



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 5478 OF 2024

BETWEEN:

1. SRI. B.Y. VIJAYENDRA,
S/O B.S. YEDEYURAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT NO.381, 6TH CROSS,
80 FEET ROAD,
DOLLARS COLONY,
RMV 2ND STAGE,
BENGALURU NORTH,
RMV EXTENSION II STAGE,
BENGALURU - 94.
2. SRI. PRASHANT MAKANUR,
S/O SRI. REVANASIDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R/AT NO.71, SHIVAKRUPA NILAYA,
GF FLOOR, 2ND MAIN, 2ND STAGE,
NEAR VIJAYANAGAR,
VINAYAKA TEMPLE,
VINAYAKA LAYOUT,
BENGALURU NORTH - 560 040.

...PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. ARUNA SHYAM M, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SUYOG HERELE E, ADVOCATE)





AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH MALLESHWARAM P.S.,
REPRESENTED BY SPP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. FST LEADER, WARD 77,
164-GANDHINAGAR CONSTITUENCY,
OFF AT NO.77,
164-GANDHINAGAR,
BENGALURU CITY,
BENGALURU - 560 009.

...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1;
R2 - SERVED)

THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO
QUASH THE FIR AND COMPLAINT IN CR.NO.60/2024
REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT MALLESHWARAM POLICE
STATION FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 505 AND 153A OF IPC AND
SEC. 125 OF REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1951 AND
1988 PENDING ON THE FILE OF XLII ADDL.C.M.M.,
BENGALURU AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT
THERETO, PRODUCED AS DOCUMENT NO.1 AND 2.

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:



CORAM: **HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA**

ORAL ORDER

The petitioners are before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in crime No.60/2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 505, 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 125 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 & 1998.

2. Heard Sri. Aruna Shyam M., learned Senior counsel for Sri. Suyog Herele E, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri. B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1.

3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 19.04.2024, a Nodal Officer comes across a post, posted on official X (twitter) account of the BJP @BJP4Karnataka handle. The allegation was that the tweet so made was against the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister as well as against Rahul Gandhi. The said statements were alleged to be in relation to certain events. The tweets were said to be of potential risk of inciting disharmony among various caste, race, religion and linguistic groups. Based on this allegation, the



complaint is registered on 19.04.2024 which becomes a crime in crime No.60/2024 for the afore-quoted offences. It is the registration of the crime that has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the tweet is nowhere indicative of the fact that they would incite communal disharmony or hurt the religious feelings of any person. He would submit that the issue in the *lis* stands covered by plethora of judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of ***PATRICIA MUKHIM Vs. STATE OF MEGHALAYA & Ors.*¹**, ***JAVED AHAMAD HAJAM Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & Ors.*²** and ***SHIV PRASAD SEMWAL Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & Ors.*³**

5. Per contra the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would contend that the crime is registered and investigation is yet to take place and the crime that is registered meets its ingredients of both the offences so alleged. He would therefore seek dismissal of the petition.

¹ (2021) 15 SCC 35

² (2024) 4 SCC 156

³ 2024 SCC Online SC 322



6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material available on record.

7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The issue lies in a narrow compass as to whether the complaint so registered would amount to ingredients of Section 505 or 153(A) of the IPC. Therefore, it becomes necessary to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows:

Date: 19/04/2024

To:
SHO
Malleshwaram Police Station
Bengaluru.

From:
FST Leader, Ward - 77
Arjun Ahirwar (Mob: 7415534609)
164, Gandhinagar.

Subject: FIR for statements on official BJP Twitter handle Karnataka announcing to creating divisions and hatred based on religion, communities/language reg.

Today, dated: 19/04/2024 working W-77 in 2nd shift
ರಾಜ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ @ INC Karnataka ದ ಪಾ'ಕೈ'ಸ್ತಾನ್ ಕರ್ಕಾರದಿಂದ ತಾಲಿಬಾನ್ ಮಾಡೆಲ್
ಜಾರಿ.

