



2024/KER/32242
'CR'

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIJU ABRAHAM

FRIDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF APRIL 2024 / 30TH CHAITHRA, 1946

WP(C) NO. 26234 OF 2023

PETITIONERS:

- 1 R. ASOKAN,
AGED 70 YEARS,
S/O. RAGHAVAN P.O., DIVYA BHAVAN, HIGH SCHOOL
JUNCTION, ADOOR, PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN - 691523
- 2 MANOJ KUMAR,
AGED 57 YEARS,
S/O. GOPALAN NAIR K., KANNOLA HOUSE KODIMATHA,
NATTAKOM P.O., KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686013
- 3 LEKHA REGHUNATHAN,
AGED 50 YEARS,
W/O. REGHUNATHAN, MAMBLATHU, 2B, REGENCY SQUARE,
COLLECTORATE P.O., KOTTAYAM -686002., PIN -
686002
- 4 MAYA THAMPAN,
AGED 59 YEARS,
D/O. PADMAVATHY , THAYPARAMBIL HOUSE, KODIMATHA,
NATTAKOM P.O., KOTTAYAM - 686013, PIN - 686013
BY ADVS.
P.A.MOHAMMED SHAH
RENOY VINCENT
SHAHIR SHOWKATH ALI
CHELSON CHEMBARATHY
ABEE SHEJIRIK FASLA N.K
MUHAMED JUNAID V.
ADITH KRISHNAN.U.
FATHIMA AFEEDA P.

RESPONDENTS:

- 1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695 001., PIN -
695001
- 2 DISTRICT COLLECTOR
COLLECTORATE, KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686001
- 3 THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER
KOTTAYAM, COLLECTORATE, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN -
686013
- 4 TAHSILDAR
KOTTAYAM TALUK OFFICE, KOTTAYAM-, PIN - 686001



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2

- 5 VILLAGE OFFICER
NATTAKOM VILLAGE, KOTTAYAM, PIN - 686013
- 6 VILLAGE OFFICER
PANACHIKKADU VILLAGE, KOTTAYAM- 686533., PIN -
686533

OTHER PRESENT:

SPL.GP - N.SUDHADEVI

THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 19.04.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:



'CR'

VIJU ABRAHAM, J

W.P. (C) .No.26234 of 2023
-----Dated this the 19th day of April, 2024**JUDGMENT**

The above writ petition is filed seeking to declare that the action on the part of the respondents in acquiring the properties of the petitioner for the 'Kottayam Corridor Project' without following due process of law and without payment of compensation amount is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the fundamental rights and constitutional rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Articles 14,19,21 and 300A of the constitution of India and for other consequential reliefs.

2. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows: Petitioners are absolute owners in possession and enjoyment of different extents of land in Nattakam and



Panachikkadu Village in Kottayam District, as is evident from Exts.P1 to P4. The 1st respondent formulated a project by the name 'Kottayam Development Corridor' as part of a larger proposal for the development and expansion of the town. The 1st respondent after realizing that such project would require full co-operation and voluntary surrender by the land owners, called for a meeting on 08.10.2011 and on the basis of the promises and assurances given by the respondents that their demand for conversion of the remaining extent of land after the surrender, would be accepted, the petitioners granted permission for effecting construction in their property and surrendered the following extent of property:

Petitioners	Total extent of land (ares)	Surrendered extent of land (ares)	Survey No.
Petitioner No.1	33.53	10.27	232/3-3
Petitioner No.1	44.94	6.12	233/1-5
Petitioner No.2	63.55	31.21	231/3-6, 3-5, 3-7
Petitioner No.2	29.12	17.46	231/3-3
Petitioner No.3	122.80	42.79	234/3
Petitioner No.4	96.75	32.47	2/1



