



**IN THE COURT OF THE XLIX ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS
JUDGE [SPECIAL COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF NIA CASES].
(CCH-50) BENGALURU**

Dated this 08th day of April, 2025.

PRESENT:

SRI GANGADHARA C.M.,
B.Com., LL.B.,
XLIX Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge,
[Special Judge for the trial of NIA Cases],
(CCH-50) Bengaluru.

Spl.C.No.1150/2024

Complainant : The National Investigation Agency, Bengaluru

(By : Learned Spl. Public Prosecutor)

VS.

Accused : Mr. M D Sulaiman @ Minaj and others

Accused No.3 : Mr. Md. Shahbaz @ Zulfikar @ Guddu, Aged about 26 years, S/o Late Md. Sabir Hussain, R/o H.No.50, Purani Basti, Panchi Mohalla, Near Gulminar Masjid, Jugsalai, Jamshedpur, Jharkhand – 831 006.

Accused No.4 : Mr. Shayan Rehman @ Hussain, Aged about 27 years, S/o Ataur Rehman, R/o No.39 B, Pocket-3, Mayur Vihar-1, Chilla Saroda Khadar, East Delhi, Delhi – 110091.

Accused No.8 : Mr. Muzamil M.D., Aged about 27 years, S/o Md. Ismail, R/o Door No.9, Ward No.17, II Cross, S N Pet (Sathya Narayana Pet) Bellari. Permanent Address : D.No.98, Ward No.11, Bangar Street, Kolmi Chowk, Bellari – 583101.

(By : Sri C.R.P., Advocate)

ORDERS

Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 have filed an application under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. seeking bail in this case.

2. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 have briefly stated the facts of the case and specifically pleaded that the complainant police have filed a charge-sheet before this Court against them for offences punishable under Sections 120B and 153A of the IPC, Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, and Sections 13(1)(b) and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 'U.A.(P) Act'). They are innocent and have been falsely implicated in this case. They were arrested on 18.12.2023, and the grounds of their arrest in writing were not supplied to them at the time of arrest. Therefore, they are entitled to bail according to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254**. The alleged offences are not applicable in the given set of facts and circumstances. The necessary ingredients required to establish the offence under the Act are absent from the charge-sheet. The allegations made by the so-called witnesses are vague, indefinite, and flippant. The delays at all levels in the case cast serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution's case. The prosecution has built its case by picking up stray materials, which have also been taken out of context to make them appear incriminating. The allegations leveled in the charge-sheet are not substantiated by any strong evidence. They have further pleaded that they are ready and willing to abide by any conditions that may be imposed by this Court and are also ready to furnish surety to

the satisfaction of this Court. Hence, they have prayed that the application be allowed.

3. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has opposed the bail application by filing his objections. He has briefly stated the facts of the case and specifically contended that accused No. 1 is the mastermind of the case. Accused No. 3 is one of the key members of the group headed by accused No. 1. He, along with other co-accused persons, hatched a criminal conspiracy to recruit 50 Mujahideens in each district of India by 2025 for the purpose of waging jihad against the Government of India, its functionaries, including the police, army, judiciary, and specific religious organizations. This was intended to threaten the unity, integrity, security, and sovereignty of India by using firearms, weapons, and explosives with the objective of causing loss of life and property, and to strike terror in specific sections of the population in order to establish a Caliphate system in India. The Investigating Officer has collected both oral and documentary evidence to substantiate the allegations made against them. These materials clearly indicate that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations against accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 are prima facie true, and Section 43D(5) of the U.A.(P) Act bars granting bail to them. The Hon'ble Apex Court delivered its judgment in *Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2024) 8 SCC 254, on 15.05.2024, and the principles laid down in *Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and others*, pertaining to the aspect of informing arrested persons of the grounds for their arrest in writing, must also be applied to cases registered under the provisions of the U.A.(P) Act. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 were arrested on

18.12.2023 and produced before the Court. Since the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court was delivered on 15.05.2024, the contention of accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 that the judgment would have retrospective operation lacks merit and finds no basis in law. He has further contended that if bail is granted to accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8, they are likely to tamper with the prosecution's evidence or influence prosecution witnesses, which would impede the prosecution's case. Hence, he has prayed that the application be rejected.

4. This Court has heard the arguments of the learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8, and the learned counsel representing the learned Special Public Prosecutor.