ಜೈ ಶ್ರೀರಾಮ್ ಎಂದರೆ ಬ್ರದರ್ಸ್‌ಗಳಿಂದ ಹಲ್ಲೆ
ಲ್ ಜಿಹಾದ್‌ಗೆ ಒಪ್ಪದೆ ಇದ್ದರೆ ಬರ್ಬರ ಕೊಲೆ
ಒಡೆಯರ್ ಪರ ನಿಂತರೆ ಕಾರು ಹರಿಸಿ ಕೊಲೆ



ಡ್ರಾಪ್ ಕೊಟ್ಟರೆ ಮತಾಂಧರಿಂದ ಹಿಗ್ಗಾ ಮುಗ್ಗಾ ಥಳಿತ
ಕನ್ನಡ ಮಾತನಾಡಿದರೆ ನಟಿ ಮೇಲೆಯೇ ಹಲ್ಲೆ ಯತ್ನ.

ಚುನಾವಣೆ ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಜಿಹಾದಿ ಮತಾಂಧ ಬ್ರದರ್ಸ್‌ಗಳನ್ನು @
siddaramaiah ಹಾಗೂ ಆ ದಿನಗಳ ಕೊತ್ವಾಲ್ ಶಿಷ್ಯ @ S.K.Shivakumar
ಅವರು ಬಿಡಿಗೇ ಬಿಟ್ಟು ಹಿಂದೂಗಳನ್ನೇ ಟಾರ್ಗೆಟ್ ಮಾಡಿ ಬೆದರಿಸುತ್ತಿದ್ದಾರೆ.

ಕರ್ನಾಟಕವನ್ನು ಮತಾಂಧರ ಗಲಭೆಯ ತೋಟವನ್ನಾಗಿ ಮಾಡಿಸಿ @ Rahul
Gandhi ಅವರು ದ್ವೇಷದ ಅಂಗಡಿ. ಈ ದಿನ ದಿನಾಂಕ: 19/04/2020 ರಂದು ಮದ್ಯಾಹ್ನ
12-31 ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಈ ಮೇಲಿನಂತೆ Tweet ಮಾಡಿರುತ್ತಾರೆ.

Talibani Congress # Congress Fails Karnataka. These
statements issued by the BJP Karnataka amounts to offence
under Section 153A, 505 IPC as they are statements creating
or prompting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes.

This is a violation of MCC Guidelines issued by Elections
of India as contained Page 29 in Manual of the MCC March
2019 Document 21 Edition 1 and Similar othe instructions.

Don't (ii) No Appeal on the basis of caste/communal
feelings of the electors

(iii) No acting which my aggavato existing differences
or create mutual hatred or cause tension between different
castes/communities/religion/linguistic groups, shall be
attempted.

Kindly immediately register the FIR against Shri
B.Y.Vijayendra, the President of the BJP and others as the
statements have been made on the official twitter handle of
the BJP and amount to creating division among people and
communities based on eligion and actions are prejudicial to
maintenance of peace and harmony. The same are also
offences under Sectionof the RP Act 1951.

Please register case and investigate the offence.

Sd/-
FST Leader.



ಸಹಿ/-

125 RP Act ರೀತ್ಯಾ ಪ್ರಕರಣ ದಾಖಲಿಸಿರುತ್ತೆ.

Whether the kind of a complaint or the post on **X** (twitter) account would amount to the ingredients of Section 505 or 153(A) need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court on time to time has considered this very issue and held as follows:

1. In the case of **PATRICIA MUKHIM** (*supra*) has held as follows:

7. The learned counsel for the respondent State argued that the appellant is a renowned journalist and is expected to be more responsible when making public comments. The learned counsel for the State submitted that the comment of the appellant has the tendency of provoking communal disharmony. He submitted that the High Court was right in dismissing the application filed under Section 482CrPC and requested this Court to not interfere as the investigation is in progress.