By Ext.P5 minutes of the meeting which was attended by the Minister and the other officials wherein it was reiterated that the land owners surrendering the lands will be permitted to convert an equal extent of their remaining lands and that exemption will be granted for effecting changes in the BTR records to enable change in the zoning for carrying out the project. While so, Ext.P6 order was issued by the 1st respondent stating that those land owners who have surrendered their whole extent of land will be allotted with Government land to an extent of 50% of the total surrendered land and such of the land owners who have surrendered a portion of their holdings will be allowed to convert paddy land (excluding wetland) to an extent of 50% of the land which they have surrendered to State Government. Petitioners submit that a conjoint reading of Exts.P5 and P6 would clearly denote that respondent No.1 reneged on its initial promise to the landowners and instead of allowing them to



convert an equal extent of the surrendered property for construction, the new order stipulated that the landowners including the petitioners herein would only be allowed to convert 50% of the surrendered land for construction purposes. Despite the unilateral modification, petitioners decided not to raise any objection against Ext.P6. Even thereafter, no action was taken from the side of the 1st respondent. Consequently, one of the affected landowners approached this Court by filing WP(C) No.33882/2015, which was disposed of as per Ext.P7 judgment directing the Government to implement Ext.P6 order. Even after a direction was issued as per Ext.P7, no steps were taken to implement the same and the petitioners therein were constrained to approach this Court by filing CCC No.2135/2016. While contempt of court proceeding was pending, the 1st respondent issued Ext.P8 order holding that change of character of remaining lands of persons who have surrendered portions of their lands for



road widening cannot be permitted as the same will be in violation of the provisions of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008. It was further ordered as per Ext P8 that the second condition which stipulates that persons who have surrendered the land will be provided with alternate land having an extent of 50% of the surrendered land is not feasible since there are no sufficient lands available for giving such alternate land and that it may also lead to arbitrary exercise of Government Largesse and thereupon decided that the land owners who have surrendered land for 'Kottayam Corridor' project will be compensated for the extent of land that they have actually surrendered at the rate of market value prevalent at the time of surrendering of their land and land value will be fixed as per the provisions under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as LARR Act 2013). Though



petitioners 2,3 and 4 have filed WPC No. 33117/2019 along with some other aggrieved persons seeking implementation of Ext.P6, later they decided not to press for the reliefs sought for in the said writ petition and as per Ext.P10 order, they were deleted from the party array. Petitioners submit that action on the part of the respondents in taking over possession of their property without taking recourse to acquisition proceedings or following due process of law is arbitrary and violative of the constitutional rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution. In the said circumstances, the petitioners have approached this Court.

3. A detailed statement has been filed by the 1st respondent wherein it is admitted that the petitioners have handed over lands for the Kottayam Corridor Project based on the G.O. (Rt)No.5925/2015/RD dated 13/11/2015, on condition that those who handover land for the Kottayam



Corridor Project will be allowed to reclaim paddy land (except wetland) equal to 50% of the extent of land handed over to Government and those who handover their whole extent of land will be given land equal to 50% of the land transferred to Government but as per the G.O.(Rt.)4064/2018/RD dated 04.10.2018, the benefit earlier granted was cancelled and those persons who handed over land for Kottayam Corridor Project will be compensated for the exact extent of land they have actually surrendered at the rate of Market Value which was prevalent at the time of surrendering of their land by fixing land value as per LARR Act, 2013. It is also stated that in the case of the petitioners who have surrendered large extents of their land for the Kottayam Corridor Project, the benefit of G.O.(Rt.)4064/2018/RD dated 04/10/2018 will be made applicable and that those persons who handed over land to Kottayam Corridor Project would be compensated for the exact extent of land they have actually surrendered at the rate of



Market Value which was prevalent at the time of surrendering of their land by fixing land value as per LARR Act, 2013 and the same will be done on the basis of negotiation or on payment the value of land at the time of taking possession of the land for the project.

4. I have considered the rival contentions on both sides.

5. Admittedly, petitioners surrendered their land as early as in 2015 only on an assurance given, as evident from Ext.P5 that they would be permitted to convert equal extent of land that they have surrendered. Thereafter, the Government retracted from their promise and imposed a further condition as per Ext.P6. Even Ext.P6 was modified by the Government by Ext.P8 order wherein they have given away all the promises given to the petitioners and ordered that the land will be acquired as per the provisions of LARR Act, 2013 fixing the land value as on the date of surrender. Whether the above stand taken by the Government in



Ext P8 is in accordance with law and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the 1st respondent should initiate proceedings as per the LARR Act 2013 and pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the said Act is the issue involved in this case.

