its order.

Case in brief

The FIR alleged that the incidents took place on various dates between May 26, 2021 to November 18, 2025. However, the FIR did not explicitly mentioned any specific day, date or time as to when those occurrences took place.

The primary allegation against the wife was that she refused to grant a divorce until she was paid ₹1 Crore. Challenging the FIR, the wife moved the High Court, arguing that the FIR was belated.

Accepting this submission, the division bench noted that the delay in lodging the FIR had not been sufficiently explained.

The Court then examined the circumstances underlying the FIR. It found a fundamental contradiction between the allegation of demand for money and the undisputed chronology on record.

The wife/petitioner pointed out that her husband had instituted a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which was allowed, and divorce was decreed by the Family Court on September 8, 2025. The FIR, however, was lodged only on January 17, 2026.

Taking note of the same, the High Court questioned as to why the factum of the divorce decree granted by the competent Court in September 2025 was not disclosed in the FIR.

" Above statements of fact occurring in the FIR which is also the admitted case of the first informant respondent-4 is contrary to the record inasmuch as prior to the lodging of the FIR itself divorce decree had already been passed by the competent Court i.e. on 08.09.2025 whereas, the FIR was lodged on 17.01.2026", the Court remarked.

Thus, the allegation that the wife refused to cooperate in the divorce proceedings until the alleged ₹1 crore demand was met was found inconsistent with the fact that the divorce had already been granted before the FIR was registered.

After considering the unexplained delay and the contradiction concerning the divorce decree, the High Court remarked thus:

" …impugned criminal proceedings have been engineered by first informant respondent-4 on account of an ulterior motive and for an extraneous consideration…As such, criminal prosecution of petitioners is not bona fide but malicious and also an abuse of the process of Court".

The Court therefore concluded that the criminal prosecution arising from the FIR "cannot be sustained in law and fact".

Earlier, the couple had been referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, High Court, Allahabad, after the petitioners submitted that the dispute was essentially private and matrimonial in nature.

However, the mediation report dated June 20, 2026, indicated that no settlement had been reached between the parties. The Court thereafter examined the challenge to the FIR on its merits.

The High Court ultimately allowed the writ petition and quashed the FIR lodged under Sections 318(1), 115(2), 352, 308(6), 329(1), 324(4), 351(2) and 221 of the BNS.

Advocate S. M. Faraz I. Kazmi, appeared for the petitioners.

AGA appeared for State-respondents 1, 2 & 3.

Advocate Kapil Tyagi, represented the first informant-respondent-4.

Case title - SR and two others vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 608

Case Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 608

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Delhi High Court Appreciates 'Scientific Investigation' Using Technology To Trace 'Fake GST Fraudsters', Denies Anticipatory Bail

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 13:13:23 GMT

The Delhi High Court has appreciated a Delhi Police Investigating Officer (IO) for conducting an elaborate “scientific investigation” using information technology tools to trace alleged fraudsters involved in creating fake GST registrations by misusing PAN cards and other credentials of innocent persons. [2026 LiveLaw (Del) 772]

Justice Girish Kathpalia made the observations while refusing to grant anticipatory bail to one Raj Kumar, accused of generating fake GST numbers using credentials of unsuspecting persons and supplying fake GST details to a co-accused for generating fake invoices and e-way bills.

The Court appreciated the detailed status report filed by the IO, noting that it described the technical investigation undertaken to “zero down on the alleged fraudsters.”

“It is indeed laudable that the Investigating Officer has filed an elaborate status report dated 25.05.2026 describing the technical investigation with the use of information technology tools in order to zero down on the alleged fraudsters. Such scientific investigation deserves to be appreciated,” the Court observed.

The FIR was registered at Police Station Cyber, Outer North, for offences under Sections 420, 419, 468, 471 and 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The prosecution alleged that the complainant discovered, after receiving an Income Tax Department notice, that two GST firms had been linked to her PAN card despite her never having applied for GST registration or having any knowledge of the businesses.

She alleged that her PAN and other credentials had been misused to obtain GST registrations and conduct illicit financial activities in her name.

During investigation, the IO visited the locations from where the firms were allegedly operating but found that no such firms were existing.

The investigation then proceeded through technical means, with the IO tracing the mobile number used for obtaining OTPs for filing GST returns, identifying linked email IDs and examining the bank account connected with one of the GST numbers.

