

*** THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND**

THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO

+ C.R.P.Nos.1014 and 1184 of 2024

COMMON ORDER:

% Dated 19.08.2025

Between:

K.Bala Vishnu Raju

Petitioner

AND

Emaar Hills Township Private Limited and Others

Respondents

! Counsel for the appellant: Sri T. Surya Satish, learned counsel
representing Sri Raghavan K. Thalapaka.

^ Counsel for the respondent Nos.1 & 3: Sri Rajvinder Ahluwalia,
learned counsel representing
Sri Shireen Sethna Baria.

< GIST :

> HEAD NOTE :

? Cases referred :

1. (2019) 4 ALT 13
2. 2025 Supreme (Online) (TEL) 8599
3. (2010) 8 SCC 329
4. 2019(2)ALD 671
5. 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7342
6. (2021) SCC OnLine Del 3946
7. (2024) 4 SCC 1
8. (2025) 2 SCC 147
9. AIR 2022 Guj 132
10. AIR 2006 Ker 206
11. 2025 INSC 975

**THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
C.R.P.Nos.1014 and 1184 of 2024**

Sri T. Surya Satish, learned counsel representing Sri Raghavan K. Thalapaka, learned counsel for the petitioner.

Sri Rajvinder Ahluwalia, learned counsel representing Sri Shireen Sethna Baria, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 & 3

COMMON ORDER: *(per Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)*

1. The present Civil Revision Petitions arise out of two orders - both dated 22.11.2023 passed by the learned Commercial Court at Hyderabad, allowing I.A.Nos.324 and 130 of 2023 in C.O.P.No.89 of 2022. The two I.As were filed by the respondent Nos.1 and 3 for deletion of their names from the array of parties in the Commercial Original Petition (C.O.P) filed by the petitioner herein.

2. C.O.P.No.89 of 2022 was filed by the petitioner herein under section 9 (1)(ii)(a, b, c, d & e) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act), *inter alia*, for restraining the respondent No.2 from alienating or creating third-party interest in the schedule property pending arbitration and directing the respondent Nos.1

and 3 not to execute any sale deed in favour of the respondent No.2. The respondent Nos.1 and 3 filed I.A.Nos.324 and 130 of 2023, respectively, under Order I Rule 10(2) of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for deletion of their names from the array of the parties in the C.O.P. The Commercial Court, by the impugned orders, allowed the said applications. The petitioner filed the present Civil Revision Petitions aggrieved by the impugned orders.

3. Emaar Hills Township Private Limited (respondent No.3 in C.R.P.No.1014 of 2024 and respondent No.1 in C.R.P.No.1184 of 2024) was the respondent No.2 in the C.O.P. and the applicant in I.A.No.130 of 2023.

4. Emaar India Limited (respondent No.1 in C.R.P.No.1014 of 2024 and respondent No.3 in C.R.P.No.1184 of 2024) was the respondent No.3 in the C.O.P. and applicant in I.A.No.324 of 2023.

5. The Commercial Court found that neither Emaar Hills nor Emaar India were parties to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 24.11.2008 which was executed between the petitioner and the respondent No.2 (Ambati Murali Krishna) and hence, not bound by the said Arbitration Agreement. The

Commercial Court accordingly allowed both applications ordering deletion of Emaar Hills and Emaar India from the array of parties in the C.O.P.No.89 of 2022.

6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and for the respondent Nos.1 and 3 (Emaar Hills and Emaar India).

7. The petitioner filed I.A.No.1 of 2025 for substituted service on the respondent No.2 by way of paper publication since the respondent No.2 could not be served by courier/speed post. The said application was allowed by this Court on 09.04.2025. The proceeding sheet dated 28.04.2025 records that the petitioner took out paper publications in two newspapers on 15.04.2025. The respondent No.2 was however not represented despite substituted service. The respondent No.2 remained un-represented since then as recorded in the proceeding sheet dated 01.07.2025.

8. The facts leading to the filing of the C.O.P (section 9 petition) are briefly stated.

9. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) (Now TGIIC) issued Government Order No.359 dated 04.09.2002 approving the proposal to set up an Integrated mixed-use Township Project on 531 Acres of land in Manikonda, Gachibowli and Nanakramguda of Ranga Reddy District, in favour of Emaar Properties PJSC. Emaar Hills Township Private Limited, one of three Special Purpose Vehicles, was incorporated by Emaar PJSC and APIIC for the development of the Integrated Township Project. APIIC conveyed the land in favour of Emaar Hills Township Private Limited by a registered Deed of Conveyance dated 28.12.2005. Emaar MGF (now Emaar India) was incorporated by the Emaar Group for developing the land. Emaar Hills and Emaar MGF took over the Project in December, 2005. Subsequently, Emaar Hills and Emaar MGF entered into a Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney on 25.07.2007 for developing the Project.

10. The respondent No.2 applied for allotment of a plot in 2008 located in the area earmarked for construction of Villas. On 20.08.2008, Emaar Hills and Emaar India allotted the plot to the respondent No.2 for a total consideration of Rs.55,65,000/- of

which 95% amounting to Rs.52,86,750/- was to be paid before execution of the Agreement of Sale and the balance 5% amounting to Rs.2,78,250/- was to be paid prior to the execution of the Sale Deed. Since the respondent No.2 did not have the funds at the relevant point of time, the respondent No.2 approached the petitioner to pay the consideration money on a proposal to share the built-up area with the petitioner upon construction over the plot in a 50:50 ratio. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed between the petitioner and the respondent No.2 on 24.11.2008, Clause 11 of which contained an Arbitration Agreement under the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act.

11. The petitioner arranged the part consideration of Rs.52,86,750/- on 27.11.2008 in terms of the MOU dated 24.11.2008, in favour of Emaar India, from the account of M/s. Avika Projects Private Limited, belonging to the petitioner. The amount was paid through Banker's Cheques in favour of Emaar India. Emaar Hills and Emaar India acknowledged receipt of the part consideration money on 01.12.2008.

12. Emaar Hills and Emaar India thereafter executed a registered Agreement of Sale dated 30.03.2009 in favour of the respondent No.2 in respect of plot bearing No.B-3 for a total consideration of Rs.55,65,000/- acknowledging the receipt of the amount of Rs.52,86,750/- i.e., 95% of the consideration money paid by the petitioner through the two Banker's Cheques. The respondent No.2 thereafter handed over the original documents relating to Plot No.B-3 to the petitioner which was duly acknowledged by the latter. Subsequently, the petitioner was asked to hand over the original documents in a case filed by the CBI against Emaar Hills and Emaar India. The petitioner issued a Legal Notice to the respondent No.2 on 20.06.2022 calling upon the latter not to create any third-party rights over the subject plot. The petitioner filed the C.O.P. before the Commercial Court under section 9 (1)(ii) (a, b, c, d & e) of the 1996 Act for interim injunction on 12.09.2022. Emaar Hills and Emaar India filed two I.As in the C.O.P. for deletion of their names from the array of parties. The I.As were allowed by the impugned orders dated 22.11.2023.

13. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 3 objects to the maintainability of the Civil Revision Petitions.

14. According to counsel, the present CRPs are not maintainable in view of the bar contained in section 8 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (2015 Act). Counsel submits that the petitioner should have filed appeals under section 13 (1A) of the 2015 Act instead of filing Civil Revision Petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

15. We first answer the issue of maintainability.

16. Section 13(1A) of the 2015 Act provides for an appeal from a judgment/order of a Commercial Court at the level of a District Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction or from a Commercial Division of a High Court to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court. The proviso to section 13(1A) clarifies that such appeals are limited to orders passed by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court, which are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC is not included in the orders enumerated in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC. Therefore, we are also of the view that the present

Civil Revision Petitions are maintainable against the impugned orders dated 22.11.2023.

17. Further, although the bar in section 8 of the 2015 Act prohibits the Court from entertaining a Civil Revision Application or Petition against any interlocutory order of a Commercial Court, it is now substantially settled that this prohibition would not extend to CRPs filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

18. In *M.V. Ramana Rao Vs. N. Subash*¹, a Division Bench decision of this Court dealt with the maintainability of a Revision Petition against an interlocutory order of the Commercial Court in respect of section 8 of the 2015 Act. The petitioner (plaintiff) in that case had filed a Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Commercial Court allowing the application of the respondent Under Order VI Rule 17 of the C.P.C for amendment of the written statement. The Court drew a distinction between the power of revision under section 115 of the C.P.C and the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and held that the power of judicial review available

¹ (2019) 4 ALT 13

under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution cannot be curtailed by section 8 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court, however, cautioned that the High Court should exercise its power under Article 227 only in suitable cases. *M.V. Ramana Rao* (supra) was followed by this Court in *M/s.NCC Limited, formerly Nagarjuna Constructions Co., Ltd. Vs. National Institute of Technology*², where the Court also relied on *Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil*³ to hold that the power of interference exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution should be restricted to instances of patent perversity, gross or manifest failure of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice.

19. It should also be noted that a ‘Civil Revision Petition’ under Article 227 of the Constitution is not equivalent to a Revision Petition under section 115 of the C.P.C. The mere nomenclature of ‘Civil Revision Petition’ for petitions filed under Article 227 would, hence, not subject them to the statutory bar imposed by section 8 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015: *Blue Cube Germany Assets GmbH and Co. KG Vs. Vivimed Labs Limited*⁴. The limits of the

² 2025 Supreme (Online) (TEL) 8599

³ (2010) 8 SCC 329

⁴ 2019(2)ALD 671

power of superintendence under Article 227 was also noticed by the Division Benches of the Delhi High Court in *C.P. Rama Rao Vs. National Highways Authority of India*⁵ and in *Black Diamond Trackparts Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Black Diamond Motors Pvt. Ltd.*⁶. In *Black Diamond*, the Delhi High Court reiterated that the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be circumvented by section 8 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

20. Therefore, on the pure question of maintainability, we have no doubt that the present Civil Revision Petitions cannot be barred solely on the basis of section 8 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

21. Whether the impugned orders fall foul of the benchmark of perversity or resulted in grave miscarriage of justice is a matter which warrants separate consideration. We propose to discuss that issue in the later part of this order.

22. We now look at the merits of the dispute brought to the Court. The question which we have been called upon to answer is

⁵ 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7342

⁶ (2021) SCC OnLine Del 3946

whether the respondent Nos.1 and 3, whose names were deleted from the array of parties in the C.O.P.No.89 of 2022 filed by the petitioner under section 9 of the 1996 Act, can sustain their defence of not being signatories to the MOU dated 24.11.2008 between the petitioner and the respondent No.2 (Ambati Murali Krishna).

23. The undisputed facts have already been stated above. The facts which are material for assessing the involvement of the respondent No.1/Emaar Hills and the respondent No.3/Emaar India (formerly Emaar MGP Land Limited) are required to be reiterated below:

- (i) The Emaar Group incorporated Emaar Hills as a Special Project Vehicle for development of an Integrated Township in Manikonda, Gachibowli and Nanakramguda of Ranga Reddy District in favour of Emaar Properties PJSC.
- (ii) APIIC (TGIIC) conveyed the Project land in favour of Emaar Hills vide Conveyance Deed dated 28.12.2005.

- (iii) Emaar Hills and Emaar MGF (now Emaar India) entered into a Development Agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney on 25.07.2007 for developing the Project.
- (iv) A part of the Project land situated in Manikonda was earmarked for construction of villas by Emaar Hills and Emaar MGF.
- (v) Plot No.B-3 was allotted by Emaar Hills and Emaar India to the respondent No.2 for a total consideration of Rs.55,65,000/-.
- (vi) The petitioner arranged for 95% of the total consideration amount i.e., Rs.52,86,750/- through Banker's Cheques on 27.11.2008 in favour of Emaar India since the respondent No.2 was not in a position to pay the consideration amount.
- (vii) Emaar Hills and Emaar India acknowledged the receipt of 95% of the total consideration on 01.12.2008.
- (viii) On 30.03.2009, Emaar Hills and Emaar India executed and registered an 'Agreement to Sell' in favour of the

respondent No.2 in respect of the plot No.B-3 mentioning the amount paid by the petitioner under the two Banker's Cheques.

(ix) The Agreement dated 30.03.2009 records that 95% of the total consideration amount (Rs.52,86,750/-) was paid by the respondent No.2 for allotment of plot No.B-3 *vide* cheque Nos.072972 and 072969, both dated 27.11.2008.

(x) The cheque numbers mentioned in the Agreement correspond with the cheque numbers reflected in the Acknowledgment Receipt dated 01.12.2008 given by the respondent No.1/Emaar Hills to the respondent No.2. These same cheque numbers are also reflected in the payment made by the petitioner to Emaar MGF (now Emaar India/the respondent No.3) through Axis Bank, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad.

24. The above facts would show that the respondent Nos.1 and 3 have an undeniable interest in the subject matter of the dispute, namely, the petitioner's claim on the respondent No.2 for

preserving the subject plot. It may be reiterated that the petitioner and the respondent No.2 had entered into an MOU dated 24.11.2008 for payment of 95% of the total consideration by the petitioner to the respondent No.2 and for sharing of the total built-up area in a 50:50 ratio after construction on the plot. The Arbitration Agreement was contained in the said MOU.

25. The petitioner's claim arose out of the MOU executed between the petitioner and the respondent No.2 under which the petitioner made payment of 95% of the total consideration amount on the understanding of sharing interest in the property. In essence, the respondent Nos.1 and 3 were the recipients of the consideration amount paid by the petitioner on behalf of the respondent No.2.

26. The petitioner's COP.No.89 of 2022 filed under section 9 of 1996 Act stemmed from the MOU dated 24.11.2008, containing the arbitration clause. The petitioner sought a restraint on the respondent No.2 from creating third party interests in the subject plot and a direction on the respondent Nos.1 and 3 not to execute any sale deed in favour of the respondent No.2. The petitioner's

apprehension was that the respondent Nos.1 and 3 would collect the balance 5% of the consideration money from the respondent No.2 and execute the Sale Deed in favour of the latter. The petitioner has admittedly paid 95% of the total sale consideration i.e., Rs.52,86,750/- to the respondent No.3 on behalf of the respondent No.2.

27. The involvement of the respondent Nos.1 and 3 hence begs the question as to whether the said respondents can feign ignorance and avoid accountability with respect to the underlying Arbitration Agreement between the petitioner and the respondent No.2?

28. Section 9 of the 1996 Act, confers plenary powers on a Court in ordering interim measures of protection as may appear just and convenient to the Court (section 9(1)(ii)(e)). The bouquet of protections available to a party, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time, after the making of the Arbitral Award (but before enforcement thereof) includes preservation of property, interim injunction, interim custody on sale of goods forming subject matter of Arbitration Agreement and appointment of a

Receiver (section 9(1)(ii)(a) and (d)). The broad-spectrum reliefs which are available to a party would be evident from the open-ended nature of the interim protective measures which a Court is empowered to grant depending on the urgency of the facts brought before it. The only *caveat* is that the application must be made by a ‘party’ as defined under section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act; that is ‘a party to an Arbitration Agreement’.

29. It is significant that section 9(1) of the 1996 Act does not limit the interim measure passed by the Court only to a ‘party’ (to an arbitration agreement) but leaves the target-respondent open and unspecified. In other words, the power to grant interim relief is subject to a party – applicant but is party-indifferent with regard to the intended respondent. There are no fetters on the Court in pulling in non-parties who are strangers to an Arbitration Agreement within the zone of protective measures.

30. A Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in *Cox and Kings Limited Vs. SAP India Private Limited*⁷ effectively did away with the party : non-party dichotomy within the definition of a ‘party’ under

⁷ (2024) 4 SCC 1

section 2(1)(h) read with section 7 of the 1996 Act to include both signatories as well as non-signatories as parties to an arbitration agreement. In the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found the conduct of the non-signatory party to be a necessary indicator of its consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement.

31. *Cox and Kings* (supra) was recently followed by the Supreme Court in *Ajay Madhusudan Patel Vs. Jyotrindra S.Patel*⁸. The involvement of the non-signatory party (the SRG Group) was evaluated in that case to ascertain whether the non-signatory party intended/consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement through their acts. The Supreme Court found that there were several email exchanges which showed the implied consent of the SRG Group to be bound by the underlying contract/arbitration agreement. However, the Supreme Court held that the contested questions of facts should be examined by the Arbitral Tribunal which was the competent forum in that respect. *Cox and Kings* and *Ajay Madhusudan Patel* converged on the need to gauge the conduct/participation of the non-signatory party in the underlying

⁸ (2025) 2 SCC 147

arbitration agreement as would be reflected from the attending facts.

32. *Vijay Arvind Jariwala Vs. Umang Jatin Gandhi*⁹ held that a stranger to the arbitration agreement does not have *locus standi* to invoke the provisions of the 1996 Act which does not present any conflict with the facts of the present case since the petitioner herein is a party to the MOU dated 24.11.2008. *Shone Sanil Vs. Coastal Foundations (P) Ltd.*¹⁰ does not come to the aid of the respondent as the Kerala High Court opined that an application under section 9 of the 1996 Act can be directed against any person claiming under a party to the arbitration agreement.

33. In a recent decision pronounced on 13.08.2025 in *Kamal Gupta Vs. M/s. L.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd.*¹¹, the Supreme Court considered whether it is permissible for a non-signatory to an agreement to remain present in the arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court opined that permitting a stranger to an arbitration to remain present and observe the said proceeding would be in breach of section 42A of the 1996 Act. Section 42A, inserted w.e.f.

⁹ AIR 2022 Guj 132

¹⁰ AIR 2006 Ker 206

¹¹ 2025 INSC 975

30.08.2019, stipulates confidentiality of all arbitral proceedings except for the award where its disclosure is necessary for the purpose of implementation and enforcement. *Kamal Gupta* (supra) is not relevant for the present Civil Revision Petitions since the question before the Supreme Court in that case was entirely different.

34. Turning our gaze to the present facts, there is no dispute that the respondent Nos.1 and 3 are vitally-connected to the subject matter of the dispute having taken on the responsibility of developing the Project. The respondent Nos.1 and 3 have also accepted 95% of the consideration money from the petitioner. The respondent Nos.1 and 3 have, however, succeeded in divorcing themselves from the very transaction which facilitated payment of 95% of the consideration amount to the said respondents.

35. Hence, the act of walling themselves in from the reach of the arbitration agreement is at statutory odds with section 9 of the 1996 Act as well as the expansive definition given to an arbitration agreement in *Cox and Kings*. In essence, the respondent Nos.1 and 3 are indivisibly-connected to the arbitration agreement having

partaken of the benefit flowing therefrom in terms of receiving 95% of the consideration for the allotted plot in the Project.

36. Therefore, the facts cannot be simplified only to the claim being restricted to the petitioner and the respondent No.2, as signatories to the arbitration agreement. After all, the dispute is not only with regard to recovery of money by the petitioner from the respondent No.2 but also for protecting the petitioner's right to the property which was within the undisputed domain of the respondent Nos.1 and 3.

37. Thus, the facts satisfy the requirements of *Cox and Kings* (supra) by a mile and more in terms of the conduct of the respondent Nos.1 and 3 who are intimately-connected to the dispute. The requirement of a written arbitration agreement between the petitioner and the respondent Nos.1 and 3, as understood under section 7 of the 1996 Act, would not dilute the petitioner's rights to claim reliefs against the respondent Nos.1 and 3 in an application under section 9 of the said Act. Giving a rigid interpretation to a written arbitration agreement under section 7 of

the 1996 Act would irrevocably diminish the efficacy of section 9 of the Act.

38. Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. permits the Court to strike out or add parties at any stage of the suit either on or without such application being made by a party as would appear necessary to the Court. The Court equally has the power to join a person, whether as plaintiff or defendant, where the Court deems it necessary for such joinder of parties on the justification of their presence enabling to completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.

39. In the present case, the respondent Nos.1 and 3 applied for striking out of their names under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. on the sole ground of their being strangers to the arbitration agreement/MOU dated 24.11.2008. We have stated our reasons in the foregoing paragraphs for holding such conduct to be inconsistent with the intent and purpose of non-signatory accountability which is intended to be preserved in a proceeding under section 9 of the 1996 Act.

40. The law has pushed the boundaries to pull in non-signatories to the arbitration agreement where the conduct of such parties reflects their intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The test is of the non-signatory having a live and proximate connection to the arbitration agreement so much so that the requirement of signing on the dotted line of a written arbitration agreement becomes irrelevant. In essence, the non-signatory cannot unburden itself from the obligations arising out of the arbitration agreement on the pretext of not being a party to it if there is evidence of an intimate connection between the non-party and the arbitration agreement. The enlarged canvas which the law now emphasises cannot be shrunk to 'parties' in the outdated sense.

41. We are hence constrained to disagree with the reason given by the Commercial Court for allowing deletion of the respondent Nos.1 and 3 from the array of parties in the C.O.P.No.89 of 2022. The extent of involvement of the said respondents would show that they are not only proper but necessary parties to the dispute. In fact, the presence of the respondent Nos.1 and 3 would, on all counts, be essential for the Court to decide on the merits of the

section 9 application for preservation of the subject plot; not only against the signatory/respondent No.2 but also the non-signatories/respondent Nos.1 and 3 to the arbitration agreement.

42. The ease with which the respondent Nos.1 and 3 were struck out from the array of parties warrants interference since the petitioner would be consigned to a pointless contest if the respondent No.2 remains the solitary respondent. The possibility of the respondent Nos.1 and 3 alienating the land in favour of third parties or to the respondent No.2 cannot be ruled out, whereby the petitioner's claim in the subject property would be entirely frustrated.

43. Section 9(1) of the 1996 Act and Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC are enabling provisions for the Court to reach the logical and correct outcome of the dispute and to preserve the subject matter of the dispute till the outcome is reached. The Court cannot permit important players to sneak across the boundary-line and disappear from the field before conclusion of the match. The Court, as the umpire, must ensure that all the players remain in the contest till declaration of the winner.

44. We accordingly have no hesitation to hold that the Commercial Court erred in passing the impugned orders by deleting the respondent Nos.1 and 3 from the array of parties in COP.No.89 of 2022. The impugned orders dated 22.11.2023 passed in I.A.No.130 of 2023 and I.A.No.324 of 2023 in COP.No.89 of 2022 are hence set aside. The error in the reason assigned is contrary to the recent decisions pronounced by the Supreme Court on the inclusive nature of arbitration agreements in respect of non-parties. Hence, we are also of the view that the CRPs are maintainable against the impugned orders.

45. CRP.Nos.1014 and 1184 of 2024 are accordingly allowed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.

MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J

B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO, J

19th August, 2025.

Note: Mark L.R. Copy.
(B/o. VA/BMS)

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