5. The points that arise for the Court's consideration are as follows:

1. **Whether accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 have made out sufficient grounds to exercise discretion under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. and grant them regular bail?**
2. **What order?**

6. The findings of this Court on the above points are as follows:

Point No.1 : In the affirmative;

Point No.2 : As per final order, for the following:

REASONS

7. **Point No. 1:** It is the case of the prosecution that the Central Government received credible information that many radicalized individuals aligned with ISIS ideology were operating

on Telegram groups from Ballari, Mumbai, and Jamshedpur. These individuals were disseminating ISIS propaganda, radicalizing, and recruiting youth into a Jamaat (organization) inspired by ISIS, and they had hatched a conspiracy to use these young recruits for committing violent terror attacks in India. In addition to the Telegram groups, key members were also managing their own local offline groups. In Ballari, accused No. 1 was the main operator and was suspected to be in contact with foreign-based handlers for carrying out violent jihad in India. Accused No. 1 and his associates were planning to create a Jamaat to establish Sharia rule in India. He had already devised a roadmap and was circulating it to motivate and recruit young people. He planned to recruit 50 Mujahideen in every district by 2025 to fight to overthrow the democratically elected government and establish Islamic rule in India. The module was in the process of procuring chemicals and making explosives. The group had conducted a trial blast at ITI ground, Ballari, Karnataka. Anas Iqbal Shaikh (accused No. 2) from Mumbai was a key member of several ISIS-aligned Telegram groups and channels and was one of the administrators of a radical Telegram group. Shahbaz @ Zulfikar (accused No. 3) from Jamshedpur was the main operator of the group in Jamshedpur. He had also formed a local offline group with his associates, and they were in the process of procuring explosive materials, pistols, and grenades for conducting violent terror attacks in India. He had also pledged funds for radicalization and committing these attacks. These radicalized individuals were disseminating ISIS propaganda to recruit and incite young people to commit violent jihad for the

establishment of Sharia rule in India. They were raising funds and collecting weapons and explosives to carry out terror attacks in various places, including Karnataka.

8. Based on this information, the Central Government directed the NIA to register a case and take up the investigation. Accordingly, the NIA registered a case in RC-03/2023/NIA/BLR and took up the case for investigation.

9. During the investigation, searches were conducted at the houses of the accused, and many incriminating documents, materials, cash, sharp-edged weapons, explosive raw materials, explosives, and digital devices were seized. The Investigating Officer also seized several handwritten notes from the house of accused No. 1, Md. Sulaiman @ Minaj. Subsequently, the accused were arrested and produced before the Court.

10. Further, the Investigating Officer recorded the voluntary statements of the accused, downloaded data from their social media accounts, recorded the statements of witnesses, sent the digital devices to the FSL for data retrieval, sent the seized explosive substances to the FSL for examination, collected reports from the FSL, and gathered other evidence. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a charge sheet to this Court. At this stage, accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 have filed this application seeking the relief of regular bail.

11. Although accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 have pleaded in their application that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated, and that the prosecution has failed to produce any

materials before this Court to substantiate the charges against them, the learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 did not raise these grounds during the arguments. Furthermore, the records indicate that the Investigating Officer has gathered sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations against accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8, and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against them are prima facie true. Since the learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 did not address these grounds during the arguments, this Court has refrained from discussing in detail the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer.

12. The learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 strongly argued that they were arrested on 18.12.2023 and the grounds of arrest were not provided to them immediately after their arrest. According to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the grounds of arrest must be communicated to the arrestee in writing; failure to do so entitles the accused to immediate bail.

13. To support his argument, the learned counsel relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and others (2024) 7 SCC 576**. In this case, the Hon'ble Court observed in paragraphs 38, 39, and 45:

"38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be

meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 of the Act of 2002 enables the person arrested under Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that unless the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a person would not be entitled to grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the Court must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the public prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be essential for the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which the authorized officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis for the officer's 'reason to believe' that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of 2002. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/she would be in a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there are grounds to believe that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail. Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19 of the Act of 2002, is meant to serve this higher purpose and must be given due importance.

39. We may also note that the language of Section 19 of the Act of 2002 puts it beyond doubt that the authorized officer has to record in writing the reasons for forming the belief that the person proposed to be arrested is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of 2002. Section 19(2) requires the authorized officer to forward a copy of the arrest order along with the material in his possession, referred to in Section 19(1), to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. Though it is not necessary for the arrested person to be supplied with all the material that is forwarded to the Adjudicating Authority under Section 19(2), he/she has a constitutional and statutory right to be 'informed' of the grounds of arrest, which are compulsorily recorded in writing by the authorized officer in keeping with the mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. As already noted hereinbefore, it seems that the mode of informing this to the persons arrested is left to the option of the ED's authorized officers in different parts of the country, i.e., to either furnish such grounds of arrest in writing or to

allow such grounds to be read by the arrested person or be read over and explained to such person.

* * * * *

“45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar Qureshi (supra) and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra), which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is that the ED’s Investigating Officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As this form of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, we have no hesitation in holding that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. Further, as already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of the ED in proceeding against the appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately after they secured interim protection in relation to the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of the ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. The learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4 and 8 has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in **Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254**. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court made the following observations in paragraphs 16 to 19, 21, and 48:

“16. Upon a careful perusal of the statutory provisions (reproduced supra), we find that there is no significant difference in the language employed in Section 19(1) of the PMLA and Section 43B(1) of the UAPA which can persuade us to take a view

that the interpretation of the phrase 'inform him of the grounds for such arrest' made by this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) should not be applied to an accused arrested under the provisions of the UAPA.

17. We find that the provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the PMLA. The contention advanced by learned ASG that there are some variations in the overall provisions contained in Section 19 of the PMLA and Section 43A and 43B of the UAPA would not have any impact on the statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest because as stated above, the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both the statutes. As a matter of fact, both the provisions find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Hence, applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied.

18. We may note that the modified application of Section 167 CrPC is also common to both the statutes. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the interpretation of statutory mandate laid down by this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) on the aspect of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest in writing has to be applied pari passu to a person arrested in a case registered under the provisions of the UAPA.

19. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that any person arrested for allegation of commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at the earliest. The purpose of informing to the arrested person the grounds of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as, this information would be the only effective means for the arrested person to consult his

Advocate; oppose the police custody remand and to seek bail. Any other interpretation would tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

* * * * *

21. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused.

* * * * *

48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in the phrase 'reasons for arrest' and 'grounds of arrest'. The 'reasons for arrest' as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the 'grounds of arrest' would be required to contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the 'grounds of arrest' would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with the 'reasons of arrest' which are general in nature."

(emphasis supplied)

15. The learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vihaan**

Kumar vs. State of Haryana and another (2025 SC OnLine SC 269), Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 13320/2024, decided on 07.02.2025. In this decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court held the following in paragraph 21:

“21. Therefore, we conclude:

- a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);
- b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;
- c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);
- d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the same time, filing of charge sheet will not validate a breach of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);
- e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has been made; and
- f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory

restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.”

16. In these decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that an arrested person has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception at the earliest. Any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Keeping with these principles in mind, this Court proceeds to examine the contention raised by accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8.

17. The records reveal that accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 were arrested on 18.12.2023 and subsequently produced before this Court. There is no material on record indicating that the grounds of arrest were provided to accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 in writing immediately after their arrest. Even the learned counsel representing the learned Special Public Prosecutor fairly admitted that the grounds of arrest were not served on accused Nos. 3, 4 and 8 in writing at the time of their arrest.

18. However, the learned counsel representing the learned Special Public Prosecutor contended that the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered its judgment in Prabir Purkayastha’s case on 15.05.2024. Therefore, according to him, the ratio laid down in that decision would be applicable prospectively, i.e., from 15.05.2024 onwards. Given that accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 were

arrested on 18.12.2023, the ratio in Prabir Purkayastha's case, according to this argument, would not apply to them.

19. In support of his contention, the learned counsel representing the learned Public Prosecutor has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Kailash Chand Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (2002) 6 SCC 562**. In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 40 that "when the Court finds or lays down the correct law in the process of which the prevalent understanding of the law undergoes a change, the Court, on considerations of justice and fairness, restricts the operation of the newly-found law to the future, so that its impact does not fall on past transactions." There is no dispute regarding the ratio laid down in this judgment, and the argument made by the learned counsel representing the learned Special Public Prosecutor is noted.