The investigation connected one of the email IDs with a mobile number registered in Kumar's name. His email ID was also found linked with another email account as a recovery email ID.

The prosecution alleged that Kumar was involved in generating GST numbers of fake entities and providing those numbers, along with associated mobile numbers and email IDs, to co-accused Aman Bisht.

It was alleged that the fake GST numbers were thereafter used to generate invoices and e-way bills, while clients allegedly made payments directly to Kumar.

Kumar's counsel argued that the case rested primarily on the disclosure statement of a co-accused and that the incriminating mobile phones did not belong to him. It was also claimed that Kumar was innocent and was not a beneficiary of the alleged fraud.

The State, on the other hand, argued that there was strong technical evidence apart from the disclosure statements, including mobile numbers and email IDs allegedly used in filing fake GST returns and receiving OTPs being registered in Kumar's name.

It was also submitted that the accused had been evading the investigation and that proceedings to declare him a proclaimed offender were nearing culmination.

Dismissing the plea, the Court noted that the probe concerning Kumar was still underway to ascertain the extent of the alleged fraud.

“Filing of fake GST returns, that too by misusing the PAN Cards and other credentials of innocent public persons has extremely serious consequences not just on the persons whose particulars have been hacked by the accused persons from different fora, but also has tremendous ramifications on economy of the country,” the Court said.

Considering the pending technical investigation, Kumar's alleged non-cooperation and the requirement of custodial interrogation expressed by the IO, the Court held that it was not a fit case for anticipatory bail.

The Court also noted that Kumar was allegedly involved in three other FIRs concerning financial fraud, including one case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.

“Grant of anticipatory bail in such cases would not just be contrary to the judicially sanctified parameters, but also send wrong signals to the society at large. Therefore, I do not find it a fit case to grant anticipatory bail. The anticipatory bail application is dismissed,” the Court said.

Title: RAJ KUMAR v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 772

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Bail Bond Amount Need Not Be Deposited In Cash For Release Of Accused: Gauhati High Court

Bhavya Singh — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:09:37 GMT

The Gauhati High Court has clarified that the amount mentioned in a bail or surety bond cannot be treated as an amount required to be deposited in cash for securing release on bail.

Justice Budi Habung observed, “it is hereby clarified that the amount specified in a personal/bail bond or surety bond does not mean that a cash deposit is required to be made before the police or the Court merely for securing release on bail. The accused and the surety shall, however, be required to execute the requisite bonds in accordance with law. No authority shall insist upon the deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash merely because such amount is mentioned in the bail order.”

The observation came in an application under Section 483(1)(b) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking modification of the bail conditions imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Daporijo, in a Bail Application. The accused, Anar Ali, had been arrested in a case under Sections 318(2) and 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After filing of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate granted him bail on execution of a bail bond of ₹2 lakh with one local surety for the like amount.

The petitioner submitted that the accused was a mason and daily-wage earner and was unable to furnish the bail bond of ₹2 lakh or arrange a local surety. It was also submitted that since he was a resident of Assam, he could not arrange a local surety in Arunachal Pradesh and that the police authorities were insisting upon deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash. Consequently, despite the order granting bail, he continued to remain in custody.

The Additional Public Prosecutor did not oppose modification of the bail conditions and submitted that similar situations arose in different parts of Arunachal Pradesh. He sought a clarification that the amount mentioned in a bail bond or surety bond should not be treated as an amount required to be deposited in cash before the police or the Court.

The High Court noted that although the accused had been found entitled to bail, he had been unable to avail himself of the benefit of the order because of his inability to furnish the stipulated bail bond and local surety.

The Court said, “Thus, despite having been granted the concession of bail, the accused continues to languish in custody for more than three months. This fact, in itself, indicates that the conditions relating to the bail bond and local surety are excessive and onerous, particularly when the accused has been unable to make arrangements for the same.”

The Court also found the requirement of a local surety to be “excessive and unduly onerous” in the facts and circumstances of the case.

“The mere fact that the accused is a resident of another State cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient ground for insisting upon a local surety, particularly when such a condition has the effect of frustrating the very order granting bail. The purpose of requiring a bond or surety is to secure compliance with the conditions of bail and to ensure the presence of the accused during the investigation and trial. Such a requirement is not intended to impose a condition which is incapable of being complied with,” the Court added.