8. *"It is of utmost importance to keep all speech free in order for the truth to emerge and have a civil society."*—Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a very valuable fundamental right. However, the right is not absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on the right of free speech and expression in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion of enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony is punishable with imprisonment which may



extend to three years or with fine or with both under Section 153-A. As we are called upon to decide whether a prima facie case is made out against the appellant for committing offences under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to reproduce the provisions which are as follows:

"153-A. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.—(1) Whoever—

(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or

(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquility, or

(c) organises any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity, for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Offence committed in place of worship, etc.—

(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in subsection (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or



religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

505. Statements conducing to public mischief.—(1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report—

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

9. Only where the written or spoken words have the tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affecting public tranquility, the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. [*Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab*, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]

10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the piece of writing and the circumstances in which it was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning [*Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra*, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] .

11. In *Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.* [*Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.*, (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094] , this Court analysed the ingredients of Sections 153-A and 505(2)IPC. It was held that Section 153-A covers a case where a person by “words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations”, promotes or attempts to promote feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will. Under Section 505(2)



promotion of such feeling should have been done by making a publication or circulating any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news. Mens rea was held to be a necessary ingredient for the offence under Sections 153-A and 505(2). The common factor of both the sections being promotion of feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious or racial or linguistics or religious groups or castes or communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. It was further held in *Bilal Ahmed Kaloo* [*Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.*, (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094] that merely inciting the feelings of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract any of the two sections. The Court went on to highlight the distinction between the two offences, holding that publication of words or representation is sine qua non under Section 505. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in *Ramesh v. Union of India* [*Ramesh v. Union of India*, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] in which it was held that words used in the alleged criminal speech should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. The standard of an ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law "the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" should be applied.

12. This Court in *Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India* [*Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India*, (2014) 11 SCC 477 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 400] had referred to the Canadian Supreme Court decision in *Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott* [*Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott*, 2013 SCC OnLine Can SC 6 : (2013) 1 SCR 467]. In that judgment, the Canadian Supreme Court set out what it considered to be a workable approach in interpreting "hatred" as is used in legislative provisions prohibiting hate speech. The first test was for the Courts to apply the hate speech prohibition objectively and in so doing, ask whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred. The second test was to restrict interpretation of the legislative term



“hatred” to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words “detestation” and “vilification”. This would filter out and protect speech which might be repugnant and offensive, but does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimisation and rejection that risks causing discrimination or injury. The third test was for the Courts to focus their analysis on the effect of the expression at issue, namely, whether it is likely to expose the targeted person or group to hatred by others. Mere repugnancy of the ideas expressed is insufficient to constitute the crime attracting penalty.

13. In the instant case, applying the principles laid down by this Court as mentioned above, the question that arises for our consideration is whether the Facebook post dated 4-7-2020 was intentionally made for promoting class/community hatred and has the tendency to provoke enmity between two communities. A close scrutiny of the Facebook post would indicate that the agony of the appellant was directed against the apathy shown by the Chief Minister of Meghalaya, the Director General of Police and the Dorbar Shnong of the area in not taking any action against the culprits who attacked the non-tribals youngsters. The appellant referred to the attacks on non-tribals in 1979. At the most, the Facebook post can be understood to highlight the discrimination against non-tribals in the State of Meghalaya. However, the appellant made it clear that criminal elements have no community and immediate action has to be taken against persons who had indulged in the brutal attack on non-tribal youngsters playing basketball. The Facebook post read in its entirety pleads for equality of non-tribals in the State of Meghalaya. In our understanding, there was no intention on the part of the appellant to promote class/community hatred. As there is no attempt made by the appellant to incite people belonging to a community to indulge in any violence, the basic ingredients of the offence under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c) have not been made out. Where allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR is liable to be quashed [*State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .



14. India is a plural and multicultural society. The promise of liberty, enunciated in the Preamble, manifests itself in various provisions which outline each citizen's rights; they include the right to free speech, to travel freely and settle (subject to such reasonable restrictions that may be validly enacted) throughout the length and breadth of India. At times, when in the legitimate exercise of such a right, individuals travel, settle down or carry on a vocation in a place where they find conditions conducive, there may be resentments, especially if such citizens prosper, leading to hostility or possibly violence. In such instances, if the victims voice their discontent, and speak out, especially if the State authorities turn a blind eye, or drag their feet, such voicing of discontent is really a cry for anguish, for justice denied — or delayed. This is exactly what appears to have happened in this case.

15. The attack upon six non-locals, carried out by masked individuals, is not denied by the State; its reporting too is not denied. The State in fact issued a press release. There appears to be no headway in the investigations. The complaint made by the Dorbar Shnong, Lawsohtun that the statement of the appellant would incite communal tension and might instigate a communal conflict in the entire State is only a figment of imagination. The fervent plea made by the appellant for protection of non-tribals living in the State of Meghalaya and for their equality cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be categorised as hate speech. It was a call for justice — for action according to law, which every citizen has a right to expect and articulate. Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be branded as an attempt to promote hatred between different communities. Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot be stifled by implicating them in criminal cases, unless such speech has the tendency to affect public order. The sequitur of above analysis of the Facebook post made by the appellant is that no case is made out against the appellant for an offence under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c)IPC."



2. In the case of **JAVED AHAMAD HAJAM** (*supra*)

has held as follows:

"16. As regards the picture containing "Chand" and below that the words "14th August-Happy Independence Day Pakistan", we are of the view that it will not attract clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC. Every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective Independence Days. If a citizen of India extends good wishes to the citizens of Pakistan on 14th August, which is their Independence Day, there is nothing wrong with it. It is a gesture of goodwill. In such a case, it cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed to the appellant only because he belongs to a particular religion.

17. Now, the time has come to enlighten and educate our police machinery on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on their free speech and expression. They must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution.

18. For the same reasons, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will not be attracted as what is depicted on the WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups as stated therein. Thus, continuation of the prosecution of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 153-AIPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law."

3. In the case of **SHIV PRASAD SEMWAL** (*supra*)

has held as follows:

27. Apparently, the post was aimed at frustrating the proposed foundation stone laying ceremony on the land, of which the complainant claims to be the true owner. The post also imputes that the person who was



planning the foundation stone ceremony was an enemy of mountains and had no concern with the well-being of the mountains.

28. The learned Standing Counsel for the State tried to draw much water from these lines alleging that this portion of the post tends to create a sense of enmity and disharmony amongst people of hill community and the people of plains. However, the interpretation sought to be given to these words is far-fetched and unconvincing. The lines referred to supra only refer to the complainant, imputing that his activities are prejudicial to the hills. These words have no connection whatsoever with a group or groups of people or communities. Hence, the foundational facts essential to constitute the offence under Section 153-AIPC are totally lacking from the allegations as set out in the FIR.

29. In *Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra* [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417], this Court held that for applying Section 153-AIPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential, whereas in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article.

30. The other substantive offence which has been applied by the investigating agency is Section 504IPC. The said offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. There is no such allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence as well.

31. Since we have found that the foundational facts essential for constituting the substantive offences under Sections 153-A and 504IPC are not available from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120-BIPC would also be non est.

32. The complainant has also alleged in the FIR that the accused intended to blackmail him by publishing



the news article in question. However, there is no allegation in the FIR that the accused tried to extract any wrongful gain or valuable security from the complainant on the basis of the mischievous/malicious post.

33. In *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal* [*State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , this Court examined the principles governing the scope of exercise of powers by the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section 482CrPC seeking quashing of criminal proceedings and held as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in



support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

The Apex Court considers identical posts on any of the social media and holds that such posts would not amount to generation of disharmony to any caste, race, religion, they are at best criticism.

8. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed and I pass the following:



ORDER

1. Criminal petition is allowed.
2. FIR registered in crime No.60/2024 against the petitioners at Malleshwaram Police Station, Malleshwaram Sub-Division, Bengaluru City stands quashed.

**Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE**

JY
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 5
CT: BHK