20. However, it is important to highlight that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pankaj Bansal's case had already laid down the law that the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court further clarified that any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. In *Prabir Purkayastha's* case, the Hon'ble Apex Court subsequently reiterated this interpretation, specifically clarifying that the statutory mandate established in Pankaj Bansal applies *pari passu* to individuals arrested under the provisions of the U.A.(P) Act. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the ratio laid down in *Prabir*

Purkayastha's case would apply prospectively, i.e., from 15.05.2024 onwards.

21. In this regard, the learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in **Thokchom Shyamjai Singh and Others vs. Union of India, through Home Secretary and Others (2025 SCC OnLine Del 980)**. A similar issue was raised before the Hon'ble High Court, specifically whether the constitutional mandate of serving grounds of arrest in writing to an arrestee under the U.A.(P) Act comes into effect from the date of the Supreme Court verdict in Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India or Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi). The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that the constitutional mandate for serving grounds of arrest in writing comes into effect from the date of judgment in Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India (i.e., from 03.10.2023). Given that the constitutional Court has interpreted the law in this manner, this Court is bound by the same view and cannot take a contrary position. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that the constitutional mandate of serving grounds of arrest in writing under the U.A.(P) Act comes into effect from the date of the verdict in Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India.

22. Furthermore, the learned counsel for accused Nos. 3, 4 and 8 has also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in *Sri Darshan vs. The State of Karnataka*, Criminal Petition No. 11096/2024 C/W Criminal Petition Nos. 11176/2024, 11180/2024, 11212/2024, 11282/2024, 11735/2024, and 12912/2024. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka has clearly held that the service of the memo of grounds of arrest on the

arrestee immediately after arrest is a mandatory requirement for all offenses committed post 03.10.2023. In the present case, as noted above, accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 were arrested on 18.12.2023, and the grounds of arrest in writing were not furnished to them immediately after their arrest. Therefore, the failure to provide the grounds of arrest renders them entitled to bail on this ground.

23. It is significant to note that accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 are involved in anti-national activities. They conspired to recruit 50 Mujahideens in each district of India by 2025, with the intent of waging jihad against the Government of India and its institutions, including the police, army, judiciary, and specific religious organizations. Their goal was to threaten the unity, integrity, security, and sovereignty of India by using firearms, weapons, explosives, and other means to cause loss of life and property, thereby striking terror into specific sections of the population in India. All of this was aimed at establishing a Caliphate system in India. To further their conspiracy, they collected weapons, explosive substances, and even conducted a trial blast. Given these serious charges, it is both just and necessary to impose stringent conditions on accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8, as their release on bail is based solely on technical grounds, namely the failure to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing. In light of the above, **this Court has answered Point No. 1 in the affirmative.**

24. Point No.2 :- In view of the discussions made supra, this Court proceeds to pass the following:

ORDER

The bail application filed by accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8, under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., is hereby allowed, and they are enlarged on bail subject to the following:

CONDITIONS

1. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 2,00,000/- each, with two local sureties for the like sum.
2. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall appear before the court regularly.
3. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall not threaten the prosecution witnesses or tamper with the prosecution evidence in any manner.
4. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall not indulge in any criminal activities in the future.
5. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall not leave the Bengaluru jurisdiction until the conclusion of the trial, without prior permission from this Court.
6. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall submit their residential addresses and phone numbers to this Court as well as to the Superintendent of Police, NIA, Bengaluru.
7. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall not use any other mobile numbers except the mobile number provided to this Court and the Superintendent of Police, NIA, Bengaluru, until the conclusion of the case.
8. Accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 shall mark their attendance at the NIA Office, Bengaluru, on alternate days between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., until the conclusion of the trial.
9. The Superintendent of Police, NIA, is directed to maintain a register to record the attendance of accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 at the NIA Office, Bengaluru.

- 10. If accused Nos. 3, 4, and 8 fail to comply with any of the conditions, the prosecution is at liberty to file an application for the cancellation of bail.**

(Dictated to the Senior Sheristedar, transcription thereof computerized by him, corrected, and then pronounced by me in open Court on **08th day of April, 2025**)

(GANGADHARA C.M.),
XLIX Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge,
(Special Judge for trial of NIA Cases),
(CCH-50) Bengaluru.