Accordingly, the Court modified the condition and directed that the accused be released on furnishing a personal bond of ₹50,000 with one surety for the like amount. It further directed that the surety would not be required to be a local resident, subject to verification of identity and solvency in accordance with law.

On the alleged insistence upon deposit of the bail-bond amount in cash, the High Court noted that the Magistrate's order had not specifically directed the accused to deposit the bail amount in cash and only required execution of a bail bond with one local surety.

The Court stated, “It is necessary to clarify that a bail bond constitutes an undertaking or obligation undertaken by the accused in the amount specified in the bond, subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the Court. Mere specification of an amount in a bail bond does not, by itself, require the accused to deposit such amount in cash. Similarly, a surety bond constitutes an undertaking by the surety in respect of the amount specified therein and does not, merely by reason of such specification, require the surety to deposit the said amount in cash.”

The Court directed that upon execution and acceptance of the requisite personal bond and surety bond, the accused be released forthwith unless his detention was required in connection with any other case or proceeding. The remaining conditions imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate were left unaltered.

The order was also directed to be furnished to the concerned Superintendent of Police for information and necessary circulation among the police officers under his command for compliance.

Case Name: Shri Kamin Taloh & Anr. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr.

LL Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Gau) 126

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J&K&L High Court Orders Prosecution Of Former Govt Employee For Using Forged Medical Certificate To Justify 7-Year Absence From Duty

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:00:36 GMT

The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has dismissed a writ petition and ordered the prosecution of a petitioner who produced a forged medical certificate to support his claim for service benefits.

The Court found that the petitioner had incorporated additional sentences in a medical certificate to justify his unauthorized absence from service for nearly seven years, and directed the Registrar Judicial, Srinagar, to file a criminal complaint against him for offences under Sections 336 and 340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The Court was hearing a writ petition filed by a former employee of the J&K State Road Transport Corporation challenging the treatment of his absence period from 21.10.2011 till his joining duties as 'dies non'. The petitioner had been terminated from service in 2006, reinstated by the High Court in 2017, and after an enquiry, his absence period was treated as 'dies non' by the Corporation.

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar, while dismissing the petition, observed,

"Once it has been found that the petitioner has produced a forged certificate before this Court, it would not be permissible for this Court to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of petitioner."

Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Conductor with the J&K State Road Transport Corporation and then terminated in 2006. The petitioner challenged his termination before the Court contending that no enquiry had been conducted and that his absence was occasioned on account of serious ailment. The writ petition was allowed, quashing the termination order and directing reinstatement.

The Court directed that payment of consequential benefits for the period from November 2004 till the decision of the writ petition would depend on the enquiry to be conducted by the respondents.

Pursuant to the directions, the petitioner was reinstated and an enquiry was held. Vide an Order the period of absence from 01.11.2004 till 20.10.2011 was treated as leave of whatever kind due, whereas the period from 21.10.2011 till date of joining was treated as 'dies non'.

The petitioner challenged this order, contending that no enquiry was held and that the treatment of the period as 'dies non' amounted to punishment. The petitioner relied upon a medical certificate issued by the Government Psychiatric Disease Hospital, Srinagar, to show that he was under treatment from 01.11.2004 to 20.10.2011.

The respondent-Corporation challenged the genuineness of the certificate, stating that it had come to their notice that the certificate was forged, which was verified by the hospital. The Court then directed the Deputy Director, Health Services, Kashmir, and Medical Superintendent, Government Psychiatric Diseases Hospital, Srinagar, to file a detailed report regarding the authenticity of the certificate.

Court's Observation:

The Court examined the compliance report filed by the authorities and found that the certificate produced by the petitioner was forged. The Medical Superintendent, Government Psychiatric Diseases Hospital, Srinagar, in his communication admitted that a medical certificate was issued to the petitioner in May 2016. However, the certificate actually issued did not contain the last two sentences that appeared in the certificate annexed as Annexure-D to the writ petition.

The Court observed,

"There is a marked difference between the two certificates, inasmuch as the certificate dated 24.05.2016, which the Medical Superintendent has reproduced in his letter dated 07.10.2023, the last two sentences... which are part of the Medical Certificate annexed as Annexure-D to the writ petition do not find mention."