6. Though the right to property was initially a fundamental right guaranteed as per the Constitution of India, by the 44th Constitution Amendment Act, the said right is no longer a fundamental right but it is still a constitutional right and a part of human right. The Apex Court in **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Chennai, (2005) 7 SCC 627** has held that in view of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, the State in exercise of power of 'eminent domain' may interfere with the right of the property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation, therefore, must be paid. The Apex Court in **N.Padmamma v. S.Ramakrishna Reddy**, reported in



(2008) 15 SCC 517 held as follows:

"21. If a right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed. (See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627] .) The principle laid down in the said decision, having regard to the concept of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India may be held to have some application in a case of this nature."

7. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, the State cannot deprive a citizen without the sanction of law. The facts of the present case reveal that the land was taken over from the petitioners without paying any compensation solely based on the undertaking given to the petitioners regarding certain benefits to be extended to the petitioners as is evident from Ext P5 and P6, the Government has even retracted from the said promises and the present stand taken as per Ext P8



order and as per the counter affidavit is that they will be granted compensation as per LARR Act 2013 at the rate of market value which was prevalent at the time of surrendering of their land. From 2015 onwards, the land is in possession of the Government and the same has been utilized for the 'Kottayam Corridor Project' without even paying any compensation till this date. In the said backdrop, the question to be considered is as to whether the stand taken by the Government that the petitioner will be paid compensation based on the value of the land as on the date of the surrender of the property is legally sustainable or not.

8. The Apex Court in **K. Krishna Reddy & Ors. v. The Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, (1988) 4 SCC 163** considered the difficulty caused to the citizen in case of delayed payment of compensation and held in paragraph 12 as follows:

"12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and need



of claimants to get compensation here and now. No matter what it is. The lands were acquired as far back in 1977. One decade has already passed. Now the remand means another round of litigation. There would be further delay in getting the compensation. After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charms and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw. They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no other work. They may even face starvation unless rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost importance that the award should be made without delay. The enhanced compensation must be determined without loss of time. The appellate power of remand, at any rate ought not to be exercised lightly. It shall not be resorted to unless the award is wholly unintelligible. It shall not be exercised unless there is total lack of evidence. If remand is imperative, and if the claim for enhanced compensation is tenable, it would be proper for



the appellate court to do modest best to mitigate hardships. The appellate court may direct some interim payment to claimants subject to adjustment in the eventual award."

(underline supplied)

Taking into consideration the fact that the property was taken over almost a decade back without giving a single penny towards compensation, the decision now taken to acquire the land fixing the land value as on the date of taking possession will cause serious hardships to the petitioners. I am of the opinion that the same will not be adequate compensation in view of the fact that petitioners will not be able to purchase now even a small extent of land which the petitioners could have purchased had the compensation amount been given at the time of taking possession itself. Therefore, the decision to pay compensation based on the land value as on the date of taking possession, which was almost a decade back, is absolutely arbitrary and unjust as observed by the Apex Court in **K. Krishna Reddy &**



Ors case cited supra.

9. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the impact of acquiring the land without sanction of law and without paying due compensation in **D.B.Basnett(D) through L.Rs. v. The Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and Others (2020)4 SCC 572** and held that the Government should either retain the land by issuing a proper notification as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or surrender possession of the land to the petitioners therein. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said judgment reads as follows:

"19. The result of the aforesaid would be that the respondents have failed to establish that they had acquired the land in accordance with law and paid due compensation. The appellant would, thus, be entitled to the possession of the land as also damages for illegal use and occupation of the same by the respondents, at least, for a period of three (3) years prior to the notice having been served upon them. We are strengthened in our observations on account of the judgment of this Court in LAO v. M. Ramakrishna Reddy [LAO v. M. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2011) 11 SCC 648 :



(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 633] , wherein it was held that the owner can be entitled to damages for wrongful use and possession of land in respect of which no notification is issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, from the date of possession till the date such notification is finally published.

20. We are conscious that the land is being used by the respondent State through Respondent 2 Department. That, however, does not give such a licence to the State Government. We had endeavoured to refer the matter for mediation, to find an amicable solution, but that did not fructify. We, however, would like to give some time to the respondent State to analyse the consequences of this judgment, and, in case they so desire, to acquire the land through a proper notification under the said Act, and to take proper recourse in law so as to enable them to keep the land. We grant three (3) months' time from the date of the judgment for the respondent State to make up their mind as to what they want to do. Would they still like to retain the land by issuing a proper notification, or would they like to surrender possession of the land. In either eventuality, the question of payment for use and occupation would still arise, which will have to be determined in accordance with law. Mesne profits would be determined by a Court Commissioner, to be



appointed by the trial court, as a relief in that behalf has been sought in the plaint itself."

(underline supplied)

The Apex Court in **Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. v. M.I.D.C and Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353** while considering a case where the property was taken over without following the procedure prescribed, explained the legal position as follows:

8. The appellants were deprived of their immovable property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution was still intact and the right to property was a part of fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right, taking possession of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in accordance with the "law", as the said word has specifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Such deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by way of executive fiat or order or administration caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 : AIR 1995 SC 142] , it has been held as follows : (SCC p. 627, para 48)



"48. In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There [is] no deprivation without [due] sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation."

9. The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to shelter and employment, etc. Now however, human rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. The right to property is considered very much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide *Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram* [(2007) 10 SCC 448] , *Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab* [(2010) 10 SCC 43 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 29] , *State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan* [(2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989] , *State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar* [(2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769 : AIR 2012 SC 559] and *Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.* [(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673 : AIR 2012 SC 573])

10. In the case at hand, there has been no



acquisition. The question that emerges for consideration is whether, in a democratic body polity, which is supposedly governed by the rule of law, the State should be allowed to deprive a citizen of his property, without adhering to the law. The matter would have been different had the State pleaded that it has right, title and interest over the said land. It however, concedes to the right, title and interest of the appellants over such land and pleads the doctrine of delay and laches as grounds for the dismissal of the petition/appeal.

17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development.



18. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a fact situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law.

19. The appellants have been seriously discriminated against qua other persons, whose land was also acquired. Some of them were given the benefits of acquisition, including compensation in the year 1966. This kind of discrimination not only breeds corruption, but also disrespect for governance, as it leads to frustration and to a certain extent, forces persons to take the law into their own hands. The findings of the High Court, that requisite records were not available, or that the appellants approached the authorities at a belated stage are contrary to the evidence available on record and thus, cannot be accepted and excused as it remains a slur on the system of governance and justice alike, and an anathema to the doctrine of equality, which is the soul of our Constitution. Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition proceedings at the



earliest, and to make payment of requisite compensation. The appeals, etc. are required to be decided expeditiously, for the sole reason that, if a person is not paid compensation in time, he will be unable to purchase any land or other immovable property, for the amount of compensation that is likely to be paid to him at a belated stage.

(underline supplied)

The Apex Court after discussing the above said legal principles in **Tukaram Kana Joshi's** case cited supra issued the following directions:

22. Be that as it may, ultimately, good sense prevailed, and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State came forward with a welcome suggestion stating that in order to redress the grievances of the appellants, the respondent authorities would notify the land in dispute under Section 4 of the Act within a period of 4 weeks from today. Section 6 declaration will be issued within a period of one week thereafter. As the appellants have full notice and information with respect to the proceedings, publication in the newspapers either of the notification or of the declaration under the Act are dispensed with. Notice under Section 9 of the Act will be served within a period of 4 weeks after the publication of Section 6 declaration and award will



be made within a period of three months thereafter.
The deemed acquisition proceedings would thus be
concluded most expeditiously. Needless to say, the
market value of the land in dispute will be assessed
as it prevails on the date on which the Section 4
notification is published in the Official Gazette.
Payment of compensation/award amount will be made to
the claimants/persons interested immediately
thereafter, along with all statutory benefits. The
appellants shall be entitled to pursue the statutory
remedies available to them for further enhancement
of compensation, if so desired.

(underline supplied)

10. In **State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Asit Das & Ors, (MAT 207 of 2018)** a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, in a factually similar situation where no land acquisition proceedings were initiated for utilizing the land of the writ petitioners therein and no compensation amount was paid, upheld the order passed by the learned single judge directing the Land Acquisition Collector to initiate the land acquisition proceedings as per the provisions of the Act, 2013 and to pay compensation to them for the acquired



land.

11. The Apex Court in **Tukaram Kana Joshi's** case cited supra while directing the authorities to take further proceedings for the acquisition of the land as per the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act categorically held that the market value of the land in dispute will be assessed as prevailing on the date on which Section 4 notification is published in the official gazette. The Apex Court in **Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 553** has held that the High Court while examining the land owner's challenge to the acquisition of land in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution should not adopt a pedantic approach, but decide the matter keeping in view the constitutional goals of social and economic justice and the fact that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, the same continues to be an important constitutional right and in terms of Article 300-A, no person can be deprived of his property



except by authority of law.

12. Yet another aspect to be considered is that in the matter of taking over the property of a citizen, the authorities are bound to follow the procedure established by law. When the authorities are given power under the LARR Act 2013 to acquire the land, they are bound to follow the procedures prescribed therein, if not, the taking over of the property becomes arbitrary. It is settled law as per the judgments in **Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch.D. 426, Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, 1936 SCC Online PC 41, Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and Others, (1999) 8 SCC 266, Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2015)13 SCC 722** and a catena of judgments of the Apex Court that where a power is given to do certain things in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In the present case none of the procedures have been followed before the land was taken over.

13. In view of the above, the stand of the



Government that the fixation of the land value will be on the value as prevailing on the date of the original surrender of land cannot be accepted. When the land of the petitioners was surrendered on a promise given by the Government regarding certain benefits as evident from Exts.P5 and P6 without giving any compensation towards the acquisition and later the Government retracted from the said promise and utilized the land for the project without paying any amount to the petitioners for almost a decade, I am of the view that the Government is bound to proceed for the acquisition of land as per the provisions of the LARR Act 2013 for determining adequate compensation due to the petitioners, if not, the Government will be playing fraud on the citizens.

Therefore, the above writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondents to grant compensation for the land taken over from the petitioners by initiating proceedings as per the provisions under the Right to Fair Compensation



and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the value of the land will be assessed as it prevailed on the date on which Section 4 notification is published in the Official Gazette. On the basis of the same, the award will be passed in accordance with law, at any rate within an outer limit of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment and thereafter, the compensation amount/award amount shall be paid to the claimants/petitioners along with all statutory benefits within a further period of one month. Since the property has already been taken over and a road has been formed long back, it is made clear that the proceedings now directed to be initiated by this court as per the provisions of the LARR Act 2013 including issuance of Section 4 notification for the purpose of ascertaining the land value as on the date of the said notification and the passing of the award are intended only for fixing adequate compensation to be paid to the



petitioners and therefore it is made clear that the proceedings shall be treated as deemed acquisition proceedings and only steps provided as per the LARR Act 2013 that are required for fixation of adequate compensation alone need be initiated by the respondents. The petitioners will be entitled to pursue the statutory remedies available to them for further enhancement of compensation, if so desired.

sd/-

**VIJU ABRAHAM,
JUDGE**

pm

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 26234/2023

PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS

Exhibit-P1	THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED TO THE 1ST PETITIONER DATED 16.06.2023
Exhibit-P2	THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED TO THE 2ND PETITIONER DATED 07.06.2023
Exhibit-P3	THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED TO THE 3RD PETITIONER DATED 08.06.2023
Exhibit-P4	THE TRUE COPY OF THE TAX RECEIPT ISSUED TO THE 4TH PETITIONER DATED 04.04.2023
Exhibit-P5	THE TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD ON 25.07.2015 DATED 05.08.2015
Exhibit-P6	THE TRUE COPY OF GOVERNMENT ORDER NO.5925/15 REVENUE ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 DATED 13.11.2015
Exhibit -P7	THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT PASSED IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 33882/2015 DATED 09.08.2016
Exhibit-P 8	THE TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER (RT) NO.4064/18/RP ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 DATED 04.10.2018
Exhibit -P9	THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WRIT PETITION NO.35722/2018 DATED 12.11.2018
Exhibit-P 10	THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.33117/2019 DATED 31.07.2023
Exhibit-P 11	THE TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES FROM THE MASTER PLAN FOR KOTTAYAM