The Court noted that the certificate issued by the hospital did not mention that the patient was under treatment since 01.11.2004 to 20.10.2011 on OPD basis, nor did it mention that an attested passport size photograph was appended. The Court observed,

"These two sentences, it seems, have been incorporated by the petitioner by preparing another certificate with more or less same language as is mentioned in the actual certificate... It appears that the petitioner, in order to justify his absence from duty from 01.11.2004 to 20.10.2011, has incorporated these sentences in the certificate, which does not find mention in the certificate actually issued."

The Court also noted that the signatories had declared the certificate as not genuine. While it may be correct that the petitioner had been a patient undergoing treatment, he had produced a forged certificate to explain his unauthorized absence.

The Court applied the settled legal position that fraudulent documents cannot form the basis for exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction. The Court relied upon Prestige Lights Ltd v. SBI (2007) 8 SCC 449, wherein the Supreme Court held that a person invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to place all facts without reservation, and if there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts, the High Court would be justified in refusing to entertain the petition.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition and directed the prosecution of the petitioner for having used a forged document to support his claim before the Court.

"While dismissing the writ petition, the petitioner cannot be allowed to go scot-free. There is material on record to prima facie disclose commission of forgery and allied offences. Section 336 of BNS makes an offence of forgery punishable... Section 340 of BNS makes the act of using as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, punishable. Both these offences, prima facie, seem to have been committed by the petitioner, as such, he deserves to be prosecuted in accordance with law.", the court remarked.

The Court directed the Registrar Judicial, Srinagar, to file a complaint against the petitioner before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, for his prosecution in accordance with law.

Case Title: Bashir Ahmad Ganai v. State of J&K and Ors.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 326

Appearances

Petitioner: Mr. I. Sofi, Advocate

Respondents: Mr. Shakir Haqani, Advocate

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 840 | Chandan v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 06:57:54 GMT

Reserved Candidate Selected On Open Merit Can Claim Better Reserved-Category Post Than Reserved Candidate Having Lower Marks: Supreme Court

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Protection In Predicate FIR Doesn't Automatically Extend To PMLA Proceedings: Delhi High Court

Nupur Thapliyal — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 07:09:03 GMT

The Delhi High Court has held that protection granted to an accused in proceedings arising out of a predicate offence does not automatically extend to independent proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). [2026 LiveLaw (Del) 771]

Justice Madhu Jain clarified that the proceedings under PMLA are distinct from those relating to the scheduled or predicate offences and, therefore, any protection granted in the latter cannot, by itself, mean that protection be also given to an accused in proceedings under under the anti-money laundering law.

“The protection granted in the predicate offence operates in the context of the said FIR and cannot, by itself, be construed as extending to the distinct and independent proceedings under the PMLA,” the Court said.

It made the observation while dismissing an anticipatory bail plea filed by a man in a money laundering case registered by the Enforcement Directorate (ED).

The accused argued that he had not been named in the predicate FIRs and that he had already secured protection in proceedings concerning the scheduled offence.

He also contended that the allegations against him were based primarily on statements of co-accused persons and that there was no material showing his conscious involvement in money laundering.

Dismissing the plea, the Court rejected the accused's argument that he was granted interim protection by the Supreme Court in the predicate offence and that in order to comply with the directions, he was required to seek anticipatory bail in the PMLA proceedings as well.

It observed that the accused cannot claim pre-arrest protection in the money laundering proceedings merely on the ground that such protection has been granted to him in the predicate offence.

The Court noted that the material placed on record traced proceeds of crime amounting to approximately Rs.26.18 crores to the accused.

It also took note of the accused's conduct after being summoned by the ED. The Court said that although summons under Section 50 of PMLA were issued to him on May 21, May 22 and May 26, he did not personally appear and instead submitted a written response through counsel.

The Court concluded: “In view of the aforesaid material, this Court finds that the condition required under Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA is not satisfied and the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him.”

It said that the material placed on record, including the accused's conduct, the statements recorded under Section 50 of PMLA, financial trail and analysis of the bank accounts, disclosed sufficient material connecting him with the alleged proceeds of crime.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application. It however clarified that its observations were confined to the consideration of the bail plea and would not affect the merits of the case.

Title: RAM SINGH v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Del) 771

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2026 LiveLaw (SC) 839 | Sujata Kumari & Ors v Rahul Kumar & Anr

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK — Fri, 21 Aug 2026 06:42:59 GMT

Wife Earning No Reason To Reduce Father's Liability To Maintain Children : Supreme